Measuring the ex-ante incentive effects of creditor control rights during bankruptcy reorganization

Agrawal, Ashwini ORCID: 0000-0003-0865-9144, Gonzalez-Uribe, Juanita ORCID: 0000-0002-1945-7372 and Martinez-Correa, Jimmy (2022) Measuring the ex-ante incentive effects of creditor control rights during bankruptcy reorganization. Journal of Financial Economics, 143 (1). 381 - 408. ISSN 0304-405X

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Abstract

A large theoretical literature studies the effects of creditor control during bankruptcy proceedings on firm outcomes. Empirical work in this area mainly examines reforms to creditor control rights during liquidation. In this paper, we use administrative microdata and exploit a legal reform in Denmark to provide the first causal estimates of creditor empowerment in reorganization-the complementary bankruptcy procedure to liquidation. We find that the Danish reform led to a sharp decline in liquidations. Although few insolvent firms make use of the new reorganization procedures, we show that solvent firms improved their financial management and increased employment and investment. The findings illustrate the empirical importance of reorganization rules on the incentives of stakeholders outside of bankruptcy.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/journal-of-f...
Additional Information:	© 2021 Elsevier B.V.
Divisions:	Finance
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G18 - Government Policy and Regulation
Date Deposited:	17 May 2021 09:15
Last Modified:	09 Nov 2024 03:54
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/110482

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