Corporate governance rules and the value of control - a study of German dual-class shares

Hoffmann-Burchardi, Ulrike (1999) Corporate governance rules and the value of control - a study of German dual-class shares. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (315). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

The paper uses a dataset of German dual-class shares during 1988-1997 to study the relationship between corporate governance rules and the price differential between voting and non-voting stock. In a first step the paper discusses how mechanisms to separate control from cash-flow rights relate to the value of control. Secondly the paper studies the impact of a new takeover regulation which was adopted in Germany in 1995 and introduced the mandatory bid rule. The paper analyses how minority voting an non-voting shareholders participate in transfers of corporate control under the alternative regulatory structures pre- and post 1995. It is further shown that a mandatory bid requirement reduces the potential control value of voting stock by restricting the ration of control to cash-flow rights.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://www.fmg.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 1999 The Author
Divisions:	Financial Markets Group
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
Date Deposited:	04 Jul 2023 14:18
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 19:47
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/119130

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