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The epistemic value of independent lies: false analogies and equivocations

Harris, Margherita (2021) The epistemic value of independent lies: false analogies and equivocations. Synthese, 199. 14577 – 14597. ISSN 1573-0964

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s11229-021-03434-8


Here I critically assess an argument put forward by Kuorikoski et al. (Br J Philos Sci, 61(3):541–567, 2010) for the epistemic import of model-based robustness analysis. I show that this argument is not sound since the sort of probabilistic independence on which it relies is unfeasible. By revising the notion of probabilistic independence imposed on the models’ results, I introduce a prima-facie more plausible argument. However, despite this prima-facie plausibility, I show that even this new argument is unsound in most if not all cases of model-based robustness analysis. This I do to demonstrate that the epistemic import of model-based robust analysis cannot be satisfactorily defended on the basis of probabilistic independence.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2021 The Author
Divisions: LSE
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited: 08 Nov 2021 09:30
Last Modified: 05 Apr 2022 15:06

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