Smart buyers

Burkart, Mike ORCID: 0000-0002-0954-4499 and Lee, Samuel (2012) Smart buyers. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (696). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Text (DP696) - Published Version Download (325kB)

• Author
• https://www.fmg.ac.uk/publications/discu...

Abstract

In many bilateral transactions, the seller fears being underpaid because its outside option is better known to the buyer. We rationalize a variety of observed contracts as solutions to such smart buyer problems. The key to these solutions is to grant the seller upside participation. In contrast, the lemons problem calls for offering the buyer downside protection. Yet in either case, the seller (buyer) receives a convex (concave) claim. Thus, contracts commonly associated with the lemons problem can equally well be manifestations of the smart buyer problem. Nevertheless, the information asymmetries have opposite cross-sectional implications. To avoid underestimating the empirical relevance of adverse selection problems, it is therefore critical to properly identify the underlying information asymmetries in the data.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://www.fmg.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2012 The Authors
Divisions:	Finance
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
Date Deposited:	29 Jun 2023 07:48
Last Modified:	01 Apr 2024 08:00
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/119056

Actions (login required)

View Item