Causal explanation and revealed preferences

Vredenburgh, Kate ORCID: 0000-0001-5721-5609 (2023) Causal explanation and revealed preferences. Philosophy of Science, 91 (2). 269 - 287. ISSN 0270-8647

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Abstract

This article tackles the objection that revealed preferences cannot causally explain. I mount a causal explanatory defense by drawing out three conditions under which such preferences can explain well, using an example of a successful explanation employing behavioral preferences. When behavioral preferences are multiple realizable, they can causally explain behavior well. Behavioral preferences also explain when agential preferences cannot be analytically separated from the environment that produces the relevant behavior (Condition 2) and when the environment is a significant causal factor (Condition 3). Thus, there are not causal explanatory grounds to completely bar revealed preference explanations from social science.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2023 The Author
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited:	05 Oct 2023 11:03
Last Modified:	01 Nov 2024 05:43
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/120366

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