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Centralized or decentralized? A principal agent game of network formation

Fu, Jing, Page, Frank and Zigrand, Jean-Pierre ORCID: 0000-0002-7784-4231 (2023) Centralized or decentralized? A principal agent game of network formation. In: Proceedings of the 2023 IEEE Ninth International Conference on Big Data Computing Service and Applications: BigDataService 2023. IEEE International Conference on Big Data Computing Service and Applications (BigDataService). IEEE, 153 - 154. ISBN 9798350335347

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Identification Number: 10.1109/BigDataService58306.2023.00031

Abstract

We construct a model of a principal-agent game of network formation (over layered networks) with asymmetric information, which is called delegated networking and we show, under relatively mild conditions on our game-theoretic model of network formation, that strategic network formation with incomplete information, implemented via a mechanism and centralized reporting, is equivalent to implementation via delegated networking with monitoring. One potential application lies in the computation of optimal resolution of the incentive compatibility problem associated with decentralized data storage via blockchain networks.

Item Type: Book Section
Official URL: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome/1808984/al...
Additional Information: © 2023 IEEE
Divisions: Systemic Risk Centre
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Date Deposited: 23 May 2024 14:18
Last Modified: 19 Jul 2024 17:30
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/123598

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