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Firm-level technological change and skill demand

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Abstract

We quantify the contribution of firm-level technological change to skill demand and aggregate inequality in the presence of imperfect competition in the labor market. We show that skill-biased technological change increases both the firm-level skill ratio and the skill premium, while other shocks (e.g. firm-specific output demand shocks) cannot explain the increase in both outcomes. We exploit administrative data and a large survey measuring a broad class of firm-level technological changes from Hungary and Norway. We estimate that the aggregate college premium increases by 6.1% in Norway and by 13.8% in Hungary as a result of the skill bias in technological change.

Keywords: skill-biased technological change, innovation, skill premiums, imperfect competition
JEL: J31; J24; O30; O33

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1 Introduction

While technological change is the main driver of economic growth, it can also contribute to rising inequality (Acemoglu 2002, Goldin & Katz 2010). In this paper, we study the consequences of technological change on inequality by focusing on the role of firms. Firms play a crucial role in the diffusion of new technologies through the process of innovation (Griliches 1957, Mansfield 1961, Mokyr 2003, Bloom et al. 2016). At the same time, a growing number of studies document that changes in firm-level wage premiums contribute to rising aggregate inequality (Card et al. 2013, Barth et al. 2016, Song et al. 2018). Consequently, it is important to understand how firm-level innovation activities and inequality are interlinked.

Direct evidence on the impact of *firm-level* technological change on skill demand is still scarce, and somewhat inconclusive. For instance, Aghion et al. (2017) find that more R&D-intensive firms pay a lower college premium, while Bøler (2015) finds that higher R&D intensity is associated with an increase in the skill ratio. Moreover, the empirical evidence documenting the relationship between innovation and inequality is nearly exclusively based on easily measurable proxies of innovation, such as R&D and patents, which are unlikely to capture a large part of firm- or economy-level technological change. For instance, in France, one of the most innovative countries in Europe, 34% of innovative firms reported no R&D spending, and 88% innovated without applying for a patent. These numbers are even higher in less innovative countries, where technology adoption plays a larger role, such as Hungary (Appendix Figure B.3). This paper complements the existing literature by utilizing a large-scale panel survey on firms' innovation activities that allows us to observe when firms significantly alter their production functions. We identify changes in production functions from survey questions about the introduction of production processes, products or management methods that are new to the firm, but not necessarily new to the market or the world. The relevance of this measure of technological change, for the European countries, is demonstrated by its strong correlation with country-level college premiums (see Figure 1).¹

We study the impact of firm-level technological change on skill demand in a framework that combines the standard CES production function with imperfect competition in the labor market (see e.g. Card et al. 2018, Manning 2013). In our framework, firms do not take wages as given. Instead, they actively set them, taking into account that higher wages are needed to attract more workers. In response to a skill-biased technological change of the production function, firms want to increase their skill ratio, and so they need to raise the relative wage of their skilled workers. The result is an increase in both the firm-level skill ratio and the skill premium.

We also show that firm's optimization implies that the skill ratio and skill premium will move in opposite directions following other shocks to the firm, such as firm-specific output demand shocks or labor supply shocks (e.g. due to changes in amenities or local labor supply). Intuitively, these shocks do not shift the firm-level relative skill demand curve, but affect which point is chosen on the curve. A downward-sloping relative skill demand curve implies that these shocks either increase the

¹In Appendix Section A.1 we provide further details about this relationship, and show that the positive correlation is robust to controlling for the share of R&D conducting firms, the college ratio or GDP/capita. In Appendix Section A.2, we also provide some additional evidence by exploiting country-industry level variation in innovation activities.

skill ratio and decrease the skill premium or *vice versa*, but they cannot lead to an increase in both outcomes. Skill-biased technological change, on the other hand, shifts out the firm-level relative skill demand curve, and leads to an increase in both outcomes. Therefore, studying the changes both in the skill ratio and the skill premium of firms following a technological change allows us to identify whether the change is skill biased. This result holds even if the event of applying a new technology coincides with favorable output demand shocks or changing labor market conditions. This insight is similar to the one provided by [Katz & Murphy \(1992\)](#) in relation to the U.S. wage structure over the 80s, where they argued that a positive relationship between relative skill prices and quantities suggests that technological change is skill biased. In this paper, we show that the same reasoning can be applied at the firm-level, when there is imperfect competition in the labor markets. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our results hold under various wage setting protocols such as union bargaining (e.g. [Van Reenen 1996](#)) and rent sharing (e.g. [Kline et al. 2019](#)).

We apply our framework to quantify the extent to which technological change is skill biased. Using the FOCs derived from the firm’s problem, we can infer the change in the skill bias term in the production function from the sum of the percent change in the skill ratio and the skill premium.² Furthermore, as we discussed before, shocks coinciding with the technological change will move the skill premium and the skill ratio in opposite directions, implying that their effects will be cancelled out when the sum is taken. Therefore, the assumptions required to identify the extent to which a technological change is skill biased are weaker than the assumptions needed to identify the impact of innovation on firm-level productivity. For instance, a key concern for identifying the latter is that innovative firms might foresee, and start innovating in response to, some positive demand shocks. This would bias the estimates of the impact of innovation on firm productivity, since the increase in firm output might simply reflect the demand shocks and not the increase in productivity *per se*. In contrast, our estimates of the degree to which technological change is skill biased are identified from the changes in relative input demand, which is not affected by the changes in output caused by positive demand shocks. This is a key insight, which allows us to identify skill bias for various forms of technological change. Nevertheless, in Section 5.3 we also corroborate our key findings by documenting the changes in skill demand in response to innovation activities induced by a quasi-exogenous change in an R&D tax credit policy in Norway.

Guided by our framework, we investigate empirically whether innovation activities lead to an increase in the skill premium and the skill ratio at the firm level. We use exceptionally rich micro data from two countries, Norway and Hungary, that are at very different distances from the technological frontier. In Norway, R&D-based, high-novelty innovation dominates, while in Hungary relatively few firms innovate and if so, they often adopt technologies developed elsewhere. This allows us to compare two very different innovation systems. In both countries, we have access to the rich information available from the European Community Innovation Survey (CIS), which allows us to study comprehensive measures of firm-level technological changes.

We estimate the change in skill premium by implementing a difference-in-differences type

²More precisely, the skill bias parameter is the sum of the percent change in the skill premium and the percent change in the skill ratio divided by the parameter of the CES production function capturing the elasticity of substitution between high- and low-skilled workers. While we do not directly estimate the elasticity of substitution in our empirical implementation, we show that our results are robust to applying a wide range of existing estimates in the literature.

identification strategy where we compare changes in the wage premium of college workers in firms that start to innovate (i.e. change their production function) to changes in the premium in firms that do not innovate (i.e. keep their production function unchanged). We find that innovation is associated with a 2-4 percent increase in the wage premium in Norway, and a 5-6 percent increase in Hungary. This increase in the skill premium is not driven by temporary bonus payments, but it is a permanent change in the salary base that is present even 5 years after innovation. Moreover, the wage change arises for both new entrants and incumbent workers, which is consistent with the wage setting protocol assumed in our benchmark framework.³

Interestingly, higher intensity innovation, measured by spending on innovation per worker, leads to a larger increase in the skill premium compared to lower innovation spending. We also find that the increase in the skill premium emerges after innovation, and is not driven by pre-innovation wage premium differences. In addition to that, we show that the changes in skill premium do not simply reflect a compositional change of the workforce: even if we control for unobserved worker skills by exploiting the worker panel in Norway, we find significant increases in wages.

Our estimates of the impact of innovation on the skill premium are robust to including a variety of controls for market-specific shocks that could potentially be correlated with firm-level innovation. In particular, we include local labor market-specific time trends, industry-skill-group-specific time trends and occupation-specific time trends in our robustness tests. Furthermore, the estimates are not sensitive to alternative timing assumptions, and they are also robust to controlling for domestic or international outsourcing, or allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in firm-specific college premiums.

To assess the impact of firm-level innovation on the skill ratio, we implement a similar difference-in-differences identification strategy. In particular, we estimate how innovation is related to subsequent long (six-year) changes in the skill ratio at the firm level. Estimating in long differences is suitable for capturing the long-term effects of innovation, and also adjusts for unobserved (time invariant) firm heterogeneity. This strategy closely follows [Caroli & Van Reenen \(2001\)](#), who study the effect of innovation on skill demand in French and British firms. In line with their findings, we find that innovation is followed by growth in the college to non-college ratio.

A key testable prediction of our model is that the relative magnitude of skill premium and skill ratio increases depends on firms' wage-setting power. In labor markets with limited wage setting power, firm-level wages should be less responsive and employment more responsive to skill-biased technological changes. Our model also suggests that firms' wage-setting power should be more limited in areas with higher firm density compared to in areas with lower firm density.⁴ We assess this prediction empirically, and show that wage responses are indeed more muted and skill ratio increases are larger in local areas with higher firm density (more limited wage setting power) compared to areas with low firm density.

Overall, our findings show that technological change tends to be skill biased both in Norway

³In our benchmark framework firms post wages. [Lachowska et al. \(2021\)](#) shows that wage posting is the primary determinant of wage setting in the US context.

⁴This comes from the observation that a firm's wage-setting power depends on the dispersion of workers' idiosyncratic preferences for working at particular firms, and this dispersion is likely to be larger if commuting times between firms are longer due to geographical dispersion.

and Hungary. Armed with the estimates of the changes in the skill premium and the skill ratio, we calculate the change in the skill bias term in innovative firms' production functions. Our estimates imply that the average change in skill bias of innovative firms is equivalent to a 5.2% increase in the skill premium in Norway and an 8.4% increase in Hungary. We also quantify the contribution of technological progress to the change in the aggregate college premium. First, we perform an accounting exercise: we decompose the economy-wide skill premium into two components, one coming from the skill premium paid by innovative firms, and one coming from non-innovative firms. Next, we show that firm-level innovation activities contribute to aggregate inequality through two channels: 1) skilled workers moving to innovative firms (which pay higher wages), and 2) innovative firms raising the skill premium following innovation. We quantify both of these terms using our estimates and find that firm-level application of new technologies increased the aggregate college premium by 6.1 percent in Norway and 13.8 percent in Hungary over a 10 year period.

These estimates on the contribution of technological change shed new light on the recent decline in the college-to-non-college wage premium observed in many developed countries.⁵ The drop in college premium might reflect that technological change, which was favoring college-educated workers from the 80s to the early 2000s (Katz & Murphy 1992), altered its character, and is now favoring other groups in the economy. At the same time, the recent fall in aggregate college premium has coincided with a significant expansion in higher education in these countries, which may mask a substantial contribution of technology to inequality. Our estimates imply that technological change is still a key driver of aggregate trends in inequality, even though the aggregate college premium has not been rising recently.

Finally, we assess whether there is heterogeneity in the contribution of different types of innovation to inequality. A common pattern in both countries is that both innovation with technical aspects (product or process innovation) and organizational changes are skill biased. Nevertheless, the bulk of the contribution to aggregate inequality comes from firms combining technical with organizational changes. At the same time, we find a difference between Norway and Hungary with respect to R&D and high-novelty innovation. In Norway, firms conducting R&D-based and high-novelty innovations are responsible for the majority of the changes in skill demand. In contrast, non-R&D and low-novelty innovations, which are associated with technology adoption, play a key role in Hungary. This latter finding underscores that technological change is skill biased even in countries far away from the technology frontier.

Our paper relates to several strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the large literature that links the evolution of wage inequality to skill-biased technological change (see for example Katz & Murphy 1992, Juhn et al. 1993, Autor et al. 1998, Acemoglu 2002, Goldin & Katz 2010, Acemoglu & Autor 2011a). Instead of inferring the change in skill bias from aggregate trends in the relative skill ratio and skill premium, we exploit the fact that most technologies diffuse slowly and firms play a crucial role in this process (Griliches 1957). By focusing on firm-level changes in technology and applying a difference-in-differences strategy we can net out the effect of changes in

⁵For instance, the college premium decreased by 11 percentage points in Norway between 2005 and 2015, and by 15 percentage points in Hungary between 2000 and 2015. The college wage premium also flattened out in the United Kingdom (see Blundell et al. 2022) and in the United States (see e.g. Autor 2019, Goldin et al. 2020)

institutions (Bound & Johnson 1992, DiNardo et al. 1996, Stansbury & Summers 2020) and market power (De Loecker et al. 2020), and focus solely on the contribution of technological change. Our strategy also differs from Haanwinckel (2018) who, similarly to us, recognizes the crucial role of firms, but instead of directly studying changes in skill demand at the firm level, builds a model of tasks within firms and infers technological change from aggregate changes in worker-firm sorting and in the distribution of firm-level skill premiums.⁶ Another insight we add to the literature is that in the presence of imperfect competition in the labor market, skill-biased technological change will increase the within-skill, across-firm inequality, providing an alternative channel to explain the increasing within skill-inequality documented in the literature (see e.g. Juhn et al. 1993, DiNardo et al. 1996, Acemoglu 2002).

Our paper also contributes to the literature that directly studies technological change (or innovation) and skill demand. Many papers in the literature focus on specific technologies, such as the steam engine (Chin et al. 2006), computers (see, e.g. Krueger 1993, DiNardo & Pischke 1997, Dunne et al. 2004, Beaudry et al. 2010), broadband internet (e.g. Akerman et al. 2015, Hjort & Poulsen 2019), robots (e.g. Graetz & Michaels 2018), artificial intelligence (e.g. Frank et al. 2019), automation (Doms et al. 1997, Acemoglu et al. 2020) or high-novelty innovation, such as R&D (Bøler 2015, Aghion et al. 2017) and patents (Kline et al. 2019). In this paper, we consider a much wider range of innovation activities that is likely to capture most forms of technological change taking place in the economy, including adoption of technologies by firms far from the technology frontier. Moreover, we take a step further and also quantify the contribution of firm-level technological changes to aggregate inequality.

Focusing on a wider range of innovation activities is not unprecedented in the literature (Caroli & Van Reenen 2001, Bresnahan et al. 2002, Abowd et al. 2007). Nevertheless, these studies usually rely on relatively small cross-sectional surveys that measure specific innovation activities. In contrast, our data includes five waves of a large-scale innovation survey, where each wave covers a large number of firms (around 5,000), and provides consistent measures for various types of innovation activities over time (and across countries). The panel dimension of our survey also allows us to account for compositional changes following innovation, which leaves us with more credible estimates of the effect of innovation on the skill premium. Finally, our paper also makes a methodological advancement relative to these papers by highlighting the issues of simply focusing on the skill ratio to assess the skill-biasedness of technological change. The changes in the skill ratio can be confounded by shocks to labor supply, or even by output demand shocks, if firms' wage-setting power differs between low- and high-skilled workers. These issues are not resolved with implementing instrumental variable strategies.⁷ Our approach instead infers the skill bias of new technologies from the firms' first order conditions, combined with estimates on the changes in firm-level skill premium and skill ratio. While this approach applies the canonical CES production function and imposes some structure on firm behavior, it allows us to infer the skill bias of technological change both in the presence of imperfect competition in the labor market, as well as if the technological change coincides with other shocks,

⁶Haanwinckel (2018) introduces imperfect competition in the labor market into a task-based framework, while here we apply the standard CES production function. In principle it is possible to derive estimable reduced form equations between changes in task content and firm-level technological change, but such an analysis is beyond the scope of our paper. Nevertheless, in Section 5 we empirically assess the change in task content.

⁷If firms' wage-setting power differs between skilled and unskilled workers, even a quasi-exogenous increase in Hicks-neutral productivity can increase the skill ratio even if there is no skill bias (see Proposition 1).

such as changes in the output demand or changes in local labor supply.

Our paper also relates to a growing number of papers studying responses to firm-level shocks with imperfect competition in the labor markets (e.g. [Card et al. 2018](#), [Garin & Silvério 2018](#), [Kroft et al. 2020](#), [Lamadon et al. 2022](#), [Carbonnier et al. 2022](#)). The fact that we find an increase in the firm-level skill premium following innovation is consistent with some wage-setting power of firms. The implied firm-specific labor supply elasticity is between two to three, which is consistent with recent quasi-experimental estimates from the literature (e.g. [Dube et al. 2017](#), [Caldwell & Oehlsen 2018](#), [Cho 2018](#), [Kroft et al. 2020](#), [Bassier et al. 2020](#)). We also demonstrate that, consistent with the predictions of the model, the implied firm-specific elasticity is tightly linked to firm density in the local labor market. In denser areas, the elasticity is around four, showing that firms have a more limited wage-setting power, while in areas with very low density it is less than one, suggesting that firms operate almost like a local monopsony. These geographic differences also suggest that technological change can affect rural and urban labor markets differently.

Finally, we contribute to the literature about the heterogeneity of innovation. One strand of this literature quantifies and compares innovation with technological aspects and organizational changes. The seminal paper of [Caroli & Van Reenen \(2001\)](#) shows that both types of innovations are skill biased, while [Evangelista & Vezzani \(2010\)](#) focus on productivity and show that firms which conduct a broader range of innovation activities—for example, combining technological with organizational innovation—have a higher performance. Another dimension, the distinction between R&D and non-R&D innovation, was emphasised by [Lopez-Rodriguez & Martinez-Lopez \(2017\)](#), who show that non-R&D innovation also contributes to productivity. Our contribution is that we compare the skill bias of all these different types of innovation and quantify their aggregate effect on the skill premium. Our results show that all these different types of innovation are skill biased to a certain extent, but their absolute and relative contribution depend on the context.

In what follows, [Section 2](#) outlines the relationship between technological change, skill demand and relative wages of skilled and non-skilled workers when there is imperfect competition in the labor markets and shows how to infer skill bias using the firm’s first order conditions. [Section 3](#) describes our data sources and the institutional context in Norway and Hungary. [Section 4](#) discusses our empirical strategy to estimate the change in skill ratio and skill premium following innovation. The results of these estimations are presented in [Section 5](#), while we quantify the aggregate implication of changes in firm-level skill demand in [Section 6](#). Finally, [Section 7](#) concludes.

2 Conceptual framework

We study the impact of firm-level technological change on the skill premium and the skill ratio. Motivated by our empirical findings showing that firm-level technological change has an impact on firm-level wages, we endow firms with some wage-setting power. This wage-setting power arises from worker heterogeneity in their valuation of jobs due to non-wage related characteristics, as in [Card et al. \(2018\)](#). We start by describing the firm’s problem before we examine how firm-level technological

change affects employment and wages.

We assume that there are J firms, each using two inputs in production at time t : high-skilled labor (H_{jt}) and low-skilled labor (L_{jt}).⁸ We use the terms skills and education interchangeably, as we proxy skills by education in the empirical section. Firms produce output (Q_{jt}) with the following CES technology in every period:

$$Q_{jt} = A_{jt} \left[\theta_{jt} H_{jt}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \theta_{jt}) L_{jt}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \quad \sigma \geq 0 \quad (1)$$

where A_{jt} is the Hicks-neutral productivity term, while θ_{jt} is the skill bias productivity term measuring the extent to which the technology used by the firm is skill biased.⁹ Importantly, technological change affects one or both of these productivity terms. Extending this production function to allow for capital or other intermediate inputs is a relatively straightforward exercise, as we demonstrate in [Appendix C](#).¹⁰

Following [Violante \(2008\)](#), we define skill-biased technological change as an increase in the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) between skilled and unskilled workers. In our production function, an increase in θ will always increase the MRT, and therefore it represents skill-biased technological change.¹¹ Firms maximize profit given their production functions:

$$\pi_{jt}(A_{jt}, \theta_{jt}) = \max_{w_{L_{jt}}, w_{H_{jt}}, p_{jt}} p_{jt} y_{jt} - H_{jt}(w_{H_{jt}}) w_{H_{jt}} - L_{jt}(w_{L_{jt}}) w_{L_{jt}}, \quad (2)$$

⁸In our conceptual framework, we abstract away from worker heterogeneity within a skill group. However, while it would complicate the discussion, it can be shown that our results would hold in the presence of worker heterogeneity, conditional on netting out changes in firms' worker composition. We carefully deal with worker heterogeneity within skill groups in our empirical implementation (see Section 4 for more details).

⁹Given the wide range of technological changes captured by our measures, we remain agnostic about the exact mechanisms driving the skill bias. The increase in skill demand can come from capital-skill complementary (see e.g. [Krusell et al. 2000](#)), from better ability of skilled workers to deal with new technologies (see e.g. [Nelson & Phelps 1966](#)), or from "flatter" organizations (see e.g. [Milgrom & Roberts 1990](#)).

¹⁰We add capital by applying a nested CES structure. However, the results can be generalized to any production function of the following structure: $F(Q_{jt}, K_{jt})$, where Q_{jt} comes from equation (1) and K_{jt} denotes capital. Note that such a production function rules out that capital is more complementary to high-skilled than to low-skilled workers (see e.g. [Krusell et al. 2000](#)). We consider such complementarity between capital and skills as one formalization of skill-biased technological change ([Violante 2008](#)), which we approximate with a change in θ_{jt} .

¹¹An alternative way to write the production function is as follows:

$$Q_{jt} = \left[(A_{H_{jt}} H_{jt})^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (A_{L_{jt}} L_{jt})^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.$$

In our case, $A_{jt} = \left(A_{H_{jt}}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + A_{L_{jt}}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$ and $\theta = (A_{H_{jt}}/A_{jt})^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}$. Note that an increase in $A_{H_{jt}}/A_{L_{jt}}$ in this formulation only favors skilled workers if $\sigma > 1$. When $\sigma < 1$, a decrease in $A_{H_{jt}}/A_{L_{jt}}$ leads to skill-biased technological change. In our formulation of the production function, θ will increase in both these cases.

and the following constraints:

$$Q_{jt} = A_{jt} \left[\theta_{jt} H_{jt}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \theta_{jt}) L_{jt}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \quad (3a)$$

$$\ln p_{jt} = \frac{1}{\rho} \ln \kappa_{jt} - \frac{1}{\rho} \ln Q_{jt} + \frac{\rho-1}{\rho} \ln p_t + \frac{1}{\rho} \ln I_t, \quad (3b)$$

$$\ln L_{jt}(w_{Ljt}) = \ln(L_t \Lambda_{Lt}) + \beta \ln w_{Ljt} + \ln a_{Ljt}, \quad (3c)$$

$$\ln H_{jt}(w_{Hjt}) = \ln(H_t \Lambda_{Ht}) + \beta \ln w_{Hjt} + \ln a_{Hjt}. \quad (3d)$$

Constraint (3a) simply restates the production function defined above. Constraint (3b) represents a downward sloping output demand function that can be micro founded using a monopolistic competition framework (see [Appendix C](#)). In this constraint, p_{jt} is the price of the firm's product, ρ is the elasticity of demand, κ_{jt} captures firm-specific demand shifters, p_t denotes the price index in firm j 's market at time t , while I_t is the income spent on total consumption in firm j 's market in period t .¹²

The third (3c) and fourth (3d) constraints represent the upward sloping labor supply functions firms face. These firm-level labor supply curves can be micro founded using a discrete choice framework as in [Card et al. \(2018\)](#). In this framework, each firm posts a pair of skill-specific wages, $\{w_{Ljt}, w_{Hjt}\}$, that all workers costlessly observe. For workers in skill group $S \in \{L, H\}$, the indirect utility of working at firm j is:

$$u_{iSjt} = \ln(\tau w_{Sjt}^\lambda) + \ln a_{Sjt} + \epsilon_{iSjt}, \quad (4)$$

where τ and λ approximate the income tax system (see [Lamadon et al. 2022](#)), $\ln a_{Sjt}$ is a firm-specific amenity that is common to all workers in group S , while ϵ_{iSjt} captures idiosyncratic preferences of worker i for working at firm j , arising from commuting distance, work flexibility and so on. We assume that the ϵ_{iSjt} are independent draws from a type-I Extreme Value distribution with a dispersion parameter ϕ . As demonstrated by [Card et al. \(2018\)](#), under these assumptions, the approximate firm-specific upward-sloping labor supply functions lead to equations (3c) and (3d), where the terms $\ln(L_t \Lambda_{Lt})$ and $\ln(H_t \Lambda_{Ht})$ represent local labor market conditions. Importantly, the firm-specific labor supply elasticity, $\beta = \lambda/\phi$, is decreasing in the dispersion of worker preferences: the more heterogeneous the workers' preferences, the more firms need to raise wages to attract more workers. A special case of this model is a perfectly competitive labor market, where the dispersion of workers' idiosyncratic preferences converges to zero—meaning that all workplaces are homogeneous from the workers' perspectives. In this case, β is infinite and so firms face a perfectly elastic labor supply function.

In this framework equilibrium is defined as workers' decision of which firm to choose, given firm characteristics, the share of high-skilled workers and preference parameters. In equilibrium workers maximize their utility when choosing firms, firms maximize profits when setting wages for low- and high-skilled workers, and market-level prices and wages reflect the equality of supply and demand on the two labor markets and the product markets. We discuss the equilibrium definition more formally in [Definition 1](#) of [Appendix C](#).

¹²When different firms serve different markets, p_t and I_t are market-specific. However, to make the notation simpler, we suppress this index in our derivations.

The first order conditions from the firm's profit maximization problem lead to the following relationship between the relative wages and skill ratio at the firm level:

$$\ln \frac{w_{Hjt}}{w_{Ljt}} = \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1 - \theta_{jt}} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \ln \frac{H_{jt}}{L_{jt}}, \quad (5)$$

where $\frac{\theta_{jt}}{1 - \theta_{jt}}$ measures the extent to which technology is tilted toward high-skilled labor. This equation resembles the key equation describing the relationship between relative demand and relative wages of college and non-college workers in the skill-biased technological change literature (see e.g. [Katz & Murphy 1992](#), [Violante 2008](#), [Goldin & Katz 2010](#)). In our framework, however, the relationship emerges at the firm level: linking the firm-specific skill premium and ratio.

Since $\sigma \geq 0$, equation (5) highlights that relative wages and relative skill ratios are negatively related in absence of changes in skill bias, θ_{jt} . Intuitively, the negative relationship is driven by a firm-level "law of demand": if the relative price of an input increases, firms will substitute away from that input. Even though firm-level relative wages and employment both change endogenously in a setting where labor markets are non-competitive, they still remain negatively related in the absence of skill-biased change. Consequently, if we observe that relative skill ratios and relative wages are both positively affected by technological change, we can infer that the technological change is skill biased.

The derived equation (5) together with the constraints given by equations (3a)-(3d) imply that

$$\ln \frac{w_{Hjt}}{w_{Ljt}} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma + \beta} \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1 - \theta_{jt}} - \frac{1}{\sigma + \beta} \ln \frac{H_t \Lambda_{Ht}}{L_t \Lambda_{Lt}} - \frac{1}{\sigma + \beta} \ln \frac{a_{Hjt}}{a_{Ljt}}, \quad (6a)$$

$$\ln \frac{H_{jt}}{L_{jt}} = \frac{\beta\sigma}{\sigma + \beta} \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1 - \theta_{jt}} + \frac{\sigma}{\sigma + \beta} \ln \frac{H_t \Lambda_{Ht}}{L_t \Lambda_{Lt}} + \frac{\sigma}{\sigma + \beta} \ln \frac{a_{Hjt}}{a_{Ljt}}. \quad (6b)$$

These equations highlight that the relative skill and wage ratios do not depend on the Hicks-neutral part of the production function (A_{jt}) or the various (firm-specific) output demand shocks (e.g. κ_{jt}). Instead, these relative terms depend on the extent to which the technology relies on skilled workers (θ_{jt}), on the relative firm-level amenities (a_{Hjt}/a_{Ljt}), and on the market-level labor supply shocks in the two markets ($H_t \Lambda_{Ht}/L_t \Lambda_{Lt}$). In particular, the changes in the skill premium and the skill share depend on θ_{jt} in the following way:

$$\underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{w_{Hjt}}{w_{Ljt}}}_{\text{Change in skill premium}} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma + \beta} \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1 - \theta_{jt}}}_{\text{Change in skill bias}} - \frac{1}{\sigma + \beta} \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{H_t \Lambda_{Ht}}{L_t \Lambda_{Lt}}}_{\text{Change in market-level labor supply}} - \frac{1}{\sigma + \beta} \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{a_{Hjt}}{a_{Ljt}}}_{\text{Change in relative amenities}}, \quad (7a)$$

$$\underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{H_{jt}}{L_{jt}}}_{\text{Change in skill ratio}} = \frac{\beta\sigma}{\sigma + \beta} \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1 - \theta_{jt}}}_{\text{Change in skill bias}} + \frac{\sigma}{\sigma + \beta} \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{H_t \Lambda_{Ht}}{L_t \Lambda_{Lt}}}_{\text{Change in market-level labor supply}} + \frac{\sigma}{\sigma + \beta} \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{a_{Hjt}}{a_{Ljt}}}_{\text{Change in relative amenities}}, \quad (7b)$$

where Δ denotes the change between before and after innovation.

These equations motivate our difference-in-differences style regressions described in detail in Section 4. We study the changes in the skill premium and the skill ratio following innovation and compare it to the changes in non-innovative firms. According to these equations, skill-biased innovation—an increase in θ —positively (or non-negatively if $\beta = \infty$) affects both the skill ratio and the skill premium. At the same time, other firm- or market-specific shocks either have no effect on the skill ratio (e.g. a Hicks-neutral increase in the production function, A_{jt} , or a change in output demand, κ_{jt}) or have an opposite effect on the skill ratio and the skill premium (e.g. a relative change in labor supply, $H_t\Lambda_{Ht}/L_t\Lambda_{Lt}$, or a relative change in amenities, a_{Hjt}/a_{Ljt}).

It is worth emphasizing that even if technological change is initiated in response to some firm-specific demand shock (e.g. a change in κ_{jt}), such shocks do not affect the skill ratio and skill premium (as they do not appear in equations (7a) and (7b)). We hence avoid the well-known issue of separating the effect of innovation on TFP (or A_{jt}) from output demand shocks that coincide with it (see e.g. Crépon et al. 1998, Griffith et al. 2006). Still, to make sure that our results do not simply reflect the endogenous nature of firm-level innovation, we present evidence from Norway where we exploit an exogenous change in incentives to invest in innovation (see Section 5.3).

The equations also highlight the importance of identifying skill-biased technological change from changes in both the skill ratio and the skill premium. Inferring whether a technological change is skill biased solely from a change in the skill ratio requires dealing with potential changes in relative labor supply and changes in relative amenities.¹³ For instance, an increase in the skill ratio might simply reflect that firms invest more in innovation if they expect a change in the relative supply of high- and low-skilled workers, or a change in relative amenities. To identify skill biasedness from the skill ratio alone, it is necessary to control for a number of hard-to-observe factors, or to exploit changes in innovation activities that are orthogonal to potential confounders. In fact, as we will see later, even when studying an exogenous technology shifter, focusing solely on skill ratio can be problematic whenever the firm-specific labor supply elasticities differ by skill groups (i.e. $\beta_H \neq \beta_L$). In this case Hicks-neutral shocks can increase the skill ratio, while they cannot simultaneously increase the skill ratio and the skill premium (see Proposition 1).

A special case in our model is when labor markets are competitive (where β is infinite). In this case, as equations (6a) and (6b) highlight, a skill-biased change, $\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1-\theta_{jt}}$, only affects the skill ratio, and not the skill premium. So in perfectly competitive labor markets it is indeed sufficient to study changes in the skill ratio. Nevertheless, even in this case, documenting the lack of change in the skill premium can be used to rule out the presence of other contaminating shocks that could potentially affect the skill ratio. For instance, as equations (6a) and (6b) show, the change in relative supply of skilled workers can lead to an increase in the skill ratio, only if there is a simultaneous decrease in the skill premium.¹⁴

Perfectly competitive market is an extreme case of our framework. Still, even if β is less than

¹³As we discuss later (see Proposition 1), whenever the firm-specific labor supply elasticities differ by skill groups, even firm-specific demand shocks can generate an increase in skill ratio. Such shocks cannot, on the other hand, explain an increase in both the skill ratio and the skill premium.

¹⁴Caroli & Van Reenen (2001) propose to apply a one-equation empirical strategy. They assume a translog production function, which is a second order approximation of our CES production function around $\sigma = 1$. Whenever $\sigma = 1$ (Cobb-Douglas production function), the change in the wage share, which can be calculated by adding up equations

infinite, a more elastic firm-specific labor supply elasticity (β is higher), implies a smaller change in the skill premium, and a larger change in the skill ratio in response to changes in the skill bias (θ) (equations (7a) and (7b)). The firm-specific labor supply elasticity, β , depends on the dispersion in the idiosyncratic preferences of individuals working at a particular firm (see equation (4) and the subsequent discussion). This dispersion is likely to depend on the average distance between different workplaces within the labor market, as this gives rise to differences in commuting time. Firm density, à la [Ciccone & Hall \(1996\)](#), is therefore a good proxy for such dispersion. In line with this prediction, we show in Section 5 that in local areas with high firm density the increase in the skill premium is smaller, while the increase in the skill ratio is larger following innovation.

The above derivation assumes that workers' qualities are constant within skill groups. Yet, a potential reason why relative wages change following innovation is that firms may hire higher-quality workers within a given skill group. In the extreme case, innovation only affects worker sorting to firms, and not the wage premium paid to equally productive workers. As a result, it is crucial to make sure that results are not driven by firm-level changes in worker composition following innovation. To do this, we show in Section 5.1 that changes in the wage premium are present also for incumbent workers who worked at the firm before innovation (as well as for new entrants). Moreover, we exploit our particularly rich data from Norway to control for unobservable worker characteristics. We discuss this in more detail in Section 4.

Our framework can be also used to quantify the size of the skill-biased technological change. Firms' optimal choice of skill ratio and skill premium implies Equation (5). The change in skill bias is given by:

$$\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1 - \theta_{jt}} = \Delta \ln \frac{w_{H_{jt}}}{w_{L_{jt}}} + \frac{1}{\sigma} \Delta \ln \frac{H_{jt}}{L_{jt}}. \quad (8)$$

This equation implies that the change in the skill premium plus the change in skill ratio divided by σ gives us the change in skill bias. Notice that the changes in the skill premium and skill ratio in the formula contain the effects of all potential shocks that coincide with a technological change, such as output demand shocks, κ , local labor supply shocks, $H_t \Lambda_{Ht} / L_t \Lambda_{Lt}$, or relative change in amenities, $a_{H_{jt}} / a_{L_{jt}}$. These other shocks could increase the skill ratio and decrease the skill premium, or vice versa, but once we apply equation (8), the effect of these other shocks will offset each other, leaving only the change in the skill bias term in the production function. In Section 6.1 we describe in more detail how we apply this idea in practice.

2.1 Extensions

Below we present two extensions of the basic set-up that are discussed in more detail in [Appendix C](#) and [Appendix D](#). First, we extend the framework to allow for skill-specific labor supply elasticities, and show that this accentuates the importance of identifying skill-biased technological changes through [\(7a\)](#) and [\(7b\)](#), will be equal to the change in skill bias:

$$\Delta \text{wage share of } H_{jt} = \Delta \ln \frac{w_{H_{jt}}}{w_{L_{jt}}} + \Delta \ln \frac{H_{jt}}{L_{jt}} = \Delta \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1 - \theta_{jt}}.$$

However, the change in the share of high-skilled wages does not capture the change in skill bias whenever $\sigma \neq 1$.

increases in both the skill ratio and the skill premium. Next, we extend our framework to account for strategic interactions between firms, and show how we can test for this in the data. We also discuss two alternative models for wage setting—bargaining and rent sharing—and how they matter for the prediction from our model on how to conclude that a technological change is skill biased.

Skill-Specific Labor Supply Elasticities. So far we have followed the literature, and assumed that the labor supply elasticities of low- and high-skilled workers are similar. In Appendix C.2, we relax this assumption by allowing the dispersion of the idiosyncratic error term, ϵ_{iSjt} in equation (4), to be skill specific. The upward-sloping labor supply curves (equations (3c) and (3d)) are then replaced by:

$$\ln L_{jt}(w_{Ljt}) = \ln(L_t \Lambda_{Lt}) + \beta_L \ln w_{Ljt} + \ln a_{Ljt}, \quad (3c')$$

$$\ln H_{jt}(w_{Hjt}) = \ln(H_t \Lambda_{Ht}) + \beta_H \ln w_{Hjt} + \ln a_{Hjt}, \quad (3d')$$

where $\beta_L = \frac{\lambda}{\theta_L}$ and $\beta_H = \frac{\lambda}{\theta_H}$ are firm-level labor supply elasticities of low- and high-skilled workers. When the firm-level labor supply elasticities differ, we cannot express the skill premium and the skill ratio in a closed form. Furthermore, it can be shown that even Hicks-neutral productivity shocks can affect both the skill premium and the skill ratio. Nevertheless, as stated in Proposition 1, such shocks will consistently move the skill ratio and premium in opposite directions.

Proposition 1. *Suppose that firms maximize profit given the constraints in equations (3a), (3b), (3c') and (3d'). Changes in A_{jt} and κ_{jt} have the following effect on the firm-level skill ratio $\left(\ln \frac{H_{jt}}{L_{jt}}\right)$ and skill premium $\left(\ln \frac{w_{Hjt}}{w_{Ljt}}\right)$.*

1. If $\beta_H = \beta_L$, then $\ln \frac{w_{Hjt}}{w_{Ljt}}$ and $\ln \frac{H_{jt}}{L_{jt}}$ are unaffected by A_{jt} and κ_{jt} .
2. If $\beta_H > \beta_L$, then $\ln \frac{w_{Hjt}}{w_{Ljt}}$ is decreasing and $\ln \frac{H_{jt}}{L_{jt}}$ is increasing in A_{jt} and in κ_{jt} .
3. If $\beta_H < \beta_L$, then $\ln \frac{w_{Hjt}}{w_{Ljt}}$ is increasing and $\ln \frac{H_{jt}}{L_{jt}}$ is decreasing in A_j and in κ_{jt} .

Proof. See Appendix Section C.2. □

Proposition 1 states that Hicks-neutral changes (changes in A_{jt}) and firm specific demand shifters (changes in κ_{jt}) directly affect the skill ratio and the skill premium if the dispersion of idiosyncratic preferences differs across the two skill groups ($\beta_H \neq \beta_L$). Nevertheless, the effects of these shocks on $\ln \frac{w_{Hjt}}{w_{Ljt}}$ and $\ln \frac{H_{jt}}{L_{jt}}$ always have opposite signs. This implies that changes in demand shifters (κ_j) or Hicks-neutral shocks (A_j) cannot explain a joint increase of the skill premium and the skill ratio.

Why does even a Hicks-neutral change (A_{jt}) affect the skill ratio when $\beta_H \neq \beta_L$? When a firm experiences an increase in A_{jt} , it will expand and, therefore, increase its demand for both types of workers. Imagine, for example, that high-skilled workers are more responsive to changes in wages than low-skilled workers ($\beta_H > \beta_L$). In optimum, firms adjust both on the wage and quantity margins:

they raise the wages of high-skilled workers less than the wages of low-skilled workers ($\Delta \ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}} < 0$), but hire relatively more of them ($\Delta \ln \frac{H_j}{L_j} > 0$).

An important implication of Proposition 1 is that even if an innovation shock *per se* is exogenous, it is not sufficient to document an increase in the skill ratio following an innovation to conclude that the innovation has a skill-biased productivity term. In the presence of imperfect competition in the labor market, even a Hicks-neutral change in the production function can affect the skill ratio (for instance if $\beta_H > \beta_L$). It is still the case however, as Equation (5) above demonstrates, that whenever the skill premium and the skill ratio both increase, technological change must be skill biased. Furthermore, the firm’s first order conditions can be used in a similar way to quantify the extent of skill bias as for the benchmark model.

Labor Market Power. So far we have assumed that agents are atomistic in labor markets, and so they do not take into account how their behavior affects other agents’ behavior. We relax this assumption and incorporate strategic interactions into our framework by following Berger et al. (2019a) and Deb et al. (2020). In particular, Deb et al. (2020) show that equation (5) has to be extended with an extra term capturing the change in market power in the presence of strategic interactions in the labor market (see more details in Appendix D)¹⁵:

$$\underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{w_{Hjt}}{w_{Ljt}}}_{\text{Change in skill premium}} = \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{1 + \varepsilon_{Ljmt}}{1 + \varepsilon_{Hjmt}}}_{\text{Change in markdown}} + \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1 - \theta_{jt}}}_{\text{Change in skill bias}} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{H_{jt}}{L_{jt}}}_{\text{Change in skill ratio}}, \quad (9)$$

where $\Delta \ln \frac{1 + \varepsilon_{Ljmt}}{1 + \varepsilon_{Hjmt}}$ shows the change in relative firm-specific markdowns for firm j operating in labor market m . In the presence of strategic interactions, the mark-downs are firm-specific and depend on the firm’s market share of the particular skill group in the local labor market (Berger et al. 2019a). These market shares may themselves be affected both by skill-biased and Hicks-neutral technological change. Importantly, if Hicks-neutral innovation leads to a large increase in market shares (and so an increase in market power), this can introduce a positive correlation between the change in the college premium and the college ratio. Guided by equation (9), we investigate the importance of this empirically. We separate the change in skill bias from the change in labor market power following innovation by estimating the changes in market shares and relative markdowns. We find some evidence for changes in relative market power following innovation in Norway, but this has a negligible impact on our estimates of the impact of innovation on the skill premium (more details are given in Appendix D).

Alternative Wage Setting: Bargaining Model. We next describe the implications for identifying skill-biased technological change from alternative systems of wage setting (further details are given in Appendix Section E.1). We first consider the bargaining model of Van Reenen (1996) where wages and employment are determined through a Nash-bargaining process between a firm and worker union. We extend the model to allow high- and low-skilled workers to be organised in different unions, and assume that the union of workers with skill S at firm j has the following objective function

¹⁵This extension explicitly models labor markets, and therefore, we index the labor market-level variables with m .

(see equation (1) in [Van Reenen 1996](#)):

$$U_{Sj} = S_j u(w_{Sj}) = S_j \frac{1}{1 - m_S} w_{Sj}^{1 - m_S}, \quad (10)$$

where $0 \leq m_S \leq 1$ measures risk aversion of the workers that can vary by skill group S . This formulation reflects that unions care about both the level of wages and employment. Similarly to [Van Reenen \(1996\)](#), we assume that wages and employment are determined through a Nash-bargaining process. The equilibrium solution maximizes Ω by optimally choosing the skill-specific wages (w_{Hj} and w_{Lj}) and the skill-specific employment (L_j and H_j) (see equation (3) in [Van Reenen 1996](#)):

$$\max_{w_{Lj}, w_{Hj}, L_j, H_j} \Omega = U_{Lj}^{\beta_L} U_{Hj}^{\beta_H} \Pi_j^{1 - \beta_L - \beta_H}, \quad (11)$$

where Π_j is firm's profit and β_L and β_H are the bargaining powers of the two unions. It turns out that this problem leads to the same FOC as in our benchmark case. The change in the skill premium following innovation will take the following form:

$$\Delta \ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}} = \Delta \ln \frac{\theta_j}{1 - \theta_j} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \Delta \ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}. \quad (12)$$

We see that the relationship between the change in skill premium, skill demand and skill bias in a bargaining model is similar to the relationship derived in our main framework. Consequently, the same reasoning regarding inferring a skill-biased technological change applies.

Alternative Wage Setting: Rent Sharing. We also derive the relative skill ratio and wages in a dynamic optimal contracting model that leads to rent sharing (see further details in Appendix Section [E.2](#)). We follow [Kline et al. \(2019\)](#) and assume that there is imperfect substitutability between incumbent workers, I_{Sj} , and new hires, N_{Sj} because of training and recruitment costs involved in new hires. The firm can hire as many new workers as desired at the competitive market wage w_S^m . Each period they decide on the wages of the incumbent workers, w_{Sj}^I , by taking into account that higher wages increase the retention rate.

In the Appendix Section [E.2](#) we derive the following relationship between changes in wages and employment:

$$\underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{(1 + \beta_H) w_{Hj}^I - w_H^m}{(1 + \beta_L) w_{Lj}^I - w_L^m}}_{\text{Relative change in incumbent wages}} = \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_j}{1 - \theta_j}}_{\text{Change in skill bias}} - \underbrace{\frac{1}{\sigma} \Delta \ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}}_{\text{Change in skill ratio}}, \quad (13)$$

where β_H and β_L determine the responsiveness of high- and low-skilled incumbent workers to changes in wages. This equation is similar to our benchmark equation (equation (5)) except for its left-hand side, which differs from the main model in two respects. First, its functional form is slightly different, however it still captures changes in the skill premium. Second, in this rent sharing model, the change in skill bias does not affect the wages of new workers, as firms can hire as many workers as they want

at the prevailing competitive wage, w_S^m . Nevertheless, firms have stronger incentives to retain their high skilled workers when skill demand increases, which drives up incumbent wages. As a result, the relevant object for assessing skill bias is the wage growth of incumbent workers.

This derivation highlights that the main prediction of the main model also applies to rent sharing models: skill-biased technological change leads to a joint increase in the skill premium and the skill ratio. However, the model only predicts an increase in the skill premium for incumbent workers and not for new entrants.

3 Data and Institutional Setting in Hungary and Norway

In our empirical application, we study the contribution of innovation activities and technological change to skill demand in two European countries: Norway and Hungary. We start by providing a brief description of innovation activities and the labor markets of both countries. Further details can be found in [Appendix B](#). Next, we describe the data sources, and provide some descriptive statistics of the firms in our data.

3.1 Background

Norway is one of the richest and most developed countries in the world, with a GDP/capita level which is 20% larger than that of the US. Hungary is among the poorest European Union member states, with a GDP/capita slightly above 50% of US level in PPP terms. In terms of innovation activities, Norway is classified as a “Strong innovator” (similar to France, ranked 10th in the EU out of 28) while Hungary is classified as a “Moderate innovator” (ranked 23rd) according to the European Innovation Scoreboard.¹⁶ This suggests that Norway is much closer to, and might contribute to push, the technology frontier, while Hungary relies more heavily on technology adoption to approach the frontier.

Labor market institutions also differ between Norway and Hungary. The Norwegian labor market is an example of the Nordic model with its three key features: (i) flexible hiring and firing, (ii) a generous social safety net, and (iii) active labor market policies. Union density is very high, with more than 38% of workers in the private sector being organised in a Union in 2014 ([Nergaard 2014](#)). Centralized collective bargaining has led to low wage dispersion and sustained high wage growth. The centralized bargaining process results in proposed wage caps, while at the same time leaving considerable room for deviations from industry-level agreements. Indeed, firm-level wage agreements often lead to substantially higher wages, allowing for firm-level wage setting. For the majority of white-collar workers in the private sector, centrally negotiated collective agreements do not specify wages, and therefore these workers are subject to firm-level wage formation with strong individual-level elements ([Nergaard 2014](#)). In strong contrast to the Nordic model of wage formation is the Hungarian

¹⁶https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/policy/innovation/scoreboards_en. This ranking is multi-dimensional, based strongly on the CIS. Norway is not an EU member state, but its score can be compared to the score of other member states. Based on data from 2018.

model. In general, Hungarian employment protection institutions are closer to the Anglo-Saxon institutions than to those found in most continental countries. It is relatively easy to dismiss workers (Tonin et al. 2009), and wage bargaining takes place mostly at the individual level. Union membership is very low and coverage of collective industry-level agreements is limited and usually lax rules are set.

These major differences between Norway and Hungary, both in terms of distance to the technological frontier and labor market institutions, is our main motivation for studying and comparing skill-biased technological change in these two countries in particular. Due to the vast span of what constitutes technological changes, as well as measurement challenges, there can be no ultimate answer to whether technological change is skill biased. However, the similarity of our results across firms operating in these fundamentally different environments suggests that our results have some external validity to other countries and contexts as well.

3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics

Innovation data: The Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The first data sources are the Hungarian and Norwegian versions of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), conducted in a harmonized way in the European Union member states and some other countries, including Norway. The richness of the CIS has been exploited in the recent literature to estimate the effect of various types of innovation on firm performance (Crépon et al. 1998, Griffith et al. 2006), however to the best of our knowledge, no paper has used so far the CIS to assess the relationship between innovation and skill demand. The survey is bi-annual and covers a representative sample of manufacturing and service firms in the economy. All firms with at least 50 employees are present in every survey year, while a number of smaller firms are sampled. The survey asks questions on firm innovation activities in the survey year and the preceding two years. For example, the CIS 2014 refers to innovation activities in 2012, 2013 and 2014. In this paper we use six waves of the CIS survey from the period 2004 to 2014 (five waves for Norway: 2004-2012). In both countries, the sample size has been progressively increasing from about 4,000 firms in 2004 to more than 7,000 at the end of the period of study.

The key idea of our empirical approach is to use the questions on innovation in the CIS survey to create a self-reported and direct measure on whether a firm experienced a technological change in a given period. The innovation measure in the CIS captures the introduction of products, services, processes and organizational solutions which are new or significantly modified from the viewpoint of the firm, but that are not necessarily new to the market (see the exact question in Appendix Table B.1). In terms of our conceptual framework, the CIS survey allows us to identify when firms experience a change in their production function. An advantage of the measures of innovation in the CIS is that they capture actual introductions of new technologies, i.e. changes in the production function. This is in contrast to innovation spending, such as R&D spending, that may or may not lead to technological change with some lag. Throughout the paper we use technological change and innovation interchangeably.

The broad definition of, and detailed question about, innovation in the CIS allows us to capture a wide variety of technological change. More details on this are found in Appendix Table B.1 that

describes the survey questions used to define our variables, and Appendix Table B.2 that reports key summary statistics of these variables. Following the existing literature (see e.g. Caroli & Van Reenen 2001), we pay specific attention to whether innovation with technical aspects (product and/or process innovation) and organizational innovation have a differential impact.¹⁷ We also study the degree to which “new” or R&D-based technological change is skill biased, compared to less novel or non-R&D based innovations. For the empirical implementation, we create an R&D dummy for whether the firm reports positive in-house R&D spending, and consider an innovation as new if the firm reports the innovation to be new to its market. Finally, in most of the paper we use a binary indicator for whether innovation took place to measure technological change in firms. In Appendix Section A.7, we extend our analysis to also look at whether innovation spending intensity, that captures the extent of innovation efforts, matters for whether the technological change is skill biased.

We link the CIS data to employer-employee data from both countries.

Norway: The Employer-Employee Register. The employer-employee register, provided by Statistics Norway, contains annual records of all employment spells, as well as associated information on wages and days worked.¹⁸ We merge the employer-employee register to data on worker demographics that include information on level of education, age and gender. Finally, we link these data to data containing information from the balance sheets of limited liability firms.

To study the impact of innovation on the skill premium, we start out with the employer-employee register for the years 2002-2013 and keep the main (highest paid) employment spell of full-time workers in each year. We restrict the sample to workers aged 19 to 67. To be included in the data, we further require that the worker is employed in a firm for at least 30 days in a given year. This results in an unbalanced panel data set containing 8,330,444 observations with 1,013,857 workers employed in 118,967 different firms over the 12-year period 2002-2013. This data set is merged to five waves of the CIS survey for Norway that was conducted biannually over 2004-2012, and covers the years 2002-2012. This gives an unbalanced panel consisting of 4,804,373 worker-year observations in 15,530 unique firms.¹⁹ To study firm-level changes in skill ratio, we create a firm-level data set by aggregating up from the worker-level sample.²⁰ For the firm-level regressions we create a sample of firms that are observed both in the year of the innovation survey, as well as six years later (see Section 4.2). Consequently, the sample for the firm-level regressions consists of firms that were surveyed in the CIS waves in 2004, 2006 or 2008, and that we can observe over a six-year time period. This results in a sample of 24,959 firms.

Hungary: The Structure of Earnings Survey. In Hungary, we use the Structure of Earnings

¹⁷“Product innovation” is defined as “the market introduction of a new or significantly improved good or service with respect to its capabilities, user friendliness, components or sub-systems.” A “process innovation” is defined as “the implementation of a new or significantly improved production process, distribution method, or supporting activity.” An “organizational innovation” is “a new organizational method in your enterprise’s business practices (including knowledge management), workplace organization or external relations that has not been previously used by your enterprise”. These carefully drafted definitions have been developed by extensive work after a number of pilot surveys by Eurostat, to make sure that the results are comparable across countries and time periods.

¹⁸A more detailed description of this database is available at <https://www.nav.no/en/home/employers/nav-state-register-of-employers-and-employees>.

¹⁹Around 70% of the firms are observed in at least two CIS waves, and around 20% are observed in all five waves.

²⁰In the firm-level analysis, part-time workers are included. Since hourly wages cannot be reliably calculated for part-time workers, we drop them from the worker-level analysis.

Survey (Bértarifa) database, which is a survey harmonized across EU countries.²¹ This is an annual worker-level survey, which includes information on a number of demographic variables, including schooling, job characteristics, tenure and wage that workers earned in May of a given year. This database samples firms with less than 50 employees and collects information on all employees of these firms. All firms with more than 50 employees are surveyed, and data on a representative sample of employees at these firms are collected. These data are available for each year between 2000 and 2014. The number of observations of employees of business-sector firms is between 120,000 and 170,000 per year. Importantly, the data set is repeated cross-sectionally at the worker level, meaning that it is not possible to perfectly link employees across waves, as we cannot identify movements of workers across firms.

These data can be merged to administrative balance sheet data collected for tax purposes by the National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV). This database includes employment, industry classification and balance sheet information of all double-entry bookkeeping enterprises in Hungary.

To create a worker-level data set, we start out with the Structure of Earnings Survey for the years between 2003-2014. The 12 waves of the survey consist of 2,085,455 individuals and 42,395 unique firms. We merged the survey to 6 waves of the CIS, which was conducted biannually between 2004 and 2014. The merged sample consists of 785,443 individuals and 6,236 unique firms.²² ²³ For the firm-level regressions we use firms that were surveyed in the CIS waves in 2004, 2006 or 2008 (as discussed above for the Norwegian data). Further, the firms must be in the Structure of Earnings Survey both in the CIS year, as well as six years later. These restrictions reduce the firm-level regression sample to 2,363 firm-year observations and 1,733 unique firms.

Descriptive Statistics. Table 1 compares innovative and non-innovative firms in the two countries. Two types of differences are apparent. First, in line with much of the literature (see e.g. Griffith et al. 2006), innovative firms are larger in both countries. Second, innovation is associated with higher skill levels. In particular, both the average years of education of workers, and the share of college graduates are substantially higher in innovative firms. These firms also pay substantially higher wages. In terms of age composition, innovative and non-innovative firms are very similar in both countries. Finally, as can be seen by the average number of employees in the innovative and non-innovative firms, the sample from Norway contains a higher share of small firms compared to Hungary. This is due to the differences in data sources in the two countries.

²¹More information about this survey is available at [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Structure_of_earnings_survey_\(SES\)](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Structure_of_earnings_survey_(SES)).

²²Over the six survey waves, around 50% of the firms are observed at least twice, and 13% are observed at least five times.

²³Matching firms based on observable characteristics leaves 179,065 worker-year observations and 1,716 unique firms (see Section 4.1).

4 Empirical Approach

4.1 Estimating the Change in Skill Premium

To estimate the relationship between innovation and the college premium, we start from a Mincer-type wage regression. In particular, our benchmark empirical model is the following:

$$\ln wage_{ijt} = \delta^u innovation_{jt} + \delta^s innovation_{jt} \times college_i + \gamma X_{ijt} + \eta_i + \varphi_j + \varsigma_{kt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}, \quad (14)$$

where $wage_{ijt}$ is individual i 's wage at firm j at time t , $college_i$ is a dummy variable for whether worker i has college education, and $innovation_{jt}$ is an indicator variable taking the value one if the firm innovates in the current or any of the previous two CIS waves.²⁴ The vector X_{ijt} contains Mincer-type control variables, including gender, age, tenure, tenure squared, a dummy variable for whether the worker is a new entrant to the firm and education dummies (including $college_i$) in specifications without worker fixed effects.²⁵ In the benchmark specification we also include worker fixed effects (η_i , only in Norway), firm fixed effects (φ_j), and group-specific time effects denoted by ς_{kt} in the equation above. In the benchmark specification ς_{kt} includes (1-digit) industry-time fixed effects and (4-digit) education group-time effects. By including the interacted education group-year effects we effectively control for education-specific wage trends, as well as policy changes that might affect education groups differently, such as changes in the minimum wage. In a more saturated model, we also include industry-location-year fixed effects, occupation-location-year fixed effects or industry-occupation-location-year fixed effects.

In the regressions above, δ^s , the coefficient on the interaction between $college_i$ and $innovation_{jt}$, captures the change in skill premium following technological change. As our conceptual framework demonstrated (see equation (7a)), the change in skill premium, δ^s , captures the change in skill-bias, θ , as well as potential changes in market-level labor supply.²⁶ To filter out such potential shocks, we explore multiple alternative control groups for innovative firms by including different combinations of industry-year, location-year, and occupation-year fixed effects in the regression (included in ς_{kt}).²⁷ These sets of fixed effects filter out changes in skill premium that arise at the labor market level. However, controlling for market-level changes at a very detailed level can be problematic if there are spillovers from innovative (treated) to non-innovative (untreated) firms within a narrowly defined market. Such spillovers would imply a violation of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) and bias our estimates. Reassuringly, our results are not sensitive to including a large

²⁴The CIS is biannual and collects information on innovation in the current and previous two years. Therefore, the variable $innovation_{jt}$ captures innovation activities in the firm over the six-year period from $t - 6$ to t

²⁵For Hungary, we additionally include controls for hours worked and a dummy for part-time employees as part-time employees are included in the sample.

²⁶The skill premium might also be affected by changes in firm-specific amenities. However, if someone is solely interested in understanding the contribution of technological change to relative wages (and not relative utilities), it does not matter whether the impact on wages goes through disproportionately lowering amenities of high-skilled workers or through tilting the production function toward high-skilled workers. This might explain why most papers in the rent-sharing literature rule out the possibility that firm-level shocks affect workers' amenities (see e.g. Guiso et al. 2005, Card et al. 2014, 2016, Carlsson et al. 2016, Lamadon 2016, Mogstad et al. 2017, Friedrich et al. 2019, Kline et al. 2019, Lamadon et al. 2022).

²⁷We classify industries based on 1-digit European Industry-standard classification system (NACE codes) rev.2, and occupations based on 2-digits ISCO 08 codes (International Standard Classification of Occupations).

number of combinations of location-occupation-industry-year fixed effects, which suggests that the bias caused by such spillover effects must be limited in our context.

While our theoretical framework suggests that innovation does not need to be exogenous to the firm in order for us to identify whether the innovation is skill-biased, we nevertheless go a long way in confirming that our conclusions are not driven by the endogenous nature of firm innovations. Including firm fixed effects (φ_j), and person fixed effects (η_i ; when using the Norwegian data) controls to a large extent for unobserved differences in wage-setting policies and workforce quality between innovative and non-innovative firms. One remaining concern however, is that firms with better management may pay a higher wage premium to skilled workers even prior to innovation, and may also be more likely to innovate. While we find no indication for such wage premium differences in the data when we study trends in the wage premium prior to innovation, we nevertheless control for unobserved time-invariant differences in skill premium in some regressions. Finally, we confirm our main findings when using an exogenous shift in innovation activities at firms induced by a change in R&D tax credits in Norway (see Section 5.3).

In Hungary, as we cannot follow workers across firms, we instead estimate our main empirical specification in equation (14) on a matched sample where innovative firms are compared to non-innovative firms with similar pre-innovation characteristics.²⁸ This matching procedure, together with firm fixed effects in the regression, alleviate the concern of endogeneity coming from the inherent differences in pay structure that might be present even before innovation. The lack of differential pre-trends in the skill premium across treated and control firms suggests that the matching procedure handles any pre-existing differences in firm-level skill premium.

Another important concern with interpreting δ^s as an estimate of the change in skill premium is that innovation might lead to a change in the composition of workforce at the firm. If higher productivity college educated workers self-select into more innovative firms, or firms that are about to start innovating, then the estimated change in the skill premium will simply reflect a change in the quality of the firm’s high skilled workers, and not an increase in the skill premium. In the benchmark regression equation, we include various measures of worker characteristics to filter out potential compositional changes in terms of observables (gender, age, tenure, tenure squared). We also estimate the impact of firm innovation on a sample of incumbent workers—namely workers that were already working at the firm prior to innovation—in order to hold fixed a firm’s workforce composition. Including person effects (η_i) in our benchmark regression for Norway also helps to deal with unobserved differences in the quality of workers.

Furthermore, since firms might pay heterogeneous skill premiums to their workers, not taking this into account could potentially lead to a bias in worker effects, which could contaminate our control for worker quality in Norway. Therefore, we also present robustness to the inclusion of firm-specific skill

²⁸The matching procedure is described in detail in Appendix Section B.6. In a nutshell, the matching procedure is as follows. “Treated” firms that are not innovative the first time they are observed in the CIS, but become innovative in a later wave, are matched with firms that never innovate. Since our sampling procedure implies that neither treated nor control firms innovate the first time they are observed in the CIS, we match on firm-level characteristics observed in this year. We use the following variables from the balance sheet for matching: 1-digit industry dummies, year dummies, log employment, log productivity, log wage premium and ownership. We also add variables from the CIS, following Griffith et al. (2006), and match based on the main market of the firm, and the types of funding it received.

premium in the regressions for Norway. Nevertheless, to avoid controlling for too many fixed effects in the regressions, and so by throwing out the identifying variation, we group firms into deciles based on their college premium and then include an additional interaction of firm premium-type deciles with the college dummy in regression equation (14). We also explore an iterative procedure for classifying firms as described in Appendix Section B.5.

4.2 Estimating the Change in Skill Ratio

To estimate how technological change is related to subsequent changes in the skill ratio of a firm, we start out with equation (7b). Guided by this equation, we use a difference-in-differences estimation, where we compare firms that innovated at the beginning of the period with non-innovators in the same industry with similar initial characteristics. In particular, we follow [Caroli & Van Reenen \(2001\)](#) and estimate long-difference regressions of the form:

$$\Delta y_{jt} = \delta innovation_{jt} + \gamma \Delta X_{jt} + \gamma^y y_{jt-1} + \varsigma_{kt} + \epsilon_{jt}. \quad (15)$$

The left-hand side captures changes in outcome y_{jt} (such as share of college workers, college to non-college ratio) between year t and $t + 6$ at firm j .²⁹ The variable $innovation_{jt}$ is the same key variable included in the worker regression equation (14), i.e. a dummy variable for whether a firm innovates in the current or previous two CIS waves. Following [Caroli & Van Reenen \(2001\)](#), we control for changes in firm capital and value added, denoted by ΔX_{jt} . However, our results are robust to excluding these potentially endogenous conditioning variables. The specification differences out time invariant firm and labor market characteristics, and we include industry-year fixed effects (ς_{kt}) to control for industry-level labor supply shocks $\left(\Delta \ln \frac{H_t \Delta H_t}{L_t \Delta L_t}\right)$. Finally, we control for a lagged value of the outcome variable (y_{jt-1}), to capture initial firm heterogeneity and investigate robustness to excluding the lagged dependent variable in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. As argued by [Caroli & Van Reenen \(2001\)](#), such a long difference specification is likely to capture the long-run effects of innovation, as opposed to short-run fluctuations in outcomes.

5 Empirical Results

5.1 Innovation and Changes in Skill Demand

Skill Premium. We start our analysis by studying the relationship between innovation and the skill premium. Table 2 shows the estimates from the benchmark specification (equation (14)) for Norway (Panel A) and for Hungary (panel B). Column (1) shows results on the full sample when the only set of control variables is interacted skill-year fixed effects, which control for skill-specific

²⁹The regression sample is reduced to firms in the CIS waves conducted up to and including 2008, since we cannot observe long-term outcomes for firms innovating after 2008. We winsorize all the long difference variables at the 5th and 95th percentiles.

labor market level shocks. According to the results for Norway, workers without a college degree earn 10.5 (s.e. 1.9) percent more in innovative firms (relative to workers with similar education levels in non-innovative firms), while this difference is 18.2 (10.5 + 7.7) percent for college educated workers (compared to college educated workers in non-innovative firms). The cross-sectional wage premium of innovative firms is somewhat larger in Hungary, with low- and high-skilled workers earning 20.1 (s.e. 2.2) and 28.6 (20.1 + 8.5) percent more in innovative firms. In column (2) we also control for worker observable characteristics such as age, tenure and tenure squared, which do not explain much of the innovative firm wage premium. In column (3), we further include firm fixed effects. In this specification, the low-skilled innovation premium becomes negative in both countries, while the college innovation premium becomes even higher than before, at 13 (s.e. 1.6) and 12.3 (s.e. 1.4) percent relative to college educated workers of non-innovative firms. This suggests that while innovative firms pay higher wages even before the innovation, the innovation itself is associated only with an increase in the wages of high-skilled workers.

Our benchmark specifications are reported in column (4). In Norway, the structure of the data allows us to include worker fixed effects, while in Hungary, we do matching at the firm level (as described in Section 4; more details are given in Appendix Sections B.4 and B.6). Importantly, while the estimates become smaller in both countries, they remain highly significant both in economic and statistical terms. In Norway, high-skilled employees experience a 4.5 (s.e. 1.0) percent wage increase following a successful innovation, while this effect is 6.7 (s.e. 2.3) percent in Hungary. Overall, we find remarkably similar results in the two countries, with a 4-7 percent increase in the wage premium of college educated workers following innovation.

In columns (5) and (6), we include one and two innovation pre-trend dummy variables indicating that the firm will innovate in the subsequent CIS wave, or in the CIS wave after the following one, as well as the interaction of these pre-trends with the college dummy. We do not find any evidence of a pre-trend in skill premium in any of the two countries, underscoring that the main results do not reflect pre-existing wage premium differences between innovative and non-innovative firms.

A number of additional robustness checks are presented in Table 3, all starting from our preferred specification (column (4) of Table 2).

Filtering Out Market-Level Labor Supply Shocks. Our first concern is that innovation may be correlated with market-level labor supply shocks. As we described in Section 2, the effects of such shocks on the skill ratio and the skill premium go in the opposite direction, and so they cannot lead to an increase in both outcomes. Still, it is worth exploring how sensitive our results are to controlling for market-level shocks. In columns (1)-(5) of Table 3, we present results for the effect of innovation on the skill premium when controlling for labor market-time specific shocks using alternative definitions of labor markets. Column (1) includes (1-digit) industry-year fixed effects, as well as district-year fixed effects capturing time-varying product or labor market specific shocks. In column (2), we include industry-district-year fixed effects to control for industry-specific shocks to local labor markets. Column (3) includes (2-digit) occupation-district-year fixed effects to additionally control for local occupation-specific shocks.³⁰ In column (4), we include industry-occupation-district-year fixed effects.

³⁰For Norway, the data on occupation comes from Statistics Norway’s statistics on monthly earnings.

This latter specification takes out shocks occurring at narrowly defined labor markets. Focusing on very narrow labor markets might be problematic however, as decisions made by innovative firms may affect decisions of non-innovative firms. For instance, if some innovative firms hire skilled workers and pay higher wages, non-innovative firms also need to pay higher wages. Such spillover effects imply a downward bias in our estimates. In line with this, comparing column (4) in Table 3 with our benchmark specification (column (4) of Table 2), shows that controlling for these fixed effects reduces the estimated college-premium effects by around 20% (4.5%, s.e. 1.0, in benchmark vs. 3.6%, s.e. 1.1, with industry-occupation-district-year fixed effects for Norway). Nevertheless, our estimates are overall quite robust to applying labor market controls defined at various levels, as we consistently find that the college premium increases significantly following innovation both in Norway and Hungary.

In column (5) of Table 3, we explore the possibility that the impact of local labor market shocks varies by firm type. For instance, in Proposition 2 in Appendix C we show that if $\beta_H \neq \beta_L$, the very same labor supply shock might have a differential impact on firms operating in the same labor market, depending on the skill bias term of the firm (θ_{jt}). To deal with this issue, we classify firms into quartiles based on their initial skill ratio (which is a monotonic function of the unobserved θ_{jt} , according to equation (6b)), and include quartile-district-year fixed effects in the regression.³¹ The estimated change in the college premium is still substantial (2.2%, s.e. 0.9, for Norway and 5.7%, s.e. 1.8, for Hungary) and statistically significant, suggesting that the observed increase in the wage premium following innovation cannot be attributed to a change in the market-level wage index (Λ_{Ht}) or the supply of skilled workers (H_t).

Short and Medium-Term Effects. In columns (6) and (7) of Table 3, we investigate the more short-term impact of innovation on the skill premium. Recall that in the benchmark specification, we examine the average change in the wage premium up to seven years after innovation. In columns (6) and (7), we examine the impact of innovation on the skill premium up to three and five years after the innovation takes place.³² In both countries, firm outcomes change gradually following the innovation – confirming that our estimates are not simply driven by short-term changes in college premium resulting from a temporarily higher effort of implementing a technological change. However, even when looking only at the immediate effects of innovation, we find a clear increase in the college premium.

Controlling for Firm-Specific College Premium. As described in Section 4.1, a potential concern with regression equation (14) is that the estimated worker fixed effects are biased in the presence of heterogeneous firm-level skill premium (pre-innovation differences in θ_{jt}). To account for the fact that different firms pay different premiums to high- and low-skilled workers, we create a proxy for firm skill-premium type, and interact the deciles of this variable with the college dummy in equation (14). More details on the proxy for firm skill-premium type are provided in Appendix B.5. Column (8) shows the estimates when we include the interaction of firm-level skill premium

³¹We classify firms into skill-ratio quartiles based on their skill ratio the first year they appear in our sample, which is the starting year of our analysis (2002 for Norway and 2000 for Hungary) or the entry date if the firm enters later.

³²For column (6), the dummy variable $innovation_{jt}$ in Equation (14) takes the value one for the years $t - 1$ and t if a firm reports an innovation in the CIS in year t . For column (7), the dummy variable $innovation_{jt}$ takes the value one for the years $t - 3$ to t if a firm reports an innovation in the CIS in year t or $t - 2$. Note that the CIS does not distinguish between firms innovating in year t and year $t - 1$. As a result, this definition is conservative and we expect to underestimate the true impact of innovation on wage premium.

deciles and the college dummy, as well as worker fixed effects in the regression. The results are very similar to the baseline estimates (3.5% vs. 4.5% in the baseline), meaning that even after allowing for variation in firm-specific wage premiums, we find a significant increase in the college premium following innovation.

New Entrants vs. Incumbents. In Table 4, we investigate whether the change in the college wage premium differs for incumbent and new entrant workers. A key implication of our conceptual framework is that an increase in the wage premium results from firms having to pay higher wages to hire new workers following a skill-biased innovation. It follows that not only incumbent workers, but also new hires should experience a higher skill premium. This is in contrast to some rent sharing models, such as the framework laid out in Section 2 and Appendix Section E.2, where incumbent workers obtain some rent following firm level shocks. To test whether the data supports the monopsonistic wage setting framework, we create a dummy variable for whether a worker is an incumbent or a new entrant, and interact it with the *innovation* dummy, as well as with the interaction of *innovation* \times *college*. The latter triple interaction reveals any potential differential effect of innovation on incumbents and new entrant college workers.³³ The results are presented in Table 4, and show that both new entrants and incumbent high-skilled workers receive a higher premium following an innovation in both countries. In both countries, the increase in the college premium is larger among new entrants compared to incumbents (4.3% vs. 2.0% in Norway and 9.5% vs. 4.3% in Hungary). These results are in line with the monopsonistic wage setting in our model, where firms need to raise wages for both new entrants and incumbents to attract more workers, and are in contrast with the rent-sharing model that predicts a skill premium increase only for incumbent workers.

Effect on Structure of Worker’s Compensation and Hours Worked. In Appendix A.3 we investigate whether innovation has an impact on the structure of workers’ remuneration. In our baseline regressions, we use measures of hourly wages (daily wages for Norway) that include base salary and all other financial compensation (e.g. overtime, bonuses). Our data however, allows us to look at the impact of innovation on differential changes of the various components of earnings of college and non-college workers. The results from this extension are presented in Table A.3. We find that the increase in the college premium of workers’ base salary after innovation is very similar to the increase in total wage premium. This confirms that the changes in the skill premium following innovation (presented in Table 2) are not driven by increases in bonus payments rewarding a successful innovation. We further find no indication of changes in hours worked. Finally, we show that when we include non-cash benefits in workers’ compensation in Norway (where this information is available), the estimated change in the college premium is very similar to the estimated change in the wage premium in the benchmark specification.

Polarization. So far, we have studied skill-biased technological change by classifying workers into two skill groups by whether or not they have a college degree. Over the last three decades however,

³³In Norway we define incumbents as workers employed at the firm for at least six years, and new entrants as all other workers. Six years is chosen because the innovation dummy captures innovations taking place during the current or previous five years, and accordingly we want to make sure that the incumbents were indeed employed at the firm prior to the innovation. Alternatively, we also define incumbents as workers being employed at the firm for at least two years. Both definitions give very similar results. In Hungary, our data structure does not allow us to define incumbents as working for at least six years in the firm. As a result, we look at the short term impact of innovation (column (6) in Table 3) and define incumbents as workers that have been at the firm for at least two years.

the US and several European countries have experienced job polarization, where the employment shares in high- and low-skilled occupations have increased. [Acemoglu & Autor \(2011b\)](#) explains this pattern by arguing that middle-skilled occupations, such as middle-skilled clerical, administrative, production and operative occupations, tend to be more affected by technological change than both high- and low-skilled occupations. We explore the degree of wage polarization in Norway and Hungary following innovation by interacting the innovation dummy in equation (14) with the four-category schooling variable (primary schooling, secondary schooling, vocational education, and college); see Appendix Section A.4 for more details on the specification. The results from estimating this extended regression are presented in Appendix Table A.4. In Norway, workers with vocational training earn a wage premium following innovation relative to workers with only primary or secondary education (see Column 4 of Table A.4). In Hungary, in contrast, the wages of workers in the lower three educational categories do not seem to change following innovation, while the wages of college educated workers increase substantially. We therefore conclude that there is little support in the data for any negative impact of innovation on middle education groups—if anything, there is some increase in the wages for this group of workers in Norway.

We also investigate whether the effect of innovation differs between routine and non-routine occupations (see e.g. [Autor et al. 2003](#)). In Appendix Table A.5 we estimate regression equation (14) by including routine intensity and its interaction with the innovation dummy; see Appendix Section A.4 for more details on the specification. The results from this exercise are presented in Table A.5. We find that people working in less routine jobs are paid higher wages in general, but there is no relative increase in their wage premium following innovation. Moreover, the effect of innovation on the college premium remains largely unchanged in these regressions, which suggests that the increase in skill demand following innovation is not limited to non-routine occupations.

Change in the Skill Ratio. We assess the impact of technological change on the skill ratio by estimating regression equation (15). The main results are presented in Table 5. Column (1) shows the impact of innovation on the long difference of the share of college educated workers in total employment. We find a significant positive relationship in both countries: the college employment share increases by 1.1 (s.e. 0.2) percentage points in Norway and by 1.9 (s.e. 0.8) percentage points in Hungary during the six-year period following firm innovation. These estimates are very close to those in [Caroli & Van Reenen \(2001\)](#) for British and French firms. Column (2) shows that the college to non-college ratio increases by around 2.8 (s.e. 0.6) percentage points in Norway, which is a 5.7 (s.e. 1.2) percent increase in skill ratio from the non-innovative firms’ average college ratio (0.49; see Table 1). For Hungary, we find that the skill ratio increases by 2.9 (s.e. 0.8) percentage points following innovation, which corresponds to a 14 (s.e. 4) percent increase from the non-innovative firms’ average college ratio (0.2; see Table 1). We further find that innovation is associated with stronger employment growth, with a significant estimate for Norway (see column (3)). Columns (4) and (5) show that the estimates are robust to not controlling for the lagged dependent variables. Appendix Section A.5 provides further robustness checks showing that the results are robust to including different sets of fixed effects to control for local labor market shocks, and don’t depend on whether we control for the changes in value added and capital stock. We also find significant, albeit slightly smaller, changes in firms’ skill demand when looking at the three-year (as opposed to six-year) changes following innovation. The main takeaway from the firm-level results is that innovation leads to an increase in

the share of high-skilled workers. The increase in skill ratio is more prominent in Hungary than in Norway (when measured in percentage change).

Outsourcing. Domestic outsourcing of less-skilled work to lower-wage contractors or international outsourcing to lower-wage countries, which can be correlated with innovation, could potentially lead to a joint increase in the skill premium and skill ratio. In our data we measure outsourcing behavior of firms (as outsourcing is considered as a type of organizational innovation). In Appendix Section A.6, we show that following outsourcing there is no significant change in the skill premium in either country. For both countries, we find that outsourcing increases the college employment share. At the same time, both the wage- and the skill premiums are robust to controlling for (or excluding) outsourcing in regression equations (14) and (15).

Innovation Spending Intensity. So far, we have studied skill bias following innovation defined as an either-or event. In Appendix Section A.7, we investigate whether innovation intensity—total spending on innovation activities—matters for whether the resulting innovation is skill biased. We find that technological change with zero and medium innovation spending leads to a smaller increase in the skill premium and skill demand than innovations resulting from high spending. This is the case in both countries.

5.2 Heterogeneity by Firm Density

So far we have documented that firms increase both their skill premium and skill ratio following innovation. Equations (7a) and (7b) of our conceptual framework also highlight that the extent to which firms adjust the skill ratio relative to adjusting the skill premium depends on the elasticity of labor supply (β). In particular, the impact of $\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1-\theta_{jt}}$ on the skill premium is $\frac{\sigma}{\sigma+\beta}$, while its impact on the skill ratio is $\frac{\beta\sigma}{\sigma+\beta}$. This has two implications.

First, the ratio of the impact on the skill ratio relative to the impact on the skill premium is roughly equal to β , the elasticity of firm-level labor supply. For Norway, the estimated increase in the skill premium varies between 4.5% (column (4) in Table 2; baseline result) and 2.2% (column (5) in Table 3; with a number of additional controls). The estimated increase in the skill ratio is 5.9%. Consequently, the implied firm-level labor supply elasticity is between 1.3 and 2.7. For Hungary, the estimated increase in the skill premium varies between 6.9% (column (5) in Table 2; baseline result) and 5.5% (column (4) in Table 3; with additional controls), while the change in the skill ratio is 14%. The implied firm-level labor supply elasticity, therefore, is between 2 and 2.6. These estimates are remarkably similar to each other and are also in the range of the existing estimates in the literature. For instance, Saez et al. (2019), studying payroll tax cuts in Sweden, find that the elasticity of firm-specific labor supply is between 1.8 and 2.4.³⁴

Second, whenever firms have more wage setting power (face a more elastic firm-level labor supply), we expect a relatively larger impact on the skill ratio and a smaller impact on the skill

³⁴According to the meta-analysis by Sokolova & Sorensen (2018), the median firm-level labor supply elasticity is around 1.7. Recent quasi-experimental studies (e.g. Caldwell & Oehlsen 2018, Cho 2018, Kroft et al. 2020, Dube et al. 2017) find estimates between 2 and 5 (see more details in Bassier et al. 2020).

premium. Remember that, in our model, the firm-level labor supply elasticity, β , is a function of ϕ , the dispersion of workers' idiosyncratic preferences for working at a particular firm. A key component of this dispersion is commuting distance, which is presumably smaller in local areas with higher firm density (or areas where the average distance between firms are smaller). Consequently, we expect that in local areas with a high firm density (and a low average commuting time), firms face a more elastic labor supply and therefore the increase in the skill ratio will be larger, while the increase in the skill premium will be smaller.

In Figure 2 we explore heterogeneity in the post-innovation change of the skill ratio and the skill premium by the spatial density of firms. Following [Ciccone & Hall \(1996\)](#), we measure firm density as the average number of firms per square kilometer in the local area. As local areas, we use the 46 commuting zones in Norway, as defined in ([Bhuller 2009](#)), and for Hungary we use the 175 NUTS4 micro regions. Then we estimate whether the changes in the skill ratio and the skill premium depend on firm density. We describe the estimation strategy in more detail in Appendix Section A.8, while in Figure 2 we show the estimated change in the skill ratio and skill premium at the 10th percentile (blue bar) and at the 90th percentile (gray bar) of the across-firm distribution of spatial density. Reassuringly, we find (for both countries) a relatively larger increase in the skill ratio, and a relatively lower increase in the skill premium in high-density areas compared to low-density areas.

The estimates in Figure 2 show that in the lowest density areas in Norway, the skill ratio increases by 0.6% (s.e. 2.2%), and the skill premium by 7% (s.e. 1.5%) following innovation. In Hungary, in low-density areas, the skill ratio increases by 5.7% (s.e. 4.7%), and the skill premium by 8.0% (s.e. 3.5%) following innovation. Consequently, in labor market with low firm density, the implied firm-specific labor supply elasticities are around 0.1 in Norway and 0.6 in Hungary. This suggests that firms face quite inelastic labor supply and so they have substantial wage-setting power in these areas. In contrast, in the most dense areas, the skill ratio increases by 8.4% (s.e. 2.4%), and the skill premium by 2.3% (s.e. 1.4%) in Norway, while the skill ratio increases by 28.7% (s.e. 11.5%), and the skill premium by 5.1% (s.e. 3.9%) in Hungary. The implied firm-specific labor supply elasticities are 3.6 for Norway and 4.4 for Hungary. This suggests that wage-setting power is more limited in areas with high firm density. Overall, these findings corroborate a key prediction of our theoretical model: the relative changes in the skill ratio and the skill premium are related to our proxy of firm-specific labor supply elasticities. Furthermore, these geographic differences imply that rural and urban labor markets can be quite differently affected by technological change.

So far we have assumed that firms are atomistic and so they do not consider the impact of their actions on other firms' behavior. However, strategic interactions may be important for the skill demand of large firms, or for firms operating in labor markets with very low firm density. Moreover, innovation itself might affect the market power of firms, which could explain the change in the skill premium and the skill ratio even if the innovation itself is not skill-biased ([Berger et al. 2019a](#)). In [Appendix D](#) we study the impact of innovation on subsequent college market share, non-college market share, and relative markdown (see equation (9)). We find no changes in these proxies of market power following innovation, except when we use a very narrow definition of the market.³⁵ Importantly, when

³⁵The narrow definition of the market is at the 3-digit skill-industry-district level. This is a narrower market definition than that of [Berger et al. \(2019a\)](#) who use US industry-commuting zones. Note that our districts are substantially smaller

we apply the model of [Deb et al. \(2020\)](#) to calculate the impact of the changes in market power following innovation on the skill premium, we find that this impact is very limited (see the details in [Appendix D](#)).

5.3 The Effects of an R&D Tax Credit Policy on Skill Demand

So far we have documented that there is an increase both in the skill premium and the skill ratio following firm innovation. As described in detail in [Section 2](#), an increase in both of these outcomes provides *prima facie* evidence for firm-level technological change being skill-biased. Even if innovation implemented in response to firm-level output demand shocks, market-level labor supply shocks, or changes in amenities, the increase in both the skill ratio and the skill premium cannot reflect those shocks. Still, to make sure that our results do not simply reflect the endogenous nature of firm-level innovation, we present evidence from Norway where we exploit an exogenous change in incentives to invest in innovation.

In 2002 the government introduced a tax credit that lowered the marginal cost of investing in R&D for a subset of firms. In particular, firms were allowed to deduct up to 20% of their R&D expenses up to a threshold of NOK 4 million (approx 450,000 USD). This implied a reduction in the marginal cost of R&D investments for firms investing less than that threshold. We use a difference-in-differences strategy to compare firms whose marginal cost was affected by the policy to a control group consisting of unaffected firms. This empirical design follows closely that of [Bøler et al. \(2015\)](#) and [Bøler \(2015\)](#) who studied the change in skill ratio (but not the change in skill premium). We classify a firm as treated if its average annual R&D expenditure is below 4 million NOK in the pre-tax credit years 1998-2001. We compare these firms to those investing between 4 and 12 million NOK in R&D prior to the policy change. We also restrict the sample to firms with at least 50 employees, as small firms rarely invest in R&D. More details, and sensitivity checks regarding the threshold for the control group, are presented in [Appendix A.10](#).³⁶

Panel A of [Figure 3](#) shows the growth in total log R&D investments relative to the pre-reform year 2001 for treated (solid line) and control firms (dashed line). Treated and control firms follow parallel trends before the reform. However, this trend breaks exactly in 2002, when the tax credit was introduced. The policy led to a 50-100% increase in R&D expenditure among treated firms. Panels B and C show the evolution of the college employment share and the college-to-non-college wage ratio. The graphs highlight that the increase in R&D expenditures was accompanied by a medium-term increase in the college employment share, and in the (raw) college skill-premium among treated relative to control firms. These patterns suggest that it takes time to translate the increased R&D expenditure into actual changes in technology. This is in line with the estimated short-term effects of innovation on the skill premium presented in columns (6) and (7) of [Table 3](#).

Next, we employ a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the effects of the R&D tax credit

local units than the average US commuting zone.

³⁶Note that the first CIS survey was conducted in 2004, so we use another data source, the R&D survey, which goes back to periods before the policy reform.

on the college employment share and the college premium in treated firms. We run the following regression to assess the impact on the college premium:

$$\ln y_{jt} = \delta \text{treat}_j \times \text{post}_t + \theta_j + \varsigma_{kt} + \epsilon_{jt}, \quad (16)$$

where y_{jt} are various firm-level outcomes (e.g. college share) of firm j at time t , treat_j is a dummy variable for whether the firm is defined as treated according to the definition above, post_t is an indicator variable taking the value one for the years following the introduction of the tax credit in 2002, and ς_{kt} reflects industry-year fixed effects. We estimate the regression equation using data for the years 1998-2012, but leaving out the two years immediately following the introduction of the policy.³⁷

Columns (1)-(3) in Table 7 show the estimate of δ from equation (16). We find that following the introduction of the R&D tax credit, treated firms increased their college employment share by 8.9% (s.e. 3.1%), and the college to non-college employment ratio by around 10.4% (s.e. 4.7%), compared to control firms.³⁸ These findings corroborate the findings of [Bøler \(2015\)](#) who, similarly to us, documented an increase in skill ratio following the introduction of this R&D tax credit policy.

However, as discussed above, an increase in the skill ratio does not necessarily imply that technological change is skill-biased. Therefore, we also estimate the change in skill premium using a modified version of equation (14):

$$\ln \text{wage}_{ijt} = \delta^u \text{treat}_j \times \text{post}_t + \delta^s \text{treat}_j \times \text{post}_t \times \text{college}_i + \gamma X_{ijt} + \eta_i + \varphi_j + \varsigma_{kt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}, \quad (17)$$

where $\ln \text{wage}_{ijt}$ is the wage for individual i at firm j at time t , X_{ijt} are Mincer-variables, η_i are person effects, φ_j are firm fixed effects, while ς_{kt} are skill-specific time effects (and so they absorb College_i , post_t and $\text{post}_t \times \text{college}_i$).

In columns (4)-(5) of Table 7 we report δ^s . Column (4) shows that following the introduction of the tax credit, the college wage premium increased by 5.9 (s.e. 2.8) percent in treated relative to control firms. Column (5) reports estimates when we include worker fixed effects in the regression and so we control for the change in the composition of the workforce even in terms of unobservables. The point estimate is similar to our benchmark estimates on the effect of innovation (3.1% here vs. 4.5% in Table 2) though it is more noisily estimated.

To sum up, we find an increase in the skill ratio in response to the tax-credit driven increase in R&D spending. We can also rule out a significant fall in the skill premium even after we control for changes in firms' workers composition. These findings together indicate that the 2002 tax credit led to technological changes that favored skilled workers. Later we use these estimates to quantify the contribution of the tax policy to aggregate inequality (see Section 6.4).

³⁷These two years are omitted since it likely takes some time to turn the increase in R&D, an input of the innovation process, into an increase in innovation output, the actual technological change. Including these two years leads to somewhat less precise and slightly lower estimated coefficients.

³⁸Note that the dependent variables are in logs in these regressions and so the coefficients already reflect percent changes. The estimates in Table 5 are in levels and so they reflect percentage point changes. Nevertheless, once we express those in percent changes we find that the college share increased by 5.5 percent and the college-to-non-college ratio by 5.7 percent.

5.4 Heterogeneity

In this section we investigate the degree to which different forms of technological change are skill biased. We study whether only innovations involving R&D or high novelty value are skill biased, or whether firms' skill demand changes even after technology adoption. This question is also linked to the debate about the skill bias of organizational changes as opposed to technical changes (Caroli & Van Reenen 2001). To this end, we estimate the effects of different types of innovation both on the skill premium and on the skill ratio. The findings for the skill premium are described in detail in this section, while we refer to Appendix Section A.9 for a discussion of the findings for the skill ratio.

The results for the skill premium are presented in Table 6. Column (1) repeats our benchmark estimates corresponding to column (4) of Table 2. In column (2), we investigate whether innovations by firms conducting R&D tend to be more skill biased than non R&D-based innovations. The results are obtained by extending regression equation (14) to include both the main innovation variable—capturing the effect of non-R&D innovation—and its interaction with a dummy variable for whether the firm conducts R&D—capturing the additional effect of R&D innovation. The results from this regression suggest that non-R&D innovation is skill biased in both countries, as it has a significant positive effect on the skill premium (and also on skill share; see Appendix Table A.14). Moreover, while the estimated coefficient on the interaction of innovation and the college premium remains positive and significant, R&D innovation seems to be even more skill biased than non-R&D innovation. The relative difference between R&D and non-R&D innovation is considerably larger in Norway compared to Hungary. In column (3), we investigate whether the novelty value of innovation matters for the impact of the innovation on the wage premium. We capture novelty value of innovation by a dummy variable indicating whether the innovation is new to the firm's market. The estimated coefficient on the interaction of this variable with the college dummy is small and insignificant for both countries, indicating that 'new to the market' innovations are not more skill biased than other less novel innovations. These results suggest that even low-novelty, non-R&D driven firm-level innovation activities are skill biased and they contribute to the increase in college premium.

Column (4) compares the effects on the skill premium of innovations that directly involves technical aspects (product and process) with organizational changes. Note that a firm can conduct both at the same time; therefore, we introduce separate dummies for these two types of innovation, and include these dummies, as well as their interactions with the college dummy in regression equation (14). We find that both technical and non-technical innovations lead to an increase in the skill premium (and also in the skilled share; see Appendix Table A.14). This reinforces the conclusions of Caroli & Van Reenen (2001) regarding the importance of organizational changes in skill-biased technological change. The magnitude of the change in the skill premium following the two types of innovation are similar in Norway, while in Hungary innovations with technical aspects lead to a considerably larger increase in the skill premium. This suggests that organizational changes play a less prominent role in increasing the skill premium in less advanced economies where technological adoption drives innovation activities.

In column (5) we further distinguish between product and process innovation within innovation activities with technical aspects (see footnote 17 and Table B.1 for the exact definitions). The point

estimate of the interaction of product innovation with the college dummy is higher than the interaction with process innovation in both countries, even if not significantly, providing some evidence that product innovations tend to be more skill biased than process innovations.

Finally, in column (6) we study whether the skill bias of innovations depends on the sector the firms operates in, and whether the sector is technology or knowledge intensive. We classify industries into four groups: high and low technology manufacturing, and high and low knowledge-intensive services.³⁹ For Norway, the point estimates are very similar across the four sectors, showing that innovations tend to be skill biased both in manufacturing and services, and the degree of skill bias is largely independent of the technology level of the industry. In Hungary the coefficients are very noisy, but interestingly, there seems to be a sharp contrast between manufacturing and services, with no evidence for skill-biased technological change in the latter.

6 Quantitative Implications

6.1 The extent of skill bias

Combining the results on the change in the skill premium and ratio allows us to back out the average effect of innovation on firm-level skill bias, $\ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}$, for the different innovation types. By differentiating, and averaging the FOC of the firm’s problem (equation (8)), we get:

$$\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} \equiv \Delta \ln \frac{\overline{\theta_{jt}}}{1-\overline{\theta_{jt}}} = \Delta \ln \frac{\overline{w_{Hjt}}}{\overline{w_{Ljt}}} + \frac{1}{\sigma} \Delta \ln \frac{\overline{H_{jt}}}{\overline{L_{jt}}}, \quad (18)$$

where $\Delta \ln \frac{\overline{w_{Hjt}}}{\overline{w_{Ljt}}}$ and $\Delta \ln \frac{\overline{H_{jt}}}{\overline{L_{jt}}}$ are the average changes in the skill premium and the skill ratio following firm-level technological change. For the elasticity of substitution between high- and low-skilled labor, σ , we use a range of estimates from the literature, including $\sigma = 2.94$ from [Acemoglu & Autor \(2011b\)](#).

It is worth discussing the underlying assumptions for this exercise. As discussed before, this exercise does not require identifying the causal effect of technological change. Even if there are various aggregate, market-level, and firm-level shocks (like output demand shocks or amenity shocks coinciding with the technological change) that bias the estimate of the effect on the skill premium, it will be cancelled out by a bias with the opposite sign in the estimate of the effect on the skill ratio. As a result, the sum of the skill premium and $1/\sigma$ times the skill-ratio identifies the skill biasness of the technological change, $\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}$. This result follows from the economic environment—CES production function, optimizing firm behavior and a specific wage setting protocol (even though other protocols lead to similar results; see [Appendix D](#) and [Appendix E](#))—imposed in Section 2.

³⁹We use the Eurostat’s categorization for this exercise. Manufacturing industries are classified based on the R&D intensities of industries. We consider Eurostat’s “High-tech” and “Medium High-tech” industries to be High-tech. These are NACE rev. 2 categories 21, 26, 30.3, 20, 25.4, 27, 28, 29, 30 (excl. 30.1 and 30.3) and 32.5. We consider all other manufacturing as low-tech. Knowledge intensive high-tech. services are defined based on the share of college educated workers, and the relevant NACE rev. 2 codes are: 59-63 and 70. We consider all other non-manufacturing industries sampled by the CIS as non-knowledge intensive services.

Importantly though, the validity of the exercise relies on applying the correct σ . While we could estimate σ by exploiting firm-level labor supply shocks, we instead apply a wide range of existing estimates in the literature (i.e. one to ten), and show that our estimates are not sensitive to the particular choice of σ (see Appendix Table F.4).

The results on firm-level skill demand are reported in Figure 4. The extent of skill bias is not negligible. Our estimates imply that the firm-level skill premium would increase by 5.2% in Norway and 8.4% in Hungary in a hypothetical scenario where firms face completely inelastic labor supply, and so their relative skill demand is fixed (formally $\Delta \ln \frac{H_{jt}}{L_{jt}} = 0$). It is worth highlighting that applying the standard approach in the literature, which infers the extent of skill bias solely from changes in the skill ratio, vastly underestimates the extent of skill bias. This approach—meaning assuming no changes in the firm-level skill premium in equation (18)—gives an estimate of the change in skill bias of 0.7% for Norway and 1.7% for Hungary. This is substantially lower than the 5.2% and 8.4% we estimate when taking into account the change in the firm-level skill premium.

Our approach also allows us to quantify the differences between different forms of technological change, which is unique in the literature. In line with our expectations, Figure 4 reveals heterogeneous impacts. For instance, non-R&D and low-novelty innovations are less skill-biased than R&D and high-novelty innovations. Furthermore, the difference between R&D and non-R&D innovation is much smaller in Hungary than in Norway. This shows that R&D does not necessarily generate a larger skill-biased change than non-R&D innovation in countries that are far from the technology frontier. Finally, we find that both organizational changes and product and process innovation are skill biased, though the magnitudes are a bit different in Norway and Hungary.

6.2 The Contribution of Firm-level Technological Change to the Economy-wide Skill Premium

Besides quantifying the extent of firm-level change in skill bias, we can also use our estimates to calculate the contribution of firm-level technological change to the aggregate increase in college premium. We do this by applying the following accounting exercise: we decompose the economy-wide skill premium into a component coming from the skill premium paid by innovative firms, and another component coming from the skill premium paid by non-innovative firms. We then use our estimates to calculate how the changes in these two components—reallocation of workers from non-innovative to innovative firms and the change in the skill premium paid by innovative (and non-innovative) firms—contributed to aggregate wage inequality.

In the presence of imperfect competition in the labor market, we have the following structure of wages:

$$\ln w_{it} = \alpha_t + \psi_i + \ln w_{Sj(i,t)} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (19)$$

where i denotes workers, j denotes firms, and ε_{it} is a mean zero error term. The ψ_i captures workers' skills that are portable across firms, and therefore not affected by firm-level technological change (at least in the short term). The term $\ln w_{Sj(i,t)}$ represents the skill-group (S) specific firm-level wage

premium of firm j . As discussed above, heterogeneous firm-level premiums can emerge as a result of worker's idiosyncratic preferences to work at a particular firm (Section 2), union bargaining (see Appendix Section A.10) or labor market power (see Appendix D).

The aggregate or economy-wide college premium is the difference between the average wages of the college workers and the average wage of non-college workers:

$$\overline{\ln w_{H_t}} - \overline{\ln w_{L_t}} = \alpha_t + \frac{1}{H_t} \sum_{i \in H} \psi_i + \frac{1}{H_t} \sum_{i \in H} \ln w_{Hj(i,t)} - \left[\alpha_t + \frac{1}{L_t} \sum_{i \in L} \psi_i + \frac{1}{L_t} \sum_{i \in L} \ln w_{Lj(i,t)} \right]. \quad (20)$$

This equation shows that the economy-wide college premium could increase either because college workers become more skilled (ψ_i increases among college workers), or because the wage premium paid by firms changes. In the following derivation we focus on the latter, as this part is what is influenced by firm-level application of new technologies. Formally, the contribution of firms to the economy-wide skill premium is:

$$\Theta \equiv \sum_{i \in H} \ln w_{Hj(i,t)} - \sum_{i \in L} \ln w_{Lj(i,t)}. \quad (21)$$

We decompose the change in the economy-wide college premium that can be attributed to firms' application of new technologies. $\Delta\Theta$ has the following two parts (see Appendix Section Appendix F for the details):

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta\Theta \equiv & \underbrace{\sum_j \left(\frac{H_{jt+1}}{H_{t+1}} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \ln w_{Hjt+1} - \sum_j \left(\frac{L_{jt+1}}{L_{t+1}} - \frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} \right) \ln w_{Ljt+1}}_{\text{Change in allocation of labor}} + \\ & + \underbrace{\sum_j \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} (\ln w_{Hjt+1} - \ln w_{Hjt}) - \sum_j \frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} (\ln w_{Ljt+1} - \ln w_{Ljt})}_{\text{Change in within-firm wage premium}}. \end{aligned} \quad (22)$$

The first part captures the reallocation of workers between firms paying different wages. As our empirical analysis demonstrated, firms introducing new technologies hire more skilled workers, which leads to a reallocation of high-skilled workers to innovative firms. Furthermore, innovative firms pay higher wages, and so reallocation of skilled workers to these firms increases the economy-wide college premium. The change in allocation of high-skilled workers depends on the expansion of innovative firms, and on the premium they pay compared to non-innovative firms:

$$\text{Ch. in allocation for H} = \underbrace{\Delta h_j^{inn} \times \vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn}}_{\text{Change in H share of inn firms}} \times \underbrace{\left(\overline{\ln w_{Hjt+1}}^{inn} - \overline{\ln w_{Hjt+1}}^{non} \right)}_{\text{Difference in H wage premiums between inn/non}}, \quad (23)$$

where $\overline{\Delta h_j^{inn}}$ is the log change in high-skilled employment in innovative firms, $\vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn} \equiv \sum_{j \in inn} \frac{H_{jt}}{H_{t+1}}$

is the share of skilled workers at innovative firms and $\overline{\ln w_{Hjt+1}^{inn}}$ and $\overline{\ln w_{Hjt+1}^{non}}$ are the average high-skilled wage in innovative and in non-innovative firms. The change in allocation of low-skilled workers is calculated analogously. Notice that all the terms that are needed for calculating reallocation effects are observed in the data. In particular, we estimate the change in high-skilled employment in innovative firms in Section 4.2, while we directly observe the share of skilled workers at innovative firms, and we can calculate firm-level skill premium paid by innovative firms.⁴⁰ We provide further details on the calculation of each of the terms in Appendix Table F.1.

The second part of $\Delta\Theta$ captures the change in the skill premium at innovative and non-innovative firms. As our empirical analysis demonstrate, firms adopting new technologies increase the wage premium of their college workers, which contributes to wage inequality in itself. The reallocation of skilled workers to innovative firms can also affect the skill premium at non-innovative firms.⁴¹ To calculate the wage changes at innovative and non-innovative firms we use the FOCs of the firm problem and then we calculate the average (weighted) change in skill-premium across the whole economy. In Appendix F we show that this leads to the following expression:⁴²

$$\text{Wage premium effect} = \underbrace{\vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn}}_{\substack{\text{Share of} \\ \text{innovative} \\ \text{firms in CIS}}} \times \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}}_{\substack{\text{Skill Bias change} \\ \text{estimated} \\ \text{in Section 6.1}}} \quad (24)$$

The wage premium effect part is equal to the share of innovative firms multiplied by the average skill bias, $\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}$, which is the total change in skill bias taking place in the economy. This is estimated using equation (18) in Section 6.1. Importantly, the formula uses the total change in skill bias, rather than the wage change at innovative firms. This is because non-innovative firms also increase their wage premiums, which must be taken into account when assessing the aggregate wage change. Notice also that the skill bias term, $\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}$, is identified based on our micro-level estimates, which are unlikely to be biased upwards by demand or supply shocks, as explained in Section 2.

The estimated contribution of firm-level technological change to the aggregate college premium is presented in Table 8. The estimates show the impact of technological change over a ten-year period. Column (1) shows the contribution of all types of technological change—the contribution of firms conducting any type of innovation—to inequality for both countries. The first row gives the reallocation effect, which contributes to the increase in skill premium by 0.52 and 3.74 percentage points over a ten-year period in Norway and Hungary. The wage premium effects are 5.58 and 10.09 percentage points in the two countries respectively. The total effect is the sum of the reallocation

⁴⁰For instance, we can estimate the average college premium paid at innovative firms by including person effects in the regression to deal with the potential sorting of better workers to better firms.

⁴¹As we discussed in Section 5, these reallocation effects could potentially violate the SUTVA assumptions in our empirical design. In practice the bias coming from violating the SUTVA assumption will be small, since the wage changes at non-innovative firms will be small.

⁴²As we discuss in Appendix Section F.1, the wage premium effect will contain two other terms. Nevertheless, it turns out that those additional terms will be very small empirically. In our calculations presented in Table 8, we take into account those terms as well but that has a negligible effect on our estimates (see Appendix Table F.3).

and wage premium effects. Our estimates imply that technological change contributed by 6.1 and 13.83 percentage points to the increase in the economy-wide skill premium over a ten-year period in Norway and Hungary. The magnitude of this effect is not sensitive to the specific value of σ used for this exercise.⁴³ The bulk of the contribution comes from the wage premium effect, suggesting that innovation contributes to the economy-wide skill premium via increased wages in innovative firms rather than the reallocation of workers to these firms. The higher contribution in Hungary suggests that technological change farther from the frontier generates more skill bias than the technological change closer to the technological frontier. This finding is also corroborated in a simple cross-country analysis presented in Section 6.3.

In Table 8 and Figure 5 we investigate the role of different forms of technological changes contribution to inequality. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 8 and row (1) of Figure 5 compare the contributions of R&D and non-R&D innovation. There is a striking difference between the two countries: while R&D-conducting firms are responsible for 85% of the total increase in inequality in Norway, this number is only 46% in Hungary. There are two reasons for this difference. First, R&D innovation is considerably more skill biased than non R&D-based innovation in Norway, while the difference between the two types of innovation is small in Hungary. Second, R&D firms have a higher market share in Norway than in Hungary.

Columns (4) and (5) in Table 8 and row (2) of Figure 5 compare new-to-market and low-novelty innovation. In Norway, 75% of the aggregate contribution comes from new-to-market innovation, while this number is only 28% in Hungary. The difference is mainly explained by the small prevalence of new-to-market innovation in Hungary compared to Norway. Finally, columns (6)-(8) in Table 8 and row (3) of Figure 5 compare the contributions of firms conducting technical innovation, firms conducting organizational innovation, as well as firms combining the two types of innovation. Firms conducting both types of innovation generate the bulk of the contribution to aggregate inequality in both countries. This is due to both the higher skill bias of this type of innovation, and the larger market share of firms conducting both types of innovations.

These findings underline the greater importance of technology adoption—either captured by non-R&D or low-novelty innovation—in Hungary compared to Norway. In Norway, the economy-wide skill premium is mainly driven by R&D-based, higher novelty innovation. Furthermore, firms conducting both technical and organizational innovation are the main contributors to the increase in inequality, suggesting strong complementarities between these two types of innovation.

6.3 Economy-wide Skill Premium, Skill Ratio and Skill Bias

How is the estimated contribution of technological change to the economy-wide college premium related to the actual changes observed in the data? As described in the Introduction, the college premium has been falling in both Norway and in Hungary. In particular, the skill premium in the

⁴³In Norway, the contribution per year changes from the baseline 6.1 to 7.5 and 5 percentage points when using $\sigma = 1.6$ and $\sigma = 10$, respectively. In Hungary, the annual values change to 15.7 and 9.6 percentage points when $\sigma = 1.6$ and $\sigma = 10$, respectively (see Appendix Table F.4).

period studied in this paper declined from 31 to 20% in Norway, and from 110 to 95% in Hungary.⁴⁴ These trends seem to contradict our estimates that predict an increase in inequality over this period.

However, the fall in college premium coincided with a significant increase in the college to non-college ratio, which has been increasing from 0.49 to 0.75 in Norway, and from 0.16 to 0.32 in Hungary. In fact, the relative increase in skilled workforce can itself explain the fall in the college premium if the (aggregate) elasticity of substitution between the two skill groups, σ^{agg} , is large enough.⁴⁵ In Table 9, we calculate the σ^{agg} that is needed to reconcile the change in the college premium and ratio without any skill bias in technological change for Norway (Panel A) and Hungary (Panel B). In particular, we use the following equation to back out the aggregate elasticity of substitution between high- and low-skilled workers, σ^{agg} (and assume, for now, that $\Delta\Theta = 0$):

$$\Delta \ln \frac{w_{H_t}}{w_{L_t}} = \Delta\Theta - \frac{1}{\sigma^{agg}} \Delta \ln \frac{H_t}{L_t}. \quad (25)$$

The implied σ^{agg} without technological change is 4.9 for Norway and 9.4 for Hungary. In both countries, the σ^{agg} that is needed to reconcile the changes in college premium and college ratio in the absence of skill bias in technological change is considerably larger than the elasticity implied by earlier periods (see [Acemoglu & Autor 2011a](#)). However, once we substitute our estimated contribution of technological change to the change in college premium (the total effect, $\Delta\Theta$, from Table 8)⁴⁶, the implied elasticities of substitution are 2.47 in Hungary and 2.87 in Norway (see the second rows of Table 9), which are very close to the elasticity of substitution found in [Acemoglu & Autor \(2011a\)](#). To sum up, the estimated technological change seems to be consistent with the observed evolution of the economy-wide college premium.

Another interesting finding is the difference in the contributions of technological change to inequality between Norway and Hungary. We found that in Hungary, which is farther from the technology frontier and mainly adopting technologies used in more developed countries, the skill bias is larger than in Norway, which is closer to the technology frontier. Is this simply a coincidence? By observing changes in the skill premium and skill share in a country and assuming a specific value for σ^{agg} , we can back out the implied contribution of skill-biased technological change using equation (25). We classify countries into groups according to their European Innovation Scoreboard, which measures research and innovation performance of European countries. Assuming $\sigma^{agg} = 2.94$, we find that the implied contribution of skill bias is 8.5% for innovation leaders, 13.9% for strong innovators (the group which includes Norway) and 21.3% for moderate innovators (the group that includes Hungary).⁴⁷ This shows that the pattern of the contribution being larger in Hungary compared to Norway is not atypical, and reflects the substantial skill bias involved in technology adoption.

⁴⁴These data come from the OECD Education at a Glance 2014 and 2020. Since the college premium is missing for 2000 in Norway, we study the period between 2005 and 2015 for Norway, and the 2000-2015 period for other countries.

⁴⁵The macro elasticity of substitution (σ^{agg}) might differ from the firm-level elasticity, σ , see e.g. [Oberfield & Raval \(2021\)](#).

⁴⁶The estimates in Table 8 are for a 10-year period, so we multiply those changes by 1.5 in Hungary to translate them into a 15-year period change.

⁴⁷Innovation leaders: Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Israel; Strong Innovators: Norway, Austria, Germany, UK, Belgium, France, Portugal, Ireland; Moderate Innovators: Hungary, Italy, Czechia, Spain and Turkey. The fourth category in the Innovation Scorecard is “Modest innovator”, but there were no countries in this group with OECD data available.

6.4 The Effect of the R&D Tax Credit on the Economy-wide College Premium

We also apply our approach to quantify the contribution of the R&D tax credit policy, described in Section 5.3, to the college premium (see the details in Appendix Section F.2). We find that the R&D tax credit reform increased the economy-wide college premium by 1.39 percentage points in the long-term, highlighting that policies encouraging innovation can have substantial effects on inequality.

6.5 Within-skill group inequality

The presence of imperfect competition on the labor market implies that technological change not only increases between-skill group inequality, but may also affect within-skill group inequality. This follows from our model where similarly skilled workers are paid different firm-specific wage premiums, which creates within-skill inequality. Given that innovative firms pay a higher college premium to begin with, the estimated increase in firm-specific college premium following innovation contributes to an increase in wage inequality within education groups. The within-skill group increase in inequality (or the residuum) is a common finding in the literature (see e.g. DiNardo et al. 1996, Acemoglu 2002) and it is often interpreted as evidence for an increase in the return to the components of skills other than years of schooling (see e.g. Juhn et al. 1993). Our imperfect competition framework and the empirical evidence provided in this paper offer a complementary explanation relying on the heterogeneous return of schooling across firms: technological change increases the return to schooling differences across firms, and as a result, it contributes to rising inequality within education groups.

6.6 Perfectly Competitive Labor Markets

So far we have studied the impact of technological change on inequality in the presence of imperfect competition. We conclude this section by discussing how the results change if labor markets are perfectly competitive.⁴⁸

Assume that there are two sectors in the economy, each of them with a representative firm using the same technology as in our main model. One of the firms innovates and experiences a change in skill bias, θ , while the representative firm in the other industry does not innovate and so its θ is unchanged.⁴⁹ In perfectly competitive labor markets, there are no within-skill wage differences across firms, and so the change in the skill premium following a skill-biased technological change is the same at innovative and non-innovative firms. With imperfectly competitive labor markets, in contrast, within-skill inequality also increases (as discussed above).

⁴⁸It is worth emphasizing that the labor market structure itself can affect the share of innovative firms and the size of skill-biased technological change. In the following analysis, we keep these factors fixed, meaning that we present only a partial equilibrium analysis that serves as an initial benchmark. To understand the full implications of the labor market structure, we would need a fully developed structural estimation, which would allow us to do general equilibrium counterfactuals far from the current labor market structure. This analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.

⁴⁹To understand the change in college premium, we do not need to specify what happens to the Hicks-neutral component in the production function in response to innovation.

It is relatively straightforward to derive the effect of technological change on aggregate inequality in this two sector economy (see Appendix [Appendix G](#) for the details). The effects are the following:

$$\overline{\ln w_{H_t}} - \overline{\ln w_{L_t}} = \overline{\Delta h_j}^{inn} \times \vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn}. \quad (26)$$

Comparing this equation with equations (22)-(24), we see that the total effect in the perfectly competitive case equals the wage premium term of the imperfectly competitive case: this term is driven by the aggregate extent of skill-biased technological change, which is the same in the two cases. However, there are no within-skill wage differences in the perfectly competitive case, and, as a result, the reallocation of workers to other firms will have no effect on the skill premium. As Table 8 shows, the reallocation term represents 8% of the total effect in Norway and 27% in Hungary, suggesting that the increase in the aggregate skill premium would be this much lower under perfect competition.

It is also worth discussing another important consequence of perfect competition: the skill ratio of innovative firms compared to non-innovative firms increases more under perfect competition than under imperfect competition. A simple calculation (see Appendix [Appendix G](#)) shows that the following holds under perfect competition:

$$\left(\Delta \ln \frac{H_{inn}}{L_{inn}} - \Delta \ln \frac{H_{non}}{L_{non}} \right) = \sigma \Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1 - \theta}. \quad (27)$$

Therefore, under perfect competition the increase in the log relative skill ratio (if $\sigma = 2.94$) would be 13.5% in Norway and 23.8% in Hungary, compared to 2.9% in Norway and 3.8% in Hungary under imperfect competition. In other words, the reallocation of high-skilled workers to innovative firms is considerably stronger under perfect competition, implying that technological change leads to a higher productivity growth as well.

7 Conclusion

This paper documents that innovation activities and technological change are associated with an increase in skill demand in Norway and Hungary. Our approach directly infers skill bias from firm-level technological change. We exploit an exceptionally rich survey, the CIS, which provides self-reported measures of firm-level technological change. We identify and quantify the extent to which firm-level technological change is skill biased by estimating the change in both the skill ratio and skill demand following innovation. We find that innovation is a key force behind the recent trends of inequality. This finding might be surprising given the considerable fall in the college premium observed in many countries in recent years. However, we demonstrate that the fall in the college premium likely reflects that in recent periods, the race between education and technology ([Goldin & Katz 2010](#)) was won by education. Our estimates imply that technological change still plays a prominent role in the evolution of the college premium.

Comparing the two countries, interestingly, we find that the increase in skill demand is substantially

larger in Hungary, the country farther away from the technological frontier. Our findings hence demonstrate that technology adoption can be a very important source of rising inequality in countries far from the technological frontier. These results highlight that the nature of technological progress matters for shaping inequality. Finally, our findings underscore the importance of taking into account the presence of imperfect competition in the labor market when assessing how firm-level technological change shapes within- and between-skill group inequality.

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
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

Figures

Figure 1: Share of Innovative Firms and the College Premium: Cross-Country Evidence



Notes: This figure shows the cross-country relationship between the college premium and the share of innovative firms in 2014. Innovative firms are those firms changing their technology between 2012 and 2014 by introducing any new or significantly modified product/service/process/organizational change. The data comes from Eurostat. The innovation variable is from the 2014 Community Innovation Survey, while the college premium comes from the Structure of Earnings Survey.


Figure 2: Change in Skill Demand Following Technological Change by Firm Density




Notes: This figure shows percent changes in the college to non-college ratio and in the college wage premium following firm-level technological change for local areas with low (10th percentile) and high (90th percentile) firm density. We measure firm-level technological change in the CIS survey which asks whether any new or significantly modified product/service/process/organizational change (aka innovation) was introduced. Firm density is measured as the log number of firms per square kilometer. This variable proxies the dispersion of workers' idiosyncratic preferences for working at a particular firm, which is tightly linked to the firm-specific elasticity of labor supply in the model. We obtain the percent change in the skill ratio values by adding an interaction term between the innovation variable and log firm density in the local area to our benchmark specification (Table 5 column (3)). The point estimates of the interaction term are reported in Appendix Table A.11, here we report the marginal effect of innovation on the skill ratio at the 10th and 90th percentile of the local area firm density distribution. We transform our estimates from percentage points to percent based on the average H/L value of non-innovative firms in Table 1. We obtain the percent change in college premium by adding an interaction term between the innovation variable and the log firm density in the local area to our benchmark specification (Table 2 column (4)). The point estimates of the interaction term are reported in Appendix Table A.12, here we report the marginal effect of innovation on the skill ratio at the 10th and 90th percentile of the local area firm density distribution. We cluster the standard errors at the firm-level in both regressions. The error bars show the 95% confidence interval around the point estimate.

Figure 3: Change in R&D Investments and in Skill Demand Following the Introduction of an R&D Tax Credit Policy in Norway


Panel A: Log R&D Investments



Panel B: College Employment Share




Panel C: College-to-Non-College Wage Ratio



Notes: This figure shows the evolution of R&D investment and the skill ratio following the 2002 introduction of a R&D tax credit policy in Norway. The tax credit allowed firms to deduct up to 20% of their R&D expenses up to a threshold of NOK 4 million (approx 450,000 USD). This implied a reduction in the marginal cost of R&D investments for firms investing less than the threshold. We assign firms to the treated group if they spent less than the policy threshold (NOK 4 million) on R&D prior to the reform. We assign firms to the control group if they reported R&D expenses between NOK 4-12 million prior to the reform. Since R&D investments are mainly relevant for larger firms, we include firms with at least 50 employees. Panel A shows the (log) total R&D investment for the firms in the treated and in the control groups. Panel B shows the average college employment share for the firms in the treated and in the control groups, while Panel C shows the average college to non-college wage ratio for the two groups (both weighted by the number of workers). All outcomes are normalized to be 100% (or one) in 2001 (the last year prior to the reform).


Figure 4: Estimated Firm-Level Skill Bias of Different Forms of Technological Change



Notes: This figure shows the change in skill bias $\left(\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1-\theta_{jt}}\right)$ calculated from the estimated change in skill premium and skill ratio following technological change. The skill premium and skill ratio estimates are from Tables 6 and A.14. We use equation (18) and $\sigma = 2.94$ (following Acemoglu & Autor 2011a) to obtain the change in skill bias. In particular, we take the estimated (percent) change in the skill premium and add to that $1/\sigma$ times the estimated percent change in the skill ratio. We measure firm-level technological change in the CIS survey which asks whether any new or significantly modified product/service/process/organizational change (aka innovation) was introduced. Row 1 shows the change in skill bias for firms conducting any type of innovation. We measure different forms of technological change from the detailed questionnaire of the CIS survey on firms' innovation activities. Rows 2 and 3 show the change in skill bias for innovative firms conducting in-house R&D and for other innovators, respectively. Row 4 shows the change in skill bias for firms conducting R&D and introducing novel processes or products that are new to the firms' market, rather than only for the firm. Rows 5, 6, 7 and 8 plot the skill bias for firms conducting only technical (process or product) innovation, only process innovation, only product innovation, or only organizational change, respectively. Row 9 shows the change in skill bias for firms combining technical innovation with organizational change. Rows 10-13 show the change in skill bias for firms operating in various industries. We follow the Eurostat categorization and assign firms to High-tech and Medium High tech manufacturing industries ("High tech manuf."); other manufacturing ("Low tech manuf."); high-tech knowledge intensive services ("High tech services") and other service industries ("Low tech services"). The blue, filled bars show the change in skill premium for Norway, and the gray bars for Hungary.

*: there are very few "High tech service firms" in Hungary. As a result, we do not include the outlier (and insignificant) -13.8 percent change in skill bias for High-tech Services in Hungary.

Figure 5: Contribution of Different Forms of Technological Change to the Economy-wide Skill Premium



Notes: This figure shows the relative contribution of different forms of firm-level technological changes to the economy-wide college premium. Firm-level technological change measured in the CIS survey which asks whether any new or significantly modified product/service/process/organizational change (aka innovation) was introduced. The estimates show the sum of the reallocation effect and the wage premium effect (see equation (22)) by three, mutually exclusive breakdowns of innovative firms. The first row breaks down the contribution by R&D. We calculate the contribution of R&D conducting innovators and the contribution of innovators not relying on R&D (non R&D). We plot the relative contributions of these two groups of firms. The second row breaks down the contribution by novelty. We calculate the contribution of firms introducing process and/or product innovations that are new to the market (new) and that of other innovators (not new). We plot the relative contributions of these groups. The last row shows the contribution by types of technological change. We calculate the contribution of innovators introducing new products or processes (only technical), of firms conducting only organizational innovation (only organizational), and of firms that combine the two (both). Then plot the relative contributions of these three groups. Further details are provided in Section 6 and Appendix Section F.1. Panel A shows the estimates for Norway and Panel B for Hungary.

Tables

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Characteristics of Innovative and Non-innovative firms

	Norway		Hungary	
	Non-innovative	Innovative	Non-innovative	Innovative
Average years of education	12.70 (1.59)	13.41 (1.64)	11.77 (1.43)	12.41 (1.49)
Share of college graduates	0.19 (0.25)	0.31 (0.28)	0.17 (0.22)	0.28 (0.24)
College to non-college ratio	0.49 (0.98)	0.87 (1.22)	0.20 (0.39)	0.47 (0.51)
Log average daily wage rate (EUR)	4.68 (0.47)	4.84 (0.42)	3.07 (0.46)	3.35 (0.48)
Average age of employees	41.38 (5.89)	41.3 (4.97)	44.04 (5.67)	42.66 (5.05)
Number of employees	33.50 (103.24)	129.02 (417.63)	146.64 (240.17)	462.30 (1557.154)
Number of firm-years	16,921	15,528	1,577	971

Notes: This table shows the characteristics of innovative and non-innovative firms in the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). We measure firm-level technological change in the CIS survey. Innovative firms report that they introduced new or significantly modified products/technologies/organization, which are new from their point of view. Non-innovative firms are the rest of the firms in the survey. We report average values of outcomes over the sample period 2003-2008 (for which we estimate the firm level regressions). The table shows the mean of firm-level average years of schooling, the mean of firm-level share of college graduates, the mean of firm-level college to non-college ratio, the mean of firm-level average log daily wage, the mean of firm-level average age of workers, and the mean of firms' number of employees. We report the standard deviation of these variables in parentheses below.

Table 2: Change in the Skill Premium Following Firm-level Technological Change

Panel A: Norway

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Innovation	0.105*** (0.019)	0.090*** (0.017)	-0.024*** (0.009)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.008)
Innovation x College	0.077*** (0.025)	0.068*** (0.025)	0.130*** (0.016)	0.045*** (0.010)	0.035*** (0.011)	0.034*** (0.011)
Innovation +2 x College					0.014* (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)
Innovation +4 x College						0.012 (0.009)
Mincer variables	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Worker FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations in CIS	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373
Firms in CIS	15,530	15,530	15,530	15,530	15,530	15,530
R-squared	0.05	0.07	0.20	0.44	0.44	0.44

Panel B: Hungary

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Innovation	0.201*** (0.022)	0.166*** (0.019)	-0.028** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.011)
Innovation x College	0.085*** (0.027)	0.100*** (0.023)	0.123*** (0.014)	0.067*** (0.023)	0.069*** (0.024)	0.065*** (0.023)
Innovation +2 x College					0.020 (0.026)	0.008 (0.023)
Innovation +4 x College						0.014 (0.021)
Mincer variables	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Matched sample	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations in CIS	785,443	785,443	785,419	197,065	197,065	197,065
Firms in CIS	6,212	6,212	6,212	1,716	1,716	1,716
R-squared	0.44	0.51	0.71	0.70	0.70	0.70

Notes: This table investigates the change in workers' (log) wages following firm-level technological change. We measure firm-level technological change in the CIS survey which asks whether any new or significantly modified product/service/process/organizational change (aka innovation) was introduced. We report the estimated coefficients on the innovation dummy, δ^u , and the innovation dummy interacted with whether the individual has a college degree, δ^s , from equation (14) described in Section 4.1. The "Innovation" dummy indicates whether technological change was introduced according to the current CIS wave or any of the previous two waves. Our primary interest lies in the coefficient of the "Innovation x College" interaction, which shows the extent to which the college premium changes following technological change relative to firms not reporting any technological change. Panel A shows the estimates for Norway, while panel B the estimates for Hungary. All specifications include skill-year fixed effects, representing interactions of primary, secondary, vocational and college dummies with year dummies. Column (1) shows the estimates when including only skill-year (e.g. college-year) fixed effects in the regression. Columns (2)-(6) also include Mincer variables (gender, age, tenure, tenure squared, a dummy for new entrant in both countries and hours worked and a dummy for part-time employees in Hungary where part-time workers are also included in the sample). Columns (3)-(6) add firm fixed effects to the regression. Columns (4)-(6) include worker fixed effects in Norway and apply the matching procedure for Hungary (discussed in detail in Section 4.1 and Appendix Section B.6). Columns (5) and (6) also include pre-trend dummies showing whether the firm innovated in the subsequent CIS wave or the wave after that. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 3: Robustness: Change in Skill Premium Following Firm-Level Technological Change

Panel A: Norway

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Industry and district- year-FE	Industry- district- year FE	Occupation- district- year FE	Industry- occupation- district- year-FE	District- college wage share- year-FE	Short term	Medium term	Firm specific college premium FEs
Innovation	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.012* (0.007)	-0.018*** (0.005)
Innovation x College	0.046*** (0.010)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.048*** (0.011)	0.036*** (0.011)	0.022** (0.009)	0.018** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.009)	0.035*** (0.009)
Observations in CIS	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373
R-squared	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.45	0.46	0.44	0.44	0.46

Panel B: Hungary

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Industry and district- year-FE	Industry- district- year FE	Occupation- district- year FE	Industry- occupation- district- year-FE	District- college wage share- year-FE	Short term	Medium term
Innovation	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.008)
Innovation x College	0.067*** (0.024)	0.069*** (0.026)	0.063*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.019)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.059*** (0.022)	0.057** (0.022)
Observations in CIS	193,019	192,970	193,797	180,456	194,352	174,102	190,666
R-squared	0.71	0.72	0.78	0.84	0.77	0.70	0.70

Notes: This table shows robustness checks for the results on the change in workers' (log) wages following firm-level technological change presented in Table 2. We report the estimated coefficients on the innovation dummy, δ^u , and the innovation x college interaction, δ^s , from equation (14). All specifications include skill-year (e.g. college-year) fixed effects, Mincer variables and firm fixed effects. Worker fixed effects are also included in Norway, while we apply the matching procedure for Hungary. Column (1) adds additionally industry-year and district-year fixed effects, Column (2) industry-district-year fixed effects, Column (3) occupation-district-year fixed effects, and Column (4) adds industry-occupation-district-year fixed effects. In column (5) we classify firms into skill-ratio quartiles based on their skill ratio the first year they appear in our sample (the starting year of our analysis or the entry date for firms entering later) and then add quartile-district-year fixed effects to the regression. Column (6) shows short-term changes by defining innovation based on the current CIS wave, while Column (7) shows the medium-term changes by defining innovation using the current CIS and last CIS wave, rather than the previous two waves, as in our main specification. Column (8) includes firm-college fixed effects for Norway by grouping firms into deciles based on their college premium and then we include an additional interaction of firm premium-type deciles with the college dummy in the regression (see the details Section 4.1). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 4: Change in Skill Premium Following Firm-level Technological Change for Incumbent Workers and for New Entrants

Panel A: Norway

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Innovation x New entrant	0.093*** (0.016)	0.084*** (0.015)	-0.021** (0.011)	-0.028*** (0.008)
Innovation x Incumbent	0.068** (0.027)	0.075*** (0.027)	-0.023*** (0.009)	0.010 (0.008)
Innovation x College x New entrant	0.073*** (0.025)	0.061** (0.025)	0.135*** (0.018)	0.043*** (0.010)
Innovation x College x Incumbent	0.054* (0.030)	0.043 (0.029)	0.059*** (0.013)	0.020* (0.011)
Skill-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mincer variables	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes
Worker FEs	No	No	No	Yes
Observations in CIS	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373
R-squared	0.05	0.07	0.20	0.44

Panel B: Hungary

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Innovation x New entrant	0.139*** (0.024)	0.135*** (0.020)	-0.026*** (0.008)	-0.016 (0.010)
Innovation x Incumbent	0.180*** (0.026)	0.159*** (0.022)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)
Innovation x College x New entrant	0.036 (0.029)	0.035 (0.025)	0.086*** (0.016)	0.095*** (0.025)
Innovation x College x Incumbent	0.049* (0.026)	0.059** (0.024)	0.080*** (0.013)	0.043* (0.024)
Skill-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mincer variables	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes
Matched sample	No	No	No	Yes
Observations in CIS	703,539	703,539	703,508	174,102
R-squared	0.461	0.511	0.716	0.704

Notes: This table investigates the change in workers' (log) wages following firm-level technological change for incumbent workers and for new entrants. We start from the benchmark regression equation (14) and add the innovation dummy interacted with new entrants/incumbent status and the triple interaction terms between innovation x college x new entrants/incumbent status. We measure firm-level technological change in the CIS survey which asks whether any new or significantly modified product/service/process/organizational change (aka innovation) was introduced. In Norway, incumbents are defined as individuals who had been working at the firm for at least 6 years, and new entrants are all other workers. To make sure that incumbent workers had been present at the firm before innovation started we focus on medium-term effects of innovation (same as in column (7) in Table 3). In Hungary, incumbents are defined as individuals who had been working at the firm for at least 24 months, and new entrants are all other workers. To make sure that incumbent workers had been present at the firm before innovation started we focus on short-term effects of innovation (same as in column (6) of Table 3). Column (1) shows the estimates when including only skill-year (e.g. college-year) fixed effects in the regression. Columns (2)-(4) also include the Mincer variables, columns (3)-(4) add firm fixed effects to the regression and columns (4) include worker fixed effects in Norway and apply the matching procedure for Hungary (discussed in detail in Section 4.1 and Appendix Section B.6). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 5: Change in the Skill Ratio Following Firm-level Technological Change

Panel A: Norway

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	College employment share	College to non college employment ratio	Log employment	College employment share	College to non college employment ratio	Log employment
Innovation	0.011*** (0.002)	0.028*** (0.006)	0.053*** (0.011)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.029*** (0.005)	0.019* (0.010)
Δ Log VA	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.007)				
Δ Log Capital	0.000 (0.001)	-0.005* (0.003)				
Dependent variable (t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Industry-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	18,215	17,796	24,945	25,813	25,112	25,813
R-squared	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.003	0.005	0.006

Panel B: Hungary

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	College employment share	College to non college employment ratio	Log employment	College employment share	College to non college employment ratio	Log employment
Innovation	0.019** (0.008)	0.029*** (0.008)	0.030 (0.020)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.026*** (0.007)	-0.014 (0.016)
Δ Log VA	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.009)				
Δ Log Capital	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.012* (0.007)				
Dependent variable (t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Industry-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,153	2,125	2,363	2,414	2,386	2,386
R-squared	0.10	0.16	0.14	0.069	0.114	0.107

Notes: This table shows the relationship between firm-level technological change and subsequent 6-year change in firm-level college employment share (columns (1) and (4)), in college to non-college ratio (columns (2) and (5)), and log employment (columns (3) and (6)). We measure firm-level technological change in the CIS survey which asks whether any new or significantly modified product/service/process/organizational change (aka innovation) was introduced. In the table we report the δ coefficients from regression equation (15). The “Innovation” dummy indicates whether the firm innovated according to the current CIS wave or any of the previous two waves. The other two explanatory variables in columns (1)-(2) are long differences of log capital stock and log value added. In each regression we include industry-year fixed effects and in columns (1)-(3) the lagged dependent variable is also included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 6: Change in the College Premium Following Different Forms of Technological Change

Panel A: Norway

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Innov x College	0.045*** (0.010)	0.022* (0.012)	0.021* (0.012)			
Innov x R&D x College		0.039*** (0.011)	0.036*** (0.012)			
Innov x New x College			0.005 (0.011)			
Tech. x College				0.033*** (0.010)		
Org. x College				0.023** (0.009)	0.022** (0.009)	
Process x College					0.013 (0.010)	
Product x College					0.027*** (0.010)	
Innov x Manuf. x College						0.057*** (0.013)
Innov x HT manuf. x College						0.058*** (0.018)
Innov x Services x College						0.037*** (0.012)
Innov x HK services x College						0.057*** (0.015)
Observations in CIS	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373
R-squared	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44

Panel B: Hungary

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Innov. x College	0.067*** (0.023)	0.059** (0.024)	0.059** (0.024)			
Innov. x R&D x College		0.023 (0.028)	0.025 (0.028)			
Innov. x New x College			-0.006 (0.032)			
Tech. x College				0.073*** (0.022)		
Org. x College				0.021 (0.022)	0.009 (0.031)	
Process x College					0.031 (0.032)	
Product x College					0.060** (0.025)	
Innov. x Manuf. x College						0.071*** (0.026)
Innov. x HT manuf. x College						0.127*** (0.038)
Innov. x Services x College						0.027 (0.035)
Innov. x HK services. x College						-0.114 (0.089)
Observations in CIS	197,065	197,065	197,065	197,262	197,262	197,262
R-squared	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70

Notes: This table shows the change in workers' (log) wages following different forms of firm-level technological changes. We measure different forms of technological change from the detailed questionnaire of the CIS survey on firms' innovation activities. The table reports regression estimates that extend the benchmark specification (reported in column 4 of Table 2). Column (2) includes a dummy showing whether the innovating firm conducted R&D and column (3) also includes a dummy showing whether the innovation was new for the firms' market rather than only for the firm. Column (4) distinguishes between innovations with technical aspects (product and process) and organizational changes, while column (5) distinguishes between product, process and organizational changes. Column (6) investigates industry heterogeneity, where "HT manuf." represents High-tech and Medium High tech manufacturing industries, "Manuf" other manufacturing, "HT services" high-tech knowledge intensive services and "Services" other service industries, all following Eurostat definitions. All specifications include skill-year (e.g. college-year) fixed effects, Mincer variables, firm fixed effects. Worker fixed effects are also included in Norway, while we apply the matching procedure for Hungary. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 7: The Impact of the R&D Tax Credit Policy in Norway

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	College employment share	College to non-college employment ratio	Employment	College premium	College premium
Treatment effect	0.089*** (0.031)	0.104** (0.047)	0.054 (0.060)	0.059** (0.028)	0.031 (0.031)
Worker FEs	N/A	N/A	N/A	No	Yes
Sample	Firm level	Firm level	Firm level	Worker level	Worker level
Observations	14,496	14,496	14,637	10,527,645	10,503,753
R-squared	0.94	0.96	0.91	0.21	0.41

Notes: This table shows how an R&D tax credit, introduced in 2002 in Norway, affected treated and control firms. Treated firms are those whose R&D expenditures had been below the policy threshold, NOK 4 mn, on average between 1999 and 2001. Control firms spent between NOK 4-12 mn in the same period. Columns (1), (2) and (3) report δ (the coefficients of the $Treat_j \times Post_t$) from regression equation (16), when the dependent variables are (log) college employment share (number of college workers divided by all workers), (log) college to non-college ratio, and (log) total employment, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) report δ^s (the coefficients of the $Treat_j \times Post_t \times College_i$) from regression equation (17), when the dependent variable is log wage. Column (4) includes skill-year (e.g. college-year) fixed effects, Mincer variables and firm fixed effects. Column (5) includes worker fixed effects as well. All regressions exclude the years 2002-2004 immediately following the reform and we restrict the sample to firms with at least 50 employees. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 8: The Contribution of Technological Change to Economy-wide College Premium over a ten-year Period

Form of Tech. Change	(1) Any	(2) R&D	(3) non R&D	(4) New	(5) Not new	(6) Only tech.	(7) Only org.	(8) Both
Panel A: Norway								
Reallocation effect	0.52%	0.52%	0.04%	0.34%	0.07%	0.01%	0.01%	0.37%
Wage premium effect	5.58%	4.93%	0.76%	3.49%	1.15%	0.40%	0.34%	4.11%
Total Effect ($\Delta\Theta$)	6.10%	5.44%	0.80%	3.83%	1.22%	0.42%	0.35%	4.48%
Panel B: Hungary								
Reallocation effect	3.74%	2.67%	2.04%	2.01%	3.57%	0.30%	0.19%	3.25%
Wage premium effect	10.09%	6.12%	6.44%	3.15%	10.44%	1.21%	0.47%	9.19%
Total Effect ($\Delta\Theta$)	13.83%	8.80%	8.49%	5.16%	14.00%	1.50%	0.66%	12.44%

Notes: This table shows the change in the aggregate college premium (in percentage points) due to firm-level technological change for a 10-year period based on equation (22). The reallocation effect represents the change in wage premium resulting from workers moving between firms introducing new technology (innovative) and firms which do not do that (non-innovative firms). The wage premium effect captures the change in wage premium in firms introducing new technologies (innovative firms) and Total is the sum of the reallocation and wage premium effects, which reflects the overall contribution of technological change to inequality. The different columns quantify the contribution of firms conducting different forms of innovation to the aggregate college premium. We measure different forms of technological change from the detailed questionnaire of the CIS survey on firms' innovation activities. Column (1) captures the contribution of all innovative firms. Columns (2) and (3) calculate the contribution of innovators that conduct R&D and of those that do not, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) distinguish between innovators with new to the market innovations, and those whose innovations are only new to the firm. Finally, columns (6), (7) and (8) calculate the contributions of firms which conducted innovations only with technical aspects (product and process), only with organizational changes, or both, respectively.

Table 9: Economy-wide Skill Premium, Skill Ratio and Skill Bias

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$\Delta \ln \frac{H}{L}$	$\Delta \ln \frac{w_H}{w_L}$	$\Delta \Theta$	Implied σ^{agg}
Panel A: Norway (Change between 2005 and 2015)				
1) No skill bias	0.43	-0.09	0.00	4.88
2) With skill bias	0.43	-0.09	0.06	2.87
Panel B: Hungary (Change between 2000 and 2015)				
1) No skill bias	0.69	-0.07	0.00	9.35
2) With skill bias	0.69	-0.07	0.21	2.47

Notes: This table shows the actual economy-wide change in (log) college to non-college ratio (column 1) and in (log) skill premium (column 2) for Norway (panel A) and for Hungary (panel B). The country-level data come from the OECD Education at a Glance 2014 and 2020 data. For Norway the college premium is missing for 2000 and so we report the changes between 2005 and 2015. In Column (3) we explore various assumption on the extent to which technological change is skill biased. Then in column (4) we calculate the implied (aggregate) elasticity of substitution between college and non-college workers, σ_{agg} , that is needed to explain the aggregate changes in the skill premium and skill ratio according to equation (25). In each panel, row 1) assumes no skill-biased technological change, $\Delta\Theta=0$. In row 2), we apply our estimated total change in skill bias from column (1) of Table 8 after adjusting it to a 15-year period for Hungary. For instance, for Hungary in Panel B of Table 8, the estimated total change in college premium due to technological change is 13.8% for a 10-year period, which implies 20.7% change for a 15-year period.

Appendix A Additional Tables and Figures

A.1 Cross-country Relationship between Innovation and Skill Premium

Figure 1 in the main paper shows the cross-country relationship between the share of innovative firms and the skill premium among “old” EU member states. To create the figure, we use country-level data from Eurostat’s webpage on the premium of college educated workers, the share of innovative firms, and the share of firms conducting R&D activities. The source of R&D and innovation variables is the 2014 Community Innovation Survey (CIS) conducted in 23 (mainly EU) countries. Innovative firms are defined as firms that change their technology between 2012 and 2014 by introducing any new (from the viewpoint of the firm), or significantly modified products/services/technologies/organizational solutions. It follows that innovation, according to this broad definition, does not have to be R&D-driven. The college premium is estimated using the 2014 wave of the Structure of Earnings Survey. In particular, we run cross-sectional regressions of the form:

$$\text{college premium}_j = \alpha + \delta_{inn}\text{ShareInnov}_j + \delta_{R\&D}\text{ShareR\&D}_j + \gamma X_j + \epsilon_j, \quad (\text{A.1})$$

where ShareInnov_j is the share of innovative firms in country j , ShareR\&D_j is the share of R&D conducting firms, and X_j includes three variables: the share of college-educated workers; CEE_j , which shows whether the country is a new member state (i.e. admitted after 2000); and log GDP per capita.

Table A.1 shows the estimates from this cross-sectional regression. Column (1) shows that there is a positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level) relationship between the share of innovative firms and the college premium among old EU member states. Column (2) includes the new EU member states as well as controls for economic development (log GDP per capita) and the college share. The estimated relationship is almost the same, though the estimates become a bit noisy. Columns (3) and (4) show the estimates when we replace the share of innovative firms with the share of R&D-conducting ones. Surprisingly, no clear relationship emerges here, which underscores the the key role played by non-R&D innovative firms to increasing inequality, especially in countries farther from the technology frontier. Finally, in column (5) we include both the share of innovative and the share of R&D-conducting firms. We find that the share of innovative firms is more strongly correlated to the college premium than the share of R&D-conducting firms. This again corroborates our key finding that non-R&D based innovation is responsible for a substantial amount of skill bias in technological change.

Table A.1: Innovation and the College Premium: Cross-country Evidence

LHS: College premium	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Innovative firms (share)	0.894** (0.408)	0.909* (0.486)			0.832 (0.606)
R&D firms (share)			-0.130 (0.521)	0.530 (0.576)	0.049 (0.662)
Share of college educated		-0.013** (0.005)		-0.017** (0.007)	-0.015** (0.007)
GDP/capita		-0.001 (0.186)		0.206 (0.180)	0.043 (0.211)
CEE		0.361** (0.129)		0.303** (0.130)	0.370** (0.136)
Constant	0.945*** (0.237)	1.443 (1.764)	1.490*** (0.135)	-0.203 (1.788)	1.058 (1.970)
Sample	No CEE	All	No CEE	All	All
Observations	17	23	16	22	22
R-squared	0.242	0.479	0.004	0.433	0.493

Notes: This table shows the cross-country relationship between the college premium and the share of innovative firms (δ_{inn}) and the share of R&D-conducting firms ($\delta_{R\&D}$) from the regression equation A.1. Innovative firms are those firms changing their technology between 2012 and 2014 by introducing any new or significantly modified products/services/technologies/organization, which are new from the viewpoint of the firm, but that are not necessarily new to the market. Therefore, innovation, according to this broad definition, does not have to be R&D-driven. Columns (1) and (3) show the raw correlation among the old EU member states. Columns (2), (4) and (5) include all EU members states in the regression as well. CEE is a dummy for new EU member states. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

A.2 Country-industry Level Relationship between Technological Change and Skill Demand

In this section we complement our findings on firm-level technological change and skill demand and present evidence at the country-industry level. For this exercise, we use data from the Eurostat, which reports statistics on innovation activities, as well as the share and premium of college educated workers at the 1-digit country-industry level. The source of innovation variables is the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The college share and college premium is calculated from the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES). We have access to the micro data for both the CIS and SES in Norway and Hungary. For the other countries we only have access to aggregate statistics that can be downloaded from Eurostat’s webpage.⁵⁰

Figure A.1 shows the descriptive relationship between the share of innovative firms in 2010 and the change in the skill premium and the skill share between 2010 and 2014. We apply the same definition of innovation as in the main paper: innovative firms in 2010 are those that introduced any new or significantly modified product/service/process/organizational change, which is new from the viewpoint of the firm, but not necessary to the market, between 2008 and 2010. Therefore, innovative firms are those experiencing technological change. The figure shows that there is a clear positive relationship between the share of innovative firms (our measure of technological change) and the change in the skill premium and the change in the skill ratio.

We investigate the robustness of these relationships in Table A.2. We follow Machin & Van Reenen (1998), and regress the four-year change in skill demand on the share of innovative firms. In particular, we run regressions of the type:

$$\Delta y_{cst} = \delta_{inn} innovation_{cst} + \delta_{R\&D} R\&D_{cst} + \gamma_y y_{cst} + \eta_c + \zeta_s + \epsilon_{cst}, \quad (\text{A.2})$$

where c indexes countries, s industries (1-digit) and t time periods. Δy_{cst} is the long difference, the change of y_{cst} between years t and $t + 4$, η_c denotes country fixed effects, while ζ_s denotes industry fixed effects. $innovation_{cst}$ is the share of innovative firms, while $R\&D_{cst}$ is the R&D intensity of the industry (the ratio of the total R&D expenditures and total the revenue of firms at the industry-country level). This long-difference regression removes differences in the level of the skill premium and the skill ratio at the country-industry level and identifies only from changes in skill demand. Country fixed effects also remove country-level shocks to skill supply or general economic conditions. In some specifications we also include industry fixed effects to filter out industry-level shocks. We weight the regressions by the number of firms in the CIS in the given country-industry cell to give more weight to observations which represent an average calculated from more observations. We cluster standard errors at the country level, as skill premiums are likely to be strongly correlated within each country.

Table A.2 presents the regression results both for the change in the share of college educated workers (top panel) and the college premium (bottom panel). Column (1) reports basic regressions

⁵⁰This merged sample includes EU27 countries (with the exception of Greece, Malta) and Norway, altogether 25 countries.

when both the share of innovative firms and the R&D intensity are included.⁵¹ The estimates suggest that the increase in skill demand is linked to broadly defined innovation activities rather than only R&D. A ten percentage point higher share of innovative firms is associated with a one percentage point stronger growth of the college employment share and a three percentage points higher increase in the college premium at the industry level. The estimated coefficient of the R&D variable is small and often negative.


Column (2) includes country fixed effects to control for country-level shocks to skill supply or economic growth, while column (3) includes industry fixed effects, but not country fixed effects. The inclusion of these fixed effects has only a small impact on the point estimates, however, some of the coefficients become less precisely estimated. In Column (4) we include both country and industry fixed effects. The change in the college share becomes insignificant, while the point estimates of the college premium are unaffected by including these two sets of fixed effects. Overall, the results reveal a strong relationship between the share of innovative firms and subsequent increase in the college premium.

Our conclusion from this exercise is that the broadly defined innovation measure, capturing many different forms of technological change (including technology adoption), is strongly related to skill demand at the country-industry level as well. For most specifications, we also see a response both in the relative quantity (college share) and in the relative wage margin (college premium), which motivates our investigation of both margins at the firm level.

⁵¹Including only the share of innovative firms in the regression yields similar results.

Figure A.1: Technological Change and the Change in Skill Demand: Country-industry Level Analysis

Panel A: Share of Innovators and the Change in the Share of College-educated Employees



Panel B: Share of Innovators and the Change in the College Premium



Notes: The figures illustrate the relationship between the share of innovative firms and subsequent change in skill demand at the 1-digit country-industry level for 25 European countries. We apply the same definition of innovation as in the main paper: innovative firms in 2010 are those that introduced any new or significantly modified product/service/process/organizational change, which is new from the viewpoint of the firm, but not necessary to the market, between 2007 and 2010. Therefore, innovative firms are those experiencing technological change. In particular, they show how the share of innovative firms in 2010 is related to the change in the share of college educated workers (Panel A) and the change in college premium (Panel B) between 2010 and 2014. The size of the circles is proportional to the number of firms in that cell, and the line shows a weighted regression line with a 95 percent confidence interval.

Table A.2: Technological Change and the Change in Skill Demand: Country-industry Level Regression Analysis

	College share change, 2010-2014			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share of innovative firms (2010)	0.104*** (0.025)	0.075 (0.049)	0.122*** (0.031)	0.011 (0.050)
R&D-intensity (2010)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.003 (0.002)
Country FE		Yes		Yes
Industry FE			Yes	Yes
Observations	158	156	157	155
R-squared	0.154	0.697	0.255	0.770

	College premium change, 2010-2014			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share of innovative firms (2010)	0.284** (0.128)	0.250** (0.119)	0.185 (0.124)	0.242* (0.136)
R&D-intensity (2010)	-0.020** (0.009)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.028** (0.011)	-0.007 (0.006)
Country FE		Yes		Yes
Industry FE			Yes	Yes
Observations	154	152	153	151
R-squared	0.192	0.670	0.303	0.714

Notes: These tables show the relationship between technological change and skill demand at the 1-digit country-industry level for 25 European countries. We present the estimated coefficients of the share of innovative firms (δ_{inn}) and R&D intensity ($\delta_{R\&D}$) from regression equation (A.2). The dependent variable is the change in the share of college educated workers (top panel) and college premium (bottom panel). The main explanatory variables are the share of innovative firms and the industry's R&D intensity. We apply the same definition of innovation as in the main text: innovative firms in 2010 are those that introduced any new or significantly modified product/service/process/organizational change, which is new from the viewpoint of the firm, but not necessary to the market, between 2008 and 2010. All columns include the dependent variable in 2010. Column (2) also includes country fixed effects, column (3) industry fixed effects, while column (4) both country and industry fixed effects. Observations are weighted by the number of firms in the country-industry cell. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

A.3 Firm-level Technological Change and Change in the Structure of Earnings and Hours Worked

In this section, we investigate the relationship between various components of wages and hours worked, and technological change by applying the same methodology as in the main paper, i.e. by estimating equation (14). Since the employer-employee register in Norway lacks detailed information on the structure of earnings, we use the annual wage survey (the Norwegian version of the Structure of Earnings Survey) for this purpose. Table A.3 reports the change in various components. Column (1) shows the change in total salary following technological change. Column (2) shows the change in base wage without any bonus payments following innovation. The estimated change in skill premium is very similar with and without bonus payments both for Norway (2.1% with bonus payments vs. 1.9% without bonus payments) and for Hungary (6.7% with bonus payments vs. 7.8% without bonus payments). This shows that the change in the skill premium is not driven by bonus payments rewarding the implementation of a successful innovation but rather reflect genuine technological change.

Column (3) of Table A.3 reports estimates using working hours (instead of total salary) as outcome variable in regression equation (14). We find no significant change in working hours of college workers (relative to non-college workers). Therefore, it is unlikely that the estimated effect on the wage premium results from longer hours worked by college workers after innovation.

Finally, in Norway, we can also assess whether non-cash benefits (taxable in-kind benefits reported in the employer-employee register) change following technological change. Column (4) in panel A reports the key estimates. We find no indication of changes in non-cash benefits for college workers (relative to non-college workers). Note that non-cash benefits can be interpreted as a proxy for the relative change in amenities. Nevertheless, we find no indication that this component of amenities changed in response to technological change.

Table A.3: Firm-level Technological Change and the Change in the Structure of Earnings in Hours Worked

Panel A: Norway

	(1) Total salary	(2) Base salary	(3) Hours	(4) Non-cash benefits
Innovation	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.031 (0.025)
Innovation x College	0.021** (0.009)	0.019** (0.008)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.010 (0.021)
Observations in CIS	4,182,655	4,180,110	4,182,655	3,837,347
R-squared	0.73	0.72	0.58	0.83

Panel B: Hungary

	(1) Total salary	(2) Base salary	(3) Hours
Innovation	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.010)	0.001 (0.002)
Innovation x College	0.067*** (0.023)	0.078** (0.033)	-0.002 (0.002)
Observations in CIS	197,065	197,064	197,065
R-squared	0.70	0.71	0.70

Notes: This table shows robustness checks for the results on the change in workers' (log) wages following firm-level technological change presented in Table 2. We report the estimated coefficients on the innovation dummy, δ^u , and the innovation x college interaction, δ^s , from equation (14), with different dependent variables. All specifications include skill-year (e.g. college-year) fixed effects, Mincer variables and firm fixed effects. Worker fixed effects are also included in Norway, while we apply the matching procedure for Hungary. Column (1) shows the change in total hourly wage, column (2) shows the change in base wage, while column (3) shows the change in working hours. The source of these variables in Norway (Panel A) is the Wage Survey rather than the administrative data used in the main regressions. Column (4) estimates the change in non-cash benefits. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

A.4 Firm-level Technological Change, Polarization, and Changes in Tasks

So far, we have classified workers into two skill groups, and looked at whether innovation affects the skill premium for college workers relative to non-college workers. However, [Acemoglu & Autor \(2011b\)](#) argue that the middle-skilled occupation categories, such as middle-skilled clerical, administrative, production and operative occupations, tend to be more affected by “routinization” than either high or low-skilled occupation categories, and that this has contributed to the observed wage polarization in the US. We study wage polarization across the skill distribution by interacting the innovation dummy in equation (14) with the more detailed schooling variable which can take four values. The four groups are primary schooling, secondary schooling, vocational education, and college. Table A.4 reports results when omitting the primary schooling category. The coefficients of the interaction terms presented in the table hence show the changes in wages following an innovation relative to workers with the lowest education level. Note that the regressions still include interacted skill-year fixed effects. The results in the Table provide little evidence for wage polarization, neither in the cross-sectional specifications (columns (1) and (2)), nor in the specifications with firm fixed effects (columns (3) and (4)). The details differ slightly in the two countries: in Norway, workers with vocational training seem to benefit from innovation relative to workers with only primary or secondary education, while in Hungary the wages of the lower three educational categories do not seem to change after innovation takes place, while the wages of college educated workers increase substantially.

In the framework of this paper, we follow the seminal work by [Katz & Murphy \(1992\)](#) and [Goldin & Katz \(2010\)](#) and model technological change as potentially increasing the productivity of skilled workers (relative to the unskilled) in production. An alternative (or complementary) framework of technological change is a task-based one, where technological change affects both the productivity of high- and low-skilled labor in performing different tasks, as well as the allocation of tasks between the different types of labor ([Autor et al. 2003](#), [Acemoglu & Autor 2011b](#), [Acemoglu & Restrepo 2020](#)). Having a college degree may strongly be correlated with performing non-routine tasks, and our finding that innovation affects the skill share and the skill premium may capture changes in the task mix of firms, rather than solely the change in the productivity of performing different tasks.

To investigate this possibility, we create a measure of the degree to which an occupation contains routine tasks (RTI) following [Autor et al. \(2003\)](#).⁵² Next, we include an interaction of $1 - RTI$ with the innovation dummy in regression equation (14). A higher $1 - RTI$ represents a higher non-routine content of the worker’s occupation. The results from this exercise are presented in Table A.5. We find that people working in less routine jobs are paid higher wages in general, even when controlling for worker fixed effects in Norway and estimating on the matched sample in Hungary. Firm-level technological change, however, does not affect this task content premium once we include person effects in the regression in Norway or apply the matching procedure in Hungary (see Column 4). Probably even more importantly, innovation’s college premium is not affected by the inclusion of the task content variables, showing that the effect of innovation on the college premium does not only reflect the different task content of the jobs performed by college and non-college workers.

⁵²We map the US occupation codes to Norwegian and Hungarian occupation codes.

Table A.4: Technological Change and the Change in Wages for Workers with Different Educational attainment

Panel A: Norway

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Innovation	0.104*** (0.016)	0.091*** (0.014)	-0.026** (0.011)	-0.019** (0.009)
Innovation x Vocational	0.018 (0.023)	0.012 (0.020)	0.027* (0.016)	0.041*** (0.015)
Innovation x Secondary	-0.001 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.014)	0.001 (0.007)	0.009* (0.005)
Innovation x College	0.078** (0.034)	0.068** (0.032)	0.132*** (0.017)	0.053*** (0.012)
Skill-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mincer variables	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes
Worker FEs	No	No	No	Yes
Observations in CIS	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373
R-squared	0.05	0.07	0.20	0.44

Panel B: Hungary

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Innovation	0.180*** (0.019)	0.133*** (0.016)	-0.040*** (0.013)	-0.003 (0.015)
Innovation x Vocational	0.037** (0.017)	0.049*** (0.014)	0.018** (0.008)	0.005 (0.012)
Innovation x Secondary	0.015 (0.035)	0.032 (0.030)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.019 (0.019)
Innovation x College	0.107*** (0.031)	0.133*** (0.029)	0.135*** (0.016)	0.060** (0.026)
Skill-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mincer variables	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Matched sample	No	No	No	Yes
Observations in CIS	785,443	785,443	785,419	197,065
R-squared	0.44	0.51	0.71	0.70

Notes: This table investigates whether firm-level technological change is associated with the polarization of workers' wages by distinguishing between four education categories rather than only non-college/college. The interactions show innovative firms' premiums for each education category relative to the premium of workers with a primary degree. All specifications include skill-year fixed effects, representing interactions of primary, secondary, vocational and college dummies with year dummies. Column (1) shows the estimates when including only skill-year (e.g. college-year) fixed effects in the regression. Columns (2)-(4) also include Mincer variables (gender, age, tenure, tenure squared, a dummy for new entrant in both countries and hours worked and a dummy for part-time employees in Hungary where part-time workers are also included in the sample). Columns (3)-(4) add firm fixed effects to the regression. Column (4) includes worker fixed effects in Norway and applies the matching procedure for Hungary (discussed in detail in Section 4.1 and Appendix Section B.6). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses.

Table A.5: Technological Change and the Skill Premium: the Role of Routine Task Intensity

Panel A: Norway

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Innovation	0.091*** (0.019)	0.094*** (0.019)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.012)
Non-routine	0.079*** (0.011)	0.055*** (0.010)	0.058*** (0.013)	-0.005 (0.010)
Innovation x College	0.064*** (0.024)	0.057** (0.024)	0.121*** (0.016)	0.041*** (0.010)
Innovation x Non-routine	0.012 (0.010)	0.017* (0.010)	0.006 (0.015)	0.007 (0.009)
Skill-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mincer variables	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes
Worker FEs	No	No	No	Yes
Observations in CIS	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373	4,804,373
R-squared	0.06	0.08	0.20	0.44

Panel B: Hungary

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Innovation	0.215*** (0.018)	0.179*** (0.016)	-0.022** (0.010)	-0.009 (0.010)
Non-routine	0.055*** (0.004)	0.033*** (0.004)	0.050*** (0.002)	0.060*** (0.007)
Innovation x College	0.040 (0.025)	0.059*** (0.022)	0.099*** (0.013)	0.085*** (0.021)
Innovation x Non-routine	0.050*** (0.011)	0.047*** (0.008)	0.026*** (0.006)	0.001 (0.008)
Skill-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mincer variables	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes
Matched sample	No	No	No	Yes
Observations in CIS	784,732	784,732	784,732	157,638
R-squared	0.46	0.52	0.72	0.70

Notes: This table investigates whether firm-level technological change is associated with changes in workers' wage premium in non-routine jobs. We augment the estimates in columns (1)-(4) of Table 2 with the innovation dummy interacted with non-routine intensity. Non-routine intensity measures the degree to which an occupation contains non-routine tasks following Autor et al. (2003). All specifications include skill-year fixed effects, representing interactions of primary, secondary, vocational and college dummies with year dummies. Column 1 shows the estimates when including only skill-year (e.g. college-year) fixed effects in the regression. Columns (2)-(4) also include Mincer variables (gender, age, tenure, tenure squared, a dummy for new entrant in both countries and hours worked and a dummy for part-time employees in Hungary where part-time workers are also included in the sample). Columns (3)-(4) add firm fixed effects to the regression. Column (4) includes worker fixed effects in Norway and applies the matching procedure for Hungary (discussed in detail in Section 4.1 and Appendix Section B.6). Standard errors, clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

A.5 Change in the skill ratio: Robustness Analyses

In Table A.6 we investigate the robustness of our results on the change in the skill ratio (Table 5, columns (1)-(3)). One potential concern is that firm-level changes in employment or the skill ratio are driven by local labor market shocks (see A.8 on local labor markets). We include local labor market fixed effects into these firm-level regressions in columns (1)-(3) and labour-market year fixed effects in columns (4)-(6). The results are not affected by these changes. Finally, in columns (7)-(9) we replace the dependent variable, a six-year change in our main specification, with a three-year change to investigate whether the results are sensitive to the choice of time period. In Norway, the point estimates become smaller but still remain positive and significant. In Hungary, they also remain positive and significant for college employment share and skill ratio, but lose significance for log employment.

Table A.6: Change in the Skill Ratio Following Firm-level Technological Change: Robustness

Panel A: Norway

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	College employment share	College to non college employment ratio	Log employment	College employment share	College to non college employment ratio	Log employment	College employment share	College to non college employment ratio	Log employment
Innovation	0.011*** (0.002)	0.028*** (0.006)	0.050*** (0.011)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.028*** (0.006)	0.050*** (0.011)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.041*** (0.006)
Long difference	6 years	6 years	6 years	6 years	6 years	6 years	3 years	3 years	3 years
Δ Log VA	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Δ Log Capital	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Dep. var. (t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Labor market FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Labor market-year FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Observations	18,204	17,786	24,931	18,204	17,786	24,931	25,052	24,528	28,311
R-squared	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.07

Panel B: Hungary

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	College employment share	College to non college employment ratio	Log employment	College employment share	College to non college employment ratio	Log employment	College employment share	College to non college employment ratio	Log employment
Innovation	0.017*** (0.004)	0.029*** (0.008)	0.031* (0.017)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.030*** (0.008)	0.031* (0.017)	0.011*** (0.008)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.003 (0.003)
Long difference	6 years	6 years	6 years	6 years	6 years	6 years	3 years	3 years	3 years
Δ Log VA	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Δ Log Capital	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Dep. var. (t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Labor market FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Labor market-year FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Observations	2,131	2,102	2,342	2,131	2,102	2,342	3,715	3,671	3,698
R-squared	0.10	0.15	0.15	0.12	0.17	0.15	0.09	0.13	0.13

Notes: This table shows robustness checks for the relationship between firm-level technological change and subsequent change in firm-level college employment share (columns 1,4,7), in college to non-college ratio (columns 2,5,8), and log employment (columns 3,6,9). In addition to the main regressions in Table 5 columns (1)-(3), we include labour market fixed effects in columns (1)-(3), labour market-year FEs in columns (4)-(6) and investigate 3 year change following innovation rather than a 6-year change in columns (7)-(9). We measure firm-level technological change in the CIS survey which asks whether any new or significantly modified product/service/process/organizational change (aka innovation) was introduced. In the table we report the δ coefficients from regression equation (15). The “Innovation” dummy indicates whether the firm innovated according to the current CIS wave or any of the previous two waves. The other two explanatory variables in columns when the dependent variable is collage employment share and the college to non college ratio are long differences of log capital stock and log value added. In each regression we include industry-year fixed effects and in columns as well as the lagged dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

A.6 Technological Change, Outsourcing and Changes in Skill Demand

Domestic outsourcing of less-skilled work to lower-wage contractors, or international outsourcing to lower-wage countries could potentially lead to a joint increase in the skill premium and skill ratio. In this section, we investigate whether our finding that firm-level innovation leads to an increase in the skill premium and the skill ratio is driven by increased outsourcing. Note that outsourcing is considered as a type of organizational innovation. Around 15% and 12% of innovative firms in Norway and Hungary outsource (see Table B.2). To assess the role of outsourcing on the skill premium, we include a measure of firm outsourcing (see Table B.1 for details on this variable in the CIS), as well as its interaction with the college dummy, in equation 14. To assess the role of outsourcing on skill demand, we include the measure of firm outsourcing in equation 15.

As presented in Table A.7, we find no significant effect of outsourcing on the skill premium in either country, and the effect of innovation on the skill premium is unaffected by the inclusion of a measure of firm outsourcing and its interaction with the college dummy in equation (14). As presented in Table A.8, we find, for both countries, that outsourcing increases the college employment share. This is not very surprising as intramural production goes down, and it seems to be driven by outsourcing of low-skilled labor tasks.

Table A.7: Firm Outsourcing and the Skill Premium

Panel A: Norway	
	(1)
Innovation	-0.013* (0.008)
Innovation x College	0.043*** (0.010)
Outsourcing	0.011 (0.008)
Outsourcing x College	0.007 (0.009)
Observations in CIS	4,804,373
R2	0.44
Panel B: Hungary	
	(1)
Innovation	0,001 (0.009)
Innovation x College	0.054** (0.025)
Outsourcing	-0.025** (0.012)
Outsourcing x College	0.032 (0.025)
Observations in CIS	197,065
R2	0.699

Notes: This table investigates the change in workers' (log) wages following firm-level technological change by firm outsourcing intensity. We augment the benchmark estimates reported in Column (4) of Table 2 by including a measure of firm outsourcing as well as its interaction with college. See table B.1 for details on the measure of firm outsourcing. The regressions include skill-year fixed effects, Mincer variables and firm fixed effects. We also include worker fixed effects in Norway and apply the matching procedure for Hungary. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.8: Firm Outsourcing and the Skill Share

Panel A: Norway

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	College employment share	College to non college employment ratio	log employment
Innovation	0.008*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.059*** (0.011)
Outsourcing	0.015*** (0.004)	0.053*** (0.012)	-0.032* (0.019)
Observations	18,215	17,797	24,945
R squared	0.07	0.06	0.07

Panel B: Hungary

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	College employment share	College to non college employment ratio	log employment
Innovation	0.013*** (0.004)	0.022*** (0.008)	0.026 (0.018)
Outsourcing	0.018*** (0.006)	0.035*** (0.011)	0.019 (0.022)
Observations	2,131	2,102	2,342
R squared	0.095	0.146	0.139

Notes: This table shows the relationship between firm-level technological change and subsequent six-year change in firm-level college employment share (column 1), in college to non-college ratio (column 2), and log employment (column 3) by firm outsourcing intensity. We measure firm-level technological change in the CIS survey which asks whether any new or significantly modified product/service/process/organizational change (aka innovation) was introduced. We augment the regression equation (15) by adding a measure of firm outsourcing. See table B.1 for details on the measure of firm outsourcing. The other two explanatory variables in columns (1)-(2) are long differences of log capital stock and log value added. In each regression we include the lagged dependent variable preceding the baseline year and industry-year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

A.7 Innovation Intensity and Changes in Skill Demand

So far, we have studied skill bias following innovation defined as an either-or event. In this section, we investigate whether innovation intensity—total spending on innovation activities—matters for skill biasedness. To this end, we create a measure of annual innovation intensity as a firm’s total innovation spendings per employee (the sum of R&D and non-R&D innovation spending as defined in Table B.1). Next, we create an annual categorical variable taking on three different values by firm innovation spending intensity: zero spending, positive spending below median in the distribution of firm innovation spending, and positive spending above median. As seen in Table B.2, firms’ main innovation spendings consist of R&D spending. Firms with a successful innovation tend to spend more on innovation activities, but also some non-successful firms have positive spendings.

To assess whether firms that spend more on innovation activities tend to increase the skill premium more following innovation than firms that spend less on innovation activities, we include the categorical variable, as well as its interaction with the college dummy in equation 14. Similarly, to assess whether firms that spend more on innovation activities tend to increase the skill ratio more than firms that spend less on innovation activities, we include the categorical variable in equation 15.

As seen in Table A.9, the increase in the college premium following innovation is the same for innovating firms with zero and medium innovation spending, while the increase in the premium is relatively higher for innovative firms with high innovation activities. This is the case in both countries. Similarly, as seen in Table A.10, there seems to be little difference in the change in the skill ratio following innovation between innovative firm with zero and medium innovation spending. Firms with a high innovation spending, on the other hand, experience a larger increase in the skill share than firms with lower innovation spending following innovation.

Table A.9: Technological Change and the Skill Premium: Innovation Intensity

Panel A: Norway	
	(1)
Innovation	-0.014 (0.009)
Innovation x College	0.039*** (0.010)
Medium innovation intensity	0.014 (0.010)
High innovation intensity	-0.014 (0.011)
Medium innovation intensity x College	0.014 (0.009)
High innovation intensity x College	0.033*** (0.012)
Observations in CIS	4,804,373
R2	0.44
Panel B: Hungary	
	(1)
Innovation	-0.004 (0.009)
Innovation x College	0.054** (0.023)
Medium innovation intensity	-0.011 (0.010)
High innovation intensity	-0.003 (0.011)
Medium innovation intensity x College	0.004 (0.023)
High innovation intensity x College	0.046* (0.024)
Observations in CIS	197,065
R2	0.70

Notes: This table investigates the change in workers' (log) wages following firm-level technological change by firm innovation intensity. We augment the benchmark estimates reported in Column (4) of Table 2 by including three categorical measures for innovation intensity and their interactions with the college dummy. Innovation intensity is captured by innovation spending per worker from the CIS, and the three categories are: zero spending, positive spending per worker below the median value ("medium innovation intensity") and above the median spending per worker ("high innovation intensity"). The regressions include skill-year fixed effects, Mincer variables and firm fixed effects. We also include worker fixed effects in Norway and apply the matching procedure for Hungary. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.10: Technological Change and the Skill Ratio: Innovation Intensity

Panel A: Norway

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	College employment share	College to non college employment ratio	Log employment
Innovation	0.010*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.030** (0.012)
ln capital (d)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.005* (0.003)	
ln value added (d)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.007)	
Medium innovation intensity	0.003 (0.003)	0.007 (0.008)	0.040*** (0.013)
High innovation intensity	0.013* (0.007)	0.053** (0.026)	0.092*** (0.029)
Dependent variable (t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	18,215	17,797	24,945
R squared	0.07	0.05	0.07

Panel B: Hungary

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	College employment share	College to non college employment ratio	Log employment
Innovation	0.011** (0.005)	0.018** (0.009)	-0.007 (0.020)
ln capital (d)	0.005 (0.004)	0.007 (0.007)	
ln value added (d)	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.011 (0.007)	
Medium innovation intensity	0.011* (0.006)	0.012 (0.010)	0.003 (0.022)
High innovation intensity	0.013** (0.006)	0.030*** (0.011)	0.127*** (0.023)
Dependent variable (t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,131	2,102	2,342
R squared	0.093	0.144	0.153

Notes: This table shows the relationship between firm-level technological change and subsequent six-year change in firm-level college employment share (column 1), in college to non-college ratio (column 2), and log employment (column 3) by firm innovation intensity. Innovation intensity is captured by innovation spending per worker from the CIS, and the three categories are: zero spending, positive spending per worker below the median value (“medium innovation intensity”) and above the median spending per worker (“high innovation intensity”). Standard errors, clustered at the firm level. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

A.8 Technological Change and Changes in Skill Demand by Local-Area Firm Density

As we describe in the main text, our model predicts that whenever firms face a more elastic labor supply (β is larger), we expect a larger impact on the skill ratio, and a smaller impact on the skill premium for the same increase in skill-biasedness, $\Delta\theta$ (see equations (7a) and (7b) in the main paper). In our model, the firm-level labor supply is tightly linked to the dispersion of idiosyncratic preferences for working at a particular firm. A key component of this dispersion is commuting distance, and so this dispersion is likely to be larger whenever workers live in lower density areas (or areas where the average distance between firms is larger). As a result, we compare responses in local areas with different levels of firm density. We summarized the key results in Figure 2, while here we provide more details underlying those results.

To this end, we extend the base worker- and firm-level regressions (equations (14) and (15)) with an interaction of the innovation variable and the log density of the local area where the firm is located. We define density, following Ciccone & Hall (1996), as the number of firms per square kilometer over the full sample period.

Table A.11 shows the firm-level results. The point estimate of the interaction is always positive in both countries, even though it is not always significant. This suggests that innovation leads to a larger increase in the skill ratio in denser areas. At the same time, in Table A.12 where worker-level results are shown, we find that the point estimate of the interaction term of the skill premium is negative. This suggest that in denser areas the changes in the skill premium are more muted.

In Figure 2 in the main paper we calculate the implied percent change in the skill ratio and skill premium at the 10th and 90th percentiles of the density distribution.⁵³

⁵³The corresponding log densities are 0.85 and 3.8 in Norway while 0.06 and 5.79 in Hungary. The larger range in Hungary reflects that we apply smaller local areas there. We have 175 local areas in Hungary and 47 in Norway even though Norway's land area is four times bigger.

Table A.11: Change in the Skill Ratio Following Firm-level Technological Change by Local-Area Density

Panel A: Norway			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	College employment share	College to non college employment ratio	log employment
Density	0.004*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.006)
Innovation	0.002 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.013)	0.096*** (0.026)
Innov x density	0.003* (0.002)	0.013** (0.005)	-0.016* (0.009)
Observations	18,204	17,785	24,931
R-squared	0.07	0.05	0.07

Panel B: Hungary			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	College employment share	College to non college employment ratio	log employment
Density	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.004)	0.013* (0.007)
Innovation	0.012** (0.006)	0.011 (0.010)	0.047** (0.020)
Innov x density	0.002 (0.003)	0.008* (0.005)	-0.011 (0.008)
Observations	2,152	2,124	2,147
R-squared	0.10	0.16	0.51

Notes: This table shows the relationship between firm-level technological change and subsequent 6-year change in firm-level college employment share (column 1), in college to non-college ratio (column 2), and log employment (column 3) by local-area firm density. We measure firm-level technological change in the CIS survey which asks whether any new or significantly modified product/service/process/organizational change (aka innovation) was introduced. We augment the regression equation (15) by adding local-area density and an interaction term between local-area density and the innovation dummy. Local-area density is defined as the number of firms (over the sample period) divided by the size of the area (in square km). The “Innovation” dummy indicates whether the firm innovated according to the current CIS wave or any of the previous two waves. The other two explanatory variables in columns (1)-(2) are long differences of log capital stock and log value added. In each regression we include the lagged dependent variable preceding the baseline year and industry-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.12: Change in the Skill Premium Following Firm-level Technological Change by Local-Area Density

Panel A: Norway

	(1)
Innovation	-0.017 (0.017)
Innovation x Log density	0.002 (0.007)
College x Log density	0.097*** (0.015)
Innovation x College	0.084*** (0.021)
Innov x Log density x College	-0.016** (0.008)
Observations in CIS	4,804,373
R-squared	0.44

Panel B: Hungary

	(1)
Innovation	-0.015 (0.014)
Innovation x Log density	0.003 (0.005)
College x Log density	-0.005 (0.009)
Innovation x College	0.080** (0.036)
Innov x Log density x College	-0.005 (0.010)
Observations in CIS	195,627
R-squared	0.70

Notes: This table investigates the change in workers' (log) wages following firm-level technological change by local-area firm density. We augment the benchmark estimates reported in Column (4) of Table 2 by interacting local-area density with innovation, with college, and also add the triple interaction between local-area density, college and innovation. The regressions include skill-year fixed effects, Mincer variables and firm fixed effects. We also include worker fixed effects in Norway and apply the matching procedure for Hungary. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

A.9 Change in the Firm-level College Share Following Different Forms of Technological Change

In the main paper we discuss the relationship between various forms of technological change and the changes in the college premium. In this section, we present the corresponding changes in the college share by extending regression equation (15). In particular, we include a set of dummy variables representing the different forms of technological change. The results are presented in Table A.14.

The first column reports the main estimate from column (1) of Table 5 as baseline. Column (2) investigates whether technological change in firms conducting R&D is more skill-biased than in non-R&D firms. The results are produced by extending regression equation (15) to including both the basic innovation variable—capturing the effect of non-R&D innovation—and its interaction with a dummy variable for whether the firm conducts R&D—capturing the additional effect of R&D-driven technological change. The results from this regression suggest that non-R&D innovation has a significant positive effect on the college share in both countries. Second, R&D-driven technological change has a relatively larger impact on the college share than non-R&D innovation; though the difference is not statistically significant in Norway. Column (3) investigates whether it matters for the effect of technological change on the skill share whether the innovation has a high novelty value. The results are produced by extending regression equation (15) to including both the basic innovation variable, and a dummy variable for whether the innovation is new to the market. The estimated coefficients on this latter variable are small and insignificant for both countries, suggesting that ‘new to the market’ innovations have a similar impact on the college share as other innovations.

Column (4) distinguishes between technical and organizational innovation. Note that a firm can conduct both at the same time; therefore, we introduce separate dummies for the different types of innovations in equation 15. We find that both types of innovation lead to an increase in the college share. This reinforces the conclusions of Caroli & Van Reenen (2001), who found that organizational changes also increase the skill ratio. In column (6) we further distinguish between product and process innovation within innovations with technical aspects. For both countries, there is only a minor difference between product and process innovation in terms of their implications for the college share.

Finally, in column (6) we study whether the change in the college share depends on the sector the firm operates in, as well as the technology intensity of the sector. We classify industries into four groups: high- and low technology manufacturing, and high and low knowledge intensive services (see the details about the classification in footnote 38 in the main paper). In Norway, the change in the college share is largest in high-tech manufacturing, and smallest in high-knowledge (HK) services. In Hungary there seems to be a sharp contrast between manufacturing and services, with no evidence for changes in the college share in services.

A.10 Relationship Between the R&D Tax Credit Policy and Skill Demand

In Section 5.3 we study the effect of introducing an R&D tax credit scheme on skill demand. In this section we provide further details about the key results presented in Table 7 and also present some robustness checks.

We exploit a reform called Skattefunn that was introduced in Norway in 2002. The reform allowed firms to deduct 20 percent of their R&D expenditures up to a threshold of 4 million NOK. As a consequence, firms conducting R&D investments below the cost deduction threshold of 4 million NOK experienced a reduction in the marginal cost of investing in R&D. We therefore follow [Bøler et al. \(2015\)](#) and [Bøler \(2015\)](#) and classify a firm as treated if its pre-reform R&D investments are below 4 million NOK. More specifically, a firm is considered treated if its average annual R&D investments in the years 1998-2001 are below 4 million NOK. We also restrict the sample to firms with at least 50 employees, as very few small firms conduct R&D.

The marginal cost of spending on R&D does not fall for firms spending more than the policy threshold on R&D, therefore the control group should be a subset of these firms. However, some of these firms are quite dissimilar from the treated group. Firms that spend substantially above the threshold are likely to be large, more globalised and more innovative than the treated group. If firm-level innovation tends to be skill-biased, heavily R&D-investing firms experience a continuous growth in the college employment share and premium relative to the treated firms even if the former group's R&D spending is not affected by the policy. In addition, thanks to the absolute nature of the threshold, non-treated firms tend to be larger, which may bias our firm-level estimates if small firms grow faster or change the structure of their labor force more rapidly. We therefore construct control groups in which firms spend above the policy threshold but below a certain percentile of the R&D expenditure distribution before the introduction of the policy. The choice of this threshold involves a trade-off: choosing a low value reduces the number of control firms, while a high threshold leads to the inclusion of firms which are very dissimilar from the treated firms into the control group. In our preferred control group firms spend between the policy threshold (4 million NOK, approx. 450,000 USD) and the median R&D spending in the distribution (12 million NOK), but we report sensitivity checks for this threshold.

We estimate the change in skill ratio following the introduction of the R&D tax credit policy using regression equation (16) and the results are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7. We estimate the effect of the introduction of the R&D tax credit on college premium using the regression equation (17).

Table A.13 reports the results from Table 7 for different values of the threshold: 8 million NOK, 12 million NOK (the baseline) and 16 million NOK. The change in skill ratio (columns (1) and (2)) is similar for the different thresholds, with the point estimates increasing with the threshold value. The point estimates on the college premium are also similar across specifications, but the estimates become insignificant when the threshold is high.

Table A.13: The Impact of the R&D Tax Credit Policy in Norway: Applying Alternative Threshold Values for the Control Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	College employment share	College to non-college employment ratio	Employment	College premium	College premium
Panel A (Control firms 4-8 NOK mm)					
Treatment effect	0.068 (0.044)	0.070 (0.062)	0.032 (0.072)	0.063** (0.030)	0.016 (0.033)
Observations in R&D survey	13,025	13,025	13,025	2,398,437	2,398,437
R-squared	0.94	0.96	0.90	0.16	0.41
Panel A (Control firms 4-12 NOK mm)					
Treatment effect	0.076** (0.034)	0.091* (0.051)	0.048 (0.058)	0.059** (0.028)	0.032 (0.031)
Observations in R&D survey	13,359	13,359	13,359	2,568,739	2,568,739
R-squared	0.93	0.96	0.90	0.15	0.41
Panel A (Control firms 4-16 NOK mm)					
Treatment effect	0.086*** (0.031)	0.097** (0.046)	0.091* (0.054)	0.043 (0.027)	0.018 (0.029)
Observations in R&D survey	13,569	13,569	13,569	2,638,158	2,638,158
R-squared	0.94	0.96	0.90	0.15	0.41
Sample	Firm level	Firm level	Firm level	Worker level	Worker level
Worker FEs	N/A	N/A	N/A	No	Yes

Notes: This table shows how an R&D tax credit, introduced in 2002 in Norway, affected treated and control firms. Treated firms are those whose R&D expenditures had been below the policy threshold, NOK 4 mn, on average between 1999 and 2001. Control firms spent between NOK 4-8 mn (in Panel A), between NOK 4-12 mn (Panel B) and between 4-16 mn (Panel C) in the same period. Columns (1), (2) and (3) report δ (the coefficients of the $Treat_j \times Post_t$) from the regression equation (16) in the main paper, when the dependent variables are (log) college employment share (number of college workers divided by all workers), (log) college to non-college ratio, and (log) total employment, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) report δ^* (the coefficients of the $Treat_j \times Post_t \times College_i$) from the regression equation (17), when the dependent variable is log wage. Column (4) includes skill-year (e.g. college-year) fixed effects, Mincer variables and firm fixed effects. Column (5) includes worker fixed effects as well. All regressions exclude the years 2002-2004 immediately following the reform and we restrict the sample to firms with at least 50 employees. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.14: Change in the College Share Following Different Forms of Technological Change

Panel A: Norway

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Innovation	0.010*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.008*** (0.003)			
Innovation x R&D		0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)			
Innovation x New			-0.000 (0.003)			
Technological				0.005** (0.002)		
Organizational				0.011*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)	
Process					0.002 (0.003)	
Product					0.005* (0.003)	
Innovation x Manuf.						0.010*** (0.003)
Innovation x HT manuf.						0.023*** (0.009)
Innovation x Services						0.010*** (0.003)
Innovation x HK services.						0.005 (0.012)
Dependent variable (t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	18,205	18,205	18,205	18,205	18,205	18,205
R-squared	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07

Panel B: Hungary

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Innovation	0.019*** (0.004)	0.011** (0.005)	0.011** (0.005)			
Innovation x R&D		0.013** (0.006)	0.011* (0.006)			
Innovation x New			0.019 (0.013)			
Technological				0.012*** (0.005)		
Organizational				0.010** (0.005)	0.007 (0.007)	
Process					0.007 (0.007)	
Product					0.008 (0.005)	
Innovation x Manuf.						0.024*** (0.006)
Innovation x HT Manuf.						0.018** (0.007)
Innovation x Services						-0.005 (0.012)
Innovation x HK services						-0.022 (0.034)
Dependent variable (t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,153	2,153	2,153	2,153	2,153	2,153
R-squared	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10

Notes: This table shows the change in firm-level college employment shares following different forms of firm-level technological change. We measure firm-level technological change in the CIS survey which asks whether any new or significantly modified product/service/process/organizational change (aka innovation) was introduced. We extend the regression equation 15. Column (1) reports the main estimate from column (1) of Table 5 as baseline. Column (2) includes a dummy showing whether the innovating firm conducted R&D and column (3) also includes a dummy showing whether the innovation was new for the firms' market rather than only for the firm. Column (4) distinguishes between innovations with technical aspects (product and process) and organizational changes, while column (5) distinguishes between product, process and organizational changes. Column (6) investigates industry heterogeneity, where "HT manuf." represents High-tech and Medium High tech manufacturing industries, "Manuf" other manufacturing, "HT services" high-tech knowledge intensive services and "Services" other service industries, all following Eurostat definitions. In each regression we include log capital stock, log value added, and the lagged dependent variable preceding the baseline year and industry-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Appendix B Institutional Details and Data Appendix

B.1 The Community Innovation Survey

Table B.1: Questions in the 2002-2004 CIS

Innovation	The sum of product, process and organizational innovation.
Product innovation	<p>A product innovation is the market introduction of a new good or service or a significantly improved good or service with respect to its capabilities, such as improved software, user friendliness, components or sub-systems. The innovation (new or improved) must be new to your enterprise, but it does not need to be new to your sector or market. It does not matter if the innovation was originally developed by your enterprise or by other enterprises.</p> <p>During the three years 2002 to 2004, did your enterprise introduce:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. New or significantly improved goods (exclude the simple resale of new goods purchased from other enterprises and changes of a solely aesthetic nature). 2. New or significantly improved services?
Process innovation	<p>A process innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved production process, distribution method, or support activity for your goods or services. The innovation (new or improved) must be new to your enterprise, but it does not need to be new to your sector or market. It does not matter if the innovation was originally developed by your enterprise or by other enterprises. Exclude purely organisational innovations.</p> <p>During the three years 2002 to 2004, did your enterprise introduce:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. New or significantly improved methods of manufacturing or producing goods or services. 2. New or significantly improved logistics, delivery or distribution methods for your inputs, goods or services. 3. New or significantly improved supporting activities for your processes, such as maintenance systems or operations for purchasing, accounting, or computing?
Organizational innovation	<p>An organisational innovation is the implementation of new or significant changes in firm structure or management methods that are intended to improve your firm's use of knowledge, the quality of your goods and services, or the efficiency of work flows. A marketing innovation is the implementation of new or significantly improved designs or sales methods to increase the appeal of your goods and services or to enter new markets.</p> <p>During the three years 2002 to 2004, did your enterprise introduce:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. New or significantly improved knowledge management systems to better use or exchange information, knowledge and skills within your enterprise. 2. A major change to the organisation of work within your enterprise, such as changes in the management structure or integrating different departments or activities. 3. New or significant changes in your relations with other firms or public institutions, such as through alliances, partnerships, outsourcing or sub-contracting?
Intramural (in-house) R&D	<p>During the three years 2002 to 2004, did your enterprise engage in the following innovation activities:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Creative work undertaken within your enterprise to increase the stock of knowledge and its use to devise new and improved products and processes (including software development)?
R&D spending	<p>Please estimate the amount of expenditure for each of the following (...) innovation activities in 2004 only (include personnel and related costs):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Intramural (in-house) R&D (Include capital expenditures on buildings and equipment specifically for R&D). 2. Acquisition of R&D (extramural R&D).
Non-R&D innovation spending	<p>Please estimate the amount of expenditure for each of the following (...) innovation activities in 2004 only (include personnel and related costs):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Acquisition of advanced machinery, equipment and computer hardware or software to produce new or significantly improved products and processes (Exclude expenditures on equipment for R&D). 2. Acquisition of other external knowledge. (Purchase or licensing of patents and non-patented inventions, know-how, and other types of knowledge from other enterprises or organisations).
New-to-the-market innovation	<p>Were any of your goods and service innovations during the three years 2002 to 2004 new to your market? Your enterprise introduced a new or significantly improved good or service onto your market before your competitors (it may have already been available in other markets).</p>
Outsourcing	<p>During the three years 2002 to 2004, did your enterprise introduce new or significant changes in your relations with other firms or public institutions, such as through alliances, partnerships, outsourcing or sub-contracting.</p>

Source: The definitions come from the CIS 2004 Questionnaire, available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/community-innovation-survey>.

Table B.2: Firm Innovation Activities

Panel A: Norway

	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
Product innovation	0.63	0.59	0.48	0.47	0.43
Process innovation	0.50	0.46	0.40	0.34	0.29
Organizational innovation	0.58	0.34	0.37	0.39	0.41
R&D	0.61	0.49	0.45	0.49	0.45
New-to-the-market innovation	0.33	0.34	0.24	0.38	0.35
Intramural R&D innovation intensity	11.37 (30.37)	13.34 (35.09)	13.10 (34.49)	15.53 (51.93)	18.00 (49.30)
External R&D innovation intensity	2.38 (13.60)	2.06 (14.78)	3.18 (24.25)	3.27 (28.31)	3.98 (44.55)
Non-R&D innovation intensity	4.40 (19.41)	.	5.22 (188.28)	3.00 (40.44)	0.87 (103.19)
Outsourcing	0.20	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.14
Number of firms	2,126	2,705	3,011	3,032	2,896

Panel B: Hungary

	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014
Product innovation	0.27	0.23	0.21	0.25	0.18	0.18
Process innovation	0.25	0.23	0.23	0.26	0.18	0.16
Organizational innovation	0.34	0.31	0.25	0.29	0.27	0.16
R&D	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.10	0.09
New-to-the-market innovation	0.09	0.09	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.05
Intramural R&D innovation intensity	1.04 (1.90)	1.10 (1.82)	1.74 (2.69)	1.73 (3.00)	3.48 (5.89)	4.38 (7.21)
External R&D innovation intensity	0.30 (0.46)	0.31 (0.53)	0.47 (0.88)	0.54 (1.00)	1.44 (2.86)	3.53 (5.69)
Non-R&D innovation intensity	2.27 (3.66)	1.97 (3.06)	3.63 (5.73)	1.69 (2.69)	3.77 (6.05)	5.00 (7.36)
Outsourcing	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.11	0.13	0.07
Number of firms	1,165	2,340	2,606	2,076	2,545	3,055

Notes: R&D and innovation intensity is measured as spendings in 1,000 USD (using the exchange rate for 2012) per employee.

B.2 Labor Markets in Norway and Hungary

Norway's labor market is an example of the Nordic model, which has three key features: (i) flexible hiring and firing, (ii) a generous social safety net and (iii) active labor market policies. In the Nordic model, labor markets are less heavily regulated relative to other European labor markets, and collective agreements take over some of these functions. Union density is very high in Norway, with more than 35% of workers in the private sector being Union members in 2012. Collective bargaining with the participation of Unions has led to smaller wage dispersion and sustained high wage growth (IMF 2015). Collective bargaining starts at the central and industry level, where key terms are decided,

including a “floor” for wage increase. In the private sector, these central wage agreements are followed by firm-level collective bargaining. The firm-level wage agreements often lead to substantially higher wage increases and levels than the centrally agreed minimum wages, allowing for firm-level wage setting. For the majority of white-collar workers in the private sector, centrally negotiated collective agreements do not specify wages, therefore these workers have only firm-level wage formation, with strong individual-level elements (Nergaard 2014).

Hungarian employment protection institutions, in contrast, are closer to the Anglo-Saxon institutions than to those found in continental countries. It is relatively easy to dismiss workers (Tonin et al. 2009) and wage bargaining takes place mostly at the individual level. Collective wage bargaining is based on firm-level agreements with unions. Union membership was 10.2% percent in 2014, one of the lowest in the OECD.⁵⁴ Apart from firm-level bargaining, industry-level agreements are rare and set only weak requirements. Unions participate in the country-level bargaining forum called National Interest Reconciliation Council, which makes only non-binding recommendations (Rigó 2012). Employment contracts usually assume full time employment and pre-specify 8-hour working days. The actual working hours in these contracts are not monitored and firms can decide whether they want to measure and compensate for overtime hours. Part time work contracts add up to only 5 percent of the workforce and contracts on hourly basis are also rare.

Figure B.1 sketches the evolution of the two key variables in our study at the macro level for Norway, Hungary and the US between 2000 and 2018. The share of college graduates increased in all three countries throughout the period. This expansion started from a much lower level and was faster in relative terms in Hungary compared to the other two countries. In parallel with the education expansion, the skill premium fell in all three countries from 2005. The fall was strongest in Hungary, in line with the quick increase in the share of college workers. The evolution of the premium was nearly parallel in Norway and the US, but it is at a much lower level in Norway.

B.3 Innovation in Norway and Hungary

The European Innovation Scoreboard provides a comprehensive picture of innovation activities of European countries.⁵⁵ It uses four categories to rank the countries’ innovation system, and classifies Norway as a ‘Strong innovator’ (the second group), and Hungary as a ‘Moderate Innovator’ (third group), suggesting that Norway is substantially closer to the world technology frontier than Hungary, where technology adoption plays a much larger role.⁵⁶

These differences are reflected by a number of indicators. In terms of GDP/capita, Norway’s GDP was 20% above that of the USA (66 vs 55 thousand USD) and more than 150% above that of Hungary (25 thousand USD). On the innovation input side, the overall R&D/GDP ratio (in 2014) was 1.35% in Hungary and 1.71% in Norway compared to an EU average of 2% and 2.7% in the USA.⁵⁷


⁵⁴OECD Employment and Labor Market Statistics.

⁵⁵Available at https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/policy/innovation/scoreboards_en.

⁵⁶We use numbers from 2014 around the end of our sample period, unless otherwise indicated.

⁵⁷Source: <https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm>.

Figure B.1: The Evolution of the Skill Share and Wage Ratio in Norway, Hungary and the US




Notes: H/L is based on the share of people with tertiary degrees among workers and the wage premium shows the average wage of 25-64 year-olds with income from employment compared to upper secondary education. Source: OECD Education at a Glance 2014, Table A62a and OECD Education at a Glance 2014 database (“*eduadult*” variable).

Figure B.2 shows the share of firms conducting different types of innovation in the two countries and the average among the EU 27 and the United Kingdom. In Norway, 59% of firms are innovative compared to 25.5% in Hungary and 49% in the EU. Other differences than the share of innovative firms are present: Norwegian innovators are much more likely to combine technical and organizational changes than either the EU or Hungary. Norwegian firms are also much more likely to rely on high novelty innovation while Hungarian firms conduct technology adoption to a larger extent. Among innovators, 26% introduced a “World first” innovation in Norway, compared to 5% in Hungary.

The CIS data also show characteristic differences in the inputs used by innovative firms in the two countries (Figure B.3). In line with a larger role of high-novelty innovations, Norwegian firms are much more likely to rely on R&D than Hungarian firms, with Norway having one of the highest share of R&D conducting firms among innovative firms (Panel A). Panel B shows a breakdown of the different types of innovation costs. It clearly demonstrates that the type of innovation costs captured by the CIS goes much beyond R&D, and also that in many European countries R&D is not the dominant component of innovation costs. The sum of external and internal R&D represents about 60% of Norwegian firms’ innovation costs, but this number is closer to 45% in Hungary. In fact, the dominant innovation cost for Hungarian firms is machinery and software, in line with an innovation model which mainly relies on technology adoption, partly based on embodied knowledge (see e.g. [Koren & Csillag 2017](#)).


Figure B.2: Prevalence of Innovation Types in Norway and Hungary




Notes: This Figure shows the share of innovative firms by the main type of innovation from the Community Innovation Survey 2014. “European Union” is the average of the EU 27 countries and the United Kingdom.

Figure B.3: Innovation Inputs and Outputs


Panel A: Share of Firms Conducting R&D Continuously or Occasionally Among Technical Innovators (%)



Panel B: Share of Different Expenditures in Total Innovation Costs (%)



Panel C: Share of Innovative Firms Applying for Patents and Other IP



Notes: Panel A of this figure shows the share of firms which conducted in-house R&D in firms which reported product and/or process innovations. The breakdown between continuous and occasional R&D spending is not available in countries denoted by *. Panel B shows the share of different types of innovation expenditures relative to total expenditures on product and process innovation. Panel C reports the share of firms which applied for a patent or other IP (a European utility model or that registered an industrial design right or a trademark). All the figures refer to the period between 2012 and 2014. Source: CIS, 2014.

B.4 Estimating Worker Fixed Effects in Norway

To estimate the impact of innovation on the skill premium, given by regression equation (14), we use the sample of 4,804,373 worker-year observations for which we have information on innovation from the CIS (as described in Section 3). However, we make use of the full universe of workers in private sector firms (8,330,444 worker-year observations) to estimate the worker fixed effects (and other control variables) included in equation (14). More specifically, we “dummy out” the effect of innovation on the skill premium for observations for which innovation status is missing, such that only the 4,804,373 observations from the CIS contribute to identifying the effect of innovation on the skill premium. In the results tables, we report the observations numbers for which we have information from the CIS.

For the robustness results presented in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, we use data on occupations from the annual wage survey that covers only a subset of the workers in the main sample. We run these robustness regressions on the full sample of workers, but dummy out the effect of innovation on the skill premium for observations for which occupational status is missing.

B.5 Estimating Skill-Specific Firm Effects

We include skill-specific firm effects as follows. First, we group firms into deciles based on their college premium. Next, we include an additional interaction of firm premium-type deciles with the college dummy in regression equation (14). Ideally, we would like to group firms into skill premium deciles based on their residual college premium that is calculated after filtering out both observed (X_{ijt}) and unobserved (η_i) worker differences. As this is not directly observed in the data, we instead implement an iterative procedure. First, we group firms based on the average college premium over the sample period. Then we estimate equation (14), and calculate, for each firm, the residual college premium conditional on X_{ijt} and on the estimated η_i . We then re-classify firms into college premium deciles based on the newly estimated residual college-premium. We re-estimate the model with new college-premium deciles, before we repeat the whole procedure of calculating the residual college premium, and using this to re-classify firms into deciles. This iterative procedure is repeated ten times. At this point, further reclassification has little impact on the classification of firms into college premium deciles.

When including the firm-skill fixed effects in regression equation (14), we find that it has a limited effect on the estimated change in the wage premium. Moreover, we get very similar estimates regardless of whether we apply the deciles based on the iterative procedure, or simply include the originally designated deciles.

B.6 The Matching Procedure in Hungary

The steps of the matching procedure in Hungary are the following. First, we run a probit regression with the innovation dummy as the dependent variable and basic firm characteristics as explanatory

variables, while restricting the sample to each firm's first record in the CIS. The explanatory variables include both balance sheet information and a number of variables from the CIS, as suggested by [Griffith et al. \(2006\)](#) when modeling the drivers of innovation at the firm level. The variables from the balance sheets are: 1-digit industry dummies, year dummies, log employment, log productivity, log wage premium, ownership. The dummies from the CIS indicate whether the main market of the worker's firm is international, whether it received funding from the local government, the national government, or the EU, and whether international sources, buyers, suppliers, competitors, universities or conferences were important information sources. The main results are not sensitive to using other sets of variables, for example, to excluding the CIS variables from the matching.

Based on this probit specification, we estimate a propensity score of innovating. Second, we restrict our sample to firms which were sampled at least twice in the CIS, and were not innovative in the first period. We consider the firms which started to innovate sometime later as treated. We use propensity score matching to design a control group for these firms from those which did not innovate in any of the subsequent periods, and use this sample and the resulting weights as our matched sample. In our main specification we use a nearest neighbor matching, but results from kernel matching yield similar results. The matching procedure effectively excludes both frequent innovators and firms which are very unlikely to innovate, and we are hence more likely to compare quite similar firms. This presumption is reinforced by the fact that no pre-trend is detectable in this sample.

Appendix C Model

C.1 Basic Set-up

This section describes the firm's and worker's problem in detail. We also define the equilibrium and derive equations (3c) and (3d) in the main paper. Throughout the section we drop the time subscript from the notation.

Worker's side. We model the worker's decision as in Card et al. (2018). For workers in skill group $S \in \{L, H\}$, the indirect utility of working at firm j is

$$u_{ij} = \ln \tau w_{Sj}^\lambda + \ln a_{Sj} + \epsilon_{ij}, \quad (\text{C.1})$$

where w_{Sj} is the firm-specific wage paid to individual i who belongs to skill group S , τ and λ approximate the progressivity of the tax system, and $\ln a_{Sj}$ is a firm-specific amenity common to all workers in group S , and ϵ_{ij} captures idiosyncratic preferences for working at firm j , arising e.g. from commuting distance, work flexibility and so on. We assume that the ϵ_{ij} are independent draws from a type I Extreme Value distribution with dispersion parameter ϕ .

Given posted wages, workers are free to work at any firm they wish. Hence by standard arguments (McFadden et al. 1977), workers have logit choice densities of the following form:

$$\begin{aligned} P_{ij}^s \left(\arg \max_{k \in \{1, \dots, J\}} \{u_{ik}^s\} = j \right) &= \frac{\exp \left(\frac{\lambda}{\phi} \ln w_{Sj} + \ln a_{Sj} \right)}{\sum_{k=1}^J \exp \left(\frac{\lambda}{\phi} \ln w_{Sk} + \ln a_{Sk} \right)} \\ &= A_S \exp \left(\frac{\lambda}{\phi} \ln w_{Sj} + \ln a_{Sj} \right), \end{aligned}$$

where $A_S = \frac{1}{\sum_{k=1}^J \exp \left(\frac{\lambda}{\phi} \ln w_{Sk} + \ln a_{Sk} \right)}$ is the same for all firms. This equation leads to the following upward sloping labor supply curve:

$$\ln S_j(w_{Sj}) = \ln \left(S \cdot P_{ij}^s \left(\arg \max_{k \in \{1, \dots, J\}} \{u_{ik}^s\} = j \right) \right) = \ln(SA_S) + \beta \ln w_{Sj} + \ln a_{Sj},$$

where S is the total supply of workers from skill group S and $\beta = \frac{\lambda}{\phi}$.

Firm's side. Firms solve the following problem:

$$\pi_j(A_j, \theta_j) = \max_{w_{Hj}, w_{Lj}} p_j Q_j - H_j(w_{Hj})w_{Hj} - L_j(w_{Lj})w_{Lj}, \quad (\text{C.2})$$

subject to

$$Q_j = A_j \left[\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \quad (\text{C.3})$$

$$\ln p_j = \frac{1}{\rho} \ln \kappa_j - \frac{1}{\rho} \ln Q_j + \frac{\rho-1}{\rho} \ln p + \frac{1}{\rho} \ln I, \quad (\text{C.4})$$

$$\ln L_j(w_{Lj}) = \ln(L\Lambda_L) + \beta \ln w_{Lj} + \ln a_{Lj}, \quad (\text{C.5})$$

$$\ln H_j(w_{Hj}) = \ln(H\Lambda_H) + \beta \ln w_{Hj} + \ln a_{Hj}. \quad (\text{C.6})$$

The first budget constraint (equation (C.3)) comes from the CES production function. While here we abstract away from capital or the presence of intermediate goods in the production function, we relax this assumption in Appendix Section C.3. The presence of capital does not change any of our conclusions presented here. The second budget constraint (equation (C.4)) represents the firm-specific output demand function that firms face. We micro found this equation in Appendix Section C.4 using a monopolistic competition model and show that κ_j is a firm specific demand shifter, p is the price index and I is the total income of the consumer. The third (equation (C.5)) and fourth (equation (C.6)) constraints represent the upward sloping labor supply function we just derived above. As we describe above, Λ_L and Λ_H are determined by other firms' wage-setting behavior. Following Card et al. (2018) and Lamadon et al. (2022) we assume that firm's behavior has no direct effect on this outcome.

We close the model by requiring that supply and demand are equal in the two labor markets, as well as in the product market:

$$L = \sum_j L_j, \quad (\text{C.7})$$

$$H = \sum_j H_j, \quad (\text{C.8})$$

$$I = \sum_j p_j Q_j = \sum_j \kappa_j^{\frac{1}{\rho}} p^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} I^{\frac{1}{\rho}} Q_j^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}}. \quad (\text{C.9})$$

Equilibrium. We define the market equilibrium in the following way.

Definition 1. Given firm characteristics $(A_j, \theta_j, \kappa_j, a_{Hj}, a_{Lj})$, worker distribution (L, H) , and preference parameter (ϕ) , we define equilibrium as the worker's decision on which firm to choose $j(i, t)$, market-level price index p , wage indices Λ_H, Λ_L , and firm's decision on prices p_j and wages w_{Hj}, w_{Lj} such that:

1. Workers choose firms that maximize their utility, as defined in equation (C.1).
2. Firms choose labor demand by setting wages w_{Sj} for each worker type to maximize profits (equation (C.2)) subject to the production function (equation (C.3)), product market constraint (equation (C.4)) and labor supply constraints (equations (C.5) and (C.6)).

3. The market level wage indices (A_L and A_H) and price index (p) are generated from the workers' optimal decisions and supply and demand are equal in the two labor markets and the product market (Equations C.7, C.8, C.9).

Solution. We solve the firm problem described above.

The FOC of the problem is the following:

$$\frac{\partial \pi_j(A_j, \theta_j)}{\partial w_{Lj}} = Q_j \frac{\partial p_j}{\partial Q_j} \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial L_j} \frac{\partial L_j}{\partial w_{Lj}} + p_j \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial L_j} \frac{\partial L_j}{\partial w_{Lj}} - \frac{\partial L_j}{\partial w_{Lj}} w_{Lj} - L_j = 0, \quad (\text{C.10})$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi_j(A_j, \theta_j)}{\partial w_{Hj}} = Q_j \frac{\partial p_j}{\partial Q_j} \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial H_j} \frac{\partial H_j}{\partial w_{Hj}} + p_j \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial H_j} \frac{\partial H_j}{\partial w_{Hj}} - \frac{\partial H_j}{\partial w_{Hj}} w_{Hj} - H_j = 0. \quad (\text{C.11})$$

The first FOC, representing the decision about low-skilled workers, can be rewritten as:

$$\left(\frac{Q_j}{p_j} \frac{\partial p_j}{\partial Q_j} + 1 \right) p_j \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial L_j} \frac{L_j}{w_{Lj}} \frac{\partial L_j}{\partial w_{Lj}} \frac{w_{Lj}}{L_j} - \left(1 + \frac{\partial L_j}{\partial w_{Lj}} \frac{w_{Lj}}{L_j} \right) L_j = 0.$$

The second (equation (C.4)) and third (equation (C.5)) constraints imply that:

$$\frac{1 + \rho}{\rho} p_j \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial L_j} = \frac{1 + \beta}{\beta} w_{Lj}.$$

The CES production function implies that:

$$\frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial L_j} = A_j \left[\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} (1 - \theta_j) L_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = A_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (1 - \theta_j) L_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}},$$

and so we get the following expression for the FOC:

$$\frac{1 + \rho}{\rho} p_j A_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (1 - \theta_j) L_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} = w_{Lj}.$$

A similar expression leads to the following expression for high skilled workers:

$$\frac{1 + \rho}{\rho} p_j A_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \theta_j H_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} = w_{Hj}.$$

Dividing the two first order conditions leads to the following expression:

$$\frac{\theta_j H_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{(1 - \theta_j) L_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}} = \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}},$$

which can be rearranged to derive the following relationship between the skill premium and the skill

ratio:

$$\ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}} = \ln \frac{\theta_j}{1 - \theta_j} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}. \quad (\text{C.12})$$

The second and the third constraints also imply that:

$$\ln \frac{H_j}{L_j} = \ln \frac{H\Lambda_H}{L\Lambda_H} + \beta \ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}} + \ln \frac{a_{Hj}}{a_{Lj}},$$

which lead to equation (6a) in the main paper:

$$\ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma + \beta} \ln \frac{\theta_j}{1 - \theta_j} - \frac{1}{\sigma + \beta} \ln \frac{H\Lambda_H}{L\Lambda_L} - \frac{1}{\sigma + \beta} \ln \frac{a_{Hj}}{a_{Lj}},$$

and to equation (6b) in the main paper:

$$\ln \frac{H_j}{L_j} = \frac{\beta\sigma}{\sigma + \beta} \ln \frac{\theta_j}{1 - \theta_j} + \frac{\sigma}{\sigma + \beta} \ln \frac{H\Lambda_H}{L\Lambda_L} + \frac{\sigma}{\sigma + \beta} \ln \frac{a_{Hj}}{a_{Lj}}.$$

The relationship between the skill premium and the skill ratio can be also used to demonstrate the key idea of the paper. The change in skill premium in response to innovation will be the following:

$$\underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}}}_{\text{Change in skill premium}} = \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_j}{1 - \theta_j}}_{\text{Change in skill bias}} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}}_{\text{Change in skill ratio}}. \quad (\text{C.13})$$

Since $\sigma \geq 0$, this equation shows that the skill premium (w_{Hj}/w_{Lj}) and skill ratio (H_j/L_j) will be negatively related when there is no change in the skill bias component. As a result, a joint increase in the premium and the skill ratio provides *prima facie* evidence for innovation activities being skill-biased.

C.2 Skill-Specific Dispersion in Idiosyncratic Preferences

Now we can extend the baseline framework by allowing differential dispersion of the idiosyncratic error term (ϵ_{ij}) for high- (ϕ_H) and low-skilled workers (ϕ_L). The upward-sloping labor supply curves firms face will have differential elasticities:

$$\ln S_j(w_{Sj}) = \ln(S\Lambda_S) + \beta_S \ln w_{Sj} + \ln a_{Sj},$$

where $\beta_S = \frac{\lambda}{\phi_S}$.

Solution. We follow the same steps as above. The FOC of the problem leads to the following two equations:

$$\frac{1+\rho}{\rho} p_j A_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (1-\theta_j) L_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \frac{\beta_L}{1+\beta_L} = w_{Lj},$$

$$\frac{1+\rho}{\rho} p_j A_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \theta_j H_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \frac{\beta_H}{1+\beta_H} = w_{Hj}.$$

The ratio of the two first order conditions leads to the following expression:

$$\frac{\theta_j H_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \frac{\beta_H}{1+\beta_H}}{(1-\theta_j) L_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \frac{\beta_L}{1+\beta_L}} = \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}}.$$

This can be rearranged to get the following relationship between skill premium and skill demand:

$$\underbrace{\ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}}}_{\text{skill premium}} = \underbrace{\ln \frac{1+\frac{1}{\beta_L}}{1+\frac{1}{\beta_H}}}_{\text{relative mark-down}} + \underbrace{\ln \frac{\theta_j}{1-\theta_j}}_{\text{skill bias}} - \underbrace{\frac{1}{\sigma} \ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}}_{\text{skill ratio}}. \quad (\text{C.14})$$

The main difference between this equation and the one derived under constant dispersion (equation (C.12)) is the new term reflecting the relative mark-down on the two labor markets. This new term reflects that the wage premium in this case also depends on the extent to which firm-level labor supply elasticities differ across skill groups. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that once we look at the change in skill premium and skill ratio, this mark-down term will cancel out as β_H and β_L are determined entirely by workers' preferences (i.e. the low and high skilled workers' dispersion of idiosyncratic preferences toward the workplace), which are unlikely to be affected by firm-level innovation activities. Thus, the change in skill premium will be driven by the following equation:

$$\underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}}}_{\text{Change in skill premium}} = \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_j}{1-\theta_j}}_{\text{Change in skill bias}} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}}_{\text{Change in skill ratio}}. \quad (\text{C.15})$$

This equation is the same as equation (C.13), which was derived when $\beta_H = \beta_L$.

Going back to the problem of finding the equilibrium H_j and L_j , the above equation (C.14) expresses the relationship between skill premium and skill demand. Then $\beta_L \neq \beta_H$, the third (equation (C.5)) and fourth (equation (C.6)) constraints become:

$$\ln L_j(w_{Lj}) = \ln(L\Lambda_L) + \beta_L \ln w_{Lj} + \ln a_{Lj}, \quad (\text{C.16})$$

$$\ln H_j(w_{Hj}) = \ln(H\Lambda_H) + \beta_H \ln w_{Hj} + \ln a_{Hj}, \quad (\text{C.17})$$

which implies that:

$$\ln \frac{H_j}{L_j} = \ln \frac{H\Lambda_H}{L\Lambda_L} + \beta_H \ln w_{Hj} - \beta_L \ln w_{Lj} + \ln \frac{a_{Hj}}{a_{Lj}}. \quad (\text{C.18})$$

Unfortunately, we cannot express the solution simply in terms of the ratios of $\ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}}$ and $\ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}$ as the solution also depends on $\ln w_{Lj}$. While this latter can be expressed from one of the first order conditions, it is not possible to express the ratios in closed-form any more. Nevertheless, we can characterize the impact of changes of various factors on $\ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}}$ and $\ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}$. We do this in Proposition 1.

Proposition 1. *Suppose firms maximize profits given the constraints in equations (C.3), (C.4), (C.16), (C.17). Changes in A_j and κ_j have the following effect on the firm-level skill ratio $\left(\ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}\right)$ and on the wage ratio $\left(\ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}}\right)$.*

1. If $\beta_H = \beta_L$, then $\ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}}$ and $\ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}$ are unaffected by A_j and κ_j .
2. If $\beta_H > \beta_L$, then $\ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}}$ is decreasing and $\ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}$ is increasing in A_j and in κ_j .
3. If $\beta_H < \beta_L$, then $\ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}}$ is increasing and $\ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}$ is decreasing in A_j and in κ_j .

Proof. We prove the proposition for A_j , but applying the same steps one can prove the statement for κ_j . Plugging equation (C.18) into equation (C.14) on the skill ratio leads to the following expression:

$$\sigma \left(\ln \frac{1 + \frac{1}{\beta_L}}{1 + \frac{1}{\beta_H}} + \ln \frac{\theta_j}{1 - \theta_j} - \ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}} \right) = \ln \frac{H\Lambda_H}{L\Lambda_L} + \beta_H \ln w_{Hj} - \beta_L \ln w_{Lj} + \ln \frac{a_{Hj}}{a_{Lj}}. \quad (\text{C.19})$$

Taking the derivative of that with respect to $\ln A_j$ leads to the following expression:

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma \frac{\partial \ln w_{Hj}}{\partial \ln A_j} - \sigma \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln A_j} &= \beta_L \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln A_j} - \beta_H \frac{\partial \ln w_{Hj}}{\partial \ln A_j} \\ (\sigma + \beta_H) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Hj}}{\partial \ln A_j} &= (\sigma + \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln A_j}. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{C.20})$$

Since the third (equation (C.16)) and the fourth (equation (C.17)) constraints imply that $\frac{\partial \ln w_{Hj}}{\partial \ln H_j} = \frac{1}{\beta_H}$ and $\frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln L_j} = \frac{1}{\beta_L}$, we can express $\frac{\partial \ln w_{Hj}}{\partial \ln A_j}$ and $\frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln A_j}$ as:

$$\frac{\partial \ln w_{Hj}}{\partial \ln A_j} = \frac{\partial \ln w_{Hj}}{\partial \ln H_j} \frac{\partial \ln H_j}{\partial \ln A_j} = \frac{1}{\beta_H} \frac{\partial \ln H_j}{\partial \ln A_j}$$

and

$$\frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln A_j} = \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln L_j} \frac{\partial \ln L_j}{\partial \ln A_j} = \frac{1}{\beta_L} \frac{\partial \ln L_j}{\partial \ln A_j}.$$

Plugging these two expressions into equation (C.20) leads to:

$$\left(\frac{\sigma}{\beta_H} + 1 \right) \frac{\partial \ln H_j}{\partial \ln A_j} = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\beta_L} + 1 \right) \frac{\partial \ln L_j}{\partial \ln A_j}. \quad (\text{C.21})$$

It is easy to see that if $\beta_H > \beta_L$, then we have $\frac{\partial \ln H_j}{\partial \ln A_j} > \frac{\partial \ln L_j}{\partial \ln A_j}$ and $\frac{\partial \ln w_{Hj}}{\partial \ln A_j} < \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln A_j}$, and so

$$\frac{\partial \ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}}{\partial \ln A_j} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial \ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}}}{\partial \ln A_j} < 0.$$

□

Proposition 1 states that the Hicks-neutral technological shock (A_j) or firm specific demand shifter (κ_j) directly affect the skill ratio and the skill premium if $\beta_H \neq \beta_L$. Nevertheless, the effects of these shocks on $\ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}}$ and $\ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}$ always have a different sign. So if one of them increases, then the other will fall. This implies that demand shifters (κ_j) or Hicks-neutral shocks (A_j) cannot explain a joint increase in skill demand and skill ratio even if $\beta_H \neq \beta_L$.

Why does even a Hicks-neutral change (A_{jt}) affect the skill ratio when $\beta_H \neq \beta_L$? When a firm experiences an increase in A_{jt} , it will expand and, therefore, increase its demand for both type of workers. If, for example, $\beta_H > \beta_L$, high skilled workers are more responsive to changes in wages than the low skilled ones, and, therefore, firms can expand their skilled labor force more when they increase the wages of both types similarly. In optimum, firms adjust both on the wage and quantity margins: they raise high skilled workers' wages less ($\Delta \ln \frac{w_{hj}}{w_{lj}} < 0$), but hire more of them ($\Delta \ln \frac{h_j}{l_j} > 0$).

An important implication of Proposition 1 is that finding that the skill ratio is increasing after an innovation does not prove that the innovation is skill-biased. In the presence of non-competitive labor markets even an (exogenous) Hicks-neutral shock can affect the skill ratio if firms have different wage-setting power at the high and low skilled labor markets (for instance, if $\beta_H > \beta_L$). Nevertheless, as equation (C.15) above demonstrated, whenever both the skill premium and skill ratio increases, we can conclude that technological change is skill-biased.

Now we also characterize how changes in the key parameters of the firm-level labor supply affect firm's behavior.

Proposition 2. *Suppose firms maximize profits given the constraints in equations (C.3), (C.4), (C.16), (C.17). Then the change in $X = \{H\Lambda_H, a_{Hj}\}$ has the following impact on the skill premium and skill ratio*

$$\frac{\partial \ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}}}{\partial \ln X} = - \left(\frac{1}{\sigma + \beta_H} \right) \left(1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln X} \right),$$

$$\frac{\partial \ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}}{\partial \ln X} = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma + \beta_H} \right) \left(1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln X} \right),$$

where

$$1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{lj}}{\partial \ln X} = \frac{\frac{\sigma + \beta_L}{1 - \frac{\sigma}{\rho}} A_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} - \beta_L}{\frac{\sigma + \beta_L}{1 - \frac{\sigma}{\rho}} A_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} - \beta_L - \left(\frac{\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1-\theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}} \left(\frac{\sigma(\beta_H - \beta_L)}{\sigma + \beta_H} \right) \right)}.$$

Proof. We prove the statement for $H\Lambda_H$, but the same steps could be used to prove the statement for a_{Hj} . As we derived in the proof of Proposition 1, the third (equation C.16) and fourth (equation (C.17)) constraints together with the FOC (equation (C.14)) imply that:

$$\sigma \left(\ln \frac{\beta_H}{1 + \beta_H} - \ln \frac{\beta_L}{1 + \beta_L} + \ln \frac{\theta_j}{1 - \theta_j} - \ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}} \right) = \ln \frac{H\Lambda_H}{L\Lambda_L} + \beta_H \ln w_{Hj} - \beta_L \ln w_{Lj} + \ln \frac{a_{Hj}}{a_{Lj}}.$$

Taking the derivative of that with respect to $\ln H\Lambda_H$ leads to the following expression:

$$-\sigma \left(\frac{\partial \ln w_{Hj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} - \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} \right) = 1 + \beta_H \frac{\partial \ln w_{Hj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} - \beta_L \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H},$$

which can be rearranged to:

$$\frac{\partial \ln w_{Hj} - \partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} = -\frac{1}{\sigma + \beta_H} \left(1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} \right).$$

Using that $\frac{\partial \ln w_{Hj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} = \frac{1}{\beta_H} \frac{\partial \ln H_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} - \frac{1}{\beta_H}$ and $\frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} = \frac{1}{\beta_L} \frac{\partial \ln L_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H}$ from the constraints, one can also express the relationship between changes in wages as:

$$\frac{1}{\beta_H} \frac{\partial \ln H_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} - \frac{1}{\beta_H} - \frac{1}{\beta_L} \frac{\partial \ln L_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} = -\frac{1}{\sigma + \beta_H} \left(1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} \right),$$

$$\frac{\partial \ln H_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} - \frac{\partial \ln L_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma + \beta_H} \right) \left(1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} \right),$$

which proves the statement. Now we need to obtain the expression for $1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H}$. The FOC for low-skilled workers of the profit maximization problem implies that:

$$\frac{1 + \rho}{\rho} \left(\frac{I\kappa_j}{p^{1-\rho}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} A_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma} - \frac{1}{\rho}} (1 - \theta_j) L_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \frac{\beta_L}{1 + \beta_L} = w_{Lj} = \left(\frac{L_j}{L\Lambda_L a_{Lj}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta_L}}.$$

Taking the log:

$$\ln \frac{1 + \rho}{\rho} + \ln \left(\frac{I\kappa_j}{p^{1-\rho}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} + \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \ln A_j + \left(\frac{1}{\sigma} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \ln Q_j + \ln(1 - \theta_j) - \frac{1}{\sigma} \ln L_j + \ln \frac{\beta_L}{1 + \beta_L} = \ln w_{Lj},$$

and the derivative with respect to $\ln H\Lambda_H$, leads to:

$$\left(\frac{1}{\sigma} - \frac{1}{\rho}\right) \frac{\partial \ln Q_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \frac{\partial \ln L_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} = \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H}.$$

Using that $\frac{\partial \ln L_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} = \beta_L \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H}$ (see equation (C.18)) we get:

$$\left(\frac{1}{\sigma} - \frac{1}{\rho}\right) \frac{\partial \ln Q_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} = \left(1 + \frac{\beta_L}{\sigma}\right) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H},$$

or:

$$\frac{\partial \ln Q_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} = \frac{1 + \frac{\beta_L}{\sigma}}{\frac{1}{\sigma} - \frac{1}{\rho}} \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H}.$$

Denoting $N_j = \left[\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right]$ for notational convenience, we notice that:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \ln Q_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} &= \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial H\Lambda_H} \frac{H\Lambda_H}{Q_j} \\ &= \frac{\partial A_j N_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\partial H\Lambda_H} \frac{H\Lambda_H}{Q_j} \\ &= A_j N_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-1} \left(\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-1} \frac{\partial H_j}{\partial H\Lambda_H} + (1 - \theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-1} \frac{\partial L_j}{\partial H\Lambda_H} \right) \frac{H\Lambda_H}{Q_j} \\ &= N_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-2} \left(\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \frac{\partial \ln H_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} + (1 - \theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \frac{\partial \ln L_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} \right) \\ &= N_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-2} \left(\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\partial \ln L_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} + \left(1 - \frac{\beta_H}{\sigma + \beta_H}\right) \left(1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H}\right) \right) + (1 - \theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \frac{\partial \ln L_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} \right) \\ &= N_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-2} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(1 - \frac{\beta_H}{\sigma + \beta_H}\right) \left(1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H}\right) + N_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-2} \left(\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right) \frac{\partial \ln L_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} \\ &= N_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-1} \left(N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(1 - \frac{\beta_H}{\sigma + \beta_H}\right) \left(1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H}\right) + \beta_L \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H}\right). \end{aligned}$$

This implies that:

$$\begin{aligned} N_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-1} \left(N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(1 - \frac{\beta_H}{\sigma + \beta_H}\right) \left(1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H}\right) + \beta_L \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H}\right) &= \frac{1 + \frac{\beta_L}{\sigma}}{\frac{1}{\sigma} - \frac{1}{\rho}} \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} \\ N_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-1} N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(1 - \frac{\beta_H}{\sigma + \beta_H}\right) &= \left(\frac{1 + \frac{\beta_L}{\sigma}}{\frac{1}{\sigma} - \frac{1}{\rho}} - N_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-1} \left(N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(1 - \frac{\beta_H}{\sigma + \beta_H}\right) (\beta_H - \beta_L) + \beta_L\right)\right) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} \\ N_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-1} N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(1 - \frac{\beta_H}{\sigma + \beta_H}\right) &= \left(\frac{1 + \frac{\beta_L}{\sigma}}{\frac{1}{\sigma} - \frac{1}{\rho}} - N_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-1} \left(N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\sigma(\beta_H - \beta_L)}{\sigma + \beta_H}\right) + \beta_L\right)\right) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} \\ \frac{N_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-1} N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(1 - \frac{\beta_H}{\sigma + \beta_H}\right)}{\frac{1 + \frac{\beta_L}{\sigma}}{\frac{1}{\sigma} - \frac{1}{\rho}} - N_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-1} \left(N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\sigma(\beta_H - \beta_L)}{\sigma + \beta_H}\right) + \beta_L\right)} &= \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H}. \end{aligned}$$

Which again implies that:

$$\begin{aligned}
1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H \Lambda_H} &= 1 + \frac{N_j^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}-1} N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(1 - \frac{\beta_H}{\sigma + \beta_H}\right) (\beta_H - \beta_L)}{\frac{1 + \frac{\beta_L}{\sigma}}{\frac{1}{\sigma} - \frac{1}{\rho}} - N_j^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}-1} \left(N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\sigma(\beta_H - \beta_L)}{\sigma + \beta_H}\right) + \beta_L\right)} \\
&= \frac{\frac{1 + \frac{\beta_L}{\sigma}}{\frac{1}{\sigma} - \frac{1}{\rho}} - \beta_L N_j^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}-1}}{\frac{1 + \frac{\beta_L}{\sigma}}{\frac{1}{\sigma} - \frac{1}{\rho}} - N_j^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}-1} \beta_L - N_j^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}-1} \left(N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\sigma(\beta_H - \beta_L)}{\sigma + \beta_H}\right)\right)} \\
&= \frac{\frac{\sigma + \beta_L}{1 - \frac{\sigma}{\rho}} - \beta_L N_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}}{\frac{\sigma + \beta_L}{1 - \frac{\sigma}{\rho}} - N_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \beta_L - N_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \left(N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\sigma(\beta_H - \beta_L)}{\sigma + \beta_H}\right)\right)} \\
&= \frac{\frac{\sigma + \beta_L}{1 - \frac{\sigma}{\rho}} N_j^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} - \beta_L}{\frac{\sigma + \beta_L}{1 - \frac{\sigma}{\rho}} N_j^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} - \beta_L - \left(N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\sigma(\beta_H - \beta_L)}{\sigma + \beta_H}\right)\right)} \\
&= \frac{\frac{\sigma + \beta_L}{1 - \frac{\sigma}{\rho}} A_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} - \beta_L}{\frac{\sigma + \beta_L}{1 - \frac{\sigma}{\rho}} A_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} - \beta_L - \left(\frac{\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}} \left(\frac{\sigma(\beta_H - \beta_L)}{\sigma + \beta_H}\right)\right)}.
\end{aligned}$$

□

Proposition 2 highlights that whenever $\beta_H \neq \beta_L$, changes in the wage index (Λ_H), labor supply of the high skilled H , and a_H have opposite effects on the skill premium and skill ratio.⁵⁸ The statement also highlights that whenever the elasticity of substitution in production is roughly similar to the substitution elasticity across different type of goods $\sigma \approx \rho$, then $1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H \Lambda_H} \approx 1$. It follows that the effects of $\ln \Lambda_H H$ on the skill ratio and skill premium are similar to those given by equations (3c) and (3d) in the main paper. Nevertheless, if σ and ρ are very different, the impacts of $\ln \Lambda_H H$ on the skill ratio and skill premium potentially depend on firm-level characteristics such as $A_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}$ and $\frac{\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}$. We conclude that this issue has little empirical importance after conducting a robustness check where we include, in regression equation 14, an interaction of region-year fixed effects with dummies for firms' pre-innovation shares of high-skilled workers (see Table 3 in the main paper).

C.3 Extension: Derivations with Capital in the Production Function

So far we have abstracted away from other inputs in the production function. Nevertheless, it is straightforward to extend the problem with other inputs. Here we demonstrate this by adding capital to the production function.

The new profit maximization problem is the following:

⁵⁸It is easy to show that an analogous statement holds for Λ_L , L , and a_L .

$$\pi_j(A_j, \theta_j) = \max_{w_{Hj}, w_{Lj}} p_j Q_j - H_j(w_{Hj})w_{Hj} - L_j(w_{Lj})w_{Lj} - rK_j, \quad (\text{C.22})$$

subject to

$$Q_j = A_j \left(\left[\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1-\theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{e-1}{e}} + K_j^{\frac{e-1}{e}} \right)^{\frac{e}{e-1}}, \quad (\text{C.23})$$

and the constraints (C.4), (C.16), and (C.17).

The FOCs of the problem now become:

$$\frac{1+\rho}{\rho} p_j A_j^{\frac{e-1}{e}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{e}} \left[\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1-\theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{e(\sigma-1)}} (1-\theta) L_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \frac{1+\beta_L}{\beta_L} w_{Lj},$$

$$\frac{1+\rho}{\rho} p_j A_j^{\frac{e-1}{e}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{e}} \left[\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1-\theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{e(\sigma-1)}} \theta H_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \frac{1+\beta_H}{\beta_H} w_{Hj}.$$

As a result, the ratio remains unchanged:

$$\frac{\theta_j H_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \frac{\beta_H}{1+\beta_H}}{(1-\theta_j) L_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \frac{\beta_L}{1+\beta_L}} = \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}},$$

and so we get the same relationship between skill premium and skill demand as before (see equation (C.14)):

$$\underbrace{\ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}}}_{\text{skill premium}} = \underbrace{\ln \frac{1 + \frac{1}{\beta_L}}{1 + \frac{1}{\beta_H}}}_{\text{relative mark-down}} + \underbrace{\ln \frac{\theta_j}{1 - \theta_j}}_{\text{skill bias}} - \underbrace{\frac{1}{\sigma} \ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}}_{\text{skill ratio}}. \quad (\text{C.24})$$

Note that Proposition 1 only uses this equation and equations (C.16), and (C.17). And so the proposition can be proved by applying exactly the same steps.

Turning to Proposition 2, the first part of the statement says that changes in $X = \{H \Lambda_H, a_{Hj}\}$ have the following effect on the skill ratio and skill premium:

$$\frac{\partial \ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}}}{\partial \ln X} = - \left(\frac{1}{\sigma + \beta_H} \right) \left(1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln X} \right),$$

$$\frac{\partial \ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}}{\partial \ln X} = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma + \beta_H} \right) \left(1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln X} \right).$$

As for Proposition 1, this part of the statement only uses equations (C.24), (C.16), and (C.17),

which are unaffected by the presence of capital.

The proposition also derives $1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln X}$. The presence of capital changes the derivation of that part, which we develop here. The FOC for low-skilled workers in the presence of capital becomes:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln \frac{1+\rho}{\rho} + \ln \left(\frac{I\kappa_j}{p^{1-\rho}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} + \frac{\varrho-1}{\varrho} \ln A_j + \left(\frac{1}{\varrho} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \ln Q_j + \frac{\varrho-\sigma}{\varrho(\sigma-1)} \ln \left[\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1-\theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right] + \\ + \ln(1-\theta_j) - \frac{1}{\sigma} \ln L_j + \ln \frac{\beta_L}{1+\beta_L} = \ln w_{Lj}. \end{aligned}$$

And the FOC for capital is:

$$\ln \frac{1+\rho}{\rho} + \ln \left(\frac{I\kappa_j}{p^{1-\rho}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} + \frac{\varrho-1}{\varrho} \ln A_j + \left(\frac{1}{\varrho} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \ln Q_j - \frac{1}{\varrho} \ln K_j + \ln \left(1 - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) = r. \quad (\text{C.25})$$

Taking the derivative with respect to $\ln H\Lambda_H$ leads to:

$$\left(\frac{1}{\varrho} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \frac{\partial \ln Q_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} + \frac{\varrho-\sigma}{\varrho(\sigma-1)} \frac{\partial \ln \left[\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1-\theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \frac{\partial \ln L_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} = \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H}. \quad (\text{C.26})$$

Now we want to express the three terms on the left hand side in the above equation in terms of $\frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H}$. We denote $N_j = \left[\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1-\theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]$ for notational convenience as before. For the first term we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \ln Q_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} &= \frac{\frac{\varrho}{\varrho-1} A_j^{\frac{\varrho-1}{\varrho}} Q_j^{\frac{1-\varrho}{\varrho}}}{1 - A_j^{\frac{\varrho-1}{\varrho}} Q_j^{\frac{1-\varrho}{\varrho}} K_j^{\frac{\varrho-1}{\varrho}} \left(1 - \frac{\varrho}{\rho} \right)}. \\ &\cdot \left(\frac{\varrho-1}{\varrho} N_j^{\frac{\varrho-\sigma}{\varrho(\sigma-1)}+1} \left(N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(1 - \frac{\beta_H}{\sigma + \beta_H} \right) \left(1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} \right) + \beta_L \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} \right) \right), \end{aligned}$$

where we used that equation (C.25). This implies that $\left(1 - \frac{\varrho}{\rho} \right) \frac{\partial \ln Q_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} = \frac{\partial \ln K_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H}$. For the second term in equation (C.26), we obtain:

$$\frac{\partial \ln \left[\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1-\theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} = \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \left(N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(1 - \frac{\beta_H}{\sigma + \beta_H} \right) \left(1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} \right) + \beta_L \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} \right).$$

Using as before that $\frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H} = \frac{1}{\beta_L} \frac{\partial \ln L_j}{\partial \ln H\Lambda_H}$ for the third term, and plugging the three terms back

into equation (C.26), we get the following expression:

$$\frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H \Lambda_H} = \frac{\left(\frac{\left(\frac{1}{\rho} - \frac{1}{\rho}\right) A_j^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} Q_j^{\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}} N_j^{\frac{\rho-\sigma}{\rho(\sigma-1)}+1}}{1 - A_j^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} Q_j^{\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}} K_j^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} (1-\frac{\rho}{\rho})} + \frac{\rho-\sigma}{\rho\sigma} \right) N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \frac{\sigma}{\sigma+\beta_H}}{1 + \beta_L - \left(\frac{\left(\frac{1}{\rho} - \frac{1}{\rho}\right) A_j^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} Q_j^{\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}} N_j^{\frac{\rho-\sigma}{\rho(\sigma-1)}+1}}{1 - A_j^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} Q_j^{\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}} K_j^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} (1-\frac{\rho}{\rho})} + \frac{\rho-\sigma}{\rho\sigma} \right) \left(N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \frac{\sigma(\beta_H - \beta_L)}{\sigma+\beta_H} + \beta_L \right)}.$$

This implies that:

$$1 + (\beta_H - \beta_L) \frac{\partial \ln w_{Lj}}{\partial \ln H \Lambda_H} = \frac{1 + \beta_L - \left(\frac{\left(\frac{1}{\rho} - \frac{1}{\rho}\right) A_j^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} Q_j^{\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}} N_j^{\frac{\rho-\sigma}{\rho(\sigma-1)}+1}}{1 - A_j^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} Q_j^{\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}} K_j^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} (1-\frac{\rho}{\rho})} + \frac{\rho-\sigma}{\rho\sigma} \right) \beta_L}{1 + \beta_L - \left(\frac{\left(\frac{1}{\rho} - \frac{1}{\rho}\right) A_j^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} Q_j^{\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}} N_j^{\frac{\rho-\sigma}{\rho(\sigma-1)}+1}}{1 - A_j^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} Q_j^{\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}} K_j^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} (1-\frac{\rho}{\rho})} + \frac{\rho-\sigma}{\rho\sigma} \right) \left(N_j^{-1} \theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \frac{\sigma(\beta_H - \beta_L)}{\sigma+\beta_H} + \beta_L \right)}.$$

This expression is similar to the one that we obtained without capital in Proposition 2.

C.4 The Derivation of the Downward-sloping Firm-level Demand Function

We assume that consumers in the market value variety, and solve the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{\{Q_1, \dots, Q_J\}} \left(\sum_j \kappa_j^{\frac{1}{\rho}} Q_j^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}},$$

subject to the following constraint:

$$\sum_j p_j Q_j = I.$$

The Lagrangian of the problem is the following:

$$\mathcal{L} = \left(\sum_j \kappa_j^{\frac{1}{\rho}} Q_j^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}} - \lambda \left(\sum_j p_j Q_j - I \right),$$

with corresponding FOCs:

$$\left(\sum_j \kappa_j^{\frac{1}{\rho}} Q_j^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}} \kappa_j^{\frac{1}{\rho}} Q_j^{-\frac{1}{\rho}} - \lambda p_j = 0,$$

and so:

$$\left(\frac{\kappa_j}{\kappa_k} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \left(\frac{Q_j}{Q_k} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\rho}} = \frac{p_j}{p_k},$$

which can be rearranged to:

$$Q_j = \frac{\kappa_j}{\kappa_k} \left(\frac{p_j}{p_k} \right)^{-\rho} Q_k,$$

and:

$$p_j Q_j = \frac{Q_k}{\kappa_k} p_k^\rho \kappa_j p_j^{1-\rho}.$$

Taking the sum over the j firms leads to the following equation:

$$I = \sum_j p_j Q_j = \frac{Q_k}{\kappa_k} p_k^\rho \sum_j \kappa_j p_j^{1-\rho}.$$

Let us define the price index as: $p \equiv \left(\sum_j \kappa_j p_j^{1-\rho} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}$, such that the above equation can be rewritten as:

$$Q_j = \frac{I}{p^{1-\rho}} \kappa_j p_j^{-\rho},$$

which leads to the following demand equation for firm j :

$$\ln Q_j = \ln I - (1 - \rho) \ln p + \ln \kappa_j - \rho \ln p_j,$$

or:

$$\ln p_j = \frac{1}{\rho} \ln I - \frac{1-\rho}{\rho} \ln p + \frac{1}{\rho} \ln \kappa_j - \frac{1}{\rho} \ln Q_j,$$

or:

$$p_j = \left(\frac{I \kappa_j}{p^{1-\rho}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} Q_j^{-\frac{1}{\rho}}.$$

Appendix D Extension: Labor Market Power

Throughout the paper (and in [Appendix C](#)) we have assumed that firms are atomistic and so they do not take into account that their actions potentially affect other firms' behavior. [Deb et al. \(2020\)](#) derive the impact of firm-level technological changes on relative wages and employment by taking into account strategic interactions between firms. This relationship is characterized by

$$\ln \frac{w_{H_{jt}}}{w_{L_{jt}}} = \ln \frac{1 + \varepsilon_{L_{jmt}}}{1 + \varepsilon_{H_{jmt}}} + \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1 - \theta_{jt}} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \ln \frac{H_{jt}}{L_{jt}}, \quad (\text{D.1})$$

where $\frac{1 + \varepsilon_{L_{jmt}}}{1 + \varepsilon_{H_{jmt}}}$ captures the contribution of relative market power differences on the skill premiums. [Deb et al. \(2020\)](#) derive that in their model the effect of market power on wages can be expressed as follows:

$$\varepsilon_{S_{jmt}} = \frac{1}{\hat{\beta}_S} e_{S_{jmt}} + \frac{1}{\hat{\eta}_S} (1 - e_{S_{jmt}}). \quad (\text{D.2})$$

where $e_{S_{jmt}}$ is the market share of firm j of workers in skill group S in market m at time t ,⁵⁹ while $\hat{\beta}_S$ and $\hat{\eta}_S$ are preference parameters of the consumers that determine the firm- and labor market-level labor supply elasticity in skill group S .⁶⁰ Notice that equation (D.1) is very similar to equation (C.14), derived in [Appendix C](#) focusing on the atomistic agents except that the relative mark-down term $\frac{1 + \frac{1}{\hat{\beta}_L}}{1 + \frac{1}{\hat{\beta}_H}}$ is now replaced with $\frac{1 + \varepsilon_{L_{jmt}}}{1 + \varepsilon_{H_{jmt}}}$. Crucially, in the atomistic case the relative mark-down $\frac{1 + \frac{1}{\hat{\beta}_L}}{1 + \frac{1}{\hat{\beta}_H}}$ is not firm-specific, but when we introduce strategic interactions, the relative markdown becomes firm-specific and depends on the firm's market share.

Following technological change or innovation, the change in equation (D.1) is:

$$\underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{w_{H_{jt}}}{w_{L_{jt}}}}_{\text{Change in skill premium}} = \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{1 + \varepsilon_{L_{jmt}}}{1 + \varepsilon_{H_{jmt}}}}_{\text{Change in markdown}} + \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1 - \theta_{jt}}}_{\text{Change in skill bias}} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{H_{jt}}{L_{jt}}}_{\text{Change in skill ratio}}. \quad (\text{D.3})$$

This equation is very similar to our benchmark equation (see equation (5)) except for the extra term that reflects the change in markdown coming from changes in labor market power (or rent sharing

⁵⁹[Berger et al. \(2019b\)](#) suggest to use the wage bill shares to calculate $e_{S_{jmt}}$ when there are no productivity differences among workers. Nevertheless, if the productivity differences are large, the wage bill shares might simply be driven by those differences. As a result, we calculate market share based on market shares in terms of workers. Our results are robust to using the wage bill for calculating the market shares.

⁶⁰[Deb et al. \(2020\)](#) present a model where $\hat{\beta}_S$ and $\hat{\mu}_S$ are the key parameters of the representative agent's labor supply function. [Berger et al. \(2019a\)](#) show in Appendix B.1 that such a representative agent's labor supply function can be micro-founded in a discrete choice framework as presented in our Section 2 and in [Appendix C](#). When there are M distinct labor markets, the idiosyncratic preferences for working at a particular firm have the following type-I Extreme value distribution (where we applied our notation):

$$F(\varepsilon_{Sij}, \dots, \varepsilon_{SiJ}) = \exp \left[- \sum_{m=1}^M \left(\sum_{j \in \text{Market}_m} e^{-(1 + \hat{\beta}_S) \varepsilon_{Sij}} \right)^{\frac{1 + \hat{\beta}_S}{1 + \hat{\eta}_S}} \right].$$

When $\hat{\eta}_S = 0$, the distribution is the same as the one used in [Appendix C](#). Whenever $\hat{\eta}_S > 0$, there is an increased correlation of draws within a labor market ([McFadden et al. 1977](#)), which creates a differential labor supply elasticity for moving across firms within a labor market, and moving across firms in different labor markets.

as called by [Deb et al. 2020](#)) following innovation. The intuition for that term is the following. When firms innovate, they might grow, which could potentially change their employment share in a given labor market and so their market power on that market. If the increase in market share differs between the college and non-college labor markets (or if the within- and between-market elasticities are different for college and non-college workers), then relative changes in market power will have a direct effect on the the skill premium.

We quantify the change in market power following innovation in two steps. First, we estimate the firm-level change in market shares using regression equation (15). Since the definition of the “markets” is crucial for this exercise, we explore various definitions of labor markets. Second, we use the parameter values for $\hat{\beta}_S$ and $\hat{\eta}_S$ from [Deb et al. \(2020\)](#) and calculate the firm-specific relative markdown, $\frac{1+\varepsilon_{Ljmt}}{1+\varepsilon_{Hjmt}}$, using equation (D.2). Panel A of Table D.1 summarizes the parameter values that we use in equation (D.2) for calculating firm-level markdowns. In Panel B and C we report average markdowns for college and non-college workers under alternative labor market definitions. In Panel B we consider a local district-one digit industry combination as a labor market. In Panel C we follow [Berger et al. \(2019a\)](#) and apply a narrow definition with a combination of a district and a three-digit NACE industry.⁶¹ Both definitions lead to very similar markdown estimates. The average markdown for college workers is between 0.60 and 0.65 and for non-college ones it is between 0.74 and 0.78 in both countries. The markdown is larger for college workers as their firm-level labor supply is less elastic.

Table D.2 shows the changes in market share and markdown following innovation. In rows (1)-(5), we define labor markets as one-digit NACE industry within a district (same as Table D.1 Panel A). Under this broader definition of labor markets we find no indication for any significant change in markdowns. In rows (5)-(10) we use a narrow definition of markets, where the college and non-college markets are defined as a three-digit NACE industry within a district (Table D.1 Panel C, following [Berger et al. 2019a](#)). When we use this narrow market definition, we find that the college and non-college share increases by roughly the same magnitude. Nevertheless, given that firm-level labor supply of non-college workers is more elastic, the change in market shares translates into a larger change in the markdown. Intuitively, non-college workers have weak preferences between firms, and so wage competition on that labor market is fiercer. As a result, gaining market power in that market makes a bigger difference. Row (10) demonstrates that, as a result, there is a 0.7% (s.e. 0.2%) increase in relative markdown in Norway if we apply this narrow definition of labor market. For Hungary, we find a 1.3% (s.e. 0.8%) increase in relative markdowns, which is only borderline significant.

This analysis highlights that relative changes in labor market power can only explain at most a small fraction of the change in skill premium observed in the data. In our preferred specification we estimate that the skill premium increased by 4.5% for Norway (see Column 4 of Table 2). This implies that at most 16% of the skill premium increase can be attributed to changes in market power. As a result, even if we incorporate the changes in firm-level markdowns into the calculation of firm-level changes in skill bias (see Section 5.4 and equation (18)) we get very similar numbers.

⁶¹As described in Section 5.2, in Norway we have 46 local labor markets, while in Hungary we have 174. These are substantially smaller regional areas than commuting zones in the United States used by [Berger et al. \(2019a\)](#). As a result, our labor market definition is in fact narrower than the one used in [Berger et al. \(2019a\)](#).

Table D.1: Labor Market Power: Parameter Values and Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Value (NO)	Value (HU)	Description
<i>Panel A: Parameter values</i>			
$\hat{\eta}_H$	0.66	0.66	College workers' market-level labor supply elasticity
$\hat{\eta}_L$	0.66	0.66	Non-college workers' market-level labor supply elasticity
$\hat{\beta}_H$	1.85	1.85	College workers' firm-level labor supply elasticity
$\hat{\beta}_L$	8.12	8.12	Non-college workers' firm-level labor supply elasticity
<i>Panel B: Market size and average markdown (district \times 1-digit industry)</i>			
	40,402	48,083	Average number of workers
$\frac{1}{N_j} \sum_{j=1}^{N_j} \frac{1}{1+\varepsilon_{Hjmt}}$	0.64	0.63	Average markdown for college workers
$\frac{1}{N_j} \sum_{j=1}^{N_j} \frac{1}{1+\varepsilon_{Ljmt}}$	0.87	0.86	Average markdown for non-college workers
$\frac{1}{N_j} \sum_{j=1}^{N_j} \frac{1+\varepsilon_{Ljmt}}{1+\varepsilon_{Hjmt}}$	0.74	0.74	Average relative markdown
<i>Panel C: Market size and average markdown (district \times 3-digit industry)</i>			
	4,787	4,191	Average number of workers
$\frac{1}{N_j} \sum_{j=1}^{N_j} \frac{1}{1+\varepsilon_{Hjmt}}$	0.60	0.53	Average markdown for college workers
$\frac{1}{N_j} \sum_{j=1}^{N_j} \frac{1}{1+\varepsilon_{Ljmt}}$	0.77	0.62	Average markdown for non-college workers
$\frac{1}{N_j} \sum_{j=1}^{N_j} \frac{1+\varepsilon_{Ljmt}}{1+\varepsilon_{Hjmt}}$	0.78	0.76	Average relative markdown

Notes: The parameter values come from [Deb et al. \(2020\)](#) who use between-market labor supply elasticities from [Berger et al. \(2019a\)](#). The labor market shares are calculated based on all firms in the employer-employee register for Norway and based on all firms in the Structure of Earnings Survey in Hungary. The average markdown is calculated for the firms in the CIS.

Table D.2: Change in Labor Market Power Following Firm-level Technological Change

Panel A: Norway

Measure	Level	Innovation	s.e.	Obs.	R-squared
(1) College market share	(CZ x 1-nace)	0.001	(0.001)	18,208	0.08
(2) Non-college market share	(CZ x 1-nace)	0.002**	(0.001)	18,215	0.09
(3) Log college markdown	(CZ x 1-nace)	-0.001	(0.001)	18,208	0.08
(4) Log non-college markdown	(CZ x 1-nace)	-0.002*	(0.001)	18,215	0.09
(5) Log relative markdown	(CZ x 1-nace)	0.002**	(0.001)	18,208	0.12
(6) College market share	(CZ x 3-nace)	0.011***	(0.004)	17,709	0.15
(7) Non-college market share	(CZ x 3-nace)	0.013***	(0.004)	18,198	0.17
(8) Log college markdown	(CZ x 3-nace)	-0.005***	(0.002)	17,709	0.15
(9) Log non-college markdown	(CZ x 3-nace)	-0.011***	(0.003)	18,198	0.17
(10) Log relative markdown	(CZ x 3-nace)	0.007***	(0.002)	17,693	0.17

Panel B: Hungary

Measure	Level	Innovation	s.e.	Obs.	R-squared
(1) College market share	(CZ x 1-nace)	-0.003	(0.003)	2,357	0.28
(2) Non-college market share	(CZ x 1-nace)	-0.006**	(0.002)	2,364	0.32
(3) Log college markdown	(CZ x 1-nace)	0.001	(0.002)	2,357	0.26
(4) Log non-college markdown	(CZ x 1-nace)	0.005**	(0.002)	2,364	0.29
(5) Log relative markdown	(CZ x 1-nace)	0.005**	(0.002)	2,357	0.17
(6) College market share	(CZ x 3-nace)	0.014	(0.018)	1,995	0.12
(7) Non-college market share	(CZ x 3-nace)	-0.015	(0.013)	2,359	0.16
(8) Log college markdown	(CZ x 3-nace)	-0.006	(0.009)	1,995	0.11
(9) Log non-college markdown	(CZ x 3-nace)	0.015	(0.010)	2,359	0.15
(10) Log relative markdown	(CZ x 3-nace)	0.013*	(0.008)	1,990	0.13

Notes: This table shows the relationship between firm-level technological change and subsequent 6-year change in firms' market power. We measure firm-level technological change in the CIS survey which asks whether any new or significantly modified product/service/process/organizational change (aka innovation) was introduced. In the table each row reports the coefficients from regression equation (15), where the dependent variable is in the first column of each row. In rows (1)-(5) the labor markets are defined at the district and 1-digit NACE industry level, while in rows (6)-(10) at the district and 3-digit NACE industry level. Relative markdowns are calculated based on equation (D.2). In each regression we include log capital stock, log value added, the lagged dependent variable preceding the baseline year and industry-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Appendix E Extension: Skill-biased Technological Change with Bargaining

In the benchmark analysis we assume that wages are determined based on the imperfect competition model proposed by [Card et al. \(2018\)](#). In [Appendix D](#) we present an extension of the model where we allow for strategic interactions between firms. In this section, we show how the relationship between the skill ratio and the skill premium is very similar under two alternative wage setting procedures. First, we derive the optimal skill demand when applying the bargaining model of [Van Reenen \(1996\)](#). Next, we derive how skill demand is determined within the rent sharing framework proposed by [Kline et al. \(2019\)](#).

E.1 Wage Setting through Bargaining

Wage and Employment Determination.

Unions. We model wage and employment determination as a bargaining process between a firm and skill-specific unions. Assume that the union of workers with skill S at firm j has the following utility function (see equation (1) in [Van Reenen 1996](#)):

$$U_{Sj} = S_j u(w_{Sj}) = S_j \frac{1}{1 - m_S} w_{Sj}^{1 - m_S}, \quad (\text{E.1})$$

where $0 \leq m_S \leq 1$ measures risk aversion of the workers that can vary by skill group S . This formulation reflects that unions care not only about the level of wages, but also about employment.

Firms. Firms' profit is given by the following function:

$$\Pi_j(A_j, \theta_j) = \max_{w_{Hj}, w_{Lj}} pQ_j - H_j w_{Hj} - L_j w_{Lj},$$

subject to

$$Q_j = A_j \left[\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}},$$

$$\ln p_j = \frac{1}{\rho} \ln \kappa_j - \frac{1}{\rho} \ln Q_j + \frac{\rho-1}{\rho} \ln p + \frac{1}{\rho} \ln I.$$

We follow [Van Reenen \(1996\)](#) and assume that firms are price takers in the output market. Nevertheless, it is straightforward to incorporate firms' price setting power into the framework presented in this section.

Equilibrium Wage and Employment. Wages are determined through a Nash-bargaining process. The equilibrium solution maximizes Ω by optimally choosing the skill-specific wages (w_{Hj} and w_{Lj}) and the skill-specific employment (L_j and H_j) (see equation (3) in [Van Reenen 1996](#)):

$$\max_{w_{Lj}, w_{Hj}, L_j, H_j} \Omega = U_{Lj}^{\beta_L} U_{Hj}^{\beta_H} \Pi_j^{1 - \beta_L - \beta_H}, \quad (\text{E.2})$$

where β_L and β_H denote the bargaining powers of the two unions.

Solution. Plugging U_{Lj} and U_{Hj} into the expression for Ω leads to the following formula:

$$\begin{aligned} \Omega &= \left[\frac{1}{1-m_L} (w_{Lj})^{1-m_L} L_j \right]^{\beta_L} \times \left[\frac{1}{1-m_H} (w_{Hj})^{1-m_H} H_j \right]^{\beta_H} \times \\ &\times \left[pA_j \left[\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1-\theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} - H_j w_{Hj} - L_j w_{Lj} \right]^{1-\beta_L-\beta_H}. \end{aligned}$$

The FOCs of this problem are the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial w_{Lj}} &= \Omega \times \left[\frac{\beta_L (w_{Lj})^{-m_L} L_j}{U_{Lj}^{1-\beta_L}} + \frac{-(1-\beta_L-\beta_H) L_j}{\Pi_j^{\beta_L+\beta_H}} \right] = 0, \\ \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial w_{Hj}} &= \Omega \times \left[\frac{\beta_H (w_{Hj})^{-m_H} H_j}{U_{Hj}^{1-\beta_H}} + \frac{-(1-\beta_L-\beta_H) H_j}{\Pi_j^{\beta_L+\beta_H}} \right] = 0, \\ \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial L_j} &= \Omega \times \left[\frac{\beta_L \frac{1}{1-m_L} (w_{Lj})^{1-m_L}}{U_{Lj}^{1-\beta_L}} + (1-\beta_L-\beta_H) \frac{pA_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (1-\theta_j) L_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} - w_{Lj}}{\Pi_j^{\beta_L+\beta_H}} \right] = 0, \\ \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial H_j} &= \Omega \times \left[\frac{\beta_H \frac{1}{1-m_H} (w_{Hj})^{1-m_H}}{U_{Hj}^{1-\beta_H}} + (1-\beta_L-\beta_H) \frac{pA_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \theta_j H_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} - w_{Hj}}{\Pi_j^{\beta_L+\beta_H}} \right] = 0. \end{aligned}$$

Rearranging and dividing the first and third, and the second and fourth FOCs, we get:

$$\begin{aligned} w_{Lj} &= \frac{m_L-1}{m_L} \times pA_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (1-\theta_j) L_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}, \\ w_{Hj} &= \frac{m_H-1}{m_H} \times pA_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \theta_j H_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}. \end{aligned}$$

These equations show that both types of workers receive a share of their marginal product, which depends on their risk aversion parameter. Under risk neutrality, the marginal product is shared equally. Dividing these two equations yields:

$$\frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}} = \frac{\frac{m_H-1}{m_H}}{\frac{m_L-1}{m_L}} \times \frac{\theta_j H_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{(1-\theta_j) L_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}, \quad (\text{E.4})$$

and taking the logarithm yields:

$$\ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}} = \ln \frac{\frac{m_H-1}{m_H}}{\frac{m_L-1}{m_L}} + \ln \frac{\theta_j}{1-\theta_j} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \frac{H_j}{L_j}. \quad (\text{E.5})$$

The relative wage of the two types of workers depends on the relative marginal product and a wedge introduced by the bargaining process, when the risk aversion of the two types of workers is different. Since the wedge, $\frac{\frac{m_H-1}{m_H}}{\frac{m_L-1}{m_L}}$, depends only on the preference parameters of the workers (risk aversion of the high and low skilled workers), it is unaffected by a firm-level change in skill demand. Therefore, the change in the skill premium following innovation takes the following form:

$$\begin{aligned}
\underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{w_{Hj}}{w_{Lj}}}_{\text{Change in skill premium}} &= \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_j}{1 - \theta_j}}_{\text{Change in skill bias}} - \underbrace{\frac{1}{\sigma} \Delta \ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}}_{\text{Change in skill ratio}}.
\end{aligned} \tag{E.6}$$

This equation shows that the relationship between the change in the skill premium and skill demand is very similar in a bargaining model of wages and employment to the relationship derived in our main framework.

E.2 Wage Setting in a Rent Sharing Model

We derive the relative skill ratio and wages in a dynamic optimal contracting model that leads to rent sharing. We follow [Kline et al. \(2019\)](#) and assume that there is imperfect substitutability between incumbent workers and new hires as a result of the training and recruitment costs involved in new hires. The cost of hiring N_{Sj} workers at firm j from skill group S is $c(N_{Sj}/I_{Sj})I_{Sj}$, where I_{Sj} is the number of incumbent workers in skill group S . The firm can hire as many new workers as desired at the competitive market wage w_S^m . Further, firms are price takers in output markets.⁶² The firm chooses a wage for the incumbent workers, w_{Sj}^I , at the beginning of the period. After the wage is posted, incumbent workers receive outside job offers. Each incumbent worker stays if their outside wage offer is smaller than their current wage. Let $G(w_{Sj}^I)$ denote the probability of an incumbent worker staying given w_{Sj}^I is posted. The firm's problem is as follows (equivalent with Section 2.2. in [Kline et al. 2019](#)).

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pi_j(A_j, \theta_j) = \max_{w_{Hj}^I, w_{Lj}^I, N_{Lj}, N_{Hj}} pQ_j - \left[c \left(\frac{N_{Hj}}{I_{Hj}} \right) I_{Hj} + N_{Hj} w_H^m + w_{Hj}^I G(w_{Hj}^I) I_{Hj} \right] - \\
- \left[c \left(\frac{N_{Lj}}{I_{Lj}} \right) I_{Lj} + N_{Lj} w_L^m + w_{Lj}^I G(w_{Lj}^I) I_{Lj} \right],
\end{aligned}$$

subject to

$$Q_j = A_j \left[\theta_j H_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \theta_j) L_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}},$$

where $H_j = N_{Hj} + G(w_{Hj}^I) I_{Hj}$ is the sum of new and retained high skilled workers, and $L_j = N_{Lj} + G(w_{Lj}^I) I_{Lj}$ is the sum of new and retained low skilled workers.

The FOC of this problem for skilled workers is the following:

$$p A_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \theta_j H_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} G'(w_{Hj}^I) I_{Hj} - G(w_{Hj}^I) I_{Hj} - w_{Hj}^I G'(w_{Hj}^I) I_{Hj} = 0$$

⁶²To simplify the notation we currently abstract away from amenities.

$$pA_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \theta_j H_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = c' \left(\frac{N_{Hj}}{I_{Hj}} \right) + w_H^m.$$

The first equation can be rearranged to:

$$pA_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \theta_j H_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \frac{G(w_{Hj}^I)}{G'(w_{Hj}^I)} + w_{Hj}^I.$$

And this implies that:

$$\frac{G(w_{Hj}^I)}{G'(w_{Hj}^I)} + w_{Hj}^I = c' \left(\frac{N_{Hj}}{I_{Hj}} \right) + w_H^m,$$

which shows that the marginal cost of hiring and retaining a worker should be equal.

Kline et al. (2019) specify $G(w) = \left(\frac{w-w^m}{w-w^m} \right)^\beta$. This implies that $\frac{G(w)}{G'(w)} = \frac{1}{\beta} (w - w^m)$, and so the above equation can be rewritten as:

$$\frac{1 + \beta_H}{\beta_H} (w_{Hj}^I - w_H^m) = c' \left(\frac{N_{Hj}}{I_{Hj}} \right).$$

Plugging this back into the second FOC leads to the following expression:

$$pA_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \theta_j H_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \frac{1 + \beta_H}{\beta_H} (w_{Hj}^I - w_H^m) + w_H^m.$$

Rearranging this equation leads to:

$$\beta_H pA_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \theta_j H_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = (1 + \beta_H) w_{Hj}^I - w_H^m.$$

The same holds for the low skilled workers:

$$\beta_L pA_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (1 - \theta_j) H_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = (1 + \beta_L) w_{Lj}^I - w_L^m.$$

The ratio of these two leads to the following expression:

$$\frac{H_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \theta_j}{L_j^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} (1 - \theta_j)} = \frac{\beta_L (1 + \beta_H) w_{Hj}^I - w_H^m}{\beta_H (1 + \beta_L) w_{Lj}^I - w_L^m}.$$

Taking the logarithm and rearranging leads to the following expression:

$$-\frac{1}{\sigma} \ln \frac{H_j}{L_j} + \ln \frac{\theta_j}{1 - \theta_j} = \ln \frac{\beta_L}{\beta_H} + \ln \frac{(1 + \beta_H) w_{Hj}^I - w_H^m}{(1 + \beta_L) w_{Lj}^I - w_L^m}.$$

Since the $\ln \frac{\beta_L}{\beta_H}$ are preference parameters of the workers (how responsive workers are to changes

in wages), they are unaffected by a change in firm-level skill demand.

The relationship between the change in wages and employment following innovation is:

$$\underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{(1 + \beta_H) w_{Hj}^I - w_H^m}{(1 + \beta_L) w_{Lj}^I - w_L^m}}_{\text{Relative Change in incumbent wages}} = \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_j}{1 - \theta_j}}_{\text{Change in skill bias}} - \underbrace{\frac{1}{\sigma} \Delta \ln \frac{H_j}{L_j}}_{\text{Change in skill ratio}}. \quad (\text{E.7})$$

This equation is similar to our benchmark equations (equations (5) and (8)) except for its left-hand side, which differs from the main model in two respects. First, while still capturing an increase in the skill premium, its functional form is slightly different. Second, in this rent sharing model, the change in skill bias does not affect new workers' wages, as firms can hire as many workers as they want at the prevailing competitive wage, w_S^m . Nevertheless, because of the training and retaining costs, the marginal cost of hiring increases with the number of new hires, providing firms stronger incentives to retain their workers, which drives up incumbent wages when skill demand increases. As a result, the relevant object for assessing skill bias in this model is the wage growth of incumbent workers.

To sum up, the basic logic of the main model applies to rent sharing models: skill-biased technological change leads to a joint increase in the skill premium and the skill ratio. However, these models only predict an increase in the skill premium for incumbent workers.

Appendix F Quantifying the Contribution of Firm-level Technological Change to the Economy-wide Skill Premium

In Section 6, we used our empirical findings to assess the contribution of technological change to inequality. This appendix section gives more details on the accounting exercise applied. First, we decompose the economy-wide skill premium into a component coming from the skill premium paid by innovative firms and another component coming from the skill premium paid by non-innovative firms. We then calculate how the changes of these two components—reallocation of workers from non-innovative to innovative firms and the change in the skill premium paid by innovative (and non-innovative) firms—contributed to aggregate wage inequality.

In the presence of imperfect competition on the labor market we have the following structure of wages:

$$\ln w_{it} = \alpha_t + \psi_i + \ln w_{Sj(i,t)} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (\text{F.1})$$

where i denotes workers and j denotes firms, ε_{it} is a mean zero error term. The ψ_i captures workers' skills that are portable across firms and are not affected by firm-level technological change (at least in the short term). The term $\ln w_{Sj(i,t)}$ represents the skill-group (S) specific firm-level wage premium that firm j pays. That wage premium depends on the technology applied by the firm.

The average wages of college and non-college workers are given by the following equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \overline{\ln w_{H_t}} &\equiv \frac{1}{H_t} \sum_{i \in H} \ln w_{it} = \alpha_t + \frac{1}{H_t} \sum_{i \in H} \psi_i + \frac{1}{H_t} \sum_{i \in H} \ln w_{Hj(i,t)}, \\ \overline{\ln w_{L_t}} &\equiv \frac{1}{L_t} \sum_{i \in L} \ln w_{it} = \alpha_t + \frac{1}{L_t} \sum_{i \in L} \psi_i + \frac{1}{L_t} \sum_{i \in L} \ln w_{Lj(i,t)}. \end{aligned}$$

The aggregate or economy-wide college premium is the difference between these two average wages:

$$\begin{aligned} \overline{\ln w_{H_t}} - \overline{\ln w_{L_t}} &= \alpha_t + \frac{1}{H_t} \sum_{i \in H} \psi_i + \frac{1}{H_t} \sum_{i \in H} \ln w_{Hj(i,t)} \\ &\quad - \left[\alpha_t + \frac{1}{L_t} \sum_{i \in L} \psi_i + \frac{1}{L_t} \sum_{i \in L} \ln w_{Lj(i,t)} \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{F.2})$$

This equation shows that the economy-wide college premium could increase either because college workers get more skilled (ψ_i increases among college workers), or because the wage premium paid by firms changes. In the following derivation we focus on the latter, as that part is what is influenced by firm-level application of new technologies. Formally, the contribution of firms to the economy-wide skill premium is:

$$\Theta \equiv \frac{1}{H_t} \sum_{i \in H} \ln w_{Hj(i,t)} - \frac{1}{L_t} \sum_{i \in L} \ln w_{Lj(i,t)}. \quad (\text{F.3})$$

We decompose the change in the economy-wide college premium that can be attributed to the

application of new technologies. $\Delta\Theta$ can be decomposed as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta\Theta &= \frac{1}{H_{t+1}} \sum_{i \in H} \ln w_{Hj(i,t+1)} - \frac{1}{H_t} \sum_{i \in H} \ln w_{Hj(i,t)} - \\
&\quad - \left(\frac{1}{L_{t+1}} \sum_{i \in L} \ln w_{Lj(i,t+1)} - \frac{1}{L_t} \sum_{i \in L} \ln w_{Lj(i,t)} \right) \\
&= \sum_j \frac{H_{jt+1}}{H_{t+1}} \ln w_{Hjt+1} - \sum_j \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \ln w_{Hjt} - \\
&\quad - \left(\sum_j \frac{L_{jt+1}}{L_{t+1}} \ln w_{Ljt+1} - \sum_j \frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} \ln w_{Ljt} \right) \\
&= \sum_j \left(\frac{H_{jt+1}}{H_{t+1}} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \ln w_{Hjt+1} + \sum_j \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} (\ln w_{Hjt+1} - \ln w_{Hjt}) - \\
&\quad - \left(\sum_j \left(\frac{L_{jt+1}}{L_{t+1}} - \frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} \right) \ln w_{Ljt+1} + \sum_j \frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} (\ln w_{Ljt+1} - \ln w_{Ljt}) \right).
\end{aligned}$$

This leads us to equation (22) in the main text:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta\Theta = \Delta(\overline{\ln w_{H_t}} - \overline{\ln w_{L_t}}) &= \underbrace{\sum_j \left(\frac{H_{jt+1}}{H_{t+1}} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \ln w_{Hjt+1} - \sum_j \left(\frac{L_{jt+1}}{L_{t+1}} - \frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} \right) \ln w_{Ljt+1}}_{\text{Reallocation effect}} + \\
&\quad + \underbrace{\sum_j \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} (\ln w_{Hjt+1} - \ln w_{Hjt}) - \sum_j \frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} (\ln w_{Ljt+1} - \ln w_{Ljt})}_{\text{Wage premium effect}}
\end{aligned} \tag{F.4}$$

We distinguish between two types of firms: firms that change their technology (innovators) between t and $t+1$, denoted by *inn*; and others (non-innovators), denoted by *non*. Let us define the (baseline) weighted average skill premium for skill group $S \in \{L, H\}$ at time $t+1$ for the innovative and non-innovative firms to be the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
\overline{\ln w_{Sjt+1}}^{inn} &\equiv \frac{\sum_{j \in inn} S_{jt} \ln w_{Sjt+1}}{\sum_{j \in inn} S_{jt}}, \\
\overline{\ln w_{Sjt+1}}^{non} &\equiv \frac{\sum_{j \in non} S_{jt} \ln w_{Sjt+1}}{\sum_{j \in non} S_{jt}}.
\end{aligned}$$

We first analyze the reallocation term in equation (F.4). The change in shares for the two skill

groups can be also rewritten as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{S_{jt+1}}{S_{t+1}} - \frac{S_{jt}}{S_t} &= \frac{S_{jt} + \frac{S_{jt+1}-S_{jt}}{S_{jt}} S_{jt}}{S_t + \frac{S_{t+1}-S_t}{S_t} S_t} - \frac{S_{jt}}{S_t} \\
&= \frac{S_{jt} + \frac{S_{t+1}-S_t}{S_t} S_{jt} + \left(\frac{S_{jt+1}-S_{jt}}{S_{jt}} - \frac{S_{t+1}-S_t}{S_t} \right) S_{jt}}{S_t + \frac{S_{t+1}-S_t}{S_t} S_t} - \frac{S_{jt}}{S_t} \\
&= \left(\frac{S_{jt+1}-S_{jt}}{S_{jt}} - \frac{S_{t+1}-S_t}{S_t} \right) \frac{S_{jt}}{S_{t+1}} \\
&= \Delta s_j \frac{S_{jt}}{S_{t+1}},
\end{aligned} \tag{F.5}$$

where $\Delta s_j = \frac{S_{jt+1}-S_{jt}}{S_{jt}} - \frac{S_{t+1}-S_t}{S_t}$ shows the percent change in the number of workers in skill group S in firm j relative to the aggregate change in the number of workers in that skill group. Similarly to the skill premium, we also define the average (baseline) change at time $t + 1$ for the innovative and non-innovative firms:

$$\begin{aligned}
\overline{\Delta s_j}^{inn} &\equiv \frac{\sum_{j \in inn} \Delta s_j}{J^{inn}} \\
\overline{\Delta s_j}^{non} &\equiv \frac{\sum_{j \in non} \Delta s_j}{J^{non}},
\end{aligned}$$

where J^{inn} and J^{non} refer to the total number of innovative and non-innovative firms, respectively. Without loss of generality we further assume that the change in employment share, Δs_j , is unrelated to the skill share, S_{jt}/S_{t+1} , and the skill premium, $\ln w_{Sjt+1}$, within the two firm types. In the case of some correlation, we could simply divide innovative and non-innovative firms into more subgroups up to the point where this assumption holds within each subgroup (see footnote 63). Therefore, it follows that:⁶³

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_j \left(\frac{S_{jt+1}}{S_{t+1}} - \frac{S_{jt}}{S_t} \right) \ln w_{Sjt+1} &= \sum_{j \in inn} \Delta s_j \frac{S_{jt}}{S_{t+1}} \ln w_{Sjt+1} + \sum_{j \in non} \Delta s_j \frac{S_{jt}}{S_{t+1}} \ln w_{Sjt+1} \\
&= \frac{\sum_{j \in inn} \Delta s_j}{J^{inn}} \times \sum_{j \in inn} \frac{S_{jt}}{S_{t+1}} \ln w_{Sjt+1} + \\
&\quad + \frac{\sum_{j \in non} \Delta s_j}{J^{non}} \times \sum_{j \in non} \frac{S_{jt}}{S_{t+1}} \ln w_{Sjt+1} \\
&= \frac{\sum_{j \in inn} \Delta s_j}{J^{inn}} \times \frac{\sum_{j \in inn} \frac{S_{jt}}{S_{t+1}} \ln w_{Sjt+1}}{\sum_{j \in inn} \frac{S_{jt}}{S_{t+1}}} \sum_{j \in inn} \frac{S_{jt}}{S_{t+1}} + \\
&\quad + \frac{\sum_{j \in non} \Delta s_j}{J^{non}} \times \frac{\sum_{j \in non} \frac{S_{jt}}{S_{t+1}} \ln w_{Sjt+1}}{\sum_{j \in non} \frac{S_{jt}}{S_{t+1}}} \sum_{j \in non} \frac{S_{jt}}{S_{t+1}} \\
&= \overline{\Delta s_j}^{inn} \times \overline{\ln w_{Sjt+1}}^{inn} \times \vartheta_{S_{jt}}^{inn} + \overline{\Delta s_j}^{non} \times \overline{\ln w_{Sjt+1}}^{non} \times \vartheta_{S_{jt}}^{non},
\end{aligned} \tag{F.6}$$

where $\vartheta_{S_{jt}}^{inn} \equiv \sum_{j \in inn} \frac{S_{jt}}{S_{t+1}}$ and $\vartheta_{S_{jt}}^{non} \equiv \sum_{j \in non} \frac{S_{jt}}{S_{t+1}}$. The above formula highlights that reallocation effects for skill group S will depend on the percent change in employment shares from skill S at innovative and non innovative firms, the wage premium paid by innovative and non-innovative firms,

⁶³ In this case, we would simply need to calculate the change in employment for each relevant subgroup and the skill premium in those subgroups. While applying the method proposed here to more than two groups of firms (e.g. innovative and non-innovate) involves more notation, the same result can be obtained. The reallocation effects will be the sum of the change in share for each relevant subgroup multiplied by the average wage premium paid in each subgroup.

and the initial share of innovative and non-innovative firms.

This formula can be further simplified if we consider the effect of reallocation in absence of any change in aggregate supply of skills – meaning that $S_t = S_{t+1}$. In that case we have the following relationship between $\overline{\Delta s_j}^{inn}$ and $\overline{\Delta s_j}^{non}$:

$$\begin{aligned}
\overline{\Delta s_j}^{inn} \times \vartheta_{S_{jt}}^{inn} &= \frac{1}{J^{inn}} \sum_{j \in inn} \frac{S_{jt+1} - S_{jt}}{S_{jt}} \times \sum_{j \in inn} \frac{S_{jt}}{S_t} \\
&= \sum_{j \in inn} \Delta s_j \frac{S_{jt}}{S_t} \\
&= \sum_{j \in inn} \frac{S_{jt+1} - S_{jt}}{S_{jt}} \frac{S_{jt}}{S_t} \\
&= \sum_{j \in inn} \frac{S_{jt+1} - S_{jt}}{S_t} \\
&= - \sum_{j \in non} \frac{S_{jt+1} - S_{jt}}{S_t} \\
&= - \sum_{j \in non} \frac{S_{jt+1} - S_{jt}}{S_{jt}} \frac{S_{jt}}{S_t} \\
&= - \sum_{j \in non} \Delta s_j \frac{S_{jt}}{S_t} \\
&= - \frac{1}{J^{non}} \sum_{j \in non} \Delta s_j \times \sum_{j \in non} \frac{S_{jt}}{S_t} \\
&= - \overline{\Delta s_j}^{non} \times \vartheta_{S_{jt}}^{non}.
\end{aligned} \tag{F.7}$$

As a result, each term in the reallocation effect in equation (F.4) can be rewritten as:

$$\sum_j \left(\frac{S_{jt+1}}{S_{t+1}} - \frac{S_{jt}}{S_t} \right) \ln w_{S_{jt+1}} = \underbrace{\overline{\Delta s_j}^{inn} \times \vartheta_{S_{jt}}^{inn}}_{\text{Change in share of inn firms}} \times \underbrace{\left(\overline{\ln w_{S_{jt+1}}}^{inn} - \overline{\ln w_{S_{jt+1}}}^{non} \right)}_{\text{Difference in wage premiums between inn/non}}. \tag{F.8}$$

Based on this derivation, this will be the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Reallocation eff.} &= \underbrace{\overline{\Delta h_j}^{inn} \times \vartheta_{H_{jt}}^{inn}}_{\text{Change in H share of inn firms}} \times \underbrace{\left(\overline{\ln w_{H_{jt+1}}}^{inn} - \overline{\ln w_{H_{jt+1}}}^{non} \right)}_{\text{Difference in H wage premiums between inn/non}} - \\
&- \underbrace{\overline{\Delta l_j}^{inn} \times \vartheta_{L_{jt}}^{inn}}_{\text{Change in L share of inn firms}} \times \underbrace{\left(\overline{\ln w_{L_{jt+1}}}^{inn} - \overline{\ln w_{L_{jt+1}}}^{non} \right)}_{\text{Difference in L wage premiums between inn/non}}.
\end{aligned} \tag{F.9}$$

According to this equation, the reallocation effect depends on the market share of innovative firms in the two labor markets ($\vartheta_{H_{jt}}^{inn}, \vartheta_{L_{jt}}^{inn}$), the premiums innovative firms pay in the two markets, and the proportional increase in the number of workers in innovative firms in the two markets ($\overline{\Delta h_j}^{inn}, \overline{\Delta l_j}^{inn}$). The former two components are observed in the data, while the latter is estimated in Section 4.2. We later provide further details on how to apply this formula to assess the contribution of technological change, via the reallocation term, to overall inequality.

Let us turn to the wage premium effect. As derived in Appendix C, a change in the technology of firm j implies the following change in the firm-level skill premium:

$$\ln \frac{w_{Hjt+1}}{w_{Ljt+1}} - \ln \frac{w_{Hjt}}{w_{Ljt}} = \ln \frac{\theta_{jt+1}}{1-\theta_{jt+1}} - \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1-\theta_{jt}} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \left[\ln \frac{H_{jt+1}}{L_{jt+1}} - \ln \frac{H_{jt}}{L_{jt}} \right]. \quad (\text{F.10})$$

According to this equation, the change in the skill premium in innovative and non-innovative firms is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Innovative} & : \quad \Delta \ln w_{Hjt} - \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} = \Delta \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1-\theta_{jt}} - \frac{1}{\sigma} (\Delta \ln H_{jt} - \Delta \ln L_{jt}) \\ \text{Non-innovative} & : \quad \Delta \ln w_{Hjt} - \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} = -\frac{1}{\sigma} (\Delta \ln H_{jt} - \Delta \ln L_{jt}). \end{aligned}$$

Substituting these terms into the formula of the wage premium effect:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Wage premium effect} & = \sum_j \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} (\ln w_{Hjt+1} - \ln w_{Hjt}) - \sum_j \frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} (\ln w_{Ljt+1} - \ln w_{Ljt}) \\ & = \sum_j \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} (\Delta \ln w_{Hjt} - \Delta \ln w_{Ljt}) + \sum_j \left(\frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} - \frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} \right) \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} \\ & = \sum_{j \in \text{inn}} \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} (\Delta \ln w_{Hjt} - \Delta \ln w_{Ljt}) + \sum_{j \in \text{non}} \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} (\Delta \ln w_{Hjt} - \Delta \ln w_{Ljt}) + \\ & \quad + \sum_j \left(\frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} - \frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} \right) \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} \\ & = \sum_{j \in \text{inn}} \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \left(\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1-\theta_{jt}} - \frac{1}{\sigma} (\Delta \ln H_{jt} - \Delta \ln L_{jt}) \right) + \\ & \quad + \sum_{j \in \text{non}} \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \left(-\frac{1}{\sigma} (\Delta \ln H_{jt} - \Delta \ln L_{jt}) \right) + \\ & \quad + \sum_j \left(\frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} - \frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} \right) \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} \\ & = \underbrace{\sum_{j \in \text{inn}} \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \left[\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1-\theta_{jt}} \right]}_{\text{Direct effect of skill bias}} - \\ & \quad - \frac{1}{\sigma} \underbrace{\left[\sum_j \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} (\Delta \ln H_{jt} - \Delta \ln L_{jt}) \right]}_{\text{Average change in log skill ratio}} - \\ & \quad - \underbrace{\sum_j \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \Delta \ln w_{Ljt}}_{\text{Change in low skilled premium weighted by the difference between high and low skill employment share}}. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{F.11})$$

The first term in this equation, the direct effect of skill bias, can be rewritten as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_{j \in inn} \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \left[\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1-\theta_{jt}} \right] &= \frac{\sum_{j \in inn} H_{jt} \left[\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1-\theta_{jt}} \right]}{H_t} \\
&= \frac{\sum_{j \in inn} H_{jt}}{H_t} \frac{\sum_{j \in inn} H_{jt} \left[\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1-\theta_{jt}} \right]}{\sum_{j \in inn} H_{jt}} \\
&= \underbrace{\vartheta_{H_{jt}}^{inn}}_{\text{Share of inn firms}} \times \underbrace{\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}}_{\text{Average change in skill bias}},
\end{aligned} \tag{F.12}$$

where the last equality takes into account that $H_{t+1} = H_t$. The (weighted) average change in skill bias, $\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} \equiv \frac{\sum_{j \in inn} H_{jt} \left[\Delta \ln \frac{\theta_{jt}}{1-\theta_{jt}} \right]}{\sum_{j \in inn} H_{jt}}$, is defined in equation (18). If $H_{t+1} = H_t$ and $L_{t+1} = L_t$, the second term in equation (F.11) can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_j \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} (\Delta \ln H_{jt} - \Delta \ln L_{jt}) &\approx \sum_j \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \frac{H_{jt+1} - H_{jt}}{H_{jt}} - \sum_j \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \frac{L_{jt+1} - L_{jt}}{L_{jt}} \\
&= \sum_j \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \frac{H_{jt+1} - H_{jt}}{H_{jt}} - \sum_j \frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} \frac{L_{jt+1} - L_{jt}}{L_{jt}} - \sum_j \left(\frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} - \frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} \right) \frac{L_{jt+1} - L_{jt}}{L_{jt}} \\
&= \sum_j \frac{H_{jt+1} - H_{jt}}{H_t} - \sum_j \frac{L_{jt+1} - L_{jt}}{L_t} + \sum_j \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \frac{L_{jt+1} - L_{jt}}{L_{jt}} \\
&= 0 - 0 + \sum_{j \in inn} \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \frac{L_{jt+1} - L_{jt}}{L_{jt}} + \sum_{j \in non} \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \frac{L_{jt+1} - L_{jt}}{L_{jt}} \\
&= \sum_{j \in inn} \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \times \frac{1}{J_{inn}} \sum_{j \in inn} \frac{L_{jt+1} - L_{jt}}{L_{jt}} + \\
&\quad + \sum_{j \in non} \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \times \frac{1}{J_{non}} \sum_{j \in non} \frac{L_{jt+1} - L_{jt}}{L_{jt}} \\
&= \left(\vartheta_{L_{jt}}^{inn} - \vartheta_{H_{jt}}^{inn} \right) \times \overline{\Delta l_j}^{inn} + \left(\vartheta_{L_{jt}}^{non} - \vartheta_{H_{jt}}^{non} \right) \times \overline{\Delta l_j}^{non} \\
&= \underbrace{\left(\vartheta_{L_{jt}}^{inn} - \vartheta_{H_{jt}}^{inn} \right)}_{\text{Difference between inn firms' share in H/L market}} \times \underbrace{\left(\overline{\Delta l_j}^{inn} - \overline{\Delta l_j}^{non} \right)}_{\text{Diff between av. growth rate in L workers between inn./non}},
\end{aligned} \tag{F.13}$$

where in the first approximation we have used that the log changes in skill S can be expressed as⁶⁴

$$\Delta \ln S_{jt} = \ln S_{jt+1} - \ln S_{jt} \approx \frac{S_{jt+1} - S_{jt}}{S_{jt}}.$$

In the last but two equality in equation (F.13) we assumed that among innovative and non-innovative firms, the change in low skilled employment is unrelated to the initial high skill share at those firms. If this assumption does not hold, we need simply to disaggregate further until the assumption holds (see footnote 63 for further details). In the last equality we used the fact that $\vartheta_{L_{jt}}^{inn} - \vartheta_{H_{jt}}^{inn} = -(\vartheta_{L_{jt}}^{non} - \vartheta_{H_{jt}}^{non})$.

This result shows that the second term in the wage premium effect is the difference between the

⁶⁴The approximation comes from a first-order Taylor approximation showing that percentage and log percentage changes are similar when the change is small.

market share of innovative firms in the high- and low-skilled market multiplied by the difference in the average growth rate of low-skilled workers between innovative and non-innovative firms.

The third term in equation (F.11) shows the correlation between the difference in firms' shares in the high vs low-skilled market in t and the change in the low-skilled premiums.

Without loss of generality, let us assume that within the groups of innovative and non-innovative firms, the change in the wage of low-skilled workers, $\Delta \ln w_{Ljt}$, is independent from the number of low- and high-skilled workers in the firm. Again if this does not hold, we need to apply more subgroups of firms (see footnote 63). The formula for the third term can be rewritten as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_j \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} &= \sum_{j \in inn} \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} + \sum_{j \in non} \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} \\
&= \sum_{j \in inn} \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \times \frac{1}{J_{inn}} \sum_{j \in inn} \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} + \\
&\quad + \sum_{j \in non} \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \times \frac{1}{J_{non}} \sum_{j \in non} \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} \\
&= \sum_{j \in inn} \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \times \frac{1}{J_{inn}} \sum_{j \in inn} \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} - \\
&\quad - \sum_{j \in inn} \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \times \frac{1}{J_{non}} \sum_{j \in non} \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} + \\
&\quad + \sum_{j \in inn} \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \times \frac{1}{J_{non}} \sum_{j \in non} \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} + \\
&\quad + \sum_{j \in non} \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \times \frac{1}{J_{non}} \sum_{j \in non} \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} \\
&= (\vartheta_{Ljt}^{inn} - \vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn}) \times \left(\frac{1}{J_{inn}} \sum_{j \in inn} \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} - \frac{1}{J_{non}} \sum_{j \in non} \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} \right) + \\
&\quad + \sum_j \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{L_t} - \frac{H_{jt}}{H_t} \right) \times \frac{1}{J_{non}} \sum_{j \in non} \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} \\
&= (\vartheta_{Ljt}^{inn} - \vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn}) + (1 - 1) \times \frac{1}{J_{non}} \sum_{j \in non} \Delta \ln w_{Ljt} \\
&= \underbrace{\left(\vartheta_{Ljt}^{inn} - \vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn} \right)}_{\substack{\text{Difference between} \\ \text{inn firms' share} \\ \text{in H/L market}}} \times \underbrace{\left(\overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{inn} - \overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{non} \right)}_{\substack{\text{Difference of av. L wage} \\ \text{changes between inn/non}}} + 0,
\end{aligned}$$

where $\overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{inn} = \frac{1}{J_{inn}} \sum_{j \in inn} \Delta \ln w_{Ljt}$ and $\overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{non} = \frac{1}{J_{non}} \sum_{j \in non} \Delta \ln w_{Ljt}$ are the (unweighted) average growth rates of low-skilled wages in innovative and non-innovative firms, respectively. In the second equality we used that the low-skilled wage changes are independent of the initial number of high- and low-skilled workers within innovative and non-innovative firms. These results imply that

the wage premium effect will be given by the following equation whenever $H_t = H_{t+1}$:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Wage premium eff.} &= \underbrace{\vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn} \times \Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}}_{\text{Direct effect of skill bias}} - \\
&\quad - \frac{1}{\sigma} \underbrace{(\vartheta_{Ljt}^{inn} - \vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn}) \times (\overline{\Delta l_j}^{inn} - \overline{\Delta l_j}^{non})}_{\text{Average change in log skill ratio}} \\
&\quad - \underbrace{(\vartheta_{Ljt}^{inn} - \vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn}) \times (\overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{inn} - \overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{non})}_{\text{Change in low skilled premium weighted by the difference between high and low skill employment share}}.
\end{aligned} \tag{F.14}$$

These insights allow us to write up the effect of technological change on inequality as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta \Theta = \Delta (\overline{\ln w_{H_t}} - \overline{\ln w_{L_t}}) &= \\
\text{Reallocation eff.} &\left\{ \begin{aligned} &+ \underbrace{\overline{\Delta h_j}^{inn} \times \vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn}}_{\text{Change in H share of inn firms}} \times \underbrace{(\overline{\ln w_{Hjt+1}}^{inn} - \overline{\ln w_{Hjt+1}}^{non})}_{\text{Difference in H wage premiums between inn/non}} \\ &- \underbrace{\overline{\Delta l_j}^{inn} \times \vartheta_{Ljt}^{inn}}_{\text{Change in L share of inn firms}} \times \underbrace{(\overline{\ln w_{Ljt+1}}^{inn} - \overline{\ln w_{Ljt+1}}^{non})}_{\text{Difference in L wage premiums between inn/non}} \end{aligned} \right. \\
+ \text{Wage premium eff.} &\left\{ \begin{aligned} &+ \underbrace{\vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn} \times \Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}}_{\text{Direct effect of skill bias}} \\ &- \frac{1}{\sigma} \underbrace{(\vartheta_{Ljt}^{inn} - \vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn}) \times (\overline{\Delta l_j}^{inn} - \overline{\Delta l_j}^{non})}_{\text{Average change in log skill ratio}} \\ &- \underbrace{(\vartheta_{Ljt}^{inn} - \vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn}) \times (\overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{inn} - \overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{non})}_{\text{Change in low skilled premium weighted by the difference between high and low skill employment share}}. \end{aligned} \right.
\end{aligned} \tag{F.15}$$

F.1 Empirical Implementation

We use equation (F.15) to quantify the extent to which firm-level technological change contributes to the aggregate college premium. Table F.1 summarizes how we calculate each of the components in equation (F.15).

The $\overline{\Delta h_j}^{inn}$ and $\overline{\Delta l_j}^{inn}$ objects are just the proportional changes in skilled and unskilled workers in innovative firms, respectively. We calculate these from the firm-level regressions on employment

growth and the change in skill ratio. $\overline{\ln w_{Hjt+1}^{inn}} - \overline{\ln w_{Hjt+1}^{non}}$ and $\overline{\ln w_{Ljt+1}^{inn}} - \overline{\ln w_{Ljt+1}^{non}}$, which are also part of the reallocation term, show the wage difference of college and non-college workers between innovative and non-innovative firms. Here we would like to filter out workers' composition effects—we are interested in how a particular worker's wage would change if she moved to an innovative firm. Therefore we start from column (2) of Table 2, but we also include worker fixed effects in Norway.

The shares of innovative firms in terms of college and non-college workers, ϑ_{Hjt}^{inn} and ϑ_{Ljt}^{inn} , are obtained from the CIS. We calculate the share of high-skilled workers at the innovative firms and apply the sampling weights provided with the CIS survey.⁶⁵

The extent of skill bias change, $\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}$, is calculated based on equation (18), where we include our preferred estimates for the innovation's effect on the skill premium and the skilled share. We use these quantities together with the change in the number of unskilled workers in innovative firms to calculate the change in the number of these workers in non-innovative firms, $\overline{\Delta l_j^{non}}$.

Finally, $\overline{\Delta w_{Lj}^{inn}} - \overline{\Delta w_{Lj}^{non}}$, the average wage increase of low-skilled workers in innovative firms relative to non-innovative firms, comes from the estimated coefficient of "Innovation" in our preferred specifications, column (4) of Table 2.

The only component in (F.15) that we do not estimate in our data is the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled workers, σ . For that we take the estimated values from the literature. Autor et al. (2003) argue that the elasticity between college and non-college workers is 2.94. If we apply that value of elasticity and calculate the contribution of firm-level technological change to economy-wide inequality, we can explain the change in college premium and college ratio observed in the data (see Section 6.3 for details). Furthermore, in Table F.4 we explore the sensitivity of our estimates to various values of σ . Reassuringly, the estimated magnitudes are not sensitive to the specific value of σ used.

Table F.2 shows the specific value of each component. Rows (1)-(2) show that the number of skilled workers employed by innovative firms increases substantially in both countries, while the number of unskilled workers in the same firms tend to decrease slightly. Rows (3)-(4) show the premiums payed by innovative firms to high- and low-skilled workers. Both types of workers earn more in innovative firms, with the difference being substantially larger in Hungary.⁶⁶ Rows (5)-(6) show the share of firms conducting different types of innovation in the two labor markets. Row (7) shows the change in the number of non-college workers in non-innovative firms followed by the estimated skill bias in row (8). The final row shows our estimates for the difference in low-skilled workers' wage increase between innovative and non-innovative firms.

We use equation (F.15) to calculate the contribution of technological change to the skill premium from these components. As both the shares and the coefficients reflect innovation activities conducted

⁶⁵These weights are not available for Hungary, where we report unweighted results.

⁶⁶Note that this is likely to be an overestimate in Hungary. This is because, unlike in Norway, we cannot include worker fixed effects in our regression when estimating the premium innovative firms pay for college and non-college workers. As a more conservative approach, we compare the coefficients with and without worker fixed effects, and rescale the Hungarian premium by a similar factor. Including worker fixed effects reduces the estimated premium of non-college workers by 38% and the skill premium by 45%. Reducing the premium to a similar degree in Hungary reduces the reallocation effect to 2.33 pp.

over a 7-year period, these estimates also show the effect of innovation taking place over a 7-year period. For easier interpretation, we convert these to reflect a 10-year period.

Besides the overall contribution of all firm innovation to the increase in the college premium, we are also interested in the contribution of different forms of technological change. We split up firms along three lines: (i) whether they conduct R&D; (ii) whether their innovation is “new to market” and (iii) whether they conduct technical innovation or organizational change or both. We follow the same approach and estimate the skill bias separately for each group of innovative firms, similarly to Section A.9.

The results of the decomposition are presented in Table F.3. Let us start with column (1), which shows the overall effect of innovation. For both countries, the first row shows the direct effect. The wage premium effect in two (4) is the sum of the direct effect and the two cross terms in rows (2) and (3). The wage premium effect was 5.58 pp in Norway and 10.09 pp in Hungary during a 10-year period. Row shows the reallocation effect, which contributed to the increase in skill premium by 0.52 and 3.74 pp. in Norway and Hungary, respectively. The total effect is just the sum of the reallocation and wage premium effects.

According to our results, skill-biased innovation contributed to the increase in the aggregate skill premium by 0.6 and 1.4 percentage points per year in Norway and Hungary, respectively. The bulk of the contribution results from the wage premium effect, suggesting that innovation mainly contributes to the aggregate skill premium via within-firm wage premium changes rather than the reallocation of workers to those firms. Within the wage premium effect, the direct effect dominates (Table F.3).⁶⁷ The higher contribution in Hungary is much in line with technology adoption generating more skill bias in Hungary compared to Norway, which is closer to the technological frontier.

We also show the contribution of different forms of technological change in Table 8 and in Figure 4. Let us start with columns (2) and (3), which consider R&D and non-R&D driven technological change. There is a characteristic difference between the two countries: while R&D conducting firms generate 89% of the total innovative contribution in Norway, this number is only 64% in Hungary.⁶⁸ This difference primarily results from the fact that the skill bias of non R&D based innovation is very small in Norway compared to R&D-based innovation, while the difference between the skill bias of the two types of innovation is much smaller in Hungary. In addition, R&D firms have a higher market share in Norway.

Columns (4) and (5) compare new-to-market and low-novelty innovation. In Norway, 63% of the aggregate contribution comes from new-to-market innovation, while in Hungary only 37%. The difference is mainly explained by the small prevalence of new-to-market innovation compared to Norway.

⁶⁷The other two terms are very small because prior to innovation, innovative firms had a similar share in the skilled and unskilled markets, and the difference between the growth of the number and wage of low-skilled workers was very similar in innovative and non-innovative firms.

⁶⁸These numbers are based on comparing the contributions by the two groups of firms in columns (2) and (3) of Table 8. Note that the different categories (e.g. R&D and non-R&D don't necessarily add up because they are calculated from different regression coefficients, all subject to different estimation errors.

Finally, columns (6)-(8) analyze firms conducting only technical innovation, only organizational change or both type. While conducting both types of innovation is more skill biased in both countries than conducting only one, in contrast to Norway, only technical is also highly skill-biased in Hungary. This, together with the relatively low prevalence of “both” in Hungary, explains the relatively large role of “only technical” innovation in Hungary.

These findings underline the higher importance of technology transfers—either captured by non-R&D or low-novelty innovation—in Hungary compared to Norway, where the aggregate skill bias is mainly driven by higher novelty innovation. Furthermore, technology transfers can take place by conducting only technical innovation, while in economies closer to the technology frontier, organizational changes seem to be a key driver of skill bias.

F.2 Contribution of the R&D Tax Credit

When estimating the effects of the R&D tax credit, we can rely on the regressions from Table 7. In particular, we can use the coefficients for the change in log H/L (0.104), log employment (0.054) and the wage premium (0.031) from Table 7.⁶⁹ The post-treatment (2006) share of treated firms after innovation was 34.6% and 38% in the college and non-college labor market, respectively. Re-running the specification in column (6) without firm fixed effects reveals that treated firms payed 4.2 percent and 1.8 percent lower wages compared to the control group.⁷⁰

Assuming $\sigma = 2.94$ as before, the implied value of θ is 0.05, the reallocation effect is -0.14 pp, and the wage premium effect is 1.54. This yields a long-term total contribution of 1.39 percentage points, which shows that such policies can generate a large amount of skill-biased technological change that has substantial effects on the skill premium.

⁶⁹We use the college premium effect estimated with worker fixed effects to generate conservative estimates. Using the value from column (4) yields a somewhat larger total contribution.

⁷⁰Recall that treated firms spend less on R&D compared to control group firms, and they also pay lower wages.

Table F.1: Calculation of the Contribution of Firm-level Technological Change to Economy-wide Wage Premium

Object	Calculation
$\overline{\Delta h_j}^{inn}$	Log change in number of workers (Coefficient of “Innovation” in Table 5 col. (3)) plus log change in H/L, calculated from the change in H/L (Coefficient of “Innovation” in Table 5 col. (2)) divided by the non-innovative H/L from Table 1
$\overline{\Delta l_j}^{inn}$	Log change in number of workers (Coefficient of “Innovation” in Table 5 col. (3)) minus log change in H/L, calculated from the change in H/L (Coefficient of “Innovation” in Table 5 col. (2)) divided by the non-innovative H/L from Table 1
$\overline{\ln w_{Hjt+1}}^{inn} - \overline{\ln w_{Hjt+1}}^{non}$	Coefficient of “Innovation” in Table 2 column (4) but without firm fixed effects
$\overline{\ln w_{Ljt+1}}^{inn} - \overline{\ln w_{Ljt+1}}^{non}$	Coefficient of “Innovation” + Coefficient of “College x Innovation” in Table 2 column (4) but without firm fixed effects
ϑ_{Hjt}^{inn}	The number of college workers employed by firms with an innovation dummy=1 divided by the number of college workers employed by firms in the CIS in the 2012 wave of the CIS, weighted by CIS weights (in Norway)
ϑ_{Ljt}^{inn}	The number of non-college workers employed by firms with an innovation dummy=1 divided by the number of non-college workers employed by firms in the CIS in the 2012 wave of the CIS, weighted by CIS weights (in Norway)
$\overline{\Delta l_j}^{non}$	This can be expressed as $\ln \left(1 - \vartheta_{Ljt}^{inn} \times \overline{\Delta l_j}^{inn} \right) - \ln \left(1 - \vartheta_{Ljt}^{inn} \right)$, where ϑ_{Ljt}^{inn} and $\overline{\Delta l_j}^{inn}$ are calculated as described above.
$\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}$	Based on equation (18). For the change in skill ratio we take the coefficient of “Innovation x College” from column (4) of Table 2 and for the change in the skill ratio we use the coefficient of “Innovation” from column (2) of Table 5
$\overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{inn} - \overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{non}$	Based on the coefficient of “Innovation” from Column (4) of Table 2
σ	We assume $\sigma = 2.94$ following Autor et al. (2003). In Table F.4 we show robustness to alternative values of σ

Notes: This table explains how we calculate each of the components in equation (F.15).

Table F.2: Details of the Calculation of Contribution of Firm-level Technological Change to Economy-wide Wage Premium

		Panel A: Norway							
		Any	R&D	non R&D	New	Not new	Only tech.	Only org.	Both
(1)	$\overline{\Delta h_j}^{inn}$	10.86%	12.71%	7.59%	12.02%	10.37%	6.62%	9.36%	14.49%
(2)	$\overline{\Delta l_j}^{inn}$	-0.35%	-0.90%	-1.21%	-1.19%	-0.03%	1.02%	-1.85%	-3.54%
(3)	$\overline{\ln w_{Hjt+1}}^{inn} - \overline{\ln w_{Hjt+1}}^{non}$	5.60%	6.70%	2.70%	5.20%	2.20%	1.20%	1.60%	5.20%
(4)	$\overline{\ln w_{Ljt+1}}^{inn} - \overline{\ln w_{Ljt+1}}^{non}$	3.70%	4.20%	2.00%	3.80%	1.70%	0.50%	1.80%	3.80%
(5)	ϑ_{Hjt}^{inn}	61.43%	44.01%	17.09%	40.16%	20.86%	12.03%	7.56%	40.78%
(6)	ϑ_{Ljt}^{inn}	59.27%	36.24%	23.43%	34.09%	25.39%	11.63%	11.02%	37.80%
(7)	$\overline{\Delta l_j}^{non}$	0.50%	0.51%	0.37%	0.61%	0.01%	-0.14%	0.22%	2.06%
(8)	$\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}$	6.39%	8.08%	2.99%	6.22%	3.86%	2.36%	3.09%	7.19%
(9)	$\overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{inn} - \overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{non}$	-1.00%	-1.50%	0.10%	-0.60%	-0.10%	-0.70%	0.50%	-0.60%

		Panel B: Hungary							
		Any	R&D	non R&D	New	Not new	Only tech.	Only org.	Both
(1)	$\overline{\Delta h_j}^{inn}$	15.66%	21.41%	11.30%	34.64%	15.92%	13.93%	8.35%	24.45%
(2)	$\overline{\Delta l_j}^{inn}$	-0.43%	-1.40%	1.58%	-1.97%	0.40%	1.87%	1.62%	0.54%
(3)	$\overline{\ln w_{Hjt+1}}^{inn} - \overline{\ln w_{Hjt+1}}^{non}$	26.60%	29.90%	20.90%	31.60%	23.00%	16.00%	18.10%	20.80%
(4)	$\overline{\ln w_{Ljt+1}}^{inn} - \overline{\ln w_{Ljt+1}}^{non}$	16.60%	19.50%	13.40%	23.30%	14.00%	12.60%	10.60%	18.90%
(5)	ϑ_{Hjt}^{inn}	64.03%	30.46%	54.32%	13.40%	66.83%	8.18%	7.79%	43.75%
(6)	ϑ_{Ljt}^{inn}	66.38%	29.10%	70.17%	13.16%	86.75%	10.39%	8.37%	46.75%
(7)	$\overline{\Delta l_j}^{non}$	0.85%	0.56%	-3.85%	0.29%	-2.64%	-0.22%	-0.15%	-0.48%
(8)	$\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}$	11.01%	14.16%	8.62%	16.47%	10.86%	10.44%	4.32%	14.64%
(9)	$\overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{inn} - \overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{non}$	-0.50%	-2.10%	-0.30%	-0.50%	-1.40%	-0.10%	1.10%	-1.60%

Notes: This table shows the numerical value of the components in equation (F.15). Each component is calculated as explained in Table F.1.

Table F.3: Decomposition Components

		Panel A: Norway							
		Any	R&D	non R&D	New	Not new	Only tech.	Only org	Both
(1)	Direct effect	5.61%	5.08%	0.73%	3.57%	1.15%	0.41%	0.33%	4.19%
(2)	$-\frac{1}{\sigma} (\vartheta_{Ljt}^{inn} - \vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn}) \times (\overline{\Delta l_j}^{inn} - \overline{\Delta l_j}^{non})$	-0.01%	-0.04%	0.03%	-0.04%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	-0.06%
(3)	$-(\vartheta_{Ljt}^{inn} - \vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn}) \times (\overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{inn} - \overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{non})$	-0.02%	-0.12%	-0.01%	-0.04%	0.00%	0.00%	-0.02%	-0.02%
(4)	Wage premium effect	5.58%	4.93%	0.76%	3.49%	1.15%	0.40%	0.34%	4.11%
(5)	Reallocation effect	0.52%	0.52%	0.04%	0.34%	0.07%	0.01%	0.01%	0.37%
(6)	Total	6.10%	5.44%	0.80%	3.83%	1.22%	0.42%	0.35%	4.48%

		Panel B: Hungary							
		Any	R&D	non R&D	New	Not new	Only tech.	Only org	Both
(1)	Direct effect	10.07%	6.16%	6.69%	3.15%	10.37%	1.22%	0.48%	9.15%
(2)	$-\frac{1}{\sigma} (\vartheta_{Ljt}^{inn} - \vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn}) \times (\overline{\Delta l_j}^{inn} - \overline{\Delta l_j}^{non})$	0.01%	-0.01%	-0.29%	0.00%	-0.21%	-0.02%	0.00%	-0.01%
(3)	$-(\vartheta_{Ljt}^{inn} - \vartheta_{Hjt}^{inn}) \times (\overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{inn} - \overline{\Delta w_{Lj}}^{non})$	0.01%	-0.03%	0.05%	0.00%	0.28%	0.00%	-0.01%	0.05%
(4)	Wage premium effect	10.09%	6.12%	6.44%	3.15%	10.44%	1.21%	0.47%	9.19%
(5)	Reallocation effect	3.74%	2.67%	2.04%	2.01%	3.57%	0.30%	0.19%	3.25%
(6)	Total	13.83%	8.80%	8.49%	5.16%	14.00%	1.50%	0.66%	12.44%

Notes: This table shows the numerical values of the components in equation (F.15).

Table F.4: The Contribution of Technological Change to Economy-wide College Premium over a 10-year Period: Sensitivity to σ

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Total contribution ($\Delta\Theta$) of:							
	Any	R&D	non R&D	New	Not new	Only tech.	Only org.	Both
Panel A: Norway								
$\sigma = 1$	9.35%	8.38%	1.48%	6.37%	2.23%	0.74%	0.74%	7.93%
$\sigma = 1.6$	7.52%	6.80%	1.08%	4.97%	1.66%	0.56%	0.52%	6.01%
$\sigma = 2.94$	6.10%	5.44%	0.80%	3.83%	1.22%	0.42%	0.35%	4.48%
$\sigma = 5$	5.45%	5.01%	0.62%	3.38%	1.00%	0.35%	0.26%	3.84%
$\sigma = 10$	4.96%	4.58%	0.52%	3.01%	0.85%	0.30%	0.20%	3.32%
Panel B: Hungary								
$\sigma = 1$	20.04%	11.28%	10.63%	6.71%	18.07%	1.96%	0.87%	16.84%
$\sigma = 1.6$	15.69%	8.37%	8.39%	4.69%	13.69%	1.54%	0.65%	12.47%
$\sigma = 2.94$	13.83%	8.80%	8.49%	5.16%	14.00%	1.50%	0.66%	12.44%
$\sigma = 5$	10.77%	5.08%	5.85%	2.40%	8.73%	1.06%	0.40%	7.52%
$\sigma = 10$	9.61%	4.30%	5.25%	1.86%	7.56%	0.95%	0.34%	6.35%

Notes: This table shows the change in the economy-wide college premium (in percentage points) due to firm-level technological change over a 10-year period based on equation (F.15). The different columns quantify the contribution of firms conducting different forms of innovation to the aggregate college premium. We measure different forms of technological change from the detailed questionnaire of the CIS survey on firms' innovation activities. Column (1) captures the contribution of all innovative firms. Columns (2) and (3) calculate the contribution of innovators that conduct R&D and of those that do not, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) distinguish between innovators with new-to-the-market innovations, and those whose innovations are only new to the firm. Finally, columns (6), (7) and (8) calculate the contributions of firms which conducted innovations only with technical aspects (product and process), only with organizational changes, or both, respectively.

Appendix G Perfect Competition Case

Throughout the paper we studied the impact of technological change in the presence of imperfect competition in the labor market. In this section, we discuss the consequences of technological change on inequality under perfect competition. In particular, we derive the change in the skill premium under perfect competition, if the skill biased change among innovative firms is $\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}$.

Suppose there are two sectors, $I = \{inn, non\}$, in the economy, where each sector has the following production function:

$$Q_I = A \left[\theta H_I^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1-\theta) L_I^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.$$

Sector $I = inn$ implements an innovation and so that sector experiences a change both in Hicks-neutral productivity, ΔA , and skill bias, $\Delta \theta$. At the same time, the Hicks-neutral component, A , and the skill bias term, θ , stay constant in the non-innovative sector, $I = non$. Under perfect competition firms are price takers and the wages are equal for all firms, $w_S = w_{S,inn} = w_{S,non}$. Firms in the two sectors maximize the following profit function:

$$pQ_I - w_L L_I - w_H H_I.$$

Note that w_L and w_H are no longer sector specific.⁷¹ The changes in w_H and w_L determine the economy-wide skill premium. Furthermore, we assume that the overall supply of high and low skilled workers is fixed, implying that $\Delta H_{inn} + \Delta H_{non} = 0$ and $\Delta L_{inn} + \Delta L_{non} = 0$.

Solving the firms' problem under perfect competition leads to the following FOCs:

$$pA^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_{inn}^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (1-\theta) L_{inn}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = w_L, \quad (G.16)$$

$$pA^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_{inn}^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \theta H_{inn}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = w_H, \quad (G.17)$$

$$pA^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_{non}^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (1-\theta) L_{non}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = w_L, \quad (G.18)$$

$$pA^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_{non}^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \theta H_{non}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = w_H. \quad (G.19)$$

The ratio of the FOCs for innovative firms implies that:

$$\ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \ln \frac{H_{inn}}{L_{inn}} = \ln \frac{w_H}{w_L}.$$

⁷¹We abstract away from differences in amenities across the two sectors. Differences in amenities would imply some wage differences coming from compensating differentials. This could be easily incorporated into this framework however.

Taking the difference over time leads to:

$$\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \Delta \ln \frac{H_{inn}}{L_{inn}} = \Delta \ln \frac{w_H}{w_L}. \quad (\text{G.20})$$

The same FOC applies for non-innovative sectors, formally:

$$\ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \ln \frac{H_{non}}{L_{non}} = \ln \frac{w_H}{w_L}.$$

Nevertheless, as the technology of these firms, by definition, is unchanged, we have that $\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} = 0$. This implies the following FOC:

$$-\frac{1}{\sigma} \Delta \ln \frac{H_{non}}{L_{non}} = \Delta \ln \frac{w_H}{w_L}. \quad (\text{G.21})$$

Taking the difference between these two equations leads to:

$$\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} = \frac{1}{\sigma} \left(\Delta \ln \frac{H_{inn}}{L_{inn}} - \Delta \ln \frac{H_{non}}{L_{non}} \right). \quad (\text{G.22})$$

Note that the following holds:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \ln \frac{H_{inn}}{L_{inn}} &\approx \frac{H_{inn,t+1} - H_{inn,t}}{H_{inn,t}} - \frac{L_{inn,t+1} - L_{inn,t}}{L_{inn,t}} \\ &= \frac{\Delta H_{inn}}{H_{inn,t}} - \frac{\Delta L_{inn}}{L_{inn,t}} \\ &= \frac{-\Delta H_{non}}{H_{non,t}} \frac{H_{non,t}}{H_{inn,t}} + \frac{\Delta L_{non}}{L_{non,t}} \frac{L_{non,t}}{L_{inn,t}} \\ &\approx -\frac{H_{non,t}}{H_{inn,t}} \Delta \ln H_{non} + \frac{L_{non,t}}{L_{inn,t}} \frac{\Delta L_{non}}{L_{non,t}} \\ &\approx -\frac{H_{non,t}}{H_{inn,t}} (\Delta \ln H_{non} - \Delta \ln L_{non}) + \left(\frac{L_{non,t}}{L_{inn,t}} - \frac{H_{non,t}}{H_{inn,t}} \right) \Delta \ln L_{non} \\ &= -\frac{H_{non,t}}{H_{inn,t}} \Delta \ln \frac{H_{non}}{L_{non}}, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{G.23})$$

where the third equality follows from the aggregate supply of high- and low-skilled workers being fixed, such that $\Delta H_{inn} + \Delta H_{non} = 0$ and $\Delta L_{inn} + \Delta L_{non} = 0$, while in the fifth equality we used that the FOCs imply that:

$$\frac{H_{inn}^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{H_{non}^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}} = \frac{Q_{inn}^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{Q_{non}^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}} = \frac{L_{inn}^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{L_{non}^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}}.$$

Equations (G.22) and (G.23) imply that:

$$\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} = \frac{1}{\sigma} \left(-\frac{H_{non,t}}{H_{inn,t}} \Delta \ln \frac{H_{non}}{L_{non}} - \Delta \ln \frac{H_{non}}{L_{non}} \right),$$

which can be rewritten as:

$$\Delta \ln \frac{H_{non}}{L_{non}} = -\sigma \frac{H_{inn,t}}{H_{inn,t} + H_{non,t}} \Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}.$$

Then equation (G.21) implies that the aggregate change in skill premium is the following:

$$\Delta \ln \frac{w_H}{w_L} = -\frac{1}{\sigma} \Delta \ln \frac{H_{non}}{L_{non}} = \frac{H_{inn,t}}{H_{inn,t} + H_{non,t}} \Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta},$$

where $\frac{H_{inn,t}}{H_{inn,t} + H_{non,t}}$ is the share of high-skilled workers working at innovative firms, while $\Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}$ is the average skill premium change for them. Therefore the change in aggregate wage premium under perfect competition relates to the total change in skill bias in the following way:

$$\text{Total Skill Bias} = \frac{H_{inn,t}}{H_{inn,t} + H_{non,t}} \Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} + \frac{H_{non,t}}{H_{inn,t} + H_{non,t}} \times 0.$$

This is related to the formula derived in [Appendix F](#). Under imperfect competition we also had an additional term coming from the reallocation of workers from low skill premium to higher skill premium firms because of the firm-specific wages. Note that the reallocation term is positive ([Table 9](#)), implying that the change in the aggregate skill premium would be smaller in the perfect competition case compared to the imperfect competition case.⁷²

We also compare the change in the skill ratio between the competitive and non-competitive case. The following equation is derived by subtracting the FOCs ([equation \(5\)](#)) of innovative and non-innovative firms, and apply for both market structures:

$$\Delta \ln \frac{H_{inn}}{L_{inn}} - \Delta \ln \frac{H_{non}}{L_{non}} = -\sigma \left[\Delta \ln \left(\frac{w_H}{w_L} \right)_{inn} - \Delta \ln \left(\frac{w_H}{w_L} \right)_{non} \right] + \sigma \Delta \ln \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}.$$

As the relative wages are not firm specific under perfect competition, the first term on the right-hand side of this equation is zero under perfect competition, leading to [equation \(G.22\)](#). This implies that the relative skill ratio changes to a smaller extent under perfect competition than under imperfect competition with the difference, $-\sigma \left[\Delta \ln \left(\frac{w_H}{w_L} \right)_{inn} - \Delta \ln \left(\frac{w_H}{w_L} \right)_{non} \right]$, increasing both in σ and the wage premium effect. The change under perfect competition reflects the change in marginal products of low- and high-skilled workers, while the change under imperfect competition is smaller than that, showing that the two types of workers are not efficiently allocated across firms.

⁷²This is always the case if the difference between the wage premiums of skilled workers between inn/non firms is larger than the difference for low-skilled workers and H/L increases in innovative firms (see [equation F.15](#)).

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