Introduction

Bradley, Richard ORCID: 0000-0003-2184-7844 and Thoma, Johanna ORCID: 0000-0002-1364-4521 (2024) Introduction. Economics and Philosophy, 40 (2). p. 468. ISSN 0266-2671

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Abstract

As readers of this journal can attest to, although philosophers and economists are somewhat used to talking to and learning from each other, it tends to be the subset of philosophers working in decision theory, philosophy of science, and particular areas of ethics and political philosophy that contribute to our interdisciplinary field of research. The book that is the subject of this review symposium, Anna Mahtani’s The Objects of Credence (Oxford University Press, 2024), is a wonderful exemplar of what can be learned when a different branch of philosophy is brought to bear on central questions in this field. Both philosophers and economists talk about and work with credences, or degrees of belief, all the time. These are usually modelled as probabilities, which are in turn usually thought of as attaching to propositions. But it has long been argued by philosophers of language that propositions cannot be the objects of credence. Mahtani’s book is an investigation into all that begins to unravel once we accept this insight. The results have profound implications both for rational choice modelling and for welfare economics.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/economics-...
Additional Information:	© 2024 The Author(s)
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Date Deposited:	22 Apr 2024 10:39
Last Modified:	15 Nov 2024 06:18
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/122708

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