Birch, Jonathan ORCID: 0000-0001-7517-4759 (2022) Should animal welfare be defined in terms of consciousness? Philosophy of Science, 89 (5). 1114 – 1123. ISSN 0270-8647
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Abstract
Definitions of animal welfare often invoke consciousness or sentience. Marian Stamp Dawkins has argued that to define animal welfare this way is a mistake. In Dawkins’s alternative view, an animal with good welfare is one that is healthy and “has what it wants.” The dispute highlights a source of strain on the concept of animal welfare: consciousness-involving definitions are better able to capture the normative significance of welfare, whereas consciousness-free definitions facilitate the validation of welfare indicators. I reflect on how the field should respond to this strain, ultimately recommending against splitting the concept and in favor of consciousness-involving definitions.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy... |
Additional Information: | © 2022 The Author |
Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Date Deposited: | 10 Jun 2022 09:57 |
Last Modified: | 14 Sep 2024 09:08 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/115337 |
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