Say on pay: do shareholders care?

Gerner-Beuerle, Carsten and Kirchmaier, Tom (2016) Say on pay: do shareholders care? Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (751). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

This paper examines the impact of enhanced executive remuneration disclosure rules under UK regulations introduced in 2013 on the voting pattern of shareholders. Based on a hand-collected dataset on the pay information disclosed by FTSE 100 companies, we establish that shareholders guide their vote by top line salary, and appear to disregard the remaining substantial body of information provided to them. Analyzing the unique British feature of two votes, one forward looking and one backward looking, we establish that shareholders differentiate between the two dimensions in about 23% of the cases. In contrast to the rationale of the legislation that introduced the two votes, however, differentiating voting behavior is not driven by characteristics of the executive's remuneration policy, but mainly by exceptionally positive future performance expectations.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://www.fmg.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2016 The Authors
Divisions:	Law
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G38 - Government Policy and Regulation K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K22 - Corporation and Securities Law
Date Deposited:	08 Jun 2023 09:48
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 04:29
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/118983

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