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In defence of revealed preference theory

Thoma, Johanna ORCID: 0000-0002-1364-4521 (2020) In defence of revealed preference theory. Economics and Philosophy. ISSN 0266-2671

[img] Text (In-Defence-of-Revealed-Preference-Theory) - Accepted Version
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Identification Number: 10.1017/S0266267120000073


This paper defends revealed preference theory against a pervasive line of criticism, according to which revealed preference methodology relies on appealing to some mental states, in particular an agent's beliefs, rendering the project incoherent or unmotivated. I argue that all that is established by these arguments is that revealed preference theorists must accept a limited mentalism in their account of the options an agent should be modelled as choosing between. This is consistent both with an essentially behavioural interpretation of preference and with standard revealed preference methodology. And it does not undermine the core motivations of revealed preference theory.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2020 Cambridge University Press
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
Date Deposited: 20 Feb 2020 10:27
Last Modified: 20 Oct 2021 01:01

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