Monumental space and the uncanny

Abstract
This paper takes up the attempt to theorize the relation between the subjectivity of the political actor and the ideological aura of the monumental site. It does this with reference to the spatial history of Strijdom Square, a cultural precinct and monumental space which was the site to a series of brutal racist killings committed by the Square’s unrelated namesake, militant right-winger Barend Strydom. This troubling intersection of subjectivity, space and ideology represents something of an explanatory limit for spatio-discursive approaches, certainly in as much as they are ill-equipped to conceptualize the powerfully affective, bodily and fantasmatic qualities of monumental spaces. In contrast to such approaches I offer a psychoanalytically informed account which grapples with the individualized and imaginative identities of space, with space as itself a form of subjectivity. I do this so as understand the ideological aura of monuments as importantly linked to the ‘intersubjectivity’ of subject and personified space. I then turn to Freud’s notion of the uncanny as a theory able to explain a series of disturbing affects of monuments, such as those of ‘embodied absence’ and ‘disembodied presence’. These and similar affects of ‘ontological dissonance’ (such as unexplained instances of doubling or repetition) may function in an ideological manner, both so as to impose a ‘supernaturalism of power’, and to effect an uncanny form of interpellation.

Keywords: uncanniness, monuments, psychoanalysis, discourse, ideology, embodiment, intersubjectivity, identification, the ‘ideological uncanny’
Strijdom Square

On Tuesday the 15th November 1988, in a self-declared attempt to start the 3rd ‘Boer war’, 23-year old right-wing extremist Barend Strydom entered Strijdom Square (named after his unrelated namesake, J.G. Strijdom, former apartheid Prime Minister), and began a racially motivated shooting spree. At the same time that President P.W. Botha was expected to announce the possibility of Mandela’s release, and while the visiting Mother Teresa prayed for peace at the Pretoria showgrounds (Quelane, 1988), Strydom began firing upon unsuspecting black men and women in Pretoria’s busiest public square.

After killing his first victim just outside the State Theatre, Strydom, dressed in military apparel, moved through the Square, shooting and wounding another two people. In the words of Frans Legodi, a witness to the events:

I heard a gunshot. I saw a white man wearing camouflaged clothes.
He turned and went to the Square. I remember I saw how he shot a man and a woman and they fell down…the woman was shot in the leg. He went on shooting everyone. The strange thing was that he was only shooting black people (Diphare, 1999).

Ten meters away from these first killings Strydom shot another three people. Another witness, Elbie Beneke, recalls that she saw:

a man came running from the State Theatre…I saw him shoot three people. He then came closer to my car where he took a black man by the face, pushed him back and shot him at point blank range through the head (Kotze, 1988, p. 1).

Strydom then left the Square, killing another bystander as he crossed the adjacent Street. At the nearby corner of Church and Prinssloo streets he opened fire on yet another victim, before gunning down a further five victims in Prinssloo Street itself. It was here that a black civilian courageously wrestled Strydom to the ground, and held him captive until the police arrived.

Strydom had carefully picked the site of this event such that it would amplify his actions and incite a resurgence of the powerful racial division of South Africa that he believed was under threat. Significantly, a week before the Strijdom Square massacre he had visited the nearby Voortrekker Monument to pray and re-enact the Blood River vow (Marsh, 1990), a clear attempt to link the murderous history of his own making to a set of historical
(and ideological) precedents. A letter found after the crimes, addressed to his father, noted “What I am about to do is not a punishment for you. It serves as the first shots in the Third Freedom war which is already being waged” (Rosen, 1992, p 2). The importance, to Strydom, of this particular site, is further underlined in comments he made when questioned about his acts:

When I walked onto Strijdom Square I shot at blacks because black people are not innocent and they are the enemy. What are they doing in our capital city? They wanted to take over our country and take it away from us (cited in Marsh, 1990, p. 107).

The monumental site of these events can in no way be seen as arbitrary; it has, as I will argue, a central role to play in this staging of ideology. If we are to properly fathom its role, we need also understand something of its considerable historical and ideological significance.

Originally a dusty open space, which served as a market place in the centre of Pretoria, this site, then called Market Square, became, in approximately 1879, the home of the prestigious Pretoria Market Hall. Not only did this building boast the first museum in the Transvaal, it also hosted the gala opening of the Mozambique railway, and was the place of the trial of those accused of the Jameson Raid. A hub of economic activity since the time of Paul Kruger, the site of numerous market-places, the square lay at the administrative centre of the Union (and then the Republic) of South Africa, and came to occupy an important place in what would go on to be apartheid’s capital city of Pretoria (Coombes, 2003).

It was during the 1960’s that the decision was taken to erect a monument on this site to Advocate Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom (1893-1958), the South African Prime Minister between 1954 and 1958 who came to be renowned for his visions of racial segregation and South Africa’s republican ‘freedom’. It was during this time that a series of forced removals saw the demolition of the Indian market that had come to occupy the site. As such, Strijdom Square epitomized, even in its basic conditions of possibility, the principles of racial superiority through the power of oppressive physical force. By 1970 the site had been formalized as monument; work had by this time begun on a large concrete dome which would surround a huge bronze bust of Strijdom. As early as 1965 however planning had begun on a
complimentary architectural project: the Square would eventually become home to the head office of South Africa’s largest Afrikaans-owned bank - *Volkskas* (‘Nation’s chest’), founded with exclusively Afrikaner capital, with the express aim of protecting Afrikaner assets. Its location in the heart of apartheid’s capital set it aside from all other major South African banks; that it was located in Pretoria, which had also been the capital of the old Boer (Afrikaner Nationalist) Republic of the Transvaal was a fact explicitly referred to by the bank’s managing director at the time. The architecturally celebrated Volkskas building was, at 132 metres, the highest building in the city, which, it was hoped, would rival the other high buildings of the 20th Century (Bruinette & van Vuuren, 1977). For much of the apartheid regime, the Square was something of a nucleus of arts and culture in South Africa. It was the domicile of the State Theatre, a large and imposing building, which was home to a grand opera house, and which, in many ways, constituted a feigned attempted to emulate the high culture of similar European institutions. Indeed, the State Theatre functioned as a rallying-point for the Afrikaans and white elite during much of the apartheid era.

Like much else within the square, the Volkskas building was built exclusively from materials indigenous to the country, such that the content of this architectural statement of Afrikaner nationalism and independence would embody the land to which its people were thought to have sole prerogative. A concern with indigenous materials was similarly visible in the gardens of the Square: four separated tracts of flora, each embodying the characteristic plant-life of the country’s then four provinces. These provinces were themselves monumentally symbolized in an iconic statue of four powerful horses, which appear to emerge out of an elevated water-feature, meaning to connote the national unity of joint provincial strength. The signature image for many of Strijdom Square however was the gargantuan and disembodied head of the former apartheid statesman. According to the commemorative programme distributed at the unveiling of the statue, by reducing the figure of Strijdom to simply a head, only the essential qualities of the leader remained.
In the programme it is also noted that the 12 foot high head is placed on a level close to the spectator so that every spectator can stand literally below his gaze and metaphorically come under his influence. For many the monument functioned as the unambiguous and material declaration of Strijdom’s determination that ‘if the white man cannot be ruler he loses his identity’ (Lapping, 1986).

[Insert image 5 about here]

An ominous and foreboding monument, the floating head appeared as a concretization of the unbending authority of apartheid’s power, the unquestionable presence and “rights” of its supremacy, and of the extreme warrants of surveillance and control that were its alone to operate. More than a salute to power however, or a naturalization of racial-cultural superiority, the head, to many, was an embodiment (or in fact, more literally, a disembodiment) of political intimidation. Unchallengeable, unchanging - not to mention disproportionately massive - the head made for a positively foreboding icon, a ‘monument of threat’, a warning against the consequences of disobedience to apartheid doctrine. Indeed, the disembodied head itself seemed somehow indicative of the violence so intrinsic to this political order, an unconscious connation of the brutal physical outcomes that would necessary follow any challenge to the sovereignty of the newly independent apartheid state.

At the time of Strydom’s actions, as is now apparent, Strijdom Square constituted an entire city block devoted to Afrikaner heritage, accomplishment, and culture. It was to many, as for Rosen (1992), apartheid’s sacred precinct, a monumental public space that aimed to build and mould an Afrikaner National identity, a space where “planning, construction and meaning…all project and celebrate a homogenous, single public identity” (p. 4). An assemblage of economic power, idealized cultural values, indexical natural elements, austere monument and marker of oppressive physical force, Strijdom Square both epitomized the values of republican Afrikaner nationalism, and presented an implicit threat to those who would challenge it.
There could, in short, hardly be a more ideologically appropriate site from which Barend Strydom could begin his killing spree.

On 29th September 1992, the day Strydom was released from prison on the basis of political amnesty, a large amount of red dye was poured into the fountain on the Square: an act that seemed to iconoclastically subvert the cultural and ideological meaning of the Square, inverting its vision of Afrikaner freedom into a potent reminder of whose freedoms it had excluded. The disturbing affects of this act were reported by the Pretoria News with the lead-in “Strange symbolism”; its report made mention of the political ambiguity of the event:

the water in the Strijdom Square fountain ran red today. Who put the dye into the water is unknown. Was it right-wingers reminding people of the atrocities committed on the square...or friends and relatives of the victims of the infamous shooting spree?” (p. 1).

In total, Barend Strydom killed eight and wounded fourteen black men and women in his vicious and racist rampage, an act he “legitimized” in his bid for amnesty as an act of war to protect the Afrikaner nation.

‘Spatio-discursive’ subjectivity and monumentality

The above fragments of the extraordinary and disconcerting spatial history of Strijdom Square beg an important question. What, one might ask, is the relation between the subjectivity of the individual political actor, and the ideological force of a monumental site? How might we conceptualize this relation, particularly if it is necessarily subtended – as it seems to me it is in this particular case – by two important factors, that of an apparent repetition of identity (or ideological persona), and that of an ambiguous form of embodiment? This troubling question of ideology, space and subjectivity seems to exceed the explanatory bounds of many discursive approaches to space and identity. I have in mind here specifically Soja’s (1989, 1996) discursive notion of space – ‘spatiality’ - as existing in socially-constructed and socially-practiced forms thought to be saturated with social and political relations of value, meaning, and power. I have in mind also, more generally,
the recent turn within much critical or cultural geography toward the interpretation and utilization of the central tenets of a poststructuralist (i.e. Foucauldian/Derridean) conceptualization of space, power and identity. (Natter & Jones (1994) provide a particularly good example in this regard; for a broader overview see also the edited volumes of Benko & Strohmayer (1994), and Duncan, Johnson & Schein (2004)). It is important to note here that discursive approaches to the joint intersections of space, identity, and power have lead much research in the South African context particularly in reference to issues of racist practice and the racialization of space (Dixon, Reicher, Foster, 1997; Dixon & Durrheim, 2000; Dixon & Durrheim, 2003; Durrheim & Dixon, 2001). Given the predominance of this discursive approach in the South African context (from which the above spatial history of Strijdom Square has, of course, been drawn), and the possibility that it is characterized by a number of explanatory weaknesses, it seems important that we look to offer a different (even if complimentary) theoretical perspective on the intersection of issues of space, identity, power.

Before turning our attentions to the specific shortcomings of discursive engagements with space, it is worthwhile noting Lefebvre’s (1974) objections to those analyses of monuments that would treat them as predominantly the outcome of signifying practices. The monument, he states, can “be reduced neither to a language of discourse nor to the categories and concepts developed for the study of language” (p. 222). The complexity of such a ‘spatial work’ must be understood as of a fundamentally different order to that of the complexity of a text, he argues. The actions of social practice, he argues – and this is a key point – “are expressible but not explicable through discourse” (p. 222, emphasis added). This is in part because social practices are precisely acted rather than read. Lefebvre’s suggestion thus is that in the analysis of monuments we need be acutely aware of “the level of affective, bodily, lived experience” (p. 224). Emphasizing this argument he maintains also that

Space commands bodies, prescribing or proscribing gestures, routes…this is its raison d’être. The ‘reading’ of space is thus merely a secondary and practically irrelevant upshot, a rather superfluous reward to the individual for…spontaneous and lived
obedience…[S]pace [is]…produced before being read…[not] produced in order to be read and grasped, but rather in order to be lived by people with bodies and lives in their own particular…context (1974, p. 143).

Now although it seems that not all discursive approaches attempt to render space legible to the analysis of signs and significations, Lefebvre’s emphasis on the bodily and lived experience of space – like his wariness towards discursive attempts at the explication of space - will prove crucial in what is to follow.

Turning now more directly to the discursive conceptualization of space in relation to subjectivity: in the view presented by Dixon & Durrheim’s (2000, 2003) - which I take to be indicative of many other approaches to a discursive spatiality - space operates as a resource of identity. Here, it is fair to say, identity and space are tied together via discourse. Identity, one might say, is cut from a broad discursive fabric that fashions spatiality and subjectivity alike. Important a contribution as this is, it fails to engage with the subject’s particular psychical investments in space. Indeed, it becomes difficult, on this basis, to account for the particularity of the individual’s imaginative engagement with space, for the affectivity of this relationship. Such relations of affect, ‘belongingness’ and identification - such ‘triangulations’ of space, power and subjectivity - may of course be importantly unconscious in nature, a case made by both Nast (2000) and, compellingly, Pile (1993, 1996). At this juncture one is compelled to ask: surely we must involve the unconscious in explaining the inter-relationship of power, space and identity, particularly so is these three are mediated by the force of ideology, a force, which, as we know, is typically less than rational in its functioning? This, I note, is not an isolated call; a variety of geographers have recently made the case for the importance of psychoanalytic approaches to the problems of conceptualizing the powers of space (Kingsburg, 2004; Nast, 2000; Philo & Parr, 2003; Pile, 1993, 1996; Robinson, 1998; Sibley, 1995a; Wilton, 1998). 4

The ‘intersubjectivity’ of subject and space
Another important characteristic – and prospective shortcoming - of discursive approaches to space and identity must be noted here. Indeed, whereas
spatio-discursive approaches often focus their attentions on space as resource, relay, as a means of transmitting identity – on spatiality as connected to, and extending a set of discursive resources – the work of Gaston Bachelard, for one, (to locate a strong counter-example) insists instead on the importance of the more specific and individualized identity given to places themselves. Put differently, one might contend that constructionist/discursive approaches do not engage sufficiently with space as itself a form of subjectivity. Here it pays to make reference to Bachelard’s (1964) ‘poetics of space’, an influential account of space and identity that focuses less on a discursive and far more on an imaginative or ‘psychically-invested’ conceptualization. Edward Said (1978) paraphrases Bachelard’s description of the inside of a house that

acquires a sense of intimacy, secrecy, security, real or imagined, because of the experiences that come to seem appropriate for it. The objective space of a house...is far less important than what poetically it is endowed with...a quality with an imaginative or figurative value we can name and feel... Space acquires emotional and even rational sense by a kind of poetic process...[I]maginative geography...help[s] the mind to intensify its own sense of itself... (pp. 54-55).

It is noteworthy here that Bachelard’s approach calls for an engagement with the uniqueness of an individualized ‘spatial subjectivity’, the very individualized subjectivity that discourse theory is at pains to dispense with (see for example, Foucault, 1981). Indeed, one of the benefits of this approach is that it attempts to grapple with the presence of given spaces themselves, with the individualized subjectivity of certain spaces-of-identity, rather than simply reading space as the medium of discourse, as a carrier of discursive values. This seems to return us to Lefebvre’s contention that social (and hence spatial) practices may be explicable in discourse, without being explicated by it, a sense, in other words, that discursive attempts to analyse space may do well at describing it (by relating it back to other discursive forms), yet stop short of engaging with the substance of space itself. To reiterate: in Bachelard’s approach to the analysis of space – and he shares this with many psychoanalytic approaches to space with which he should not
be conflated (such as those of Bingley, 2003; Pile, 1996; Wilton, 1998) – it is often the poetic endowment of certain places which comes to sharpen the mind’s ‘sense of itself’, to lend and indeed refine a sense of subjectivity.

The explanatory limit of the spatio-discursive approach here is not simply that of accounting for the unique specificity of an individualized ‘subjectivity of space’, it is also that of the more fundamental issue of what we might term the fantasmatic investments in the ideological aura of certain spaces. To extend this line of thought: we need some way of accounting for the subjective and affective depth of such investments. Without explanatory recourse of this sort we have little to offer as way of accounting for the extremities of action and identity exemplified in the case of Strydom’s Strijdom Square murders. Psychoanalysis again offers itself as an important explanatory vehicle here. Indeed, as Slavoj Žižek has repeatedly demonstrated (1989, 1994) psychoanalytic conceptualizations seem indispensable in the analysis of the material externality of ideology in various objects, including spatial objects such as monuments and seemingly utilitarian spaces (1997). 5

Another issue must be raised here: that of the potential inadequacy of spatio-discursive approaches regards powerful bonds of identification based on paternal or ideological likeness (or, for that matter, both). This is an issue which speaks directly to the practices of identification implicit in Strydom’s decision to carry out his actions within the space of a monument that bore the name of his namesake and that ‘carried the gaze’ of his ideological forbearer. In a case such as this, or so it would seem, we need explanatory reference to a more direct (and more personalized) ‘dialogue of identification’, than that offered by a loosely discursive account. Rather than making recourse to a variety of discursive forms (space, text, practices, knowledge) some of which ‘carry’ more power than others, we need here to cut to the heart of a particularly idiosyncratic bond of identification in which identities of subject and space seem to merge.

Psychoanalysis again offers itself as a promising conceptual resource in this respect: Freudian psychoanalysis 6 in particular is useful here in making the argument that identification is not simply an effect of circulating patterns of representation and/or practice, but is in many ways instead the
product of arrangements of prohibition which require a physical presence, and adopt a *figure-to-figure line of development* (as is the case of oedipal dynamics). This is not so much a flux of value and subjectivity - although social law and prohibition does of course play a crucial part here – as it is a subject-to-subject form of influence. An *embodiment* of sorts, the presence of other actual human figures (ideally two, one as the prototypical object of desire, the other as the feared/hated model of identification) is a pre-requisite for the Freudian account of identification. 7 I am not alone in making an argument of this sort; indeed, the argument I am making echoes those of Callard (2003) and Kingsbury (2003), both of whom argue that psychoanalysis offers an important - and possibly *necessary* - alternative to social constructionist approaches routinely favoured by geographers as means of formulating the intersections of space, power, identity. 8

The issue of embodiment brings to the fore another prospective shortcoming of discursive approaches to space: the fact that they lack an account of the corporeal properly able to acknowledge and understand the *bodily* experience of space. One cannot help but recall Lefebvre’s (1974) warnings in this respect, that space commands as its *raison d’être*, that space is “lived by people with bodies and lives” (p. 143). Understandings of the body as a primarily discursive entity, as a socially constructed form, will not suffice if we are to offer a compelling account of the ideological aura of monuments which affects the bodies of its subjects and which, furthermore, may itself be said to take on various technologies of embodiment.

The approach to space that I am suggesting then is clearly not one that hopes to consider the relationship of discourse to subjectivity. It is rather an approach that wishes to pursue a subject-to-subject line of influence, a figure-to-figure transaction of identification that hopes to foreground the importance of *intersubjectivity* in the conceptualization of identity, even if that intersubjectivity, oddly enough, is between space and subject. Might it be the case that powerful places ‘speak’ to us along these lines, that we need to understand the relationship of monumental site to subject as that of a dialogue of identification (even if largely imagined, fantasmatic) rather than as a kind of reciprocal pooling of discourses? If this is the case then, as emphasized above, we need look to the identities engendered *by* space itself,
to ask after an imaginative subjectivity of place, to *think of space* as itself possessing a kind of imaginative persona. In this way we might provide an alternative way of thinking the intersections of space, power, identity. We may thus be better able - through the appreciation of intersubjectivity and imaginative space - to think the interchange of identificatory practices across the elements of space and subjectivity alike.

**Embodiment as means of ‘subjectifying’ space**

With this theoretical backdrop in place, we might now move to a slightly different order of question. If monuments may be said to possess a certain ideological aura – and the general consensus is that they do indeed (Mitchell, 1994; Rose, 2003; Taussig, 1997; Vidler, 1992; Warner, 1985) – then how might we go about conceptualizing this aura, this imaginative subjectivity, in a way which extends the psychoanalytic lines of speculation offered above? Or, to return to the Strijdom Square history that opened this paper, how might this evidence support a hypothesis of the powerful functioning of subjectified space? Might we discern here an attempt to give to space an imaginative, figurative essence, a ‘psychology’ of sorts, a historical persona of sorts with which to influence the identity of the human subject?

One means of taking up this hypothesis is through the idea of embodiment as a kind of technology of affects. To consider for a moment the challenge faced by the designer of monuments: the task at hand is that of imbuing space with a distinctive aura, investing it with a certain authenticity or historical substance. It is also the challenge of lending that space an iconic form, and, along with it, a universal significance and legibility that may spread its history and testimony. One way of giving meaning to place that would both ‘personify’ it - give it psychological substance - and lend it an iconic stature – a kind of historical ‘persona’ - would to give it body, to make place literally *embody* the figure of nation, leader, patriarch. There are at least two routes of embodiment, both of which follow the basic structure and functioning of language, that of metonym and that of metaphor. Lefebvre is again helpful here:

Two ‘primary processes’ as described by…psychoanalysts…might reasonably be expected to operate in monumental space: (1)
displacement, implying metonymy, the shift from part to whole, and contiguity; a (2) condensation, involving substitution, metaphor and similarity (1974, p. 225).

This point is best made with an illustration. First, in the case of contiguity, or displacement: Strijdom Square is just one in a series of South African examples in which indexical/metonymic materials are used in the construction of colonial/apartheid monuments. There is an almost magical kind of thinking taking place here whereby the use of the substance, the stone, the flora of a country, is used to (imaginatively) consecrate a political essence of sorts; a sense of presence conjured up via material. Bunn (1999) has made reference to exactly this metonymic association between settler identity and natural landscape within colonial Southern Africa. The tactic here is that of making political vision somehow intrinsic to the land; what is produced is “an expression of settled European identity…coaxed out of the rock” (p. 3).

Secondly, with reference to the substitutive processes of condensation and similarity: place may also be ‘embodied’ metaphorically, symbolically, via reference to iconicized form, through material embodiments of key historical or political figures as is the case in statues. Here personified power takes the universal form of the body or its part components; in monumental statue “force and image lock together” as Taussig (1997, p. 166) puts it. Such a symbolic ‘figuration of power’ is amply displayed in aspects of Strijdom Square. Take for example the case of the monumental horses, which, like so many other component-parts of similar monuments of dominance, draw on military symbolism. These are figures of conquest, signifiers of power that work to extend the monumental power of a key figure. Two forms of monumental embodiment then: the literal embodiment of substance, that is, the stand-in substitution of a piece of stone for the land, or, for a political order “intrinsic” to it, and the figurative embodiment of form, the poetic reference, in a figure of colossal stone, to a particularly ‘great’ man, and the political system that this figure is thought to epitomize. In both these instances of embodiment one is reminded of the psychoanalytic claim that all subjectivity arises initially from the body as a kind of surface of emergence, that the ego is initially and necessarily bodily in origin. Hence, if one wishes to imbue place with a psychologized presence of identity, give it body. The technology of
embodiment in question is one in which the attempt is made to make the land a body of the consciousness of the place. It comes as no surprise thus that the human form haunts monuments, nor that monuments should attempt to affect power through a tactics of embodiment (as Vidler (1992) argues). That such a process may be experienced as both unsettling and yet also ‘domesticating’, simultaneously familiarizing and yet nevertheless disconcerting, does however pose something of an explanatory challenge. It is with these ideas in mind, and with a concern for the psychic affects of embodiment that we turn our attentions to Freud’s notion of the uncanny.

The Freudian Uncanny
For Freud (1964) there are a variety of impressions and events able to induce feelings of what he calls ‘the uncanny’. When we speak of the uncanny we have in mind a sense of the eerie, the frightening, the unexplained, that visceral pinch of fear and uncertainty – as in instances of déjà vu – which disturb us and cause us to momentarily reassess our relation to the world and its supposedly natural order. Of particular importance here, for Freud, are doubts as to whether an apparently inanimate object is really alive, or, conversely, whether a lifeless object might in fact be somehow animate. Similarly uncanny are the effects of fits, or manifestations of insanity, because “they excite in the spectator the impression of automatic, mechanical processes at work behind…ordinary mental activity” (Freud, 1964, p. 226). Initially then it seems as if there are two basic ‘poles’ of the uncanny: anxieties concerning variants of embodied absence on the one hand, and disembodied presence, on the other. At basis these are ontological anxieties about the status of the object, and more particularly, anxieties about its status as human. Put differently, these are anxieties about the soul, which becomes problematic by virtue of either its absence (where it should be present) or its presence (where it should be absent).

Such anxieties seem to constitute two of the most foundational themes of the genres of science fiction and horror. On the one hand, the dead body made animate, the soulless thing that walks and talks, that mimics the human despite a dreadful emptiness within. On the other hand, and of a roughly more romantic nature, the idea of a free-floating
consciousness, a disembodied and typically malevolent form of intelligence; an undefined actor or agency outside of the bodily confines of the human. In the case of disembodied presence we are, more generally, also concerned with here superstitious beliefs, and, moreover, the belief in an intangible 'unmoved mover'. An essential aspect of the uncanniness of disembodied presence is the sense of a kind of 'remote control', a superstitious 'theory' of action where effect is seemingly separated from its agent. Or, put more precisely, a “remote control,” where a disturbing uncertainty (and typically, a suspicion of the supernatural) occupies the place where one would expect to find the embodied actor. In each of these cases we have an instance of 'ontological dissonance', as one might put it, a case of what cannot be, but that we implicitly (even if only momentarily) believe is. What we are confronted with in such variations of the uncanny is an animistic conception of the universe, the idea that the world is peopled with the spirits of human beings, by a belief in the omnipotence of thoughts, the attribution to various peoples and things of magical powers.

A related form of this ontological dissonance which so troubles the subject is to be found within the phenomenon of the “double”, or with disturbing, instances of repetition. Here we are as concerned with the doubling of individual persons (twins, doppelgangers, clones, mirror-image replacements of the “genuine object”) as with the doubling (as in déjà vu) of particular circumstances, events, features; the uncanniness, in short, of duplication. With respect to the uncanniness of involuntary repetition Freud makes special mention of those “remarkable coincidences of wish and fulfillment, the most mysterious repetition of similar experiences...on a particular date” (p. 248). Again we confront problems of human authenticity and essence, of singularity. In that which is an uncanny then we have an affront to the hoped-for uniqueness of soul in the "doubling, dividing and interchanging of the self" (Freud, 1964, p. 234). Alternately, we are faced with vexing extensions of (aspects of) humanity into natural phenomena, the echoing repetitions of key events, or individual features, in a variety of different yet uncannily similar forms. It is important to note the extent to which Freud emphasizes the role of recurrence within experiences of the uncanny, so much so that “the quality of uncanniness can only come from
the fact of the ‘double’ being a creation dating back to a very early mental stage, long since surmounted” (1964, p. 236). The uncanny is hence that class of the frightening in which something repressed makes its return. Moreover, the uncanny is not a category of repressed material but “an unsettling sense of familiarity that appears when repressed material manages to slip into consciousness” (Herbst, 1999, p. 105).

The uncanny is thus both that which is at some level familiar and unfamiliar, that which had been known, secreted away, and then returned – the old-established ‘thing’ which became alienated to the mind precisely through repression. One is reminded here of the return of the dead, the present conceding its authority, so to speak, to the legacy of the past. The uncanny experience may hence be characterized as that of a kind of precognitive gap, of varying length and intensity, a flickering moment, as Herbst (1999) describes is, when familiarity and unfamiliarity coexist. Here it is important to point out that Freud distinguishes between two primary sources of the uncanny. The first is of a more phylogenetic variety, and concerns the surmounting of the tendencies of primitive thought (animism, magical thinking, belief in the omnipotence of thoughts). This form of the uncanny revolves around “reality testing”, and makes its appearance when an event questions our concept of reality, creating the impression that what we had thought we had surmounted in the obscure realms of our forebears reappears. The second source of the uncanny – although the two are intermingled at the level of experience – is of a more ontogenetic variety. This form of the uncanny concerns the reappearance of largely forgotten and inaccessible infantile material derived from repressed realms of the unconscious.

The uncanny thus disturbs the ego, and in two principal ways: directly, by the threatening emergence of repressed material which duly induces massive anxiety, and indirectly, by calling into question the basic structures of meaning, explanation and value sanctified by a given social/political/symbolic order. In each case, such forms of ego-disturbance represent a harking-back to particular phases in the evolution of the self-regarding feeling, a regression to a time when the ego had not yet marked itself off sharply from the external world and from other people. It is not only
the disjuncture of body and soul that Freud is interested in here – that is, problems of embodiment - but disjunctures of history also, anxieties of ‘the before’ suddenly pre-empting the specific moment of the present, those moments in which that which had been superseded now comes to overrun the sensibilities of the present. It is vital in this respect that we take note of the priority that Freud places on the factor of repetition in his account of the uncanny; underlining the “dominance in the unconscious mind of a ‘compulsion to repeat’…a compulsion powerful enough to overrule the pleasure principle, lending to certain aspects of the mind their daemonic character” (1964, p. 238).

The modality of the uncanny that we are dealing with here is one based on repetitions of time, hauntings, overlaps, problematic, precisely uncanny relationships between what is past and what is present. The genres of horror and science fiction are again replete with examples of this: time-travel, paradoxes/irregularities of history, déjà vu experiences, the motif of a present haunted by the past. Indeed, the uncanniest objects are those that exhibit disjunctures both of time and of embodiment (and hence also, typically, of life/death). These are disturbing objects that are doubly out of place. The ghost, for example, is a figure who is both without body and out of their own natural time, and hence unsettling on two counts. The uncanny disturbs the ego in its relationship to body and time. It is a response, a disjunctive, and hugely anxious reaction - visceral at the level of experience - to a breakdown of a sort of implicit natural order, be that of history (the separateness of past and present) or of embodiment (the lack of co-ordination between body and soul).

It is crucial that we emphasize the ‘ego affect’ of the uncanny, the extent to which it upsets a natural order in which the ego has found its place (again, in body and time). Indeed, the affects induced by the uncanny necessarily exceed the objective contents of their stimulus. It is the scale of this disruption, the anxiety thus provoked which Freud (1964) has in mind when he speaks of a powerful “urge to defence” (p. 236) mobilized in the ego in such moments.

‘Ghostly matter’
How then might we think of monuments as instruments of the uncanny, as exploiting uncanniness as the hot spring of their ideological and indeed, interpellative efficacy? There are at least two ways in which we might offer an answer to this question. The first prioritizes what we might term the ‘supernaturalism of power’ and is a result of an uncanny affect of presence. The second prioritizes the ‘ontological dissonance’ of the uncanny, and queries how this affect might beg the involvement of the subject.

A ‘technology of the uncanny’ could, presumably, make us impute a presence despite an actual absence. This is a rudimentary element of the uncanny and it is basic to a wide variety of fears - a sense of an unfixable, observing presence that cannot easily be discerned. Such doubts, to paraphrase Freud (1964), as to whether an apparently inanimate object may in fact be alive, a lifeless object in fact animate, might be usefully incurred by monumental forms. Here it should be clear that I am concerned not so much with rational or conscious sorts of engagement – although the ‘flickering’ moment of the uncanny is clearly experienced as a disruption on these levels – but rather with more fantasmatic kinds of psychical investment in monuments. It is helpful here to make reference to the uncanny effect of dolls, figurines, and statues. We sometimes, initially, in a moment of ontological error, impute a psychological presence to such objects, which then cannot be realistically sustained - or, more disturbingly yet, sometimes is, despite our rational beliefs to the contrary, such that this imagined subjectivity remains in place even after we have ‘realized’ the artificiality of the object. This then is one route of the uncanny, that moment of ontological error in which a given monumental place (or object) takes on a psychological presence, an imagined subjectivity.

A related affect of the uncanny is that of a sense of automatic processes beyond both ordinary mental activity and our everyday structures of explanation. This is the phylogenetic variety of the uncanny which elicits the tendencies of animism, magical thinking, a sense of omnipotence/omnipresence. (Gordon (1997) is right in this respect to note that in emphasizing this aspect of the uncanny Freud is harking back to “Animism, Magic and the omnipotence of Thoughts” in his earlier Totem and Taboo). It is not difficult to grasp the political or ideological imports of such
affects. Such forms of presence (as above) imply relations of surveillance, an awareness of which was central, as noted in the original design specifications of the 12-foot high Strijdom Head. More than just a relationship of surveillance though, this uncanny presence functions also to imply a supernatural omnipresence, and beyond this, a non-material, and even conceivably spiritual essence to the political order it supports. We have here, in the uncanniness of presence without physical body a sense of a decorporealized surveillance extending beyond the confines of the human. Implying presence in this way is a useful tactic for a mystificatory variety of power that wishes to hold its subjects in awe, or within a relation of intimidation. This is what I have in mind in speaking of the ‘supernaturalism of power’, a ‘magic of the state’ in Taussig’s (1997) conceptualization, a kind of haunted, ‘ghostly matter’ in Gordon’s (1997) terms - to draw two close comparisons - a set of affects which saturate a given place and hence create the impression of a divine power, a power without origins, beyond the limits of human understanding, present even in the absence of human actors. The ideological profit in being able to retrieve, and reiterate, however momentarily, however unconsciously, such “primitive” modes of apprehension through the designs of monuments, would seem clear, particularly if it is the case that, as it seems it is, that these magical types of thinking are characterized by relations not only of fear, but of prohibition, docility, subservience, and reverence. 10 In this way monuments might be said to induce a powerful unconscious of authority.

Places of imbued presence
As scarecrows are to crows, one might say, successful monuments are to political subjects - not in view of the fact that they may frighten us away (although they may do this too) – but in view of the fact that they operate a ‘mechanism of presence’ and hence disturb us, in seemingly ambivalent ways, on exactly this basis. We may hence speak of the ‘psychic investment of monuments’, of how they are haunted with power, of how they attempt to keep the ghost of authority upon them animating in imaginative and fantasmatic ways the spaces they occupy. Taking the case of figurative monuments, one sees how iconoclasm, vandalism, jokes of defacement trade
off exactly such a mechanism of presence. To deface a statue in condescending or obscene ways is effective. Because, it is – in exactly an imaginary sort of way - to see a pigeon shit on the head of Cecil John Rhodes, or Paul Kruger, rather than on a bit of polished marble. One thinks here of popular news media images in the early 90’s of the decommissioning of Soviet monuments, of the assumption, so evident in how these images were put to use, that the pulling down of these iconic structures was a way also of dismissing the political consciousness they had embodied.

One sees exactly this kind of thinking, this attempt to imbue presence, in an interesting footnote to the initial construction of Strijdom Monument. Although the head was originally designed to look ‘towards the future’ and the rest of the Square, in a westerly direction, this was later changed by the late President’s wife, who refused to have Strijdom’s gaze looking in the direction of a series of Indian shops across from the Square (Bruinette & van Vuuren, 1977). A far less reverent example of how presence was imbued in the Strijdom bust comes from Frans Legodi, a member of the cleaning department at Strijdom Square:

We used to clean…Mr Strijdom’s head. We would order soap to keep it shiny, even inside the nose. I would look to see is a white man was passing. If not, I would slap the face. That would make me feel good (Diphare, 1999).

This example makes it clear how this ‘mechanism of presence’ also points to the ‘Achilles heel’ of the technology of power that such monumental forms attempt to effect. Because of the presence they are supposed to manifest, to embody, the desecration of monuments does lend itself to powerful significations, powerful symbolic resonances. Exactly this seems to have been the case when red dye was introduced into the fountains of Strijdom Square in September 1992. The uncanniness of monuments as technology of power hence opens up the possibility of its own subversion. 11

The presence of which I have been speaking is clearly of a paradoxical sort. It is a presence without a real, corporeal embodiment (except of course for that of the visiting human subject, whose role I will come to shortly), a paradox, in short, of disembodied presence. This, crucially, is an imaginative presence and hence also a personal or fantasmatic presence, due, in part, to
the particular historical, cultural or symbolic resonances of the place for the subject. Hence the value of formal cultural analyses of elements of monuments like that of Strijdom Square (elements of which are contained above). These resonances – which are also points of personal connection, as we may assume to have been the case for Barend Strydom – are of course exactly the elements of composition that are heightened and hence exploited by the designers of monuments. To reiterate the point, we may say that presence as such is over-determined in monuments. In monuments we frequently confront a combination of figurative, symbolic, cultural, institutional, historical presences, each of which plays its part in loading the overall significance - or ‘subjectivity’ - of the place. The gravity of a place, its overall resonance, is multiplied and extended in this way, haunted, occupied with the consciousness of a regime. (Vilder’s important (1992) The Architectural Uncanny offers a series of analyses of this sort, focussing on embodied architectural forms, the emblem of the ‘haunted house’, and on the interchange between psychological and physical senses of (un)homeliness (i.e unheimlich, the German for ‘the uncanny’)). In this way we might suggest that the success of a monument as kind of political technology might be measured by the degree to which it is able to move its subjects in this way, by how effectively it sets up a relationship of inter-subjectivity between its subjects and its imaginary subjectivity.

Uncanny interpellation
The uncanniness of monuments operates not only due to how they evoke a sense of presence, but also, so it would seem, by the way they evoke certain kinds of absence. If soulless embodiments (what I have called embodied absence) cause us to impute presence, then what might be the subject-effect of disembodied presence? It is interesting here to speculate as to what might be the power-effect of a profound sense of presence that occurs outside the confines of an embodied human actor. How, in view of a broader technology of power, might the subject play their part in ‘re-coupling’ separated components of soul and body, of consciousness and physicality? Where, one might ask, would be the fleshy body, the corporeal subject, to match up with this powerful consciousness of place, to ‘fill in’ the disturbing ontological gap
(of uncanniness) that has been posed in the space of the monument? Perhaps this is one way of considering the interpellative mechanism of monuments, that of an ontological dissonance that has the effect of ‘begging’ the involvement of the human subject, hailing the corporeality of the subject to complete a sense of disembodied presence, hailing the subjectivity of the subject to complete a sense of embodied absence.

If we were to follow this line of argument we might suggest that a monumental space like Strijdom Square was something akin to a ‘field of the uncanny’ which required the role of the human subject – both the physical body and the subjective presence - to complete the circuit of power it had initiated. What is disconcerting about it, its subtly unnerving qualities, its ‘unfamiliarity’, begs resolution, a form of domestication, or re-familiarization, a ‘making homely’, that only the subjectivity of the political subject can offer. The design, the technology, of the monument seems, in other words, to have begged a subject to fill its ontological gap, required the subject to act as a relay mechanism that would restore an ontological order to the dissonances of embodied absence and disembodied presence. If this is the case, then perhaps the most important offshoot of a consideration of the uncanniness of monuments is less about how we impute presence to certain forms and places, and more about how the disjunctive effects of the uncanny vex and disturb the ego, and do so in ways which imply not just a ‘subject reaction’, but a substantial level of subject-involvement (or, a variety of intersubjectivity) also.

It is worth replaying the terms of this argument so it is clear how the uncanny might function ideologically – interpellatively - and how this functioning might provide a way of thinking about the relationship of space, power and identity. To reiterate the implications of Freud’s notion of the uncanny: as socialized and rational human subjects we prefer soul and body always to go together. This is the stable ontological coupling of the human - the ‘uncoupling’ of these components is unfailingly disturbing to us. The uncanniness of presence is incurred when we see human forms, figures, bodies without attached subjectivities; the ontological ‘gravity’ they exert on us is exactly that of imputing psychological presence to a body. The imaginative presence we bring to bear on such figures is a means of restoring to order the
ontological dissonance they represent. These disjunctive effects, the tension between a literal embodiment (be it metaphoric or metonymic) and the contents of a soul seem then to function as potential ideological, interpellative mechanisms, as disjunctions that need be solved. Whether we are dealing with the uncanniness of disembodied presence of embodied absence – both of which apply to the imaginative affects of monuments - either way a kind of suspension is put into play. A disquieting ontological gap is opened, which vexes and troubles the ego, and which the subject would see resolved, even if an imaginative contribution is required on their part, and even if an element of their own subjectivity, their own imaginative or actual involvement (or participation) is required. The ‘gravity’ of this restorative urge to re-couple psychological presence with a bodily dimension has hence taken on an ideological force, such that it itself becomes an interpellative force in the case of uncanny monuments.

The ideological uncanny

Exactly what is contradictory and unfathomable about the ontological ambiguity of monuments is the lynchpin of their interpellative functioning; the ontological affront they manifest can only be rectified – the disjunction resolved, the ontological gap closed – by the involvement or participation of the subject. The uncanniness of monuments, one might say, is ensured by leaving in place an ontological gap, by keeping open a space for the subject whose role is exactly to mediate between these incompatibilities. Can we thus think of the subject as in some ways implied by this disjunction, of these ontological contradictions as begging the mediation of the involved subject?

It is useful here to repeat Freud’s (1964) suggestion that the ego-disturbance of the uncanny represents a regression to a time when the ego had not yet marked itself off sharply from the external world and from other people. The boundaries of the ego at this stage are seemingly cast too wide, and they include other objects within their ambit, as is seemingly the lesson of transitivism, as observed by Lacan (1977), when the ego has yet to settle into the confines of the bodily parameters of the individual. Incidentally, this reference to Lacan also gives us a sense of the imperative of closing the gap between body and soul in the uncanny object, namely the ‘I-function’ whose
role is to bring together the disturbing incoherence and/or fragmentation of the
*corps morcele* into an imaginary whole. This suggestion of transitivism, of a
lack of ego-distinction – and we might suggest, *political agency* also - from the
surrounding environment, that state of *informe*, in Bataille’s terms, the blurring
of the edges of the individual into the backdrop of their surroundings, seems a
crucial component of the place-identity intersubjectivity.

We see here the importance of conceptualizing not just the subjectivity,
but also the *intersubjectivity* of subject and place. In each case we see a
depth of involvement, or more accurately, a momentary lack of ego-definition
or ego-separation when – as in Julia Kristeva’s account of the abject (1982) –
the ‘I’/object distinction is more virtual than substantive. This, it seems, is the
point I have been reaching after in trying to grasp where subjectivity, power
and monumental space might be said to overlap. Here we can retrieve
something of the oddity of referring to the ‘subjectivity’ of place. This is a
‘subjectivity’ after all which it can only ever be imaginary, can only exist as a
*function of the subjectivity of the subject*, or, more to the point yet, as a
function of the intersubjectivity of the subject and their involvement with the
imagined consciousness of the place of which they become part. If the Barend
Strydom/Strijdom Square ‘circuit of intersubjectivity’ bears witness to one
point, then this is it, the idea that there is a kind of making of the subject that
is going on here, where the subjectivity of space is the subjectivity of the
subject who, in the case particularly of monumental sites, animates its circuit
of power by finding (*activating*) their place within an arrangement of power-
identity of which they effectively become part.

It is as if the technology of the monument requires the involvement of a
human subject to make itself work – as a structure of power – requiring the
involvement of their subjectivity and/or their corporeality to complete its own.
The design of monuments, it seems, may be thought of as providing a ‘space’
for the embodied human subject, an opening for their body to animate the
consciousness of its place, and for their subjectivity to animate the body of its
place. The actions of Strydom make a striking case in point: here is the
human actor whose murderous physical actions perfectly complimented the
consciousness of the place, whose political subjectivity perfectly
complimented - *completed*, one might say - its technology of embodiment. In
both cases Strydom himself, embodied actor, political consciousness, steps in to fill the gap; the uncanny dissonance is closed, subjectivity and body brought together, as is, by the same token, the ideological loop that tethers consciousness to action.

My reading of the operation of the uncanny has been that of an affect of disjuncture that begs an external component to correct its dissonance. We should not overlook however the fact that the disjuncture of the uncanny has both a bodily and historical axis, that it exists as rupture of body from spirit and of then from now. Strydom’s intervention – his doubling of his namesake – has, as it were, a double significance. We should be aware here of the crossing of subjectivities – the ‘completing’ involvement of Strydom in Strijdom - not only in the intersubjectivity of place, but also in reconciling a potential rupture of history. Strydom’s doubling of his namesake clearly exists also on the level of historical continuity; a point that seems quite clear in his motive of wanting to incite a third “Freedom war”. We might query here whether the compulsiveness of the subject thus interpellated - their compulsion to repeat, to double a prior act, to bring neglected history violently into the present - might be motivated along similar lines, as completing a ruptured whole, if not of body-consciousness, then of historical continuity. Key here too is the compulsion to repeat history, the dynamics of the fort-da game as initiated by a set of monumental historical markers which appear to hail the actions of a subject to repeat their history, to make its order unendingly complete.

Disturbingly then, the field of the uncanny at work here is not simply that of the ‘gravity’ for Strydom to ‘complete’ Strijdom, a kind of fantasmatic ‘interpellative loop’ at the individual level, it is also the ongoing uncanniness exerted on us, that of a deplorable doubling in time, the uncanny repetition of apartheid’s racist violence. One of the outcomes of Strydom’s murderous acts then may have been that increasing the ideological uncanniness of this place, of compounding its psychical and historical resonances. Fortunately however, this account of Strijdom Square – and of the ideological affects of uncanny doubling within its domain - does not end here.

At approximately 5am on the morning of the 31st of May 2001, the gigantic Strijdom head into an underlying parking lot, taking along with a
large section of Strijdom Square. A press release by the Voortrekker monument heritage site (2003) noted, “The bronze statue landed at the bottom of the parking area [beneath the Square] and broke into five pieces”. A Johannesburg newspaper reported that

The monument was virtually demolished. All that remained were sculptured horses on a plinth alongside the head. The sculpture’s head could not be seen from the side of the Square, the centre of which had sunk several meters, as if in a sinkhole (The Star, 2001, p. 3).

The collapse came on the 40th anniversary to the day of what would have been “Republic Day” under the apartheid regime – marking the day South Africa left the Commonwealth to continue its pursuit of racial segregation policies. The statue was exactly 29 years old: it collapsed on the same day, May 31st, that it was first unveiled in 1972 by Susan Strijdom, the former prime minister’s wife. Another newspaper article also reported the collapse:

the bronze bust of…Strijdom – the “Lion of the North” – crashed into a 10m-deep chasm…split in two…it lay unceremoniously dumped among piles of broken concrete and dust. It seemed as if the structure of the dome [above the bust] gave in…[The director of city-planning] explained that the slab forming the square was not designed for such an impact and gave way…He added it was just a coincidence that the dome collapsed on the anniversary of the old Republic Day (Otto, 2001, p. 3).

The Voortrekker monument heritage site later (2003) expressed concern that an ear went missing at the time of the collapse.

Freud had, of course, included amongst his description of the uncanny those “remarkable coincidences of wish and fulfilment, the most mysterious repetition of similar experiences in a particular place or on a particular date” (1964, p. 248). If we are to take my argument regards the uncanniness of monuments seriously, then the impact of this particular event might be said to exceed its (not inconsiderable) symbolic significance. In terms of the latter, one might feel the temptation to make an observation about the ostensibly iconic nature of this event, of how it so powerfully signifies the death of apartheid. I would tend to resist this temptation, instead suggesting that we
can only hope that apartheid is as dead as Strijdom’s shattered head. Of course, on the other hand, if we are to credit the above account of the affective and ideological resonance of monuments along the lines that I have speculated above, then it would seem that we should take this serendipitous event, this instance of historical chance seriously. Ultimately then, does this event, the final destruction of this head, its splitting apart on the 40th anniversary of apartheid’s Republic Day, have any real significance, even if only fantasmatic, unconscious, imaginary? Undoubtedly.

[Insert image 7 about here]

**Conclusion**

This paper has concerned itself with the question of the ‘ideological aura’ of monuments, an aura, which, as I have tried to show, seems importantly linked to the *affective* responses that their uncanny presence provokes. I have offered a critical psychoanalytic approach to what I have very loosely termed the ‘intersubjectivity’ of subject and place. The attempt in this respect has been to approach the dialectic of subject-space identification in a way that does not solely rely on a discursive, social constructionist or post-structuralist framework. A key objective here, furthermore, has been that of understanding space as *itself* a kind of subjectivity even if of a predominantly imaginative or fantasmatic kind. In addition, I have suggested that Freud’s notion of the uncanny may help us understand how monuments produce insidious ideological and interpellative affects by incurring affects of uncanniness, which are able to unsettle the ego in its relation to body and time. Be it through the affects of ‘imputing presence’ within inanimate monumental structures, or by ‘implying’ a subject through an uncanny structure which begs the ‘resolution’ of the participation of a certain ideological subjectivity, or action, we might understand monuments as machines of the uncanny, as vehicles of ideological uncanniness.

In many ways the Strijdom Square of 2004 has returned to what it once was: an economic hub and thoroughfare, a properly public space at the heart of the city of Pretoria. The political context of the Square’s making has become thoroughly ostracized from its current uses. No longer apartheid’s
sacred precinct, the Square is today filled with informal traders – the majority of whom are black – selling a dizzying variety of cheap goods and foodstuffs to passers-by. A nearby taxi-rank ensures that the square is always busy; it operates as a popular drop-off and meeting point. The damage to the floor of the square has been repaired, although the dome has not been replaced. The State Theatre, experiencing financial difficulties, is, for the most part, closed. A number of homeless people live in and around the square, effectively treating it as home. On weekdays the square often has a rather festive feel to it, especially around lunchtimes, when it is busiest. An assortment of barbers, street-performers, buskers, beggars and photographers were plying their trades there when I last visited the square. I remember one man (noted also by Dipha re, 1999) who specialized in taking photographers of passers-by alongside a cardboard cut-out of Nelson Mandela, sometimes, ironically, alongside the Strijdom head.

References


Endnotes
1. The Voortrekker Monument is a monument to the white Afrikaaner ‘pioneers’ who has first sought out independence North of the Limpopo. The vow in question being that of the Voortrekkers’ pact with God that should they prevail in the Battle of Blood River in the war against the Zulu they would always commemorate the day of its anniversary. More than this, victory at Blood River was also taken as a sign that white predominance over blacks was God’s will (Lapping, 1986).
2. Strijdom’s policy of ‘baaskap’ (‘domination’) was the forerunner of apartheid’s policy of apartheid. It was likewise during Strijdom’s rule that the South African flag and anthem were introduced.
3. Artist Jacques Coetzer later claimed responsibility for putting dye in the fountain (Williamson, 1989). Reticent to be identified as of left or right political persuasion, Coetzer’s motivation was more a case of seeking to “wrench South Africans from a placid and spineless acceptance of horror” (Williamson, 1989, p. 10).
4. While the psychoanalysis of space does not represent a totally new approach (Lefebvre (1974) had spoken, tentatively of a ‘psychoanalysis of space’, some time ago), it is fair to say that the psychoanalytic examination of the inter-relation of space and subjectivity has assumed a certain ‘critical mass’ over the last 15 years and that it now represents an increasingly prominent perspective on problems of
space and power (for further examples of work of this sort see Blum & Nast, 1995; Creswell, 1996; Hoggett, 1992; Pile & Thrift, 1995; Rose, 1993, 1995; Sibley, 1995b).

5. I should emphasize here that although I am tracing a series of rather rough schematic distinctions between discursive and psychoanalytic approaches to space, identity and power, these approaches should not always be taken to be mutually-exclusive. Lacanian psychoanalysis, for example, has been very much involved in the theorization of discourse. Discursive and psychoanalytic approaches are hence not necessarily oppositional, and do sometimes coincide (see for example Bracher et al (1994)).

6. That this account relies on Freudian psychoanalysis makes for an important qualification, particularly so given that the broad discourse of psychoanalysis is made up of a variety of often conflicting ‘schools’ of thought (Kleinian, Lacanian, Winnicottian, Object Relations approaches), whose particular perspectives on issues of identification and intersubjectivity are often quite divergent. Theoretical divergences of this sort are often of considerable importance in terms of the social, political and geographical application of psychoanalytic ideas, as Sibley (2003) has argued. Freudian psychoanalysis offered a particularly apt mode of explanation in reference to the linking of identification between Barend Strydom and Strijdom square, not only because it insists on the role of physical embodiment, but also because it emphasizes the powerful influence of a paternal figure on masculine identity. Freud’s influential account of unsettling repetitions of event and identity in his paper on the uncanny also proved instrumental in this respect.

7. This is to say nothing of the name-of-the-father dynamics which would seem to be so explicitly apparent here, that is, the presence and function of an ideological or paternal (symbolic) authority figure. An exploration of Lacan’s Name-of-the-Father relation - which seems so undeniably present in the Strijdom-to-Strydom trajectory of racist violence – presents a potentially vital future line of analysis.

8. In this respect see also Wilton (1998) on the “interrelationship between the individual psyche and the morphology of the surrounding social
landscape” (p. 174), and Nast (2000) for discussion of the spatiality of power and identity in relation to oedipal dynamics.

9. The Frankenstein monster, the robot as ‘ghost in the machine’, the zombie, the vampire, the reanimated corpse, all of these make good examples of embodied absence. On the other hand, the fear of the dark, phobias of those things we cannot see or physically apprehend but nonetheless “know” to be there, ideas of phantoms, ghosts, spirits, poltergeists, these make for further examples of disembodied presence.

10. Importantly, what I have in mind here is not a simple re-articulation of religious narratives (although many of these are replayed and extended in the cultural thematics of monuments), rather it is a political technology which models itself on religious beliefs so as to incur effects of power which are quasi-religious in nature. In this respect my analysis dovetails strongly with Taussig’s (1997) *The Magic of the State* which details the circulation of power - its “transformations between spirit and matter”, in Taussig’s (p. 11) terms - through various kinds of ‘spirit possession’, as in the case of popular shrines, official monuments or even slogans, money, the police, etc., in such a way that a ‘magical omnipotence of the state’ is evoked.

11. This speculations on the ‘presence’ of monuments, help us, incidentally, to make an argument as to why it can be politically effective to leave the monuments of a past, oppressive regime up. Such monuments become “prehistoric”, at least in as much as they can no longer be animated by the power that used to haunt them. They become dinasours of a historical era that has passed them by, hence more powerfully indicative of change that has taken place when left entact than when dissembled and secreted away. Something of this process, as described at length by Warner (1985), has taken place at Strijdom Square. To give just one example, the bust of Strijdom was subjected, in 1999, to the ‘indignity’ of hosting Thabo Mbeki’s presidential inauguration celebrations – Mbeki being of course the leader of the ANC, and the second black South African president, the epitomization, in other words, of Strijdom’s greatest political dread.
12. I note this as a provisional link; clearly the intersection of Freud's notion of the uncanny and Lacan's description of the mirror-stage requires a more thorough articulation than that I have offered here. Vidler (1992) makes a useful contribution in this regard. Lacan's mirror-stage, he notes, proposes a theory of a 'corps morcelé', a 'morselated body' that participates, at the moment of the mirror stage, "in a sort of drama impelled toward a spatial identification of the self" (p. 77). In this model the mirror is "construed as a lure that..."machines" the fragmented phantasms of the pre-narcissistic body into what Lacan calls "a form that [is] orthopeadic of its totality"" (p. 77).

List of images

1. ‘Strijdom Square 1’. Caption: The main components of the sculptural programme of Strijdom Square: ‘floating’ bust of Strijdom with protective dome, and monumental charging horses – emblems of ‘joint provincial strength’ – which likewise appear to hover, held aloft by the waters of one of the Square’s water-features. (Image courtesy Voortrekker Monument heritage site).

2. ‘Towerbuilding’. Caption: The 132 metre high Volkskas building which provides the backdrop for the Strijdom Monument. (Image courtesy Michele Vrdoljak).

3. ‘Panorama 1’. Caption: Panoramic view of Strijdom Square with State Theatre (to the left), Volkskas building (center) and informal traders. (Image courtesy Michele Vrdoljak). [Note: the quality of this image may mean that it may need be cropped]

4. ‘Strijdom Square 2’. Caption: Strijdom Square at night; Strijdom's head illuminated. (Image courtesy Voortrekker Monument heritage site).

5. ‘Bighead’. Caption: Still-frame from video shot that shows relative the proportions of the Strijdom Head and onlooker. (Image courtesy Michele Vrdoljak). [Note: although the quality of this image leaves something to be desired, it is imperative that it be be used, because it helps foreground the gargantuan proportions of the head].

6. ‘Bloodfountain’. Caption: Strijdom Square as it appeared on the 29th September 1992, the date Barend Strydom was released from prison
after. Red dye had been poured into the fountain on the Square: an act that seemed to iconoclastically subvert the cultural and ideological meaning of the Square, inverting its vision of Afrikaner freedom into a potent reminder of whose freedoms it had excluded. [Note: this is the one image that I would like reproduced in colour, so as to show the colour of dye in the fountain]. (Image courtesy Abri Fourie).

7. ‘Domedown’ Caption: Strijdom Square, 31st May 2001, hours after the collapse of the Strijdom Head and dome, on the anniversary of apartheid South Africa’s ‘Republic Day’. (Image courtesy Abri Fourie).

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