Brexit and the 2017 UK General Election*

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Introduction

The 2017 UK General Election came less than a year after one of the most significant political events in recent British and European politics history: the referendum decision of British voters to exit the European Union (EU). The snap election that was meant to strengthen the Conservative government’s hand in the UK–EU Brexit negotiations, and Prime Minister Theresa May’s position within her party and in parliament, resulted instead in a diminished Conservative minority government. Given the major political event that preceded the election, it was foreseeable that it might result in new patterns of voting behaviour. What was surprising, however, is that the 2017 election saw the decline of multi-party politics in Britain, despite the Brexit divide cutting across party lines. The parties that were most united in offering distinct positions on Brexit – the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) with its ‘hard Brexit’ approach and the pro-EU Liberal Democrats and Greens with their promise of a second referendum – all lost votes. In contrast, the two major parties, that promised to honour referendum results but were deeply internally divided on the nature of post-Brexit UK–EU relations, were rewarded with the largest combined vote share in any election since 1970. How did an election in the midst of the Brexit debate lead to the strengthening of two-party politics in Britain? Was this outcome a signal that voters were uniting behind the decision to leave the European Union? And, how did the outcome of this election affect the ongoing Brexit negotiations?

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These questions are examined in this contribution. I argue that despite the ostensible consensus on Brexit by the two major parties, the public – alongside parliamentarians and political parties – remained as divided as ever. An analysis of individual-level data from the British Election Study (BES) shows that while traditional economic left–right values continued to be the main driver of electoral behaviour in British politics, other key political fault lines that were apparent in the Brexit referendum were also present in this election: the younger, progressive and degree-educated voters flocked to Labour, whereas the Conservative voter base was significantly older and more socially conservative. Moreover, the Brexit vote itself had an independent effect on vote choice, as the Conservative Party attracted more Leave voters and benefited from the collapse of UKIP, whereas Remain voters were more likely to vote for the Labour Party.

The main conclusion of this contribution is therefore that while the 2017 election resulted in the resurgence of two-party politics based on contestation along the classic economic left–right dimension, electoral behaviour in Britain – like elsewhere in Europe – is also driven by salient cultural concerns (De Vries, 2017; Kriesi et al., 2008). This reflects in part the divide created by the Brexit referendum that mobilized an underlying fault line between socially liberal cosmopolitans – mostly young and well-educated - and older, less educated socially conservative voters and which continues to reverberate (Hobolt, 2016; Jennings and Stoker, 2017). The election also had implications for Britain’s negotiations on its future relationship with the EU. The surprise outcome of the ballot weakened Mrs May’s position in her party and within Parliament, and this made it more difficult for the government to present a united and coherent position in the UK–EU negotiations. Rather than strengthening the British government’s hands in the Brexit negotiations, the 2017 election illustrated that Britain remains deeply divided over its future in the EU and in the world – in the electorate, in parliament and even within the government itself.

I. The Surprise 2017 General Election

Both the announcement and the outcome of the June 2017 UK General Election were a surprise. The snap election was called by Conservative Prime Minister, Theresa May, who had been appointed leader of the party and the government in July 2016, after former Prime Minister David Cameron resigned in response to the unexpected Brexit referendum outcome. While Mrs May had repeatedly ruled out a snap election, she nonetheless decided in April 2017 to call one
shortly after triggering Article 50 to start the exit negotiations with the EU. Ostensibly the reason for the election was to strengthen Britain’s hand in the Brexit negotiation by increasing the government’s parliamentary mandate. At the time, the snap election seemed like a clever tactical decision as the Conservative party had a sizeable lead in the opinion polls of up to 20 percentage points over Labour and was widely expected to win a large majority in parliament (Prosser, 2018). However, as the campaign progressed Labour recovered ground and finished close behind the Conservatives. Shifts of this magnitude in voting intention is highly unusual during campaigns and indicate are more volatile electorate than in the past (Mellon et al., 2018).

One key driver of vote switching during the campaign was the public’s perception of the two contenders for the premiership, Theresa May and Labour’s Jeremy Corbyn. The Conservative campaigned focused heavily on Mrs May as a strong and reliable leader who would deliver the best deal for Britain in the Brexit negotiations. But she turned out to be a much weaker campaigner than expected, while the Labour leader became increasingly popular during the campaign. Mr Corbyn was viewed by most commentators – including many of his own MPs – as too left-wing and largely unelectable, yet his favourability ratings improved steadily during the campaign (Mellon et al., 2018). Moreover, the Labour Party chose to focus their campaign on a popular anti-austerity message of increased social spending and nationalization of key public services.

Just like Cameron’s failed gamble to hold a referendum on British membership in the hope of mollifying divisions within his party and the electorate (Hobolt, 2016), May’s plan to strengthen her position within her party and in parliament and in the EU with a snap election did not pay off. The outcome was that the Conservatives lost their majority of seats and had to form a minority government with the support of the small right-wing Northern Irish party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Theresa May emerged much weaker as a result. Table 1 shows the vote and seat shares of the 2017 general election and the change in vote share since the last general election in 2015.
Table 1: 2017 UK General Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Brexit position</th>
<th>Seats 2017</th>
<th>Vote share 2017 (%)</th>
<th>Change in vote share since 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>Theresa May</td>
<td>Hard Brexit No 2nd referendum</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>+5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>Jeremy Corbyn</td>
<td>“Jobs first Brexit” No 2nd referendum</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>+9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish National Party</td>
<td>Nicola Sturgeon</td>
<td>Soft Brexit Scottish Independence referendum</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>–1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>Tim Farron</td>
<td>Soft Brexit 2nd referendum on deal</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>–0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
<td>Arlene Foster</td>
<td>Hard Brexit No 2nd referendum</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>+0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinn Féin</td>
<td>Gerry Adams</td>
<td>Special status for Northern Ireland within the EU</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaid Cymru</td>
<td>Leanne Wood</td>
<td>Soft Brexit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>–0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>Jonathan Bartley &amp; Carolin Lucas</td>
<td>Soft Brexit 2nd referendum on deal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>–2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Independence Party</td>
<td>Paul Nuttall</td>
<td>Hard Brexit No 2nd referendum</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>–10.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This list excludes the (Conservative) Speaker of the House of Commons, John Bercow, and the Independent Sylvia Hermon. 

*Hard Brexit* refers to the position of leaving the EU’s Single Market. *Soft Brexit* refers to staying in the EU’s Single Market and Customs Union.

The most noticeable change in patterns of aggregate-level electoral support between 2015 and 2017 is the move towards greater two-party dominance in 2017: 82.4 per cent voted for either a Conservative or a Labour candidate with a high turnout of 68.8 per cent. The dominance of the Conservatives and Labour was particularly pronounced in England where they won 87.3 per cent of the vote. As Table 1 shows, this strengthening of the major parties was largely due to the collapse of UKIP that dropped from a vote share of over 12 per cent to under 2 per cent, but the other smaller parties (outside Northern Ireland) also lost votes.

What is perhaps surprising is that voters did not reward the parties that took the most distinct positions on the Brexit question. Despite being the most unified pro-Brexit party, UKIP was abandoned by most of the 52 per cent of the British electorate who had voted to leave the European Union. UKIP’s decline can be attributed to the fact that the party’s major
campaigning issue of leaving the EU had been accepted by both major parties. Moreover, the referendum had allowed the Conservative Party to adopt a similar a hard-line position on reducing immigration post-Brexit; a position that had formed a major part of UKIP’s electoral appeal (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). According to the British Election Study, 73 per cent of 2015 UKIP defectors voted for the Conservative Party in 2017 (57 per cent of all 2015 UKIP voters) (Mellon et al., 2018). Remainers also did not reward the Liberal Democrats or the Greens that had campaigned most strongly against a Hard Brexit and for a second referendum on the final Brexit deal, with the option of staying in the European Union (Liberal Democrats, 2017). Both parties lost voters, with 42 per cent of 2015 Green voters switching to Labour in the 2017 election (Mellon et al., 2018).

In contrast, the two major parties – the Conservatives and Labour – did not make Brexit a central theme of their campaign. Both parties were committed to honouring the referendum result, but they focused little on the details of their plans for Brexit, perhaps in part due to their internal divisions over the UK’s future relationship with the EU. Mrs May had already given a major speech on Brexit that made it explicit that the government would seek to leave not only the EU itself, but also the Single Market and the Customs Union, and therefore ruled out a so-called ‘Soft Brexit’.

The emphasis during the campaign was therefore on the need for a ‘strong and stable government to get the best Brexit deal’ (Conservative Party, 2017). The Labour Party was promising a ‘Jobs First Brexit’, which some interpreted as a softer approach to the negotiations, but the party made no commitment to staying in the Single Market or any promises of a second referendum. Instead the focus of its campaign was a Britain ‘For the Many, not the Few’, which signalled a commitment to more redistribution and greater spending on the welfare state.

Given the election result, it is tempting to conclude that voters had largely united behind Brexit and that the issue was unimportant in the election. However, the polling data show a very different story. As shown in Figure 1, there has been very little movement in public opinion

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1 Labour’s Manifesto was ambiguous on Single Market membership (Labour Party, 2017). The party promised to ‘scrap the Conservatives’ Brexit White Paper and replace it with fresh negotiating priorities that have a strong emphasis on retaining the benefits of the Single Market and the Customs Union’, thus emphasizing the ‘benefits’ of the Single Market, rather than ‘membership’ of the Single Market.
on Brexit since the referendum when it comes to the question of whether Britain was right or wrong to vote to leave the EU.

As Figure 1 shows, the public remains split down the middle when it comes to the question ‘in hindsight, do you think Britain was right or wrong to vote to leave the EU?’ Few people have changed their minds since the referendum and if anything the division between Remainers and Leavers is becoming more entrenched. Other research that I have conducted with collaborators on public attitudes and identities in the aftermath of Brexit reveals that around three-quarters of British citizens identify as either Remainers or Leavers, and these new identities cut across traditional party lines. More worryingly, our research shows that such identities go beyond political disagreement and translate into animosity towards and stereotyping of the opposite side (see Hobolt et al., 2018). But to what extent were these divisions reflected in the 2017 election? This question is examined in the next section.

II. A Brexit Election?
While the two major parties, the Conservatives and Labour, adopted seemingly similar positions on the Brexit question, the Brexit question clearly continued to divide voters. Despite the reluctance of the parties to make the election about Brexit, the issue nonetheless did have an impact on their electoral support. Heath and Goodwin’s (2017) analysis of constituency-level data show that Conservatives made gains from the electoral decline of UKIP in Leave-supporting areas, but lost in more Remain-supporting areas with large number of graduates and younger voters. There was also a slight tendency for Labour to perform better in Remain-supporting constituencies (Heath and Goodwin, 2017). Jennings and Stoker, in their study of aggregate-level constituency data, however, reject the description of the 2017 election as a ‘Brexit election’, since ‘the vote is better seen as a symptom of the longer-term bifurcation of politics; less revenge of the “Remainers” and more a continuing battle of mobilisation between cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan areas’ (Jennings and Stoker, 2017, p. 359).

These patterns in constituency-level voting thus raise important questions about the salience of Brexit to individual-level voters, as well as a broader cosmopolitan/non-cosmopolitan divide in British politics. The Brexit referendum itself had demonstrated a stark demographic and value divide between younger, better educated and more cosmopolitan voters who voted overwhelming to remain in the EU, and older, less well-educated more socially conservative voters who favoured leaving (Hobolt, 2016). Attitudes towards immigration was one of the key issues that divided Remainers and Leavers, as the latter group saw Brexit as an opportunity to restrict immigration (Clarke et al., 2017; Hobolt, 2016).

This divide is not particular to British politics. Many scholars have pointed to the increasing importance of a new dimension in European politics centred not around classic economic questions about redistribution and the role of the state, but rather on a cultural divide between openness to immigration, multiculturalism and international co-operation on the one hand and traditional cultural values, nationalism and euroscepticism on the other hand (see De Vries and Hobolt, 2012; De Vries and Marks, 2012). Although the emphasis is on ‘cultural’ attitudes, such attitudes may well, at least in part, be rooted in the structural changes to the globalized economy that has created both winners and losers (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008). This divide has been given various labels in the literature, such as the integration–demarcation dimension (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008), the cosmopolitan axis (Jennings and Stoker, 2017), and the transnational cleavage (Hooghe and Marks, 2018) and while there is no agreement on the exact
content of this divide (De Vries, 2017), it is regarded as distinct from the traditional economic left–right dimension and focused more on identity and cultural concerns.

There is little doubt that the Brexit referendum heightened the salience of the cultural dimension of politics in ways that cut across the traditional economic and left–right dimension (Hobolt, 2016). So, the question is to what extent this cosmopolitan divide was also present in the general election, and whether the Brexit issue was salient to voters’ decision-making even when accounting for these factors. To examine this, we turn to individual-level data from the British Election Study’s post-election face-to-face survey (Fieldhouse et al., 2018). This dataset provides a nationally representative face-to-face survey on how people voted in the election, their socio-demographic characteristics and their political attitudes as well as how they voted in the 2016 referendum, and thus provides an excellent source for examining the drivers of voting behaviour.

Our analysis focuses on the vote for the two major parties, with a vote for the incumbent Conservative Party as the reference category (the full details of the data and results can be found in the Appendix). First, we examine the demographic predictors of the Conservative vote. To the extent that the demographic divide of the Brexit referendum is replicated, we should see that younger voters and graduates would be far less likely to vote Conservative. We also examine the impact of ethnicity and social class identity on vote choice. Figure 2 shows the marginal effects based on a logit model of Conservative vote in the 2017 general election, with Labour vote as the reference category. It clearly shows that age was a significant factor in the general election – as it was in the referendum (Hobolt, 2016) – with voters over 65 years old 34 percentage points more likely to vote Conservative than voters below 35 years old. We also find that university graduates were 10 percentage points more likely to vote Labour than those with no qualifications. However, this educational divide is much less stark than in the referendum, perhaps is part due to the legacy of class divisions in electoral politics which meant that working class voters would traditionally vote Labour, while the better-educated middle class would vote Conservative (Evans and Tilley, 2017). We do observe that voters who self-identify as working class (reference category) were still significantly more likely to vote Labour, compared to middle class voters and those without a class identity. Voters from ethnic minority backgrounds were also more likely to vote Labour.

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2 The results are almost identical if we include all the minor parties in the analysis.
These individual-level demographic differences mirror the constituency-level differences between Labour-supporting urban areas with more diverse, younger and more educated voters and Conservative-voting smaller towns and rural areas, with older and less diverse populations (Jennings and Stoker, 2017). But does this mean that electoral behaviour in Britain had tilted towards the cosmopolitan axis in the 2017 election, and that economic attitudes were less relevant? And did Brexit play a role in shaping vote choices?

To examine these questions, we fit a second model that – in addition to the demographic variables above – also includes a set of attitudinal variables and an item on vote choice in the 2016 referendum. As mentioned above, there is no agreement on the main features of the ‘cultural’ dimension of politics or the degree to which it is correlated with, or orthogonal to, traditional left–right attitudes towards politics (De Vries, 2017). Hence, as a starting point for
our analysis, we ran an exploratory factor analysis on a large set of attitudinal question items, covering both standard economic left–right items and questions on socially liberal versus socially conservative attitudes. The results show two main attitudinal dimensions that can be labelled as ‘economic’ and ‘cultural’. The economic items capture attitudes towards state intervention in the economy and redistribution, whereas the cultural items capture attitudes towards traditional values, crime, immigration and ethnic minorities. On the basis of this factor analysis, I created two factor scores representing the cultural and economic attitude dimensions, as well as including a question on whether the respondent voted Leave, Remain or abstained in the Brexit referendum. The results are shown in Figure 3.

3 Economic attitudes items include: ‘Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's economic problems’; ‘It is the government’s responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one’; ‘Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership’; and ‘Make much greater efforts to make people’s incomes more equal’ (see Fieldhouse et al., 2018).

4 Cultural attitude items include: ‘Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values’; ‘People in Britain should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives’; ‘For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence’; ‘Do you think immigration is good or bad for Britain's economy?’ and ‘And how do you feel about attempts to give equal opportunities to black people and Asians in Britain?’ (see Fieldhouse et al., 2018).
The results are striking. First, they clearly show that classic left–right economic attitudes are still the primary driver of vote choice in Britain. This should not be surprising given that post-war party competition in Britain, and in most of Western Europe, has been organized around the economic left–right dimension. Moreover, given the nature of the election campaign where the two parties took very distinct positions on these economic issues – after two decades of ideological convergence – it is understandable economic left–right attitudes were also salient to voters (Evans and Tilley, 2017; Green and Hobolt, 2008). But it is nonetheless an important reminder that that attitudes concerning the role of the state in the economy and redistribution are still strongly correlated with vote choice. Cultural attitudes also matter, but less than economic ones. Interestingly, we can see that the Brexit vote was a very important determinant of vote choice, even when controlling for cultural attitudes and demographics. Someone who voted to Leave the EU in 2016 was 16 percentage points more likely to vote Conservative than someone who had voted Remain, holding other attitudes constant. This suggests that despite the reluctance of the major parties to offer distinct positions on Brexit, the referendum played
a role as Leavers flocked to the Conservatives and Remainers (perhaps more surprisingly) voted for Labour in larger numbers. One reason why a salient pro-EU/eurosceptic divide did not benefit smaller parties, as we have seen in the rest of Europe (see Hobolt and De Vries, 2015), is Britain’s use of the first-past-the-post electoral system, which encourages voters to think more strategically about which party has a realistic chance of forming a government when casting a vote. Another reason is that issues other than Brexit appear to have been more important to a number of voters, notably traditional concerns about the economy and social services.

In the next section, I examine the broader consequences of this Brexit election on British politics and UK-EU negotiations.

III. Brexit Negotiations

When Mrs May announced the snap general election in April 2017, she declared with reference to Brexit that ‘the country is coming together but Westminster is not’. As shown in Figure 1, however, there is little evidence to support the claim that the country is coming together, and the election result did not lead to greater unity over Brexit, in Westminster or in the general population. This polarization of public opinion along Brexit lines makes it more difficult for the government to agree on a negotiation position that will satisfy a large proportion of the electorate. Following the disappointing election result for Mrs May, only 34 per cent of voters thought her government was doing a good job handling Britain’s exit from the EU, compared with 57 per cent who thought they were doing a bad job.5 One of the reasons for the negative evaluation of the government’s performance, even among many Leavers, is the continued uncertainty surrounding the Prime Minister’s approach to Brexit. Her Cabinet has remained openly divided on the right balance between achieving the benefits of continued free trade with the European Union and avoiding a border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland on the one hand, and enforcing British priorities on restricting payments to the EU, ending freedom of movement and leaving the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice on the other hand. While the EU – led by the Commission’s negotiator Michel Barnier – has maintained a unified and consistent line throughout the negotiations, emphasizing the core principles that the UK cannot leave the Single Market and the Customs Union and maintain

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5 Poll by Ipsos MORI, 18 July 2017.
frictionless trade and the benefits of membership, the British government has been accused of
an unrealistic ‘have cake and eat it’ approach to the Brexit negotiations (Hagemann, 2018).

It is not only the government that is in turmoil over the future shape of Britain’s relationship
with the EU. Both the Labour Party and the Conservatives are fundamentally divided in
Parliament over key aspects of how the UK’s relationship with the EU should be reshaped. A
survey of MPs in late 2017 shows that within the Labour Party, the ordinary backbench MPs
favour a softer approach to Brexit than their party leadership with 90 per cent of Labour MPs
stating that membership of the Single Market is both possible outside the EU and compatible
with honouring the referendum (Cowley and Wager, 2018). In contrast, a majority of
Conservative MPs take a more hard-line approach to aspects of the Brexit negotiations than
their government, with 74 per cent of Conservative MPs surveyed opposing the continued
freedom of movement during a transition period, and 63 per cent saying they do not want any
role for the ECJ after March 2019, both of which have been conceded to the EU by the British
government in the discussion of transition arrangements.

The UK general election can thus be said to have weakened the British government’s position
in the negotiations, as it did little to provide more clarity on Britain’s position on the future
UK–EU relationship and damaged Theresa May’s position both within her party and within
parliament. Her weakness within the party – leading to her being described as a ‘dead woman
walking’ in the aftermath of the election – has meant that she has little authority over the ‘hard
Brexiters’ within her Cabinet, and this makes it more difficult to compromise in the UK–EU
Brexit negotiations. Moreover, her weakness within Parliament means that she is vulnerable to
rebellions within her own ranks – also from Tory Remainers – and she needs the support of the
hard-line DUP to ensure the survival of her minority government. This became abundantly
clear in December 2017 when an agreement struck between Britain and the EU to solve the
problem of the Irish border and move to the next phase of Brexit talks was thwarted at the very
last minute by the DUP. An agreement was finally struck to move the Brexit negotiations to
the second phase that involves the future relationship between the UK and the EU, but Mrs
May continues to find herself performing a delicate balancing act between hard-liners in her
own party and in the DUP and a Parliament dominated by parliamentarians who prefer a softer
approach.

Conclusion
Less than a year after the historical referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU, Prime Minister May called the election to secure an increased majority for her government and a strong mandate for the Brexit negotiations. The surprising outcome of the election was a hung parliament, resulting in a minority government led by a weakened prime minister. While Brexit was the apparent reason for the early election, it did not dominate the campaign, not least as the two major parties shared a very similar position on the Brexit issue, namely that the referendum outcome would be respected and that Britain would be leaving the EU without a second referendum. The fact that this Brexit election led to the strengthening of two-party politics – with the Conservatives and Labour winning the biggest combined share of the vote since the 1970s – is something of a conundrum. As a cross-cutting political issue, we might expect Brexit to lead to greater fragmentation of party politics (Hobolt and De Vries, 2015). Yet, instead the Conservative Party benefited from the fact that the Brexit vote allowed them to adopt a hard-line position on both Brexit and immigration. This resulted in the collapse of UKIP’s electoral appeal, as voters – especially older, socially conservative voters – flocked to the Conservatives (Mellon et al., 2018). The analysis also shows that Remain voters – especially younger socially-liberal graduates – voted in larger numbers for Labour. Some Remain voters may have voted Labour in the hope that the party would adopt a ‘softer’ approach to Brexit in office, while others were attracted to the party’s left-wing anti-austerity message. Our analysis reveals that the major parties’ distinct socio-economic policies were decisive for many voters.

Overall, the election that was meant to unify the nation, and Parliament, after a divisive Brexit referendum did little to achieve that. The British public remained deeply divided on the issue of Brexit. The election also weakened the Prime Minister’s position, both within her party and within Parliament. The difficult policy choices involved in negotiating Britain’s exit from the European Union were thus compounded by an election that enfeebled the government and revealed deep and enduring divisions in the country.
### Online Appendix

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative vote</td>
<td>1,396</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age groups</td>
<td>2,175</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education groups</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>1.62</td>
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<td>Middle class ID</td>
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<td>White British</td>
<td>2,194</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.35</td>
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<td>Cultural dimension</td>
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<td>0.83</td>
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<td>Economic dimension</td>
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<td>Brexit vote</td>
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<td>0.74</td>
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Table A2: Vote Choice Models

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<th>Demographic Model</th>
<th>Full Model</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Log odds</td>
<td>SE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age (Reference: 18–34 years old)</td>
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<tr>
<td>35–44 years old</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–64 years old</td>
<td>0.89*</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+ years old</td>
<td>1.62*</td>
<td>0.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education (Reference: No qualification)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other qualification</td>
<td>–0.01</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree education</td>
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<td>0.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Class identity (Reference: working class)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle class identification</td>
<td>1.44*</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>No class identification</td>
<td>1.10*</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>White British (Reference: Non-white)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural dimension</td>
<td>0.33*</td>
<td>0.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic dimension</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Brexit vote (Reference: Remain)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voted leave</td>
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<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,326</td>
<td>1,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: British Election Study 2017 (Fieldhouse et al., 2018).

Dependent variable: Conservative vote. Logistic regression model. *p<0.05.
References


