Brustle, Johannes, Dütting, Paul and Sivan, Balasubramanian (2022) Price manipulability in first-price auctions. In: WWW 2022 - Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2022. Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference. Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, 58 - 67. ISBN 9781450390965
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
First-price auctions have many desirable properties, including uniquely possessing some, like credibility. However, first-price auctions are also inherently non-truthful, and non-truthfulness may result in instability and inefficiencies. Given these pros and cons, we seek to quantify the extent to which first-price auctions are susceptible to manipulation. In this work we adopt a metric that was introduced in the context of bitcoin fee design markets: the percentage change in payment that can be achieved by being strategic. We study the behavior of this metric for single-unit and k-unit auction environments with n i.i.d. buyers, and seek conditions under which the percentage change tends to zero as n grows large. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first rigorous study of the extent to which large multi-unit first price auctions are susceptible to manipulation. We provide an almost complete picture of the conditions under which they are “truthful in the large,” and exhibit some surprising boundaries.
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | https://dl.acm.org/doi/proceedings/10.1145/3485447 |
| Additional Information: | © 2022 ACM |
| Divisions: | Mathematics |
| Subjects: | Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science |
| Date Deposited: | 25 May 2022 14:45 |
| Last Modified: | 26 Oct 2024 07:54 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/115200 |
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