Optimal sin taxation and market power

O'Connell, Martin and Smith, Kate ORCID: 0000-0003-3229-0439 (2024) Optimal sin taxation and market power. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. ISSN 1945-7782 (In Press)

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Abstract

We study how market power impacts the efficiency and redistributive properties of sin taxation, with an empirical application to sugar-sweetened beverage taxation. We estimate an equilibrium model of the UK drinks market, which we embed in a tax design framework to solve for optimal sugar-sweetened beverage tax policy. Positive price-cost margins for drinks create inefficiencies that lower the optimal rate compared with a perfectly competitive setting. Since profits mainly accrue to the rich, this is partially mitigated under social preferences for equity. Overall, ignoring market power when setting tax policy leads to welfare gains 40% below those at the optimum.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.202...
Additional Information:	© 2024 American Economic Association
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D62 - Externalities H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Date Deposited:	11 Mar 2024 10:21
Last Modified:	24 Apr 2024 10:27
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/122263

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