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Reply: clubbish justice

Spiekermann, Kai (2008) Reply: clubbish justice. Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 7 (4). pp. 447-453. ISSN 1470-594X

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Identification Number: 10.1177/1470594X08095755


Replying to my earlier article `Translucency, Assortation, and Information Pooling: How Groups Solve Social Dilemmas', Robert Goodin examines the normative implications of the rule `cooperate with those whose inclusion benefits the larger scheme of cooperation', and gives several reasons for why the conversion of justice into a club good is normatively unappealing. This reply to Goodin discusses whether the rule leads to an exclusion of poor agents, whether a group should hire agents to detect free-riders, and how a group should deal with naive cooperators. The rule can be defended as an enforcement mechanism in some cases, but it is normatively unappealing as a theory of justice.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2008 SAGE Publications
Divisions: Government
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Sets: Departments > Government
Collections > Economists Online
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2010 16:45
Last Modified: 20 Feb 2021 04:10

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