The myth of transnational public policy in international arbitration

Kleinheisterkamp, Jan ORCID: 0000-0003-4037-8860 (2023) The myth of transnational public policy in international arbitration. American Journal of Comparative Law, 71 (1). 98 – 141. ISSN 0002-919X

Text (The Myth of Transnational Public Policy in International Arbitration) - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (377kB)

• Author
• Scopus publication

Abstract

This Article traces the concept of transnational public policy as developed in the context of international arbitration at the intersection between legal theory and practice. The emergence of such a transnational public policy, it is claimed, would enable arbitrators to safeguard and ultimately to define the public interests that need to be protected in a globalized economy, irrespective of national laws. A historical contextualization of efforts to empower merchants and their practices in Germany and the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries highlights their reliance on the mythical lex mercatoria that shaped English commercial law. Further contextualization is offered by the postwar invocation of “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” to keep at bay the application of supposedly less civilized, parochial legal orders, and by the consequent emergence of the “new” lex mercatoria as conceptualized especially in France. These developments paved the way, on the theory side, for later conceptualizations of self-constitutionalizing law beyond the state, especially by Gunther Teubner, and, on the practice side, for the notion of transnational public policy developed by arbitrators, especially by Emmanuel Gaillard, culminating in jurisprudential claims of an autonomous arbitral legal order with a regulatory dimension. In all these constructions, the recourse to comparative law has been a crucial element. Against this rough intellectual history, the Article offers a critique of today’s construction of transnational public policy by probing into its constitutional dimension and the respective roles of private and public interests. This allows, in particular, to draw on parallels to historic U.S. constitutional debates on the allocation of regulatory powers in federalism.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://academic.oup.com/ajcl
Additional Information:	© 2021 The Author
Divisions:	Law
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory K Law > K Law (General)
Date Deposited:	14 Apr 2021 10:48
Last Modified:	12 Dec 2024 02:30
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/109865

Actions (login required)

View Item