Simon, Robert, Spiez, S and Torunczyk, H (2021) Games of incomplete information and myopic equilibria. Israel Journal of Mathematics, 241 (2). 721 - 748. ISSN 0021-2172
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Text (Games of incomplete information and myopic equilibria)
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Abstract
We consider a finitely defined game where the payoff for each player at each terminal point of the game is not a fixed quantity but varies according to probability distributions on the terminal points induced by the strategies chosen. We prove that if these payoffs have an upper-semi- continuous and convex valued structure then the game has an equilibrium. For this purpose the concept of a myopic equilibrium is introduced, a con- cept that generalizes that of a Nash equilibrium and applies to the games we consider. We answer in the affirmative a question posed by A. Neyman: if the payoffs of an infinitely repeated game of incomplete information on one side are a convex combination of the undiscounted payoffs and payoffs from a finite number of initial stages, does the game have an equilibrium?
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | https://link.springer.com/journal/11856 |
Additional Information: | © 2021 The Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
Divisions: | Mathematics |
Subjects: | Q Science > QA Mathematics |
Date Deposited: | 17 Jan 2020 11:15 |
Last Modified: | 09 Aug 2024 05:15 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/103097 |
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