Besley, Timothy and Case, Anne (1995) Incumbent behavior: vote seeking, tax setting and yardstick competition. American Economic Review, 85 (1). pp. 25-45. ISSN 0002-8282
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
This paper develops a model of the political economy of tax-setting in a multijurisdictional world, where voters' choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously. Voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems. This forces incumbents into a (yardstick)competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing. We provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using U.S. state data from 1960 to 1988. The results are encouraging to the view that vote-seeking and tax-setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php |
| Additional Information: | © 1995 American Economic Association |
| Divisions: | LSE |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H20 - General H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations > H71 - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue |
| Date Deposited: | 27 Apr 2007 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Sep 2023 12:15 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/1220 |
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