Perpetuating crisis as a supply strategy: the role of (nativist) populist governments in EU policymaking on refugee distribution

Zaun, Natascha ORCID: 0000-0002-0436-6275 and Ripoll Servent, Ariadna (2023) Perpetuating crisis as a supply strategy: the role of (nativist) populist governments in EU policymaking on refugee distribution. Journal of Common Market Studies, 61 (3). 653 - 672. ISSN 0021-9886

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Abstract

We still know very little of how populist governments behave as compared to mainstream governments in Council decision-making. Studying the ‘crucial case’ of negotiations around refugee distribution in the EU, an issue which allows populists to mobilize both anti-EU and anti-immigrant sentiment, we demonstrate that populist governments differ from mainstream ones in three important ways: First, they reject formal and informal rules of Council decision-making if these are not conducive to their preferred outcome; second, they reject traditional means of ensuring compromise such as package-deals and side-payments; third, they reject the final solution and exploit the ensuing deadlock to prove that the EU is weak and dysfunctional. We show that populist governments adopt such a behaviour even when they would benefit from the adoption of a policy solution. However, we expect populists to engage in such political games only when the negative effects of non-decisions are not immediate.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14685965
Additional Information:	© 2022 The Authors
Divisions:	European Institute
Subjects:	J Political Science > JZ International relations J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) J Political Science > JC Political theory
Date Deposited:	17 Aug 2022 11:48
Last Modified:	18 Nov 2024 08:00
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/116008

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