Derek Hook and Michele Vrdoljak

Gated communities, heterotopia and a 'rights' of privilege: a 'heterotopology' of the South African security-park


You may cite this version as:
Available in LSE Research Online: September 2007

LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL ([http://eprints.lse.ac.uk](http://eprints.lse.ac.uk)) of the LSE Research Online website.

This document is the author’s final manuscript version of the journal article, incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer review process. Some differences between this version and the publisher’s version remain. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it.
Gated communities, heterotopia and a “rights” of privilege: A ‘heterotopology’ of the South African security-park

*Derek Hook & Michele Vrdoljak*
**Abstract.**

This paper attempts a two-tiered analysis of what has come to be referred to as the ‘security-park’, i.e. that South African variation of the ‘gated community’ which combines Blakely & Snyder’s (1999) typically separable ‘lifestyle’, ‘prestige’ and ‘security zone’ gated community types. The first part of this analysis reviews the existing literature on gated communities and relates it back to the South African situation. The second part, both theoretical and empirical, draws on Foucault’s (1997) notion of the heterotopia, and on a variety of textual representations of Dainfern. The heterotopia, as an ‘analytics of difference’ becomes a particularly important means of critique here, drawing attention to security-parks as: (1) possessing a precise and well-defined function within society (a function which typically coalesces around points of social crisis) , (2) operating distinctive systems of admission and exclusion, (3) containing certain ‘juxtaposed incompatibilities’ (of which a paradoxical ‘heterochroneity’ is one of the most pronounced elements), (4) embodying - via the espousal of a certain ‘utopics’ - an ‘alternate mode of social ordering’ (in Hetherington’s (1997) term). Each of these analytical strands constitutes a discursive relay through which one might deduce greater networks of social power, or in the case of Dainfern or security-parks more generally, historical structures of the race- and class-structure of privilege and poverty. Representations and practices of the security-park are in this way indicative of a far larger political rationality - a self-justificatory set of entitlements, warrants and exclusionary prerogatives which we have labelled a “rights” of privilege.

**Keywords:** heterotopia, heterotopology, gated community, security-park, discourse, social power, historical structures of privilege.
Preamble.

This paper is divided into three sections. The first introduces the notion of the ‘gated community’, of which we consider the South African ‘security-park’ to be a paradigmatic example. Tying a generic level of discussion (by making references to more global ‘gating’ phenomena), to the specifics of the South African situation (references in particular to Dainfern Estate - probably the most auspicious example of a South African security-park), we hope both to critically characterize the security-park, and to inform the analysis to follow. The second section provides what the authors hope will be a qualified, yet informative explication (or even expansion) of Foucault’s theoretical concept of the heterotopia. The third part of the paper essentially joins the two foregoing sections by advancing an analysis of Dainfern Estate as heterotopia.


Urban fortresses.

The term ‘gated community’ lends itself to the amalgamation of the spatial and the social; ‘gating’ referring to a form of spatial fortification and ‘community’ to an organized social body of persons. Blakely and Snyder (1999) define gated communities as residential areas with restricted access in which normally public spaces are privatized. [Gated communities] are security developments with designated parameters, usually walls or fences, and controlled entrances that are intended to prevent penetration by non-residents (p. 2).

Whilst gated and walled cities are as old as building itself, and whilst residential ‘gated neighbourhoods’ were underway in New York as early as the late 1800s, it was only during the 1960s and 70s that master-planned retirement villages appeared where the middle-class could fence themselves off (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). ‘Gating’ - by which we refer to both physical barricading and the attempt to create privatized, restricted-entry living spaces - then spread to resorts, country-clubs and middle-and upper-class suburban divisions designed for exclusivity, prestige and leisure. It has been estimated that over three million households and eight a half million residents live in over thirty thousand gated communities across the United States (Sorkin, 1997, Soja, 2000).
Blakely and Snyder (1999) identify three main categories of gated communities in the US, namely: ‘lifestyle’, ‘prestige’ and ‘security-zone’ communities. In ‘lifestyle communities’ shared public space is privatized and controlled more as a social statement than as a safety device (examples include retirement, golf/leisure and suburban ‘new town’ communities). These developments reflect “a notion of shared territory and exclusive rather than inclusive sharing values” (Blakely & Snyder, 1999, p. 55). Special mention here should be made of suburban ‘new towns’, these are areas where both residential and commercial/industrial developments occur simultaneously, within the same spatial confines, so as to literally create new - if not artificial - ‘towns’. Such suburban new towns provide residents with not just gates, but with schools, shopping centres, offices, parks and recreational facilities. Prestige communities, by contrast, lack such recreational amenities, consisting instead of a set of enclosed residential subdivisions (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). The gating of prestige communities hopes to symbolize distinction, to create a secure place on the social ladder, to protect an image, current investments, and housing values. They present a controlled aesthetic and image, and possess ostentatious entrances in addition to roving patrols to add an aura of exclusivity (Blakely & Snyder, 1999).

The motivation for security zone communities is predominantly the fear of crime and outsiders. Here residents, rather than developers, establish the gating in attempts to ‘maintain’ the values, identity and safety of the neighbourhood. Residents often close off all access to their neighbourhood, sometimes even hiring guards, as is frequently the case in Johannesburg’s predominantly white, middle-to-upper class Northern suburbs. Sometimes full closure is impossible and only certain streets are barricaded, although, as Landman (2000b) notes of the South African situation, security zone gating and street closures occurs (in some form) at almost all income levels, and in almost all areas.
One should note that this distinction between different kinds of gated community often breaks down in practice, especially in South African where large-scale gated communities - the aforementioned ‘security-parks’ - tend to encompass all of these functions. In fact it would be accurate to say that the South African security-park could be defined as an amalgamation of Blakely & Snyder’s (1999) ‘lifestyle’, ‘prestige’ and ‘security zone’ communities, especially given that they typically incorporate ostentatious entrances, controlled aesthetics, roving patrols and golf/leisure facilities within a walled-in security-ridden interior. Indeed, as we have described it elsewhere (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2000), the security-parks is that:

walled-in “community” living space that accommodates the homes of a typically elite and homogenous group...combining the luxury amenities of a high-class hotel with paramilitary surveillance and protection technology in an effort to separate off exclusive and desirable living areas from the city at large (p. 191).

Perhaps the closest international approximation (outside of the US) to security-parks comes from Brazil. Gated communities of a similar form and scale first appeared in São Paulo in the form of residential complexes of houses or condominios (condominios fechados). Like the security-park, these walled buildings offer exclusive internal clubs, sophisticated security technology, private guards and typically ‘distinguishable’ characteristics such as imposing architecture and aristocratic names (Caldeira, 1996a). Such living spaces also include exotic features such as an individual swimming pools, maid’s bedrooms, waiting rooms for drivers, and so on (Caldeira, 1996a). Like security-parks, they serve as socially homogenous environments for upper class citizens, upon whom they are seen as conferring a high status.

**Fear in a fortress society.**

In many ways the rationale for building and living in gated communities rests on the assumption that unregulated and uncontrolled space is dangerous space. For Blakely and Snyder (1997), rapid demographic, economic and social change in the US has resulted in a fear about the future, in vulnerability and uncertainty about the stability of neighbourhoods – all of which are reflected in an increasing fear of crime. The need to fortify against perceived rising crime levels and threats to personal security have resulted in the creation of a “fortress society” (Ekblom, 1995) as gates assuage the fear of random crime. It is important to emphasise however that the social perception of threat becomes a function of security mobilisation and not crime rates (Davis, 1992). Davis (1992) evidences that:

white middle-class imagination, absent from any first hand knowledge form inner-city conditions, magnifies the perceived threat through a demonological lens. Surveys show that Milwaukee suburbanites are just as worried about violent crime as inner-city Washingtonians, despite a twenty fold difference in relative levels of mayhem (p. 224).
Similarly, within South Africa, there is little difference in feelings of unsafeness between people in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban and Cape Town - despite vast differences in crime-rates in these cities (Rossouw, 2001). In this way, the dramatic growth of the security industry seems clearly indicative of perceptions of crime. Between 1980 and 1990 the number of security guards in America doubled and surpassed the size of the police force (Reich, in McKenzie, 1994). In the US private security outspends law enforcement by 73 percent and is now the nations primary protective force (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). In current-day South Africa private security has proved to be the fastest growing sector of the economy; with 125 000 guards working for 3 200 security companies, private guards now outnumber the police by a figure of two to one (Irish, in Landman, 2000a).

In relation to Brazil, Caldeira (1996a, 1996b) claims that the fear of violence and crime has increasingly ensured segregation, distance and separation between classes - a division continually reinforced by popular discourses around crime. For her (1996a), continually repeated stories of crime contribute not only to a magnification of perceptions of the criminal threat, but also to a special and at times gratuitous zeal of attempted counteractive security measures. Hence an aesthetic of security has come to impose a new logic of surveillance and distanciation, resulting in “a city where different social groups are...closer in the city space, but...are separated by walls and technologies of security [such that they]...tend not to circulate or interact in common areas” (Caldeira, 1996a, p. 55).

Echoing these sentiments in the US context, Davis’ (1992) portrayal of Los Angeles seems to mirror Johannesburg - that of a flooded market where virtually every neighbourhood contracts its own private policing, “hence the thousands of lawns displaying the little ‘armed response’ warnings” (p. 248), where a Sunday edition of the Los Angeles Times contained nearly a hundred advertisements for guards and patrolmen (Davis, 1992). In South Africa residential anxieties about crime-prevention seem to have reached unprecedented heights. As Bremner (2000) observes (and it is here worth quoting her at length):

In relation to Brazil, Caldeira (1996a, 1996b) claims that the fear of violence and crime has increasingly ensured segregation, distance and separation between classes - a division continually reinforced by popular discourses around crime. For her (1996a), continually repeated stories of crime contribute not only to a magnification of perceptions of the criminal threat, but also to a special and at times gratuitous zeal of attempted counteractive security measures. Hence an aesthetic of security has come to impose a new logic of surveillance and distanciation, resulting in “a city where different social groups are...closer in the city space, but...are separated by walls and technologies of security [such that they]...tend not to circulate or interact in common areas” (Caldeira, 1996a, p. 55).

Echoing these sentiments in the US context, Davis’ (1992) portrayal of Los Angeles seems to mirror Johannesburg - that of a flooded market where virtually every neighbourhood contracts its own private policing, “hence the thousands of lawns displaying the little ‘armed response’ warnings” (p. 248), where a Sunday edition of the Los Angeles Times contained nearly a hundred advertisements for guards and patrolmen (Davis, 1992). In South Africa residential anxieties about crime-prevention seem to have reached unprecedented heights. As Bremner (2000) observes (and it is here worth quoting her at length):
Householders install ever more sophisticated physical security measures. They raise their low, picturesque garden walls by two, three or sometimes even four metres, and top them with spikes or glass chips; they unfurl razor wire (a particularly cruel form of barbed wire developed in South Africa...) along their perimeters; they add electric fencing, designed to shock when touched; they install automated driveway gates and intercom systems. Entry into houses and even passage through them is barred by burglar-proofing of prison-like dimensions and layer upon layer of metal security gates, which divide various sections into secure zones - to pass from sleeping to living to kitchen areas may involve unlocking three security gates... People spend substantial amounts of their disposable income ensuring that their homes are secured. If one house on a street installs an electric fence, the others feel pressurized to follow suit, afraid of becoming the most vulnerable property on the block. Security has become a way of life (1999, p. 8).

**Militarized security technology.**

If security-park developments have a most important agenda, it is that of the creation of a perception of staunch and inviolable security, where one’s rights to property and personal privacy remain sacrosanct (see Figures 1 & 2). As we have argued elsewhere: “The zeal of the attempt to fortify against the threat of crime has meant that security-park developers have placed an inordinate emphasis on familial and personal security, on efficient and fail-safe crime prevention” (2000, p. 202). It is hard to miss this crime-prevention ‘selling point’ in the promotional material of security-parks, as is explicit in the case of Dainfern Estate (hereforth referred to as Dainfern). Prichard Security System’s double page advertisement states that:

> In maintaining a secure oasis Dainfern...relies heavily on the designed security infrastructure and the appointment of a reputable security firm, capable of honouring the requirements of the developers, the Homeowners Association and residents. Prichard Security Services, a subsidiary of the PSG...is responsible for the security controls at Dainfern (1994/5, pp. 36-37).

Likewise:

unparalleled round-the clock security...[including] a two-metre perimeter wall topped by an electronic fence...homes are linked to the security control centre by radio and telephone, and there are 24-hour perimeter and entrance centred guards (Hofmann, in Stamper, 1999).
To enter security living space one needs to submit to a series of procedures, involving the recording of entry and exit times, and the provision of written personal details and motives for entry. As Davis (1992) has put it:

Residential areas with enough clout are thus able to privatise local public space, partitioning themselves off from the rest of the metropolis, even imposing a variant of neighbourhood “passport control” on outsiders (p. 246).

These procedures of entry are typically accompanied by video-taped documentation of the appearance of visitors and their means of transport. Often permission to enter is contingent on the verbal confirmation of an appointment by a resident. Residents, on the other hand, once recognised, are admitted at the checkpoint rather than needing to undergo further scrutiny. Residents submit to an elaborate system of surveillance with the rationale of self-protection, claims Sorkin (1992a). However, rather than merely a submission to a Panoptic gaze, the surrender of privacy here is a privilege (Sorkin, 1992a). Rather than operating towards an ideal of further integrating communities, these new city developments work to entrench patterns of selective development and enforced distinction (Sorkin, 1992b). This is the case in South Africa, where already powerful class and race divisions are reinscribed in concrete terms, in barred-off roads, unpassable walls, electrified fences, booms and razor-wire.

A ‘culture of security’ and its status symbols.

The security-park hence may be read as the ‘crowning achievement’ of an anxious ‘culture of security’ which, feeding a booming security industry, has been translated into a hierarchy of security status-symbols. As part of the white ‘emigrate or, dig in with style’ response to South Africa’s escalating crime figures, the multiple security insulations of razor wire, cameras, metal gates, intercoms, electric fences has faded into fantasy and pastiche (Bremner, 2000). This is a situation whereby suburban fortification has become highly desirable, and has been commodified such that the demand for luxury security-park homes has soared, along with the elevation of their appreciation costs. Hence a new security aesthetic has come to dominate, with the security-park producing not only new technologies of security, but also new technologies of image and style (Bremner, 2000).
It thus becomes evident that the security-park - and the gated community more generally - should not be understood purely in terms of security and control of space; it functions also as a powerful economic indicator of affluence. According to Davis (1992) security becomes a positional good defined by income access to ‘protective services’. Davis (1992) sees security as a prestige symbol – and sometimes as the decisive borderline between the merely well-off and the ‘truly rich’ – ‘security’ has less to do with personal safety than with the degree of personal insulation, in residential, work, consumption and travel environments, from ‘unsavoury’ groups and individuals, even crowds in general (p. 224).

Similarly aware of the ‘fashionability’ of gated communities, Reville and Wilson (1999) argue that developers rely on trends to maintain the desirability of their product. Hence if a competitor is successfully applying a new security technology, then development strategies will be modified to incorporate the new product. Such new design elements, once introduced into an area, quickly multiply, with the result that the ‘snowballing’ of popular security measures contributes significantly to the further fragmentation and division of the city (Reville and Wilson, 1999).

**Bucolic pastiche; pretend rurality.**

One way in which developers have hoped to further capitalize on the consumer appeal of security-park real estate has been through stylized quasi-pastoral designs and imagery. The idyllic imaginary of eco-sensitive architectural styles and evocative names like are viewed as strong means of extending an already large potential market. By the same token, security-park developments are more easily dissociated from the city and its environs by being portrayed as ‘rustic’ escapes. Imaging a bucolic rural lifestyle is achieved through continual reference to nature, especially in names that mix evocations like ‘forest’, ‘river’, ‘wood’ or ‘valley’ with the recreational promise of a ‘club’, a ‘resort’, an ‘estate’. The result, in names like ‘White River Country Estate’, ‘Woodhill Residential Estate and Country Club’ or ‘Pearl Valley Country Estate and Gold Resort’ (all of which are names of actual South African security-parks), is the promise of a lifestyle increasingly divorced from reality. In this respect the security-park is reminiscent of the game lodge, which Ndebele (2000) describes as as attempt to ‘get closer to nature by virtue of its electrified fences and patrolling guards. [see Figure 3].
A similar tactic is to embroider all descriptions of the security-park with the language of pseudo-classical architecture. One promotional brochure for Dainfern for example refers to ‘porticos’, ‘boulevards’, ‘palm-lined walkways’, ‘fountains’, ‘classically sculptured gardens’, its “Harmonious Mediterranean design in the Palm Springs style”. This reference to stereotypical European emblems of class is not limited to South Africa alone, for example Davis (1992) draws attention to the Los Angeles gated communities of Kaufman and Broad who have “brought France...to the desert in fortified mini-banlieus, with lush lawns, Old World shrubs, fake mansard roofs and nouvemuax riches titles like ‘Chateau’” (p. 6). Likewise, Tudor, Mediterranean, Medieval and Modern styles frequently coexist in the security-park, in a mishmash of colliding architectural genres, such that style, as Bremner (2000) rightly notes, becomes the vehicle for denying the violent context of the city [see Figures 4, 5 & 6].

‘Theme parks’ of the rich and famous.
The coupling of self-aggrandizing appeals to “first world” style with an idealized ecological imagery is nowhere better evidenced than in a Dainfern advert which promises a ‘California styled theme village’ overlooking the superb Gary Player designed championship course...[which] meanders around the Jukskei River that runs through the estate [and which is]...set in a beautiful valley. The rolling terrain provides sweeping views from the homesites... Weeping willows, reeds and dams, rocky outcrops in the river, and the remarkable abundance of bird-life, are at the heart of the estate (Stamper, 1999, p. 24).

Here rural charm and the promise of an international architectural style are the devices used to guarantee Dainfern’s secession from greater Johannesburg (see Figure 7). In this case the creation of a feeling of natural retreat and seclusion is increased by the fact that the Dainfern complex comprises stand-alone homes and townhouse complexes along with a series of ‘villages. Each such village has a unique character and identity designed and customised by leading architects. The cluster units are constructed to meet the aesthetic and functional needs of the family and to cultivate “creativity and the need for individual identity and self expression” (Cohen, 1994/5, pg. 53). The term “village” here clearly aims to attain a quaint, county ambience further fostered “by the use of earthy colours, natural timber windows and natural brick paving” (Cohen, 1994/5, p. 53).
Increasingly elaborate in their attempt to cut off connections with the surrounding city, the stylization of security-parks hopes to transform these spaces into virtual theme parks, ever more detached from the reality of the asymmetrical socio-economic conditions lying beyond their confines. In many ways, the retreat into luxury is the best escape from the threat of crime, and the home-within-the-hotel qualities of the security-park become a defence against confronting the social inequalities of the current post-apartheid dispensation. Hotel-like amenities such as adjoining golf-courses, restaurants, squash/tennis courts, private bars, children’s play-areas, swimming-pools, decorative fountains (see Figures 8 & 9) and a full accompaniment of care-taking staff, all play their role in keeping the security-park virtually ‘recreationally self-sufficient’. The unstated agenda being that most recreational activities can be catered for within the security-park, hence an ever decreasing need to leave the premises.

A proliferation of internal regulations and controls.
That an agenda of separatism is enforced in security-park living arrangements seems obvious. Blakely & Snyder (1999) write of how such communities function to reproduce an established order, hastening to mention that gated communities are frequently built and maintained on the basis of explicit ‘deeds of lifestyle’. Likewise, they assert that many prestige communities impose minimum housing standards and uniform ‘building lines’, that new potential homemakers have to conform to. This is certainly the situation in South African security-parks which typically maintain their own internal bylaws, and their own ‘architectural mandate’ over what may and may not be built within their confines. (In South Africa, the post-apartheid transformation of local government resulted in lacunae in bureaucratic procedures of planning, which left the control of certain developments largely to the prerogative of building entrepreneurs (Bremner, 2000). The outcome has been that the city council has only very limited powers of intervention within security-park complexes, which is not the case with the vast majority of building projects scattered across the greater Johannesburg metropolitan area).
Security-park developers, like those of gated communities more generally, make use of Home Owners Associations (HOAs) as a means to control the long-term “quality” of housing. HOAs are thought to protect property values by ensuring both uniformity in development and the continuation of original standards - both protect against potential changes whether mooted by individual homeowners or local governments (McKenzie, 1994). It is, as McKenzie (1994) point out, through such HOAs that each property owner comes to share legal ownership of streets, sidewalks, gates and other facilities; elected boards oversee this common property and set rules regarding individual homes. Predictably, the private government of HOAs is often illiberal and undemocratic; in some HOAs each household, rather than each adult gets one vote, in others the number of votes depends on the value of the property. For McKenzie (1994), this process is far less about extending community prerogative (or for that matter individual freedom) and far more about extending a rigorous and at times incredulous control of space and capital. As an example, in some HOAs there are rules stipulating what home furnishings can be seen from windows and the hours after which neighbours may not socialize outside of their houses (McKenzie, 1994). Perin (1979) similarly cites the rules of not being allowed to plant a tree, or to paint a house a certain colour, unless the HOA approves the decision. Soja (2000) uses Foucault’s term of a ‘tactics of habitat’ to speak collectively about these various measures of civic secession, micro-governance and association-administered servitude regimes.

‘Private governments’.

Kennedy (in Blakely & Snyder, 1999) argues that HOAs should be considered ‘state actors’ as the services they provide, and the authority they wield, is similar to those of local governments. In the private micro-governments of HOAs, claims Lagerfeld (in Landman, 2000b), people can effectively set their own taxes, and use them for the services they choose, and restrict the benefits to those within the gates rather than complaining of using “their” money for other peoples’ problems. Through this general trend of fragmentation, through a withering notion of mutual social responsibility, the idea of what it means to be a resident of a community, seems to have changed from speaking of citizens to taxpayers (Blakely & Snyder, 1999).

The private world of gated communities hence shares little with their neighbours or the larger political system. Civic responsibilities (the provision of policing services for example) and communal services (such as street maintenance) are internally controlled. Local governments often favour relinquishing the control of certain areas to gated community HOAs, as the latter pays for infrastructures (streets, sewers) and then pass the cost on to the homeowners (McKenzie, 1994). Davis (1992) accuses the government of collaborating “in the massive privatisation of public space and the subsidisation of new, racist enclaves” (p. 227). Rather than just being racist, Blakely and Snyder (1999) understand HOAs’s avoidance of interaction and co-operation as following a trend evident in society as a whole:
America is an increasingly unequal place, gated communities are a manifestation of broader social force unleashed in an unstable metropolitan system... [these forms of gating] reflect and illustrate larger patterns and trends in society (Blakely & Snyder, 1999, p. 27).

It is Soja’s (2000) view that these ‘private governments’ will be playing increasingly public roles in the future.

In South Africa an indication of the autonomy (and the self-serving agendas) of the security-park is evidenced in the latter’s lack of engagement with national architectural and city-planning debates on how best to restructure Johannesburg. Rather than playing their part in facilitating the de-segregation of the overall Johannesburg metropolitan area, in aiding national agendas of inner city reconstruction and redevelopment, security-park developers are doing exactly the opposite: building on the ever more northerly outskirts of Johannesburg, so as to escape, in ever greater distances, the urban centre of the city. The division of those living in better protected environments from those living in more exposed settings is now increasingly along economic rather than merely racial lines (Kruger et al. 1997). Nonetheless, these divisions defer largely to the structural socio-historical opportunities left behind by apartheid, and serve to reify inequality in the old terms of a privileged white minority and a dispossessed black majority.

An autonomy of amenities.
In certain South African security-parks such as Dainfern a ‘self-sufficiency of amenities’ has developed to the extent that the park now boasts its own post-office and postal code (see Figure 10). In fact, the walled-in area of Dainfern now operates as a suburb, despite the fact that it is largely impenetrable to outsiders, and is only artificially-attached to surrounding residential areas. Rather than rely on municipal water supplies, the Dainfern complex draws on the Jukskei River to supply much of its water. Additionally, almost all civil maintenance resources, such as the removal of trash, the upkeep of roads and public parks, trees and assorted plantlife, are managed internally. Dainfern even manages its own emergency ‘storm water maintenance plan’, and has ensured, with the building of its own power exchange on the premises, that there will never be a shortage of power lines available to owners (Clover, 1994/5) [see Figure 11]. In perhaps the most dramatic evidence of its plans to assert its separation from South African civil society in general, Dainfern has its own school, ‘Dainfern College’. The school is situated at the entrance to the estate allowing children “to walk safely from home to school and back”. It was established because of “current fears about the possible deterioration in the government schooling system” (anonymous, 1998). The school operates on a residence debenture system ensuring that ownership resides in the hands of the parents and governing body, and secures a child’s place in the collage.

A new ‘separate development’.

Blakely & Snyder (1999) argue that fortress developments allow select citizens to withdraw from public contact, whilst forcibly excluding others from sharing their economic and social privileges. The South African security-park is no exception, ensuring that “freedom of movement is restricted, chance contact is eradicated and public interaction limited to that between self-defined, homogenous groups” (Bremner, 2000, p. 11). In the same vein, Caldeira (1996b) argues that such fortified enclaves depict the very opposite of the ideal aspirations of many Modernist city planners. Instead of eliminating the dualism between public and private space in the establishment of a homogenous public domains, gated communities have destroyed public space and enlarged private domains that fulfil public functions in a deeply segregated way (Caldeira, 1996b). Her analysis of Brazilian gated community publicity material made manifest how “the advertisements elaborated the myth of what they call “a new concept of residence” on the basis of the articulation of images of security, isolation homogeneity, facilities and services” (1996b, p. 309). The related advertising images which conferred the highest status and that proved to be most seductive were those of the enclosed and isolated community, “of a secure environment in which one can use various facilities and services and live only among equals” (Caldeira, 1996b, p. 309).
Massey (1999) applies Sennett’s concept of ‘purified communities’ to gated communities. The concept refers - both figuratively and literally - to the processes whereby people build walls around themselves as way excluding others who are not the same. The principle of difference is hence firmly rejected in favour of the promotion of a culture of sameness (Massey, 1999). The sharp distinction between those who live in these communities and those who are outside does not only close one group off from another but also connects the two - in a process of mutual co-construction - by virtue of the differences drawn (Massey, 1999). When people draw walls around themselves a sense of community is established in relation to how others are thought to behave. Massey (1999) explains that

if an enclosed community imagines itself to be respectable, civilised, law-abiding, middle-class, and the like, then this is precisely because it imagines that many of those on the outside are not these things.

In this way, the insulated community establishes a sense of itself from that which it is not (p. 90).

According to Marcuse (1995) walls or partitions reflect social relations produced by the functioning of the city. He uses “walls – boundaries, partitions, borders, transitions – as both an embodiment and a metaphor for the nature of these social divisions, walls as both a reflection and a reinforcement of divisions” (p. 244). Walls hence, like the more intensified ‘gating’ of security-park living spaces provide both a sense of (internal) identity and of (external) difference. As Blakely & Snyder (1999) put it - gates send a powerful signal of exclusion to those that are unwelcome. This is also a signal of an exclusive difference and prerogative to those who are resident or welcome within these exclusive spaces. In this connection it comes as no surprise that Watson and Gibson (1995) read such ‘gatings’ as emblematic of wider social systems of exclusion, domination and identity.
Virtually impenetrable to the outsider, highly-stylized and effectively cut-off from the rest of the socio-economic and geographical reality of Johannesburg, the security-park represents an increasing privatization of potentially public activity, and an independence from the general civic life of the city. In very unambiguous terms, gated communities create forms of economic, social and class segregation. This is a new separatism for South Africa, one in which the prospects of a truly democratic and demographically-representative sense of community are dashed. Growing divisions between city and suburb and rich and poor create new patterns, which reinforce the costs that isolation and exclusion impose on some (specifically the poor, marginalized and disenfranchised) (Weideman, in Landman, 2000b). The spatial logic of apartheid is hence given a new rooting-point and Johannesburg becomes more fragmented, dispersed and divided, to the point where Bremner (2000) can claim that security-parks have obliterated public space from the urban realm. Landman (2000a, 2000b) reaches the same conclusion, reiterating that such developments have lead to fragmentation within the greater community, a new elitism and intolerance. This is an attitude dramatized in one brochure which assures potential buyers that the security entrance is “welcoming to those who live there and their guests...[but] much less to people with no business there, which is exactly how Dainfern residents like it”.

2. The heterotopia.

Qualifying the concept.

The concept of the heterotopia has received much attention of late (see Connor, 1989; Soja, 1995; Delaney, 1992; Chambers, 1994; Lyon, 1994; Bennett, 1995; Hetherington, 1996a, 1996b), and whilst no doubt the concept is still one in need of elaboration and development, it is one which holds unique possibilities for critique - particularly in the sense that it enables one to articulate the larger political rationality of a given site/text’s general context of domicile. In the same vein, this concept proves useful precisely because it demonstrates how the logics and practices of place transpose the rationality of power into material practice. It is in these ways that the term is usefully brought to bear on the subject of the security-park, a subject which although not lacking in criticism, could seemingly benefit from another layer of critical interrogation, particularly one able to shed some light on larger discourses of privilege in post-apartheid South Africa.

Before moving on to a more elaborative interpretation of the concept of the heterotopia, it is necessary to make two important points of qualification. The first concerns the emergence of the term in Foucault’s writings. As noted by Soja (1995) and Hetherington (1997), the two main places Foucault evokes the term are in the introduction to The Order of Things (1989) and in a lecture given to a group of architects in 1967, only released and published unedited shortly before his death, translated into English as Of Other Spaces (1997). These two texts deal with the concept in significantly different ways, although as Genocchio (1995) notes, these two uses of the term “bear a strange consistency” (p. 37). Two problems spring to the fore here, both of which lead to the same conclusion. Whether it is because we are engaging with an under-worked concept, or with two divergent texts (the articulation between which is never discussed by Foucault), we have to assume that the heterotopia is, in a very significant way, an unfinished concept, a theoretical ‘work in progress’.
The second point of qualification is simple, despite the frequency with which it is missed: one should not automatically assume that heterotopia refers only to a type of place. The concept, in short, cannot be reduced simply to an understanding of space. As Hetherington (1997) puts it, the heterotopia can be just as much a *textual* site as a geographical one, in fact:

In the main, Foucault is interested in the heterotopic character of language and the way that textual discourse can be unsettled by writing that does not follow the expected rules and conventions...[Although he] does...go on to speak of heterotopia in relation to specific social spaces whose social meaning is out of place and unsettling within a geographical relationship of sites (Hetherington, 1997, p. 8).

Similarly, in linking Foucault’s two different descriptions of the concept Genocchio (1995) suggests that:

In *The Order of Things* Foucault’s discussion of heterotopia centres upon a discursive/linguistic site in contrast to... an examination of *actual*... locations [in *Of Other Spaces*]... In each case the distinguishing feature of the heterotopia is [that it enables]...a form of discontinuity...a status which, in turn, gives each the ability to transgress, undermine and question the alleged coherence or totality of self-contained orders and systems (p. 37, *italics mine*).
We should not lose sight of this (spatio-discursive) duality of the heterotopia as an analytical term. This may seem a minor point, because the spatial and the discursive would seem to be inseparable spheres of social life and meaning (as embodied by Soja’s (1989) notion of ‘spatiality’) - indeed, in a Foucauldian vein, one might speculate that the spaces and practices of a given place like that of the gated community may be seen as very materialized forms of discourse. (In his later genealogical work, Foucault particularly stresses the analysis of discourse as practice, violence, as embodied in material arrangements, physical structures, bodily regimes, etc. (1977, 1981)). The importance of the discursive or textual dimension of the heterotopia is that whereas Foucault does detail what we might refer to as a substantive ‘ontology’ of the discursive (Foucault, 1972, 1981), he provides no thorough or comparable ‘ontology’ of the spatial. As such, we should be wary to note that we do not limit the application of the heterotopia to an analysis of space alone. By the same token, we should bear in mind the breadth with which Foucault uses the notion of discourse, as suggested above. The implication of this is that we should apply the notion of the heterotopia as an analytics rather than merely as place; as a particular way to look at space, place, or text. This is not to deny the lower-order utility or uses of the term in those situations in which it is used as a critical referent for a particular place. (This is a usage Foucault (1997) himself frequently defers to in Of Other Places, and one the present authors will also make use of). This cautioning is rather to prevent an elision of the higher-order and more inclusive value of the term as an overarching analytics. Emphasizing the analytical breadth of the term is also important in the context of this project, given that here the analysis will lead from an engagement with the textual. (Indeed, the primary data of this analysis are textual: transcribed interviews with residents and collected promotional literature for Dainfern).

Real utopias, effectively realized political sites.
Heterotopia is an extraordinarily pliable notion; as Soja (1995) notes, the heterotopia is always variable and culturally-specific, changing in form, function, and meaning according to the particular “synchrony of culture” in which it is formed (p. 15). Similarly, its meaning and function may change over time. The changes that take place in heterotopia - the ‘re-inventions’, reproductions or transformations in the maintenance of particular sites function as an index of historical changes more generally. The heterotopia, furthermore, is also a universal element of human societies, ‘a constant feature of all human groups’ (Foucault, 1997), despite that, as Soja (1996) adds, it has no absolute universal model and takes varied forms. Foucault (1997) is similarly categorical that the heterotopia *posses a precise and well-defined function within society*. This is an important point. Given that heterotopic places have well-formulated rationales and highly-specialized social functions and meanings, it stands to reason that one should be able to study the discourses and characterizing practices which ‘institute’ the place of the heterotopia and solidify its social identity. Indeed, this would seem quite central to Foucault’s suggested project of ‘heteropology’ which “would have as its object the study, analysis, description and ‘reading’...of those different spaces, those other places [that enable]...both mythical and real contestation of the space in which we live” (Foucault, 1997, pp. 352-353). For Foucault then (1997), the study of heterotopia without doubt leads the analyst back to the over-arching schema of political practices and discourses of the society in which it is localized. In this sense - and as anticipated above - the heterotopia makes for a viable theoretical tool for linking space and power, politics and place; *an analytic node through which one might deduce greater networks of power.*

A further characterizing feature of the heterotopia is that it is importantly related to other spaces. Despite that the heterotopia is notably distinct from the spaces around it, it does connect and link with other spaces, even if such connections more than anything work to create effects of contrast and difference. Following Foucault (1997), the role of the heterotopia is either to create ‘a space of illusion that exposes real space as still more illusionary’, or, to create a space that is “other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well-arranged, as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled” (1997, p.356). (Soja (1996) refers to this as the ‘external function’ (p. 161) of the heterotopia).The heterotopia then, by definition, is a *differential space*, importantly related to, but always fundamentally different from, the places which surround it. Given this quality, it is unsurprising that, as Foucault (1997) insists that the heterotopia “has the power of juxtaposing in a single real place different spaces and locations that are incompatible” (p. 354). This is to say that the analysis of the heterotopia typically yields a variety of contradictions and paradoxes not necessarily perceived at first. The variability of the heterotopia is again important here, as Soja (1995) notes that “[T]his complex juxtaposition and cosmopolitan simultaneity of differences in space...charges the heterotopia with social and cultural meaning” (p. 15). The incompatibility of the heterotopia’s various internal combinations, in short, makes for important focal points of a critical analysis.

**Heterochroneity, protected entry and site of crisis.**
Another characterizing feature of the heterotopia is the special nature of its time. Foucault (1997) notes that the heterotopia exhibits a 'pure symmetry of heterochronisms', that it is linked to 'bits and pieces of time', that it enables visitors to enter 'a total breach of traditional time'. The ability, in relative terms, to generate altered senses or perceptions of time within its domain, is thus another quality by which we might identify the heterotopia. Soja here (1996) speaks of “slices of time” (his phrase) which, borrowing on Foucault, he claims “allows the heterotopia “to function at full capacity” (p. 160), the clear suggestion being that this special chroneity accentuates the heterotopia’s function.

Heterotopia also presuppose a system of opening and closing (Foucault, 1997). The question of accessibility is central here and Foucault (1997) is concerned with how a place is open or closed to public entrance, how it maintains boundaries, barriers, gateways and disallows thoroughfare, loitering or anonymous entrance. It is at this dimension of space that power becomes, arguably, most palpable, and Foucault (1997) is adamant that all heterotopia involve a system of opening and closing that, at the same time, isolates them and makes them penetrable. Indeed, one does not generally access a heterotopia purely by the force of one’s will alone, access is rather accompanied by a form of submission or by a variety of a rite of purification (Foucault, 1997).

Foucault (1997) also suggest that there are two fundamental forms of the heterotopia: one of crisis, and one of deviance. The heterotopia of deviance are those places occupied by individuals who exhibit behaviour which deviates from current or average standards of a society: the asylums, psychiatric clinics, prisons, rest homes, schools for delinquents, etc. (Foucault, 1997). The heterotopia of crisis is generally recognized as that privileged or forbidden place reserved for the individual or society in a state of upheaval, difficulty or breakdown with reference to the greater environment in which s/he or they live. We have already noted that heterotopia are differential spaces; that they are typically sites of crisis or deviance only strengthens this differential quality. It is from this difference, their very ‘otherness’ that stems their ability to offer critical perspective on other places. Hence Foucault’s (1997) description of the heterotopic place as that which is “absolutely other with respect to all the arrangements that they reflect” (p. 352). In the same vein he (1997) claims, the heterotopia is “a place that lies outside all places and yet is localizable” (p. 352). One surmises from this that the heterotopia is a place able to transcend its basic social function and to subvert or mirror the typical kinds of social intercourse of a society.
It is possible to further motivate this idea. As both place of ‘otherness’ and highly-specified social function, it would seem that the heterotopia should be able to demonstrate a certain amount of friction between its normative and extraordinary identities. This would seem to be exactly the condition underlying its ability to represent a point of slippage, or de-stabilization, for current socio-political or discursive orders of power. It is this very over-arching functionality that Hetherington (1997) targets in his definition of heterotopia as ‘spaces of alternate ordering’ (p. viii):

heterotopia organize a bit of social world in a way different to that which surrounds them. That alternate ordering marks them out as Other and allows them to be an example of an alternative way of doing things (p. viii).

The role of the heterotopia as ‘place of Otherness’ [which, incidentally, is the literal translation of the original Latin term (Hetherington, 1997)] is central to Foucault’s understanding; it has also proved central to the various ways in which the concept of the heterotopia has been ‘taken up’ (cf. Genocchio, 1995; Soja, 1995; Lees, 1997, Hetherington, 1997, 1998) - that is as a viable form or site of resistance. Hence, in Lees’s (1997) perhaps somewhat idealistic terms, the heterotopia is a ‘spatially-discontinuous ground’ that ‘opens a critical space’ which ‘provides a real site of practical resistance’ (p. 321). More directly, and more optimistically yet, Lees (1997) defines the heterotopia as “heterogenous field of potentially contestatory countersites for political praxis and resistance” (p. 322). Similarly, Genocchio (1995) speaks of heterotopia as “socially-constructed counter-sites embodying...form[s] of ‘resistance’ (p. 36).
There is also an inevitable utopian quality about the heterotopia; for Hetherington (1996, 1997) the quintessential ‘alternate ordering’ that helps define the heterotopia is based on a number of utopics. In fact, one may, in this way, start to see how the heterotopia stands as Foucault’s (1997) theoretical conversion of the idealized notion of the utopia into pragmatic, ‘real-world’ terms. For him (1997), both utopias and heterotopia “have the curious property of being in relation with all the other sites... in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect” (Foucault, 1997, p. 352). However, whereas utopias are ideal sites with no real place, and remain fundamentally unreal, heterotopia are “real sites” of “effectively enacted utopias” (Foucault, 1997, p. 24). Heterotopia are the potentially transformative spaces of society from which meaningful forms of resistance can be mounted. These are the places capable of a certain kind of social commentary, those sites where social commentary may, in a sense, be written into the arrangements and relations of space. Following on this, Lees’s (1997) claims that the practised politics of the heterotopia would not be merely analogies or figurative comparisons of resistance, as in the case of the imagined space of the utopia, but would instead constitute real-world interventions within the political fabric of society, acted upon rather than simply spoken forms of criticism commensurate with the realized and actual field of political action and power.

Foucault (1997) adds that heterotopia are the “real and effective spaces which are outlined in the very institution of society...which constitute a sort of counter-arrangement, of effectively realized utopia, in which all the real arrangements that can be found within society, are at one and the same time represented, challenged and overturned” (Foucault, 1997, p. 352, emphasis added). However, importantly, this ‘recycling’, this re-representing and challenging, of the meaning and functioning of other spaces need not be used solely towards laudable or progressive political goals - something which Hetherington (1997) for one is at pains to emphasize. Indeed, this very prospective mechanism, or ‘reforming’, rearranging or reordering space makes for an apt description of colonizing activity. With this sobering warning. Foucault (1997) reminds us of what we should have suspected all along, that although the heterotopia may be a vehicle of progressive political aims and agendas, it is just as easily a site and means of reactionary politics.

**Alternative ordering through similitude.**

Heterotopia are able to unsettle spatial and social relations directly, through material forms of ‘alternative ordering’, or less directly through representational means. As Hetherington (1997) claims: “Heterotopia are places of Otherness, whose Otherness is established through a relationship of difference with other sites, such that their presence either provides an unsettling of spatial and social relations or an alternative representation of spatial and social relations” (p. 8). The representational ‘alternative ordering’ of the heterotopia, for Foucault, occurs through similitude. Hetherington (1997) usefully explains the notion of similitude by comparison to the idea of resemblance:
The ordering represented by resemblance is a familiar one, social expectations developed over time assume that certain things go together in a certain order. These representations act as signs where what is being signified refers to a known referent. Similitude, however, is all about an ordering that takes place through a juxtaposition of signs that culturally are not seen as going together, either because their relationship is new or because it is unexpected. What is being signified cannot easily be attached to a referent. Foucault takes the surrealist paintings of Magritte as an illustration of the ordering process of similitude...Similitude is constituted by an unexpected bricolage effect....This representation may well be all about resisting or transgressing....cultural expectations...of a social order (p. 9).

As such, heterotopia do not signify through resemblance - as in the way a metaphor works, where one thing is used to resemble another - but rather through similitude, which is closer to metonymy, “where meaning is dislocated through a series of deferrals that are established between a signifier and a signified rather than directly to a referent” (Hetherington, 1997, p. 43). Whereas in resemblance the relationship between signifier and signified is strongly conventionalized and formalized, in similitude the reference ‘anchor’ is gone and “...[h]ierarchy gives way to a series of exclusive lateral relations” (Harkness, cited in Hetherington, 1997, p. 43). The fuller implications of this characteristic of the heterotopia will become apparent as we continue through the discussion of security-parks.

**Heterotopia as essentially relational, comparative.**

One last characterization needs be made here. For Hetherington (1997), as already noted, heterotopia are places of Otherness (‘Otherness’ that is, as different to norms within or between cultures, as that in excessive of or incongruous to the normative standards of a socio-cultural or historical location). This Otherness is established through a relationship of differences with other sites...[H]eterotopia do not exist in themselves, there is nothing intrinsic about...any site, that might lead us to describe it as a heterotopia. It is the heterogenous combination of the materiality, social practices and events that were located at this site and what they come to represent in contrast with other sites, that allow us to call it a heterotopia (Hetherington, 1997, p. 8).
For Hetherington (1997), this principle of heterotopia derives from that they represent through similitude: heterotopia “only exist in relation...they are established by their difference in a relationship between sites rather than their Otherness deriving from a site itself” (p. 43). This point is useful in holding at bay, once again, the temptation to overly concretize the notion, to ‘literalize it in space’ rather than practice it as an analytics. The reason for the emphasis on this quality of heterotopia quickly becomes clear when we engage Genocchio’s (1995) critique of the concept.

Genocchio (1995) rightly points out that heterotopia embody a kind of discontinuity (which we might understand, in the terms given above, as their ability to ‘juxtapose incompatibilities’). It is this ‘embodied discontinuity’ which gives them “the ability to transgress, undermine and question the alleged coherence or totality of self-contained orders and systems” (Genocchio, 1995); this discontinuity, this Otherness is the hotspring of their critical efficacy. How coherent though is this conceptualization of Otherness, especially once the attempt is made to ground it in an actual physical site?

How is it that we can locate, distinguish and differentiate the essence of this difference, this ‘strangeness’ which is not simply outlined against the visible...how is it that heterotopia are ‘outside’ of or are fundamentally different to all other spaces, but also relate to and exist ‘within’ the general social space/order that distinguishes their meaning as difference? (Genocchio, 1995, p. 38).

As Genocchio (1995) argues, to concretize the notion as site, to literalize it as discrete, physical area is to undermine the concept itself through a form of self-contradiction. Or in Hetherington’s (1997) terms:

trying to identify sites as heterotopia is self-refuting because...the concept depends on maintaining its undefinable incommensurate character...it is this which gives heterotopia their power; to locate a heterotopia as a site and name it as such is to remove all of its alterity and make it a space like any other (p.47).
The upshot of this is basically to reiterate what we argued for in the opening of this paper: that we use the heterotopia as an analytical idea about space or text rather than as any particular place, as “a practice...that challenges...functional ordering...while refusing to become part of that order, even in difference” (Hetherington, 1997, p. 47). As such heterotopia possess no singular autonomy in themselves, and exist only in a relational or comparative capacity, by virtue of incongruous juxtapositions or combinations - through *effected* difference and otherness, in the effects of bricolage that Foucault considers so indicative of the signification of similitude. Perhaps the most obvious implication of this for the analysis of space, as will be discussed as we continue, is that it enables one to deny notions of space as an innocent, transparent, apolitical medium and assert instead how space has played a crucial role in reinstating certain structures of power in more insidious ways.


Having contextualized the emergence of the South African security-park, and having illustrated the theoretical notion of the heterotopia, we now turn to advance a ‘heterotopology’ of Dainfern, to plot an analysis of *Dainfern as heterotopia*. As mentioned earlier, the analytics of the heterotopia enables unique possibilities for critique - a means of indicating the larger political rationality of a site/text’s general context of domicile - and it is for this reason that it is useful to apply it here, so as to hopefully extend previously offered critiques of gated communities. Foucault (1997) does not particularly prioritize any of his characteristic qualities of the heterotopia, and as such we will proceed in an order that suits the purposes (and clarity) of our developing argument.

**Crime-fear.**

Given that heterotopia are those ‘other’ places which arise around points of crises (and particularly around crises of living space), it would seem as if there could be little doubt that the security-park qualifies as a heterotopia, at least in the sense that upper-class (and predominantly white) South Africa perceives the current crime problem as attaining crisis-proportions. As exemplified in Dainfern’s promotional literature:

> In the present social climate, our very homes are sitting targets and our families victims of unprecedented violence (Dainfern promotional brochure, 1999).

This characteristic of the heterotopia, that in many ways it is a spatial answer to a social problem, would seem to be exactly what provides security-parks like Dainfern with the pragmatic rationale for their extreme and elaborate control of space. This quality of offering a ‘spatial solution’ also provides the security-park with a *precise and well-defined function within society*, a functioning which, in Foucault’s (1997) terms, should prove emblematic of presiding structures of power. On a straightforward level, the security-park appears to serve a series of overt functions, like that of crime-prevention, of ensuring ‘the good life’, and, in slightly more measured tones, of providing a special ‘like-mindedness’, the opportunity of membership in an exclusive community. These rationales jostle for ascendance in the promotional material:
The golf estate lifestyle has captured the hearts and minds of discerning South Africans who yearn for the freedom of living in a secure, rural setting amongst people of like-minded persuasion who seek a lifestyle of real quality....We recognize the special nature of golf estate development, where superior lifestyle and security are paramount to a discerning audience....where standards are non-negotiable (Dainfern promotional brochure, 1999).

Signals of distinction.
One of the strengths of Foucault’s analytics of the heterotopia is the way it suggests that one overturn routine explanations of pragmatic function, to offer instead functional explanations tied to broader socio-political agendas. In this respect it is vital that one pays attention to how the more insidious functions of the security-park exceed its stated objectives. The elitist overtones, like the separatist agenda within the above extract (“superior lifestyle”, “discerning audience”, ‘non-negotiable standards’, “people of a like-minded persuasion”) are on the one hand quite blatant, and clearly need to be, operating as they do as such ostentatious signals of class. More insidious perhaps is how the avoidance of crime is so integrally coupled with the attempt to bolster social class - as another Dainfern brochure proclaims:

Residents are ‘escapees’ from Bryanston, Sandton and the like, people who can no longer abide the high crime rate and the upkeep of large estates. They have basically swopped that lifestyle, once the yardstick by which your success was judged in the ‘old’ South Africa, for living in one giant fully secured garden (Dainfern promotional brochure, 1999).

Quality of life - much like the prospects of appreciating nature, or of living a truly natural life - become indissociably attached to security. One Dainfern brochure assures the potential buyer:

You’ll become part of a community of people who, like you, prefer country style living in a secure, natural environment, where you fall asleep to the call of the kiewiet, and wake up to the gentle flow of the Jukskei river... In maintaining a secure oasis at Dainfern...one of the key ingredients...is the security consciousness and peace of mind (1994/5, pp. 36-37).
Exclusivity, social status, and the assurance of a peaceful, quality lifestyle are all collapsed into a discourse of crime-prevention. This would seem to explain something of the excessive nature of Dainfern’s security measures - that the latter operate to fulfill a series of functions beyond this basic preventative objective.

Consider the following resident’s account:

the whole operation is quite militarised. They have two...or three shifts of guards. And they line them all up and they stand at attention. And there is this whole thing where they distribute all their guns and they give orders and the whole bit. So at that time of the day there is this incredible military presence at the gate because they are doing this sort of change of guard.

Like the multiple physical ‘gatings’ at Dainfern, these pseudo-military operations, with all their pretend ‘regality’, operate as signals of distinction. There is a tactics of conflation at hand here, where all important codes of class are couched in the more neutral yet no less desirable codes of nature, safety, quality. Crime fear, class elevation and the right to exclude support each other at every point, ultimately coalescing (as we will go on to see) around a ‘rights of privilege’.

**The new ‘influx control’**.

One of the most straight-forward of Foucault’s criteria of heterotopia is the idea of a strict and characteristic system of admission. Dainfern operates a particularly stringent prohibition of general public access through a series of security measures which feature strongly in the promotional literature:

“Only two controlled entrances allow access to Dainfern’s large suburban territory (approximately 320ha)...[Dainfern has] high walls with electric wiring designed...to be...forcibly discouraging. 24-hour perimeter patrols to spot any undesirable activity before a problem can arise... Entire estate surrounded by 2.4m walls... Manned gatehouse with strict access control. Residents issued with their own access cards; visitors admitted only on resident’s prior notice - or after telephone authorization on arrival...Entire perimeter patrolled around the clock” (Dainfern promotional brochure, 1999).

The ritual of entry at Dainfern becomes, for visitors, a paralegal relation of contract; entrance requires a written acknowledgement of, and agreed adherence to, its rules of behaviour:
Visitor cards are granted after signing a document agreeing to abide to the rules of the Dainfern Estate, and only after verbal confirmation of an appointment by a resident (Dainfern promotional brochure, 1999).

These security measures quickly and categorically separate three classes of people: residents, legitimate visitors and ‘undesirables’:

[A residents’] access card gives... instant entry. If you are a guest...[a] phone call to your host will confirm your status... Builders are allowed on site only during specified hours and are not permitted to remain overnight (Dainfern promotional brochure, 1999).

Talk of one’s “status” being “confirmed”, or differential entry-rights and necessary “authorization” to access what is ostensibly a suburban area sit uncomfortably for many South Africans, especially when accompanied by tacit indications of race. The racism implicit in the above reference to “builders” has not gone unnoticed, as in a recent newspaper report:

Dainfern has been accused of racism because (black) builders cannot enter the estate without producing an ID whilst the (white) contractor has never been asked for identification. ...every morning the black workers...stand in a queue for their IDs to be examined. And that is never simple. Some are turned away at the gate because the guards don’t think their papers are authentic (Oliphant, p. 4).

These measures bear a striking formal similarity to past apartheid means of limiting the movement of black citizens (signing registers, requiring the permission of empowered parties, possessing the correct ‘documents’ to obtain right of access). Of course these procedures do not simply duplicate the spatial regulations of apartheid. They significantly advance upon them by adding an additional - and potentially over-riding - dynamic, that of class:

A (black) driver says that when he is driving his luxury Pajero nobody asks him for an ID whereas when driving a van, one has to be shown (Oliphant, 2001, p. 4).

This is a far more pro-active, and a far more liberal politics of admission which is predicated not so much on a categorical prohibition of race as on a set of highly specific and individualized rights of entry. This makes for a highly refined and selective system of access control, where prejudice manifests not only on the basis of race/class, but on the far more extensive continuum of prejudice against ‘outsiders’ in general.
It is interesting to note here - in line with Foucault’s (1997) warning that one should pay special attention to the details and concealings of heterotopic systems of inclusion - that Dainfern also features internal divisions of space. Bear in mind, as mentioned earlier, that the Dainfern complex contains stand-alone homes and townhouse complexes along with a series of unique, separate and identifiable ‘villages’. Whilst these forms of division are not as thorough and omnipresent as are those of the perimeter, they do indicate that there is no absolute class uniformity within Dainfern, that Dainfern itself is internally fragmented. In the words of one Dainfern resident: There is no real worry to have to wack up a high wall to isolate yourself from other people. But people still build walls between the houses...It’s just a South African thing I suppose. Most suburbs have big walls between the houses, not only onto the street front...You want to isolate yourself from your neighbours, doesn’t matter if you’re living in Dainfern.

Suffice to say, the imperative of privacy does extend itself within the divided spaces of the park to individual homes and dwelling spaces. Rather than assuming a ‘community of commonality’ within Dainfern, one would do better to assume a regulation of admission that revolves around individualized rights of seclusion, privacy and protection.

**A time of control.**

Foucault’s criterion of ‘juxtaposed incompatibilities’ makes for useful application here.
This criterion usefully draws attention to the ways in which the security-park is a compromise-function, a paradoxical balancing of lethal with safe spaces, communal with private, accessible with impenetrable. Similar contradictions, of rustic nature against sophisticated technologies of surveillance, of assured safety despite urban detachment, likewise manifest here. Publicity representations of Dainfern labour to make these contradictions seem somehow reasonable, hence the pairing off of the militarized and the luxuriant, the idyllic and the anxious in ways which hope to appear eminently pragmatic, rational. Promotional literature is hence filled with euphemistic paradoxes - especially in connection with security concerns. We have a “stringent yet unobtrusive security”, electrified fencing which is “not...lethal but forcibly discouraging”, a “high security entrance” whose approach is softened by “landscaped gardens” (Dainfern promotional brochure, 1999). Threats of protective violence hence subsist alongside promises of escapist recreation; spaces of status and affluence are juxtaposed with those of fear and of fortified seclusion.

Analysis of Dainfern’s ‘heterochroneity’ similarly yields a series of paradoxes. Given the extent of its broad and ample recreational facilities, one does get the sense of security-park time as markedly leisurely in nature. The idea here being that time within the security-park hopes to approximate as closely as possible an ‘eternal weekend’. As one Dainfern resident put it: “You kind of get the feeling you are living at a holiday resort sometimes”. This variety of time is sharply contrasted by the stringent regulation and ritualization of time controlled by the documentation of security-park surveillance technology. The accurate recording of times of arrival and departure means for a repetition and cataloguing of time, where points of access and potential security compromise are collected and analysed so as to assuage concerns of predictability, security and order. This regularization and repetition of time is accompanied by another means through which time is ordered with surveillance and control, the unresting ‘monochroneity’ of an unceasing vigilance, where 24 hour security is maintained. In this sense the time, like the space of the security-park, is rigorously patrolled and controlled, ‘domesticated’ such that the environment becomes ever more permeated with power.

These contradictory juxtapositions lie at the very heart of the critical analytical utility of the heterotopia; indeed, one is here reminded of Hetherington’s (1997) cautioning that heterotopia are essentially relational, comparative. Of course these juxtapositions work both internally (within Dainfern itself) and externally (with reference to other spaces), to indicate the outcomes (and continuance) of a recent history of South African power, of the race- and class- structuring of privilege and poverty. One of the strongest indications to this effect is exactly the disparity, as discussed above, of differential schedules of access afforded Dainfern’s residents and those who work for them. The son of a Dainfern resident’s reflections on a neighbouring “squatter camp” are similarly evocative in this regard [see Figure 12]:
next door is a place called Zieverfontein...Its a squatter camp and actually from my parent’s house you can see [it]...Its like this big fucking contrast. And...you can hear the music at night...Some property company has bought the land and they going to move the squatters somewhere, wherever. And they are going to do another development like Dainfern, where Zieverfontein is. So its a bit weird. If you stand on the top deck [of our house]...you can actually see the shacks. My parents...are concerned...But.....I say....If you want to have such a rich area then you’ve got to have a contrast. There’s the balance. And the balance unfortunately is right next door....You kind of expect the crime rate to be higher... You kind of expect to get hijacked once you hit the road. All of things you’re trying to get away from are right outside the door. Its a large, large squatter camp... and this company [a Dainfern interest] has bought this farm and they are going to relocate the squatters [there]. Reading this one might be forgiven for thinking that no political transformation had been effected in South Africa, particularly in terms of the reference to the ‘relocation’ of squatters. Interesting also is the suggestion that Dainfern might boast - contrary to its best promises - a higher crime rate than other areas. These stark paradoxes, whether from within or from without, work as powerful indicators not only of an historical structure of privilege, but of the extreme measures needed to ensure the maintenance of such massive social asymmetries of affluence and dispossession. The contradictions are emblematic of a situation in which the ideal world of naturalized privilege is necessarily predicated on forcible measures of exclusion, and on gratuitous levels of power and control. One would imagine that these contradictions, by the very weight of their incongruence, would point to an untenable living situation, and to more than just that, to an untenable social-political structure. Yet this is to misunderstand how the discursive strategies of entitlement operate in this instance. Rather than indications of an inequitable system, these contradictions are taken up as exactly the measures necessitated by an unfavourable socio-political system, a tactic by which socio-political accountability is deferred and historical privilege is consolidated in the face of profound inequality. We will return to this point as we go along.

A perfect world.

The ‘utopics’ so inherent in the construction of heterotopia are evident in the case of Dainfern. These utopics were useful in demonstrating how crime-prevention measures operated in excess of their stated function, as a means of implementing a broader social-moral order and hence fulfilling the function of ‘alternate social ordering’ considered so paramount by Hetherington (1997). One Dainfern resident is (however unintentionally) eloquent in this regard:
What’s happened in this country is that there’s been a breakdown of rules and that kind of thing. Nobody has regard for anyone and if one wished to go through a red robot, you go through a red robot. If you wish to take someone’s car or break into a home and have your way with a poor housewife or remove everything out of their property you do. This is the new thing in South Africa. You take what you want, you do what you like. Whereas here there are laws. There are rules and if you do not abide by them you will be asked to please leave the estate. If you don’t abide by the laws of Dainfern you will be asked to leave. So that is a very good thing. And we live here in harmony now. We know there are various things that you can’t do and I think that that is one of the main things about this country, why its falling apart, its these people just doing what they want. Sometimes you think thank goodness you can still live by certain standards.

On this basis one might suggest that the policing and gate-keeping procedures of Dainfern operate not simply outwardly, as signs of deterrence and exclusion to the unwanted outsider, but inwardly also - on Dainfern residents themselves - as something like the civil co-ordinates, the discursive reference-points, of a new and preferable moral social ordering. Perhaps more importantly though, the extract draws attention to the importance of utopian rhetoric in the self-validating claims of Dainfern. Once again the promotional material is revealing:

Imagine a world of open spaces and freedom. A world of peace and tranquillity. A world of guaranteed security. Imagine this idyllic world within your world (Dainfern Estate promotional brochure, 1999).

Security is again a necessary component of a perfect world, as is the qualification of the prerogative of personal possession. A celebration of nature and personal propriety blend together with a sense of an exclusionary morality, and an even more exclusionary community spirit, to form a vague yet nonetheless forceful articulation of a kind of “rights” in the following extract:

Everybody that lives here in Dainfern is very proud of what they own and they respect everything. So you don’t have people damaging things. Its yours. What the estate plants out here is yours and you have pride in everything here. There are bird hives, beautiful dams and you can go for a stroll for an hour on a Sunday, going to look at dams and things like that and there’s a beautiful river that runs right through Dainfern and its yours. You pay a levy here and it belongs to you. We have this wonderful sense of pride.
Such ‘utopics’ frequently rely on an idealized nostalgia whose predominant function seems to problematize virtually any other existing social space:
Dainfern Ridge is like it used to be – before homes became fortresses and children had to be escorted to visit their friends (Dainfern Estate promotional brochure, 1999).

‘Disqualifying the exterior’.
Security-parks like Dainfern may hence most certainly be read as heterotopia, at least in the sense that they promote themselves, through a utopics, as the closest possible realization of certain social, moral ideals. This is not only the case in terms of how such security-parks sell themselves as virtual ‘pleasure-resort’ living spaces, it is also true in how outside spaces come to be constructed by contrast. Indeed, constructions of the security-park continually emphasize the treacherous and crime-ridden quality of the urban spaces of greater Johannesburg (as in the lengthy account of the Dainfern resident above), whilst nonetheless presenting the security-park’s own sanitized space as a preferable, ‘more natural’ living environment. The key discursive tactic in the foregoing extract is to construct the outside world as perilous, damaged, irretrievably lost to social disorder, and to do so in a way which provides a series of warrants for exclusion, separation and segregation. Note, for example, the disqualifying tactics in the following extract, which neatly denies that ‘real’ parks might exist in the city:
The harmony of Dainfern...make[s] an instant impact. Palm-lined avenues....Classically designed parks, with...fountains and water-features. A far cry from what passes for parks in the city. A place to stroll freely. No litter. No tension (Dainfern Estate promotional brochure, 1999).
In this connection security-parks like Dainfern fulfill another of Foucault’s criteria for heterotopia, in that they find their function in reference to alternate spatialities, in making overt the problematics and vulnerabilities of ‘other’ external and surrounding spaces. In fact, and here again in reference to its effectively realized “utopian” qualities, the security-park is the closest permissible version of a pseudo-independent and sequestered mini-society - such as the proposed Afrikaaner ‘Volkstad’ - which hopes to maintain some variety of autonomous or demographic self-governance along with the enforced right to separation. In fact, if one were to adopt the characteristic logic of Foucault’s (1977) *Discipline & Punish* in this respect, one might venture that security-parks need to continually generate a new fear of crime, to overstate this threat, bloating it into a virtual ‘crime paranoia’ that constantly ‘necessitates’ Dainfern’s multiple levels of avoidance, exclusion and separation. If heterotopia do perform the function of representing, in miniature, aspects of the greater socio-political values and discourses of their broader context, then one could suggest that this is how the discourse of crime is operationalized more generally in South Africa: as a warrant to protect and consolidate past historical prerogatives and structures of privilege.

**A new moral, political homeland.**

In developing the above analysis it is important to point out that gated communities are sites of the appropriation of certain civil governmental responsibilities of safety and security, law and ‘order’, and of certain municipal functions (such as providing water, backup electricity and even education). This makes for a variety of segregation by privatization. It seems there are certain civil and municipal responsibilities which the financially-empowered elite have taken aboard as their own in the confidence that they will perform them better. In effect, security-parks operate a micro ‘government’ of space which is self-owned and self-serving, and exhibits, a variety of formal similarities with the historical macro politics of apartheid, particularly in the ways it enables the functions of exclusion and separation. Consider the following Dainfern resident’s account:

I think [in]...Dainfern we are very segregated...we are very by ourselves here [sic] and we are proud, we are not trying to incorporate ourselves into other places where people live...We have...a big wall around the place and...its private without... We’ve never in the history that I’ve lived here...done anything with people outside of Dainfern. Its very community based. Its sort of, it is a sort of Aryan race look on things...its not, we’re not saying that we’re much better, we’re saying that this is our place, we are here, leave us alone.
By virtue of this self-serving, self-owning micro-government of space one might suggest that the security-park appears, very overtly, to be a ‘potentially transformative space of society’, albeit a politically conservative one. In a heterotopic manner, Dainfern performs the job of inverting social relations manifest in external societal contexts; reordering them, “correcting” them, “perfecting” them against an opposed political rationality, such that the interests of a particular minority (here the affluent upper class) might win out. Mirroring this suggestion, Davis (1992) has asserted that ‘fortified-enclaves’ are forms of resistance with the primary aim of the reassertion of privilege.

Important here too, as Foucault indicates (1997), is the assertion that the functioning of the heterotopia may well be indicative of more wide-sweeping changes across the social sphere. In this connection it is interesting to speculate how the security-park may serve as a model of how the elite monied minority plans to engage with (their) civil and political concerns from now on. Having given up on petitioning the government as a largely ineffective means of pursuing their own interests, this group has decided to consolidate their “first world” lifestyles and historical bases of privilege, independently, and through their own, and not inconsiderable means. The security-park’s privatized autonomy of amenities, along with its own internal micro-government and its geographical separation from the rest of urban Johannesburg - especially once taken in conjunction with the multiple other material means of exclusion and separation it operates - would appear to go a long way to removing this group from their political responsibility to national agendas or reintegration and nation-building.
Indeed, this particular social grouping seems one increasingly non-participatory in schemes of national unity, reconstruction and reconciliation. In many ways the privatization of this security-park domain, and the prerogatives it accordingly cedes to its inhabitants (to exclude “undesirables”, to protect oneself with force, to live in a removed geographical location) suggests the extent to which the largely white upper-class has decided that national or macro politics is no longer the means through which to pursue its interests. We might pose these measures of distantiation as forms of similitude, (in which (as above) relations of direct meaning are dislocated through a series of deferrals), similitudes of the attempt, by this grouping, to sequester themselves from the greater political agendas and imperatives of the new South Africa. In other words, what we are saying here is that the security-park is a place replete with alternative representations of social reality. This is a devious means of representation however - one not based on paradigmatic similarity, such as the metaphor, which operates on the basis of substitution. Rather it is representation based on syntagmatic combination, that is, on a selective re-ordering, which operates on the basis of contiguity, using a series of stand-ins, in which an attribute or adjunct of the thing stands in for the thing itself. What this means is that the ‘politics of the pragmatic’, those various co-ordinated operations of power which pretend to amount to no more than a series of crime-preventative measures, do ultimately combine to represent a broader - and preferred - political rationality. In this way the multiple means - no matter how minor - through which the security-park operates its various systems of privilege, exclusion and separation, come to coalesce around a central function: the generation of the right to divorce oneself from the new political agendas of the country, and to substantiate what we have referred to above as a ‘rights of privilege’. In this way, accountability is detoured, calls of integration elided, historical bases of privilege consolidated, a new separatism entrenched - the over-riding function of the security-park becomes apparent.

Pragmatic function as alibi.

On the basis of this analysis, the security-park - and Dainfern in particular - obtains enough of Foucault’s criteria to qualify as heterotopia, even if a particular reactionary variation. In many ways, the security-park is an embodiment of the kinds of spatially-organized power, of exactly the increasingly surveyed, segregated and simulated socio-spatial order that Foucault (1997), and more progressive heterotopic spaces take as their object of criticism.

A recurring consideration across the preliminary data gathering of this paper was the suggestion that the most frequently cited pragmatic rationales for security-park development were not always borne out. Contrary to the most commonplace of such assertions - the importance of safety and security - residents (as both Rossouw (2001) and Landman (2000a) suggest) did not necessarily testify to feeling more safe. Similarly, as Landman (in Rossouw) argues:

There’s no evidence in existence that points to gated communities actually reducing crime; there are only isolated instances where the crime situation has improved...people make the mistake of thinking that criminals will always be discouraged by physical barriers like fences or booms. You have to look at the importance of community involvement ... (p. 6).
As one respondent noted above, Dainfern’s density of wealth might be expected in fact to attract a higher crime rate. Another newspaper report (Pliso 2001) suggests that security-parks have become havens for wealthy criminals, precisely because of the “desirable” status and protection they are thought to afford residents. Another finding of Landman’s (2000a, 2000b), is that, contrary to what one might expect, the development of enclosed communities does not necessarily create stronger community ties. As in the case of blocking-off suburban areas with booms and a guarded, fenced perimeter such programmes can lead to community conflict, especially when not all land-owners are in agreement with such plans (Landman, 2000).

The insularity fostered by security-park complexes might be said to filter down to ever more micro-levels of exclusion, separation and division. Such would certainly seem to be the case where individual homes in security-parks continue to fortify themselves even within supposedly safe community living areas. Similarly, the internal division of homes into separate ‘secure zones’ with multiple security gates would seem to reduplicate this insularity ever more internally. And this is to say nothing of how such an expensive and private system of service delivery cultivates a bloated sense of residential rights and entitlement in residents. In one preliminary interview, for example, a security-park resident explained to the authors how his neighbour had requested that he have his dog’s voice box removed, because the animal’s barking had been disturbing the neighbour’s afternoon naps. Such a heightened sense of individual residential prerogative can understandably be seen to lead to intra-community conflict rather than to the building of a ‘community spirit’.

Engendering a wider politics: Inscribing power into space.
If one can convincingly advance then that security-parks do not necessarily deliver on the very pragmatic reasons provided for their establishment, then what is it that they do actually do? Well, much like the symptom - if one is to borrow briefly from the vocabulary and theory of psychoanalysis - their real reason may differ quite radically from the cause typically attributed them (see Davidson, 1982). On the basis of the above discussion one might suggest that the driving force behind the establishment of the heterotopic security-park is not as much about providing security, crime prevention and a new sense of community, but is rather about inscribing a historical structure of privilege into space. Although of course at some level these pragmatic rationales for security-park development would hold - as would such given reasons, in a superficial sense, in the case of the psychoanalytic symptom - they detract from a more fundamental function. Just because these practices of power operate beneath a (seemingly) powerfully legitimizing rationale - that of crime - and just because they have a predominantly spatial - i.e. apparently pragmatic - existence does not makes them innocent in the perpetuation of historical asymmetries of power.

Soja (1989) has consistently warned against analyses that treat space - and more than that places - as innocent depoliticized sites. As Soja (1989) has cautioned, we must be wary of preconceiving space as an arbitrary or unimportant dimension of power. As Foucault (1993) and Soja (1989, 1995) after him stress space, or more accurately, place, is an instrumental and fundamental means of transposing the logic of power into the forms of material practice. In the terms of this analysis the fact that space is so typically assumed to be an innocent, transparent or apolitical medium, has played a crucial role in reinstating certain historical structures of power in such an insidious or less than overt manner. More than just an index of the discourses of power, such practices of power realized in space - in actual places - may function as a ‘seeding ground’, a practical and concrete precedent against which further relations of power may be expanded and elaborated. They are one end of a discursive loop in which discourses of crime-fear necessitate certain material measures, that in turn anchor and validate a variety of prerogatives and self-entitlements. Discourse as talk, as social value, reinforces discourse as concrete, physical and potentially violent materiality at each point in an unfolding spiral of social power where past structures of privilege are continually reproduced.

‘A grounds of identity’.
What we are arguing here then is that whilst security-parks justify their elaborate controls of space on the basis of a problem that they are about to solve, these controls of space do not simply function as an end-point, a solution to a problem. They importantly exceed this function. Rather than the necessary response to a dangerous “actuality”, they operate as a precedent, a legitimatory basis upon which to further extend and concretise the prerogatives of exclusion, separation and privilege, forming the beginning points of a broader political rationality. They are the measures - the ‘discursive relays’ one might say - upon which a variety of identity- and discourse-correlates are further built, motivated, justified.

Such a precise and well-developed regime of spatiality may hence have an interpellative function which provides a ‘grounds of identity’ (in the double sense that Dixon & Durrheim (2000) use to refer both to a ‘belonging to place’ and to a warrant through which particular social practices and relations might be legitimized). In other words, this spatiality might work, in Althusser’s (1977) terms, as an ideological mechanism which structures the lives, experiences and subjectivities of its residents, in a way which resonates with, and maintains historical arrangements of benefit. A suggestion which leads on from this is that what is happening at Dainfern is less a case of preventing crime or of ensuring the good life, and more a case of the attempted creation of a new and separate world, a new social, moral and political enclosure, where subjectivities of prerogative and rank can be protected and extended through the provision of multiple concrete co-ordinates that affirm, legitimate and even necessitate such subjectivities. This may ultimately be the principal function of the security-park, that of ceding selective and exclusive “rights” and prerogatives to its residents, “rights” of self-entitlement, violent self-protection, of self-government - those rights in short that this elite no longer qualifies for merely by being white.

Conclusion.
This paper has relied on a two-tiered analysis in its critical engagement with Dainfern and the South African security-park more generally. The first part of the analysis was based on a review of the existing literature on gated communities, which was related back to the South African situation. The second part was both theoretical and empirical, drawing, in almost equal parts, on Foucault’s notion of the heterotopia, and on a variety of textual resources on Dainfern. Each of Foucault’s characteristics of the heterotopia, that is, proved useful, both as a way of sharpening one’s analysis of the security-park, and as a way of indicating the larger political rationality of its general context of domicile. Particularly interesting for the authors is how these findings - especially that of a ‘rights of privilege’ - might be linked up to discursive strategies in post-apartheid South Africa more generally. What we have termed ‘crime-fear’ is clearly a central component here. It is operative in constructing the external (the country beyond the gates) world as irretrievably damaged, and doing so in such a way as to provide a series of warrants for broader projects of alternate social ordering, in which a “rights” of exclusion, distanciation and entitlement feature strongly. It is also a centrepiece in the discursive generation of a ‘right’ to divorce oneself from the new political agendas of the country, to defer accountability, elide integration and consolidate historical bases of privilege.

A moral, naturalist ‘utopics’ functions in much the same way, to create an ideal world of naturalized privilege that is “necessarily” predicated on measures of forcible exclusion, segregation, separation. It is through just such a utopics that a tactics of conflation is managed in which the codes of class, affluence and status come to be couched rather in terms of appeals to nature, moral order, safety, quality. Overall, the security-park has sufficed as a useful emblem of how logics of power have both been altered, and have also remained the same, in post-apartheid South Africa. In the entrance controls of security-parks for example, an apartheid dynamics of race has been on the one hand retrieved, and on the other transformed, such that categorical privileges of race-group membership have been translated into hierarchized privileges of class. The law of power in post-apartheid South Africa no longer follows racist rules of categorical prohibition, but rather follows the flow of a neo-liberal discourse of individualized rights of seclusion, privacy and distanciation.

This paper has also attempted to add to the theoretical notion of the heterotopia. Perhaps the principal way in which it has done so has been to suggest that the heterotopia’s function of representation-by-similitude might mean that heterotopic analytics enables symptomatic readings of place/text. Indeed, can we not consider the symptom as a particularly cryptic form of similitude, one which follows particularly oblique or lateral (that is, as opposed to linear) lines of representation? Is the symptom not exactly that, the disguised representation of a state of affairs which must, by definition, take the route of an unobvious, detoured or unconventional representation? This, in part, is what we have attempted to do with the above application of the heterotopia, to suggest that whilst it may embody very blatant and materialized broader social or emerging moral or political discourses, it may also - and perhaps more tellingly - hold symptomatic indications of a social, moral political order, in which relations of direct meaning are dislocated through a series of deferrals. Clearly the complexities of this suggestion - and the meta-theoretical level of discussion they would seem to necessitate - fall beyond the purview of this paper; they do however open an opportunity for future theoretical experimentation.

**Endnotes**

i. Soja (1989) points to a separation between space *per se*, space as a contextual given, and socially-constructed space, the created space of social organization and production. Rather than imagining space as a white page on which the actions of groups and institutions are inscribed, Soja (1989) warns of the social production of space, and argues that the organization, meaning and functioning of space is a product of social translation, transformation and experience. “Socially-produced space is a created structure comparable to other social constructions” he claims (1989, pp. 79-80), before going on to quote Lefebvre: “Space is not a scientific object removed from ideology and politics; it has always been political and strategic... Space has been shaped and moulded from historical and natural elements, but this has always been a political process. Space is political and ideological. It is literally filled with ideologies” (Lefebvre, cited in Soja, 1989, p. 80).

Soja (1989) hence operationalizes ‘spatiality’ as that socially-constructed and socially-practised space intricately intertwined with socio-political relations of power, meaning, discourse and ideology.

ii. This despite Soja’s (1995, 1996, 2000) attempts to appropriate Foucault’s scattered comments about space into something like a ‘spatial theoretics’. To my mind Soja over-emphasizes the importance of space to Foucault, reading it as a central analytical term - rather than a recurring motif - within the theorist’s oeuvre.

iii. Or, as is stated in the formal rules of Dainfern (in terms of the procedure for non-resident entry): “Obtain a casual employee ID card at the security gate by lodging a valid ID document which will be handed back on the return of the ID card”.
iv. It is of interest here - especially if one subscribes to Foucault’s (1997) notion that the heterotopia reflects in miniature the more macro politics of its greater context - that a xenophobic South Africa’s current “problem” of “illegal immigrants” has been played out in Dainfern: “Brown Molefe...a driver, has been banned from working at Dainfern because he allegedly “smuggled two illegal immigrants” onto the estate,. Molefe says that one morning he ferried two of his workers to Dainfern but one South African didn’t have his ID on him while the other one was a Malawian who had all the right documents. But he was still denied entry” (Oliphant, 2001, p. 4).

iv. One should be wary of extrapolating too wildly here; security-parks do not always exhibit as homogenous cultural and demographic make-ups as on might imagine (as Rossouw (2001) suggests).

References.
http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/93/gates.html
Dainfern promotional brochure (1999).


