Brown, Campbell ORCID: 0000-0001-9821-9710 (2020) Sex crimes and misdemeanours. Philosophical Studies, 177 (5). 1363 - 1379. ISSN 0031-8116
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Abstract
How wrong is it to deceive a person into having sex with you? The common view seems to be that this depends on the nature of the deception. If it involves something very important, such as your identity, then the wrong done is very serious. But if it involves some- thing more trivial, such as your natural hair colour, then the wrong seems less great. Tom Dougherty rejects this view. He argues that sexual deception is always seriously wrong. In this paper, I present a response to Doughterty’s argument. I propose an analysis of the wrong- ness in deception according to which acts of deception, in sexual relations and elsewhere, may differ in their degree of wrongness, and some may not be seriously wrong.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | https://link.springer.com/journal/11098 |
Additional Information: | © 2019 The Author |
Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Date Deposited: | 05 Feb 2019 14:15 |
Last Modified: | 14 Sep 2024 07:41 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/100025 |
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