Social incentives, delivery agents, and the effectiveness of development interventions

Bandiera, Oriana ORCID: 0009-0002-6817-793X, Burgess, Robin ORCID: 0009-0002-1187-3248, Deserranno, Erika, Morel, Ricardo, Sulaiman, Munshi and Rasul, Imran (2023) Social incentives, delivery agents, and the effectiveness of development interventions. Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, 1 (1). 162 - 224. ISSN 2832-9368

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Abstract

There has been a rise in the use of the local delivery model for development interventions, where local agents are hired as intermediaries to target benefits to potential beneficiaries. We study this model in the context of a standard agricultural extension intervention in Uganda. We document a trade-off between coverage and targeting: delivery agents treat more farmers when they have a greater number of social ties, but they are significantly more likely to target their nonpoor ties. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the design of the local delivery model for antipoverty interventions.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/journal/jpemi
Additional Information:	© 2022 The Authors
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory J Political Science > JC Political theory
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D00 - General
Date Deposited:	03 Jan 2023 09:18
Last Modified:	01 Nov 2024 05:41
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/117653

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