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On a class of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with single-peaked utility functions

Ingalagavi, Chinmay and Sadhukhan, Soumyarup (2023) On a class of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with single-peaked utility functions. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 109. ISSN 0304-4068

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102912

Abstract

We consider the problem of constructing strategy-proof rules that choose sets of alternatives based on the preferences of voters, modelled as Social Choice Correspondences (SCCs) in the literature. We focus on two domain restrictions inspired by Barberà et al. (2001) in the context of single-peaked utility functions. We find that for the narrower domain, the set of tops-only, unanimous, and strategy-proof SCCs coincides with the class of unions of two min–max rules (Moulin, 1980). For the broader domain, the set of SCCs coincides with the class of unions of two ‘adjacent’ min–max rules, meaning the corresponding parameters for the two rules must be either the same or consecutive alternatives.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/journal-of-m...
Additional Information: © 2023 Elsevier B.V.
Divisions: Mathematics
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Date Deposited: 14 May 2024 14:21
Last Modified: 12 Jun 2024 01:48
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/123436

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