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Revalidating Participation: Power and Pre-Figurative Politics within Contemporary Leftwing Movements

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Introduction

‘Practice what you preach’ is a popular idiom not only within progressive politics, but also beyond, and this idea is also encapsulated in the famous Mahatma Gandhi quote: ‘If you want to change the world, start with yourself’. This is often easier said than done.

Take decision-making processes within social movements and parties of the left. One would expect this to be highly democratic, more open, and less hierarchical than for example within conservative movements and parties, but Robert Michels’ famous study of decision-making processes within the labour movement and socialist parties concluded that even though they profess a progressive horizontal politics and strive towards maximum participation, in reality they also organise themselves in highly hierarchical and centralised ways and take decisions in a very top-down manner (Tolbert, 2013). In the post-revolutionary communist organisations and parties this tendency was arguably even more pronounced. He called this the Iron Law of Oligarchy (Michels, [1911] 1962).

After a very active cycle of protests at the end of the 1960s and the emergence of what was then called New Social Movements (Offe, 1987), a new left critique of this iron law was formulated. It advocated for ‘real’ participation and calling for a radical democratisation, not only of politics, but also of everyday life, of schools, of the workplace. In its Port Huron Statement, the US student organisation Students for a Democratic Society (1962), foregrounded that ‘politics has the function of bringing people out of isolation and into community’. Participation was a prime signifier within these radical democratic discourses. Furthermore, democratic participation was also intrinsically linked to power and to the ability to ‘determine the outcome of decisions’ (Pateman, 1970: 71).

This hope of a more participatory society did not fully materialise and the liberal representative model of democracy with its rigid and highly hierarchical party system and a political oligarchy governing ‘in our name’ by simple majorities, came to be seen as hyper-elitist and disconnected from the interests and everyday struggles of ordinary citizens. This has, amongst
others, led to very high levels of distrust towards the political class and media elites in particular, and liberal democratic institutions in general (Norris, 1999; Dalton, 2004).

In response to this increase in public distrust towards democratic politics and practices, we could observe, in recent years, a resurgence of the new left critiques through for example the pirate parties and anti-austerity movements across Europe. They echoed the critiques of corporate capture and the need to re-democratise democracy. One of the central demands of the Spanish indignados or 15M movement was: ¡Democracia Real YA! [Real Democracy NOW!]. This manifested itself not only in terms of a stringent critique of the competitive elitism model which is so prevalent within liberal democracies, but also through the articulation of a pre-figurative politics, practicing alternatives to the elitist representative model, which conform more to participatory direct democracy models (see Held, 2006).

Out of the global justice, the indignados and the occupy movements emerged a consensual assembly model to make collective decisions. This has its antecedents in basic democratic progressive organisations such as community media and workers cooperatives. Besides this, we can also observe a delegative decision-making model being appropriated and advocated for by the Pirate Parties, for example. However, also Momentum, the parallel campaign organisation supporting Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership of the UK Labour Party, has introduced delegative decision making, embedding its radical left project within democracy and democratic principles.

While highly sympathetic to these innovations and revisits, we also need to acknowledge that they are not problem-free either. The issues I will identify call for a revaluation of ideology and accounting for power and conflict within decision making processes within the Left. In what follows, I will address first the assembly model and subsequently the delegative model, also sometimes called liquid democracy.

**The Assembly Model within the Anti-Austerity Movement**

The anti-austerity movement, reacting against the acceleration of neoliberal policies in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, juxtaposed a broken democracy frame with their own real democracy frame – i.e. a democracy that represents the real interests of the people rather than corporate interests and the interests the wealthy elites that seem to run our broken democracy. As Flesher Fominaya (2015: 154) points out, anti-austerity movements across Europe combined ‘pre-figurative practices of radical democracy within social
movement spaces with a highly organized attack on the illegitimacy of representative democratic institutions’. They argued that we need a more participatory, a more open and a more transparent democracy, as this quote from Occupy London Stock Exchange attests:

united in our diversity, united for global change, we demand global democracy: global governance by the people, for the people […] Like the Spanish TomaLaPlaza we say “Democracia Real Ya”: True global democracy now! (Occupy LSX, 2011a – emphasis added)

One way that the anti-austerity movement throughout Europe performs its alternative vision of democracy is through the general assembly model, which is horizontal in structure, autonomous in its decision-making and anti-representative in spirit. The assembly model aims to ‘create a social space facilitating equal voice’ (Prentoulis and Thomassen, 2013: 177). Following the example of the Spanish Indignados movement meetings (Nez, 2012; Romanos, 2013), these public assembly assemblies were held in a deliberative spirit and a certain conversational group etiquette developed, including the appropriation of a set of codes and hand signals to govern discussion, to signal agreement/disagreement or add a point, amounting to what some described as ‘the democracy of direct action’ (Razsa and Kurnik, 2012: 241). This emphasis on deliberative democracy and consensual decision-making is in line with the pre-figurative practices of the anti-austerity movements across Europe, placing ‘new forms of democracy in the centre of the public space’ and even inviting passers-by to join in and to participate (Romanos, 2013: 211)

This adherence to openness and transparency maps onto movement frames of horizontalism and consensual decision-making as is apparent from these quotes, respectively from interviews with people active in the National Campaign against Fees and Cuts - a radical student protest organisation in the UK and Occupy London Stock Exchange as well as from a document published by Occupy Wall Street:

We will organise through democratic assemblies at the lowest possible levels. (NCAFC, 2012/2014 – emphasis added)

Open discussion is at the heart of our Occupation and our decision-making process. The more people we can involve in our debates, the stronger and more representative the results will be. (Occupy LSX, 2011b – emphasis added)

[Consensus] is a democratic method by which an entire group of people can come to an agreement. The input and ideas of all participants are gathered
and synthesized to arrive at a final decision acceptable to all. (Occupy Wall Street, 2011 – emphasis added)

Furthermore, and totally in line with new left visions of participatory democracy (Pateman, 1970), the anti-austerity movement has an explicit agenda of extending democratic values and equal participation beyond parliament, advocating for more democracy in schools, universities and the workplace. In addition, solidarity with global democratic struggles is very much part and parcel of this ‘real democracy’ frame:

We want schools, colleges, universities and research institutions and the work they do to be public, democratic, open and accessible to all, and to be oriented towards free enquiry, the needs and interests of society, and liberation from existing hierarchies and oppressions (NCAFC, 2012/2014 – emphasis added).

The citizens of the world must get control over the decisions that influence them in all levels – from global to local. (Occupy LSX, 2010a – emphasis added)

These are all very sound intentions and ambitious aspirations of a democratic progressive movement in terms of its pre-figurative politics and its own practices concerning internal decision-making. Reality is, however, often much messier than these good sounding ideals. This became apparent when interviewing anti-austerity activists3.

First of all, not all decisions were made by the assembly. As such, the way that decisions were made within the anti-austerity movement needs to be differentiated. There were ad-hoc decisions, which were made daily or even hourly, and more principled decisions about identity, strategy and tactics. The former tended to be the domain of those who were ‘running the show’ and organizing the direct actions. The latter tended to be made by the assembly, which operated according to horizontal deliberative principles and adhered to consensual decision-making (see Nez, 2012).

This also exposes a tension within the assembly model, namely that it can be time consuming and not very efficient, especially when decisions need to be made in the moment. Tina, from UK Uncut, a fair taxation protest organisation, said that consensus decision-making ‘is arduous, tiring and takes hours, but we make sure everybody is heard’ (personal interview, 04/11/2015). Furthermore, and more problematic in the context of radical politics, according to Dave from Occupy LSX, decision-making by consensus ‘tends to lead to conservative decisions’ and this, he argued, ‘compromised [Occupy’s] flexibility’ (personal interview, 10/10/2016). Similarly, a leading student activist from NCAFC, pointed to the massive efforts and energy that
was put into face-to-face decision-making by consensus, but said that ‘there were, of course, also tensions with that’ (George, personal interview, 23/02/2017), especially since it has to be acknowledged that a total consensus is an ontological impossibility, exclusions always take place (see also Mouffe, 1999). The discourse of horizontalism and non-hierarchical structures also tends to bump up against practical issues related to organization and the emergence of informal systems of authority.

This highlights another tension relating to power, horizontalism and the idea of a leaderless organisation. Whereas there certainly was an ethos of horizontality and democratic decision making within the anti-austerity movement, the idea of a ‘leaderless’ organization is fallacious. Tina, a leading activist in UK Uncut, clarified that ‘a leaderless movement does not exist, there are always people that are organizing, that answer the emails, that do the Twitter and the Gmail, that answer the media phone, etc.’ (personal interview, 4/11/2015). Similarly, in the context of Occupy LSX, there was a clear difference as well as a set of tensions between ‘those in the centre doing loads of stuff’ and those ‘in the periphery’, as explained by Dave, who was active in the media team (personal interview, 10/10/2016). This was also acknowledged by another Occupy LSX activist (quoted in Deel and Murray-Leach, 2015: 187-8):

> Anyone that pretends Occupy is a completely leaderless movement is just denying reality. There’s a core group of maybe 20 people, maybe 30 people that are basically coordinating the work that’s happening: facilitating amongst working groups outside of the open forum process – background work.

While the assemblies tended to take place offline, mediation was essential to satisfy the need for transparency of the process and to communicate the consensual decisions reached by the assembly to those unable to be present in person. In the case of Occupy, online spaces were used to complement the offline decision-making process. The general assemblies were broadcast live and, at times, those watching the stream would be ‘given the opportunity to participate remotely by asking questions or making comments’ (Kavada, 2015: 880). Transparency was achieved, often, by decisions being reported on the movement organisations’ websites. Decisions made during the NCAFC general assembly, held on 12 June 2016 in Edinburgh, were even tweeted, albeit in a succinct way:

- Motion 2 passed. Now discussing motion 3: NSS [National Student Survey] sabotage. #NCAFCconf
- Debating amendments to motion 3. #NCAFCconf
• Motion 3 passes as amended. #NCAFCconf
  […]
• A minute of silence for the victims of the attack in Orlando. #NCAFCconf
• Closing remarks from @Deborah_Malina: "go back to your campuses, build activist groups. I’m excited to continue the fight!" #NCAFCconf

(@NCAFC_UK, 12 June 2016)

Occupy LSX had a policy of transparency for its assemblies and began to stream them live; for example, their Radical General Assembly held on 14 May 2015, after the UK’s general election which gave David Cameron an overall majority ushering in an all-Tory government, were streamed and the video recordings of these debates were made accessible by the Occupy News Network through bambuser.

Besides the assembly model, we can also distinguish a delegative model of decision-making within progressive politics. The delegative model in a sense blends direct democracy ideals with representative democracy ones and is geared towards making direct democracy work beyond small-scale closed communities and organisations. Compared to the assembly model which is characterized by consensus and collective decision-making, the delegative model is majoritarian and more individualistic, based on a choice between different potential alternatives or issues.

**Delegative Democracy within the Pirate Parties**

The idea of delegative democracy was discussed by Marx and Engels (1971) when they wrote about the Paris uprising in 1871 and the subsequent establishment of the Paris Commune (see also Carpentier, 2011: 28-9). As such, it is not entirely unsurprising to observe that liquid democracy, which is a form of delegative democracy, is being foregrounded today as an alternative way of decision-making by current progressive protest movements such as the Indignados in Spain, the Occupy Movement or Momentum, the leftwing campaigning organisation loyal to Jeremy Corbyn in the UK. It was, however, above all the pirate party movement that has adopted the language and practice of delegative democracy in their political discourse as well as decision-making processes and procedures.

Besides its emphasis on digital rights, the Pirate Parties argue that democracy itself needs to be reformed by incorporating more participatory forms of democracy. In the interviews I conducted with representatives of the pirate parties in Germany, UK and Belgium, they would say things like: ‘we are
looking for more possibilities to participate’ (PP Germany 2012) and ‘more fundamental work needs to be done to reach out’ (PP UK 2012). At the level of pre-figurative politics, the pirate party movement operationalized the real democracy frame by adopting the concept of Liquid Democracy (LD), which amounts to a form of delegative democracy that is technologically mediated. Some also speak of adhocracy in this regard (see Jenkins 2006; Global Freedom Movement 2011).

LD is defined by the pirate parties as means for a demos to debate and subsequently vote on concrete ideas and/or policy proposals formulated by one or several of their peers. Individual members of the demos can furthermore delegate their vote to others whom they trust and who have particular expertise on the issues being discussed – ‘you can choose to delegate your vote to a person for a single idea, but for another theme you choose somebody else’ (PP Germany 2012). For the Pirate Parties, LD is also about ‘seeing the collaborative, the distributed and the non-hierarchical advantages of the internet in relation to policy’ (PP UK 2012). It is thus also embedded in a broader techno-optimistic discourse and imaginary about the internet (cf. Mansell, 2012).

The way this is operationalized is through a set of practices and protocols embedded in an online platform which facilitates LD as a process. This is what is being called the Liquid Feedback tool (cf. Figure 1). It is defined as an ‘opinion-finding tool’ and it is liquid in order to emphasize the fluidity and openness of the decision-making process.

maybe the idea comes from one person, other people connect to it and start thinking about the idea and create other alternatives, and this is how politics should be developed (PP Germany 2012).

Pirate Parties use these online ‘Liquid Feedback’-type platforms and collaborative text editors (Pirate Pads) to discuss and shape policy ideas and in doing so they adopt a strong discourse of horizontal democracy in which participation and public discussion and debate plays a central role:

People can comment and vote things up and down. Certain things will be top of the pile and certain things we felt were not good or serious or well-articulated, or against the spirit of the party, they didn’t get anywhere (PP UK 2012).

[Liquid Democracy] means that it is a process, it is never finished (PP Germany 2012).
[...] you get to choose which political topics you wish to actively participate in, you may also delegate your vote to other members (PP Belgium 2014).

**Figure 1:** Screenshot of an Open Source Liquid Feedback Platform

![Screenshot of an Open Source Liquid Feedback Platform](http://liquidfeedback.org)

The use of LD as a tool of internal decision-making comes with its own set of problems and issues. In the various articulations of LD as pre-figurative politics there is little mention of how to deal with conflict. A bit reminiscent of the ideals of a Habermassian deliberative public sphere, LD is often presented as conflict-free: ideas are proposed, debate is had, votes are delegated, votes are cast, and decisions are made. However, as neo-Gramscian accounts on politics and power point out, conflict cannot be simply be eliminated from the political, conflict is intrinsic and constitutive of the political (Mouffe 1999). Concurring with this theoretical position which foregrounds the political as inherently conflictual, once the Pirate Party in Germany started to grow and began to win mandates through elections, internal conflicts and disruptive power struggles emerged as well.

This led Der Spiegel (2013) to speak of “Liquid Democracy” with regard to the German Pirate Party. The UK representative even commented on this by vehemently stating: “we are less fractious than the Germans” (PP UK 2012), but it is also fair to say that the Pirate Party UK is much smaller and less popular than its German counterpart(y) is. Besides these issues of scale, interviews with pirate party representatives revealed serious shortcomings in terms of dealing with (internal) conflict:
Conflicts and ideological conflicts are simply not being dealt with in an active way at all. Mostly we ignore they are there and I suspect most people just hope for people they disagree with to simply go away, which surprisingly works all too often. Since there is no hierarchy, there is no formalised way to deal with conflict or with gaming the system in any effective manner, mostly because there are no real exclusion mechanisms, which tends to rewards trolling behaviour above all else (PP Belgium 2014).

This inability to deal with conflict also speaks to the inherent tensions between online discussions and debates on the one hand, and offline debates and decision-making power, which are left unaddressed by focusing too much on the potentials of the innovative technological tools enabling LD.

Another common critique is that this type of decision-making often leads to a fairly limited number of people have a disproportional impact on the decision-making process, which runs counter to its direct democracy ideals. Linked to this, there are also issues in terms of the lack of a critical mass of people actually participating in such liquid democracy experiments. As is well known, in line with Noelle-Neuman’s (1984) Spiral of Silence, those that disagree often have a tendency to silence themselves and disengage from the process and there is no way to account for that within the platforms.

We’ve done some experiments with ‘true’ liquid democracy, but the adoption rate and the enthusiasm for actually using it was quite low. […] one can easily observe the very low number of active or true participants (PP Belgium 2014).

Finally, the emphasis within the LD discourse on issue-based deliberation and the voting up of ‘good ideas’ and down of ‘bad ideas’ reduces politics to individual issues without addressing the wider structural connections and disconnections between different issues.

**Conclusions: On Ideology and Power**

This last point implicates ideology as that binding narrative, which is something that is increasingly rejected by both the pirate party and the anti-austerity movements. This abject rejection of the left-right ideological cleavage is a contemporary manifestation of anti-ideologism, as these quotes from documents and interviews attest:
Some of us consider ourselves progressive, others conservative. Some of us are believers, some not. Some of us have clearly defined ideologies, others are apolitical (Democracia Real Ya!, 2011)

We reject [the left-right] terminology’ (PP UK, 24/05/2012); ‘We say we are not left-right, we don’t want to be associated with these old-style clusters (PP Germany, 04/06/2012).

Not being framed as left was important to us, the media didn’t seem to want to frame us as left and we certainly weren’t framing ourselves as left. We felt that ‘left’ was a diversionary label and that our solutions were humane and represented common sense economically, ecologically and socially (Dave, Occupy LSX, 10/10/2016)

This disarticulation of the progressive project from a leftwing ideology and thus also the rejection of a clear meta-narrative which binds together critiques and solutions is problematic and potentially dangerous. Whereas in some cases this disarticulation is strategic, for example with Occupy, at the same time it opens the door for partial co-optation by hegemonic and reactionary forces, such as rightwing populism (cf. Cammaerts, 2018).

Besides a blatant rejection of ideology and the left-right political cleavage, we can also observe a denial of conflict, discursive power and power relations in the context of progressive politics and decision-making. Power is always present and this needs to be explicitly acknowledged within progressive politics rather than swept under the carpet through the discourse of horizontalism and consensus-based decision-making. Especially post-structuralist and post-Marxism accounts of power are highly relevant in this regard (Foucault, 1994; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Lukes, 2005). As such, this is not necessarily about coercive power, but rather about the ways in which power operates at a micro level within particular processes, technologies and between people. These critical perspectives teach us that power is situated at many different levels and in sometimes less obvious or blatant ways.

Power is situated in discourse through the production of knowledge and expertise, through the ability to persuade and to argue a position eloquently and passionately. Foucault frequently reminded us that power is also situated at the level of subject positions, which again cannot be eliminated. Educational levels, class, status within the movement, or to put it in Bourdieusian terms, activist capital matter a great deal in this regard. Those more active within the movement also tend to be those with a more authoritative voice, more listened to, and more followed compared to someone in the periphery of the movement. This also has relevance to the role of affect within activism and political engagement (Jasper, 1998).
Power also manifests itself through the power to include and exclude, through negative choices, through the hidden and unspoken, through the construction of a horizon of possible and impossible positions and viewpoints, as discussed by Lukes’ (2005) third dimension of power. Furthermore, the strive towards reaching a consensus obscures the fact that exclusions always occur; there are always ‘constitutive outsides’, as Derrida (1978: 39-44) highlighted. Intrinsically linked to this, power also inevitably invokes resistance and contestation; against the exercise of power, against exclusions, against ideological enemies. This brings the inevitability of conflict into the fray (Mouffe, 1999) and the necessity to confront this.

It is, however, not a matter here of devising strategies to eradicate or eliminate conflict, power and power relations within progressive politics, this is ontologically impossible, but rather to make them explicit, to acknowledge the various manifestations of power, as well as creating an awareness amongst those engaging within progressive politics of what power does, how power operates and how it is situated in the power of voice and discourse, of action and practice, and of status and subject position within the movement and beyond.

References:


Students for a Democratic Society (1962) SDS Port Huron Statement: http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Resources/Primary/Manifestos/SDS_Port_Huron.html [Last consulted 18/01/2018].

End Notes:

1 Parts of this chapter have also been published in: Cammaerts, 2015 and Cammaerts, 2018.
2 See URL: http://socialistnetwork.org.uk/category/momentum/page/2/ [Last consulted 18/01/2018]
3 The names of all anti-austerity activists that were interviewed were anonymized.
4 See URL: http://occupylondon.org.uk/brick-lane-debates-radical-general-assembly/ [Last consulted 18/01/2018]
5 Bambuser.com is a Swedish live-streaming platform which is popular amongst activists because it enables the live streaming, from a laptop of mobile phone, of direct actions and meetings. The broadcasts are also recorded and archived for viewing after the event.
6 The quotes in this section come from semi-structured interviews that were conducted with: Kaye Loz, leader of the Pirate Party UK on 24 May 2012; with Anita Moellering and Christiane Schinkel, respectively press officer and chairwoman of the Pirate Party in Berlin on 4 June 2012 and with Thomas Goorden, a spokesperson for the Pirate Party Belgium on 15 February 2014.