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Prestige, promotion, and pay

Ferreira, Daniel and Nikolowa, Radoslawa (2024) Prestige, promotion, and pay. Journal of Finance, 79 (1). 505 - 540. ISSN 0022-1082

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Identification Number: 10.1111/jofi.13301


We develop a theory in which financial (and other professional services) firms design career structures to “sell” prestigious jobs to qualified candidates. Firms create less prestigious entry-level jobs, which serve as currency for employees to pay for the right to compete for the more prestigious jobs. In optimal career structures, entry-level employees (“associates”) compete for better-paid and more prestigious positions (“managing directors” or “partners”). The model provides new implications relating job prestige to compensation, employment, competition, and the size of the financial sector.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2023 American Finance Association
Divisions: Finance
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
H Social Sciences
JEL classification: G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G20 - General
L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L20 - General
Date Deposited: 09 Mar 2023 11:30
Last Modified: 15 May 2024 17:09

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