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Institutional corruption and election fraud: evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan

Callen, Michael ORCID: 0000-0002-8408-1404 and Long, James D. (2015) Institutional corruption and election fraud: evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan. American Economic Review, 105 (1). 354 - 381. ISSN 0002-8282

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Identification Number: 10.1257/aer.20120427

Abstract

We investigate the relationship between political networks, weak institutions, and election fraud during the 2010 parliamentary election in Afghanistan combining: (i) data on political connections between candidates and election officials; (ii) a nationwide controlled evaluation of a novel monitoring technology; and (iii) direct measurements of aggregation fraud. We find considerable evidence of aggregation fraud in favor of connected candidates and that the announcement of a new monitoring technology reduced theft of election materials by about 60 percent and vote counts for connected candidates by about 25 percent. The results have implications for electoral competition and are potentially actionable for policymakers.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/aer
Additional Information: © 2015 American Economic Association
Divisions: Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
T Technology
JEL classification: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C93 - Field Experiments
D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements: Legal, Social, Economic, and Political
Date Deposited: 17 Dec 2019 11:18
Last Modified: 12 Dec 2024 02:01
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/102931

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