Powers that be? Political alignment, government formation, and government stability

Carozzi, Felipe ORCID: 0000-0002-0458-5531, Cipullo, Davide and Repetto, Luca (2024) Powers that be? Political alignment, government formation, and government stability. Journal of Public Economics, 230. ISSN 0047-2727

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Abstract

We study how partisan alignment across levels of government affects coalition formation and government stability using a regression discontinuity design and a large dataset of Spanish municipal elections. We document a positive effect of alignment on both government formation and stability. Alignment increases the probability that the most-voted party appoints the mayor and decreases the probability that the government is unseated during the term. Aligned parties also obtain sizeable electoral gains in the next elections. We show that these findings are not the consequence of favoritism in the allocation of transfers towards aligned governments.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/journal-of-p...
Additional Information:	© 2023 The Authors
Divisions:	Geography & Environment
Subjects:	J Political Science > JZ International relations J Political Science
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H20 - General H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations > H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Date Deposited:	31 Oct 2023 12:24
Last Modified:	22 Mar 2024 00:06
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/120574

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