Guimaraes, Bernardo, Cordeiro De Noronha Pessoa, Joao Paulo and Ponczek, Vladimir (2021) Non-compete agreements, wages and efficiency: theory and evidence from Brazilian football. CEP Discussion Papers (CEPDP1751). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK.
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Abstract
We propose a model to study non-compete agreements and evaluate their quantitative effects. We explore an exogenous policy change that removed non-compete clauses in the market for Brazilian footballers, the Pele Act of 1998. The Act raised players’ lifetime income but changed the wage profile in a heterogeneous way, reducing young players’ salaries. We structurally estimate the model’s parameters by matching wages and turnover profiles in the post Act period. By changing a single parameter related to the non-compete friction, we can match the changes in the age-earnings profile. We then show that the bulk of income gains is due to distributional forces, with efficiency gains playing a minor role.
Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
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Official URL: | https://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/discussion... |
Additional Information: | © 2021 The Authors |
Divisions: | Centre for Economic Performance |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions |
JEL classification: | J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J30 - General J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies > J60 - General K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law > K31 - Labor Law |
Date Deposited: | 21 Mar 2022 16:03 |
Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 19:40 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/114417 |
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