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Games of incomplete information and myopic equilibria

Simon, Robert, Spiez, S and Torunczyk, H (2020) Games of incomplete information and myopic equilibria. Israel Journal of Mathematics. ISSN 0021-2172 (In Press)

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We consider a finitely defined game where the payoff for each player at each terminal point of the game is not a fixed quantity but varies according to probability distributions on the terminal points induced by the strategies chosen. We prove that if these payoffs have an upper-semi- continuous and convex valued structure then the game has an equilibrium. For this purpose the concept of a myopic equilibrium is introduced, a con- cept that generalizes that of a Nash equilibrium and applies to the games we consider. We answer in the affirmative a question posed by A. Neyman: if the payoffs of an infinitely repeated game of incomplete information on one side are a convex combination of the undiscounted payoffs and payoffs from a finite number of initial stages, does the game have an equilibrium?

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2020 Springer Switzerland AG
Divisions: Mathematics
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics
Date Deposited: 17 Jan 2020 11:15
Last Modified: 28 Jun 2020 23:28

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