Moral luck, responsibility, and systems of tort liability

Voyiakis, Emmanuel ORCID: 0000-0002-6351-4733 (2020) Moral luck, responsibility, and systems of tort liability. Res Publica. ISSN 1356-4765

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Abstract

Bernard Williams drew our attention to what might be wrong with denying the role of luck in our understanding of agency and responsibility. Susan Wolf and David Enoch, in separate works, have asked us to focus instead on what might be virtuous and valuable in embracing that role, and on how our institutions might assist us in that regard. They claim that the agent who ‘takes’ a responsibility that law or morality do not already assign to them may be displaying a special moral virtue or exercising a distinctive moral power. I raise some objections to Wolf’s and Enoch’s case for that claim, and query some of its purported institutional implications for tort law systems.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.springer.com/journal/11158
Additional Information:	© 2020 Springer Nature B.V.
Divisions:	Law
Subjects:	K Law > K Law (General)
Date Deposited:	21 May 2020 09:15
Last Modified:	15 Nov 2024 22:15
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/104515

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