Walking wounded or living dead? Making banks foreclose bad loans

Bruche, Max and Llobet, Gerard (2011) Walking wounded or living dead? Making banks foreclose bad loans. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (675). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

Because of limited liability, insolvent banks have an incentive to roll over bad loans, in order to hide losses and gamble for resurrection, even though this is socially inefficient. We suggest a scheme that regulators could use to solve this problem. The scheme would induce banks to reveal their bad loans, which can then be foreclosed. Bank participation in the scheme would be voluntary. Even though banks have private information on the quantity of bad loans on their balance sheet, the scheme avoids creating windfall gains for bank equity holders. In addition, some losses can be imposed on debt holders.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://www.fmg.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2011 The Authors
Divisions:	Financial Markets Group
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G28 - Government Policy and Regulation D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
Date Deposited:	29 Jun 2023 10:21
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 04:31
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/119073

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