Burkart, Mike ORCID: 0000-0002-0954-4499 and Lee, Samuel (2022) Activism and takeovers. Review of Financial Studies, 35 (4). 1868 - 1896. ISSN 0893-9454
Text (hhab039)
- Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (391kB) |
Abstract
We compare activism and takeovers from the perspective of a blockholder who can provide effort to improve firm value. We show that free-riding behavior by dispersed shareholders has the following implications: First, activism can be more profitable than a hostile takeover even if it is less efficient. Second, activism is most efficient when it brokers, rather than substitutes for, takeovers. Third, such takeover activism earns superior returns. More broadly, our theory implies that activists specialize in governance reforms with limited, temporary ownership being a strength rather than a shortcoming of activism.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Official URL: | https://academic.oup.com/rfs |
Additional Information: | © 2021 The Authors |
Divisions: | Finance |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
Date Deposited: | 06 Aug 2021 14:24 |
Last Modified: | 19 Oct 2024 01:54 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/111564 |
Actions (login required)
View Item |