Burkart, Mike 
ORCID: 0000-0002-0954-4499 and Wallner, Klaus
(2000)
Club enlargement: early versus late admittance.
Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (359).
Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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Abstract
We develop an incomplete contract model to analyze the enlargement strategy of a club. An applicant is characterized by his wealth and the degree of conformity with the club standard. The club gains only from a fully reformed new member, but reform is costly. The club chooses between early admittance, where entry is conditioned on completed reform. Under the optimal enlargement strategy of the club, wealthy applicants pay an entrance fee and enter early, and poor applicants enter in reversed order: A less advanced is admitted early and a more advanced late. Moreover, poor applicants extract rents that increase in the ration of reform distance to wealth. If the club can impose a deadline for late entry, it can eliminate all rents with stage financing. In the dynamic game, renegotiation undermines the viability of the late admittance strategy. In the finite game, the applicant's rent from a late offer is non-monotonic in his reform distance and the ability to deteriorate his reform status strategically need not be detrimental to the club.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | https://www.fmg.ac.uk/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2000 The Authors |
| Divisions: | Finance |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G30 - General |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Jul 2023 10:33 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Apr 2024 08:00 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/119099 |
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