AI and bureaucratic discretion

Vredenburgh, Kate ORCID: 0000-0001-5721-5609 (2023) AI and bureaucratic discretion. Inquiry. ISSN 0020-174X

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Abstract

Algorithmic decision-making has the potential to radically reshape policy-making and policy implementation. Many of the moral examinations of AI in government take AI to be a neutral epistemic tool or the value-driven analogue of a policymaker. In this paper, I argue that AI systems in public administration are often better analogised to a street-level bureaucrat. Doing so opens up a host of questions about the moral dispositions of such AI systems. I argue that AI systems in public administration often act as indifferent bureaucrats, and that this can introduce a problematic homogeneity in the moral dispositions in administrative agencies.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2023 The Author
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited:	25 Sep 2023 10:57
Last Modified:	18 Nov 2024 19:42
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/120271

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