Bank bailouts, international linkages and cooperation

Niepmann, Friederike and Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim (2010) Bank bailouts, international linkages and cooperation. CEP Discussion Papers (CEPDP1023). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK.

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Abstract

Financial institutions are increasingly linked internationally. As a result, financial crisis and government intervention have stronger effects beyond borders. We provide a model of international contagion allowing for bank bailouts. While a social planner trades off tax distortions, liquidation losses and intra- and intercountry income inequality, in the noncooperative game between governments there are inefficiencies due to externalities, no burden sharing and free-riding. We show that, in absence of cooperation, stronger interbank linkages make government interests diverge, whereas cross-border asset holdings tend to align them. We analyze different forms of cooperation and their effects on global and national welfare.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/discussion...
Additional Information:	© 2010 The Author(s)
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F36 - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration F - International Economics > F4 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance > F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
Date Deposited:	26 Feb 2024 14:24
Last Modified:	11 Sep 2025 05:16
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/121902

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