Loan insurance, market liquidity, and lending standards

Ahnert, Toni and Kuncl, Martin (2020) Loan insurance, market liquidity, and lending standards. Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers (94). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

We examine loan insurance when lenders can screen at origination, learn loan quality over time, and can sell loans in secondary markets. Loan insurance reduces lending standards but improves market liquidity. Lenders with worse screening ability insure, which commits them to not exploiting future private information about loan quality and improves the quality of uninsured loans traded. This externality implies insufficient insurance. A regulator achieves constrained efficiency by (i) guaranteeing a minimum price of uninsured loans to eliminate a welfare-dominated illiquid equilibrium; and (ii) subsidizing loan insurance in the liquid equilibrium. Our results can inform the design of government-sponsored mortgage guarantees.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://www.systemicrisk.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2020 The Author(s)
Divisions:	Systemic Risk Centre
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	G - Financial Economics > G0 - General > G00 - General G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
Date Deposited:	30 Jun 2023 15:57
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 19:45
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/118918

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