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Social power and non-cooperative game theory

Bosworth, William (2022) Social power and non-cooperative game theory. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 34 (2). 262 - 279. ISSN 1460-3667

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Identification Number: 10.1177/09516298221081810

Abstract

This paper defends the use of non-cooperative game theory for analysing questions of governance. To do so it posits a way of extending the resource account of social power from cooperative games to noncooperative games in a way that side steps a range of criticism. This involves identifying tipping points in the reputations of certain agents for paying and punishing those in their thrall. These tipping points are what give threats and offers their credibility in the absence of enforcement mechanisms and stabilise the distribution of social resources in society.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/home/jtp
Additional Information: © 2022 The Author
Divisions: Government
Subjects: J Political Science > JC Political theory
Q Science > QA Mathematics
Date Deposited: 07 Feb 2022 16:54
Last Modified: 09 May 2022 11:09
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/113654

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