Group agency and artificial intelligence

List, Christian ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X (2021) Group agency and artificial intelligence. Philosophy and Technology, 34 (4). 1213 - 1242. ISSN 2210-5433

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Abstract

The aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even have rights and a moral status? I will tentatively defend the (increasingly widely held) view that, under certain conditions, artificial intelligent systems, like corporate entities, might qualify as responsible moral agents and as holders of limited rights and legal personhood. I will further suggest that regulators should permit the use of autonomous artificial systems in high-stakes settings only if they are engineered to function as moral (not just intentional) agents and/or there is some liability-transfer arrangement in place. I will finally raise the possibility that if artificial systems ever became phenomenally conscious, there might be a case for extending a stronger moral status to them, but argue that, as of now, this remains very hypothetical.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.springer.com/journal/13347
Additional Information:	Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. © 2021 The Author
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited:	17 Dec 2021 10:30
Last Modified:	16 Nov 2024 07:21
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/112972

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