Can parliamentary sanctions strengthen local political accountability? Evidence from Kenya

Mbate, Michael (2023) Can parliamentary sanctions strengthen local political accountability? Evidence from Kenya. In: Faguet, Jean-Paul and Pal, Sarmistha, (eds.) Decentralised Governance: Crafting Effective Democracies Around the World. LSE Press, London, UK, 209 - 231. ISBN 9781909890848

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Abstract

This chapter uses administrative data from Kenya that directly matches parliamentary sanctions with incidences of corruption at the subnational level to demonstrate how party politics can impede the legislative oversight of local politicians. The results show that co-partisanship between parliamentarians serving in oversight committees and local politicians in Kenya tended to weaken oversight because of collusive behaviour and the need to preserve party credibility. However, this effect seems to decline substantially when committee members face an electoral threat and are motivated by career concerns. These findings suggest that the structure and composition of national legislative committees and the nature of political incentives faced by the legislature can influence local accountability outcomes.

Item Type:	Book Section
Official URL:	https://press.lse.ac.uk/site/books/e/10.31389/lsep...
Additional Information:	© 2023 The Author
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General) J Political Science > JC Political theory
Date Deposited:	10 Oct 2023 14:03
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 18:10
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/120423

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