Adler, Matthew D. (2016) Aggregating moral preferences. Economics and Philosophy, 32 (2). 283 - 321. ISSN 0266-2671
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Preference-aggregation problems arise in various contexts. One such context, little explored by social choice theorists, is metaethical. ‘Ideal-advisor’ accounts, which have played a major role in metaethics, propose that moral facts are constituted by the idealized preferences of a community of advisors. Such accounts give rise to a preference-aggregation problem: namely, aggregating the advisors’ moral preferences. Do we have reason to believe that the advisors, albeit idealized, can still diverge in their rankings of a given set of alternatives? If so, what are the moral facts (in particular, the comparative moral goodness of the alternatives) when the advisors do diverge? These questions are investigated here using the tools of Arrovian social choice theory.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/economics-... |
| Additional Information: | © 2016 Cambridge University Press |
| Divisions: | CPNSS |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 08 Aug 2019 12:21 |
| Last Modified: | 17 Mar 2024 22:21 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/101329 |
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