Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover

Anderson, Ronald W., Bustamante, Maria Cecilia and Guibaud, Stéphane (2012) Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (711). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard in a firm subject to stochastic growth opportunities. In our model, managers are dismissed after poor performance, but also when an alternative manager is more capable of growing the firm. The optimal contract may involve managerial entrenchment, such that growth opportunities are foregone after good performance. Firms with better growth prospects have higher managerial turnover and more front-loaded compensation. Firms may pay severance to incentivize their managers to report truthfully the arrival of growth opportunities. By ignoring the externality of the dismissal policy onto future managers, the optimal contract implies excessive retention.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://www.fmg.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2012 The Authors
Divisions:	Systemic Risk Centre Finance
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G30 - General D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory D - Microeconomics > D9 - Intertemporal Choice and Growth > D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing
Date Deposited:	29 Jun 2023 08:24
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 04:30
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/119042

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