Remittances, monetary institutions, and autocracies

Garriga, Ana Carolina and Meseguer, Covadonga (2019) Remittances, monetary institutions, and autocracies. Oxford Development Studies, 47 (4). 452 - 467. ISSN 1360-0818

Text (Remittances, monetary institutions, and autocracies) - Accepted Version Download (213kB)

• Author

Abstract

How do remittances affect the choice of exchange rate regimes? Previous research shows that remittances, by easing the ‘impossible trinity’, increase the probability of governments adopting fixed exchange rates. However, that research overlooks the conditioning effect of monetary and political institutions. We argue that remittances, by altering recipient governments’ incentives to use monetary policy counter-cyclically, make central bank independence a credible anti-inflationary tool in less credible regimes; that is, autocracies. Thus, autocracies that receive remittances do not need to rely on fixed exchange rates. In this way, remittances open policy alternatives for developing autocracies. Statistical tests on a sample of 87 developing and transitional countries between 1980 and 2010 support our argument.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cods20/current
Additional Information:	© 2019 Oxford Department of International Development
Divisions:	International Relations
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Date Deposited:	15 Aug 2019 10:39
Last Modified:	18 Oct 2024 05:45
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/101372

Actions (login required)

View Item