Political parties in constitutional theory

Khaitan, Tarun ORCID: 0000-0003-3661-4832 (2024) Political parties in constitutional theory. In: Ginsburg, Tom, Huq, Aziz and Khaitan, Tarun, (eds.) The Entrenchment of Democracy: The Comparative Constitutional Design of Elections, Parties and Voting. Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 63 - 99. ISBN 9781009447737

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Abstract

In this chapter, I first argue that the key function that parties perform, when functioning as they ought to function, is to facilitate a mutually responsive relationship between public policy and popular opinion by acting as an intermediary between a state and its people. They perform this intermediary function in a unique manner, because of their bi-directionality and their plenary character. When they perform this function effectively, political parties significantly reduce four key information and transaction costs that would otherwise make democratic governance impossible: political participation costs, voters’ information costs, policy packaging costs, and ally prediction costs. I further identify four normative principles in relation to political parties: viz, the purposive autonomy principle, the party system optimality principle, the party-state separation principle, and the ‘anti-faction principle. These political principles are drawn from the value of democracy itself. As such, they should – alongside other relevant political and constitutional norms – inform fundamental constitutional design choices.

Item Type:	Book Section
Additional Information:	© 2024 Cambridge University Press & Assessment
Divisions:	Law
Subjects:	K Law > K Law (General) J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Date Deposited:	12 Feb 2024 16:39
Last Modified:	20 Dec 2024 00:20
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/122002

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