Sonia Livingstone and Julian Sefton-Green

Class in "The Class": conservative, competitive and (dis)connected

Book section (accepted version)

Original citation:

© 2018 Routledge

This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88369/
Available in LSE Research Online: June 2018

LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.

This document is the author’s submitted version of the book section. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it.
Class in “The Class”: Conservative, Competitive and (Dis)connected

Sonia Livingstone and Julian Sefton-Green, LSE, London


We recently spent a year with a class of 13- to 14-year-olds in a fairly typical London school. We followed 28 young people through their lessons at school, and in the corridors and playground moments of the school day, and then we spent time with them in their homes, meeting their parents, understanding their friendship groups, sharing their hobbies, discussing their social networks, going online together. Our interest lay in how this highly diverse group made sense of the world—what was expected of them, what gave them pleasure, and what problems they encountered. Our purpose was to grasp young people’s own views of the world and how these intersected with the views of their parents, teachers, and the wider society. Avoiding a media-centric approach, a central thread through our ethnographic portrait was the young people’s everyday use of media and, more profoundly, their experience of growing up in a so-called “digital age.”

In The Class: Living and Learning in the Digital Age, we interrogate these views and experiences through the lens of late modern theories of selfhood, pedagogy, and sociality (Livingstone and Sefton-Green 2016). More than ever before, people are charged with charting their own course through life and taking responsibility for their own risks to a degree that contrasts markedly with previous eras, when social convention and tradition had greater force. Yet in trying to cope with the stresses of modernity, people are beset by unprecedented levels of uncertainty—incomplete knowledge, conflicting experts, complex decisions, precarious alliances, untrustworthy institutions, too little time.

Socio-technological developments promise enticing solutions and enhanced life choices, but they demand complex calculations of risk that preoccupy and burden us. As Zygmunt Bauman (2002, xv–xvi) put it: “Modernity replaces determinism of social standing with compulsive and obligatory self-determination… Let there be no mistake: now, as before, individualization is a fate, not a choice.” From this perspective, each individual is on their own, since traditional networks of support or welfare provision are no longer reliable or ever-present. Thus Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (2002, 23) write of the necessity for individuals to become “actors, builders, jugglers, stage managers of their own biographies and identities and also of their social links and networks.” Moreover, the unequally distributed resources of social, economic and cultural capital that individuals have at their disposal are further exacerbated through the processes of social reproduction. As a result, “social inequality is on the rise precisely because of the spread of individualization” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002, xxiv). But Beck and Beck-Gernsheim argue further that we must now recognize “the non-class character of individualized inequalities”—for while inequality is still with us, the dis-embedding “processes of individualization deprive class distinctions of their social identity” (2002, 39).
Somewhat problematically for our project, such theories of late modernity appear to speak for everyone yet they devote relatively little attention to the nature or specificities of children’s experiences or of the key institutions of family and school that shape them. In this chapter, we contribute to this volume’s analysis of the changing relations between media and social class in late modernity by reflecting on what we learned from our fieldwork about the lived realities of social class in the class (forgive the double use of “class”!), focusing on the young people’s use of media and the wider processes of mediation in which their lives are entangled.

**Conceiving of class difference**

The contention that it is class consciousness rather than inequality that is fading in late modernity certainly rang true in our fieldwork. People still use the terms “middle” and “working” class, but the meaning of these terms is changing, no longer mapping neatly onto right and left wings of the political spectrum, or management and workforce, or even onto wealthy and poor but instead referring to a looser association between social status and forms of knowledge, social capital, and cultural tastes and habits. Social class, as several contributors to this volume have noted, involves an active process of identification and signaling ways of belonging to wider collectivities, not a deterministic process of positioning through socio-economic factors.

In our study differences of social class (and indeed, racial difference) were publically effaced by the school, creating a seemingly “fair” neutrality despite the fact that students spoke multiple languages, practiced the breadth of the world’s religions and, while some lived in homes worth several million pounds, others lived in state-subsidized council (“social”) housing. Some of the students were migrants or refugees with educated parents who had held high-status jobs in their country of origin but now lived in far poorer circumstances. In about half the families, the mothers had higher education degrees, but in other cases, especially single-parent families, parents were working in low-paid precarious jobs. From economic, cultural, and social perspectives (Savage 2015), the young people in our class were a microcosm of contemporary Britain, and they lived with the risk of conflict, misunderstanding, and prejudice also faced by the wider society.

While teachers, parents, and the young people themselves generally endorsed the idea that all should be equal, treated according to their individual merits, the class was hardly unaware of differences in social class. We saw this most clearly in the choice of friendships, enacted offline and online, where the young people self-assorted into relatively homogeneous groupings by socio-economic position, ethnicity, and gender, albeit with interesting exceptions that we explore in the book. But while most of the young people preferred not to articulate this as anything other than a personal choice, Megan and Shane had a go at discussing differences of social class, drawing on a polarized discourse of “people like me” and “others.” Megan, a popular girl from a middle-class family, gave a highly coded account, based on who lived where and which elementary school they went to. When asked to explain further, she admitted that:
“I’m not really friends with—this sounds bad—any poor people. But that’s not because I’m not friends with people who are poor. It’s just that just happens to be who I’m friends with.”

We thought this comment suggested a commitment to holding on to these social distinctions, but Megan did not welcome our pushing her on this point. Indeed, when we next asked whether the mix of backgrounds at the school was problematic, Megan was glad to explicate the democratic vision of the whole class:

“No, I don’t really think that’s an issue, like, because we all go to the same school, so we’re not that different... It’s not like we’re going to have fights: ‘You’re not as rich as me. I don’t like you.’ So I don’t think it matters. I think it’s good because you can always meet someone who’s, like, different to you.”

Shane, whose family was not well off, was more willing to explain how social class divided the students:

“In our year, we’ve got the posh people. There’s the people that play pat ball, football, and the people that chat about rubbish.”

Whilst Shane had no trouble identifying “the posh people,” he found it hard to explain why they merited such a label: “They’re not posh, but we just call them posh, I don’t know why.” Although it may not have been obvious from his initial classification, Shane was not keen on those who “play pat ball,” preferring those who play football (soccer) or “chat about rubbish”—meaning, “not chat about rubbish but, like, the people, like, always having a laugh.”

The wealthier parents had chosen to live in a mixed neighborhood and to send their children to the local school rather than to bring them up in a more privileged context. Some of the less well-off parents had worked hard to give their child this chance to benefit from a “good school.” Shane lived on the edge of the catchment area, and his mother told us of her efforts to get him into the school as a way of extricating himself from the more problematic environment of his primary school, and was glad that his new friends were, as she told us, “lovely boys, all well-mannered kids.” This did not necessarily provide Shane with a straightforward route to “success.” As he explained, “when I was younger, I wanted to be a footballer. But it’s not as easy as people think it is.” Later, he reflected: “I’m basically guaranteed a job with my uncle, but if not, I’d rather be a carpenter or like something designing stuff, making wood.”

Although Shane was from a poor background and Megan from a relatively privileged one, both were more able to identify privilege than poverty. In our sociologically informed efforts to classify members of the class, we faced a similar hurdle: identifying who was middle class was fairly straightforward but, with the exception of Shane himself (who bore a remarkable resemblance to Paul Willis’ lads “learning to labour”; see Willis 1978), none of the class could be neatly labeled as working class, with several having more cultural capital than one might expect from their economic resources, for reasons of migration or divorce.
Mediated imaginaries

Schools are expected to fulfill more roles than simply providing and accrediting learning. They are organized in ways that promote a particular way of being. Given that members of a class are brought together not exactly by accident but by processes over which they have little control, they have to learn to manage their relations with each other and with the wider community of the school. Recognizing the wide diversity of backgrounds accommodated within the class, the school in our study had good reason to emphasize a narrative about the students as a collectivity. As their class teacher Catherine explained, “they have a real sense of, you know, an identity as [the class] and I think that, for the most part, they’re quite proud of that.” Another teacher added, when asked about the relations among the wealthier and poorer students, “I don’t think it affects, necessarily, the way they interact with each other.” Or, as Megan explained, in justifying the school’s seemingly arbitrary rules on uniform and appearance, “It’s like being a community, because everyone is the same.” While some may read the efforts of the school critically as imposing middle-class social norms on the potentially unruly mass, civility can also connote positive ideas of tolerating or getting on with others (Elias 2000). As Susanne Wessendorf (2014, 392) observes of highly urban multicultural neighborhoods, such as that of our school, these are “super-diverse” and thus demand “civility towards diversity” as a daily strategy of their inhabitants—for survival, and for effective functioning.

Stanton Wortham (2005, 1) argues that not only do the “social identification, power relations and interpersonal struggles” of daily life occur in the classroom as anywhere else, but they also intersect with the academic learning that necessarily occurs there. Wortham was particularly interested in the “common pedagogical strategy of building an analogy between students’ actual or hypothetical experiences and the curricular topic” (2005, 2). Since building these analogies is doubly hazardous—both because the teachers know little of the students’ lives at home and because these are themselves very diverse—popular culture is often positioned as a shared body of experience by which teachers can bridge what students are presumed to know already and what they need to learn. To motivate students in physical education, the teacher observed that they would do the same warm-up exercises as celebrity footballers. To advertise the science club in the year group assembly, students were enjoined to find out “how an iPhone works.” To explain graphs in math, the exercises were to plot data on mobile phone tariffs or Hollywood film profits. To judge work in geography, students were invited to act as judges in X Factor, a popular reality television show. These popular culture references far from matched the actual interests of the students, and at times they actively masked significant differences between them, skating over potential conflicts. So, while to the teachers, references to television programs or listening to music offered a kind of common culture (see Jones 2009, on how popular culture has come to stand in for common culture) that enabled both teaching and civility, the limitations of this approach were never far away.

Meanwhile, in their leisure time the young people exploited the potential of media to imagine more individualized alternatives to the shared imaginary constructed by the school. For example, Abby, from a poor, mixed-race home, loved music because:
“I think music, kind of, describes a person really. So like, if there was like… if you listen to that type of music they’re kind of, they’ve got their own type of personality kind of, like that music and I think if you, like, listen to, like R&B type music, you’re not exactly like [unclear] or nothing, but you kind of, have the same type of personality as the music.”

And Megan, from a more privileged and artistic home, said:

“All Tumblrs are different so you can have some which is just writing or some that is just pictures… I used to have a Kawaii blog, which is like… although if I Tumblr it’s just a random [thing]—if I thought something was nice I’d re-blog it. Then I went to Kawaii which is flashing images and now it’s gone to Hipstar, sort of indie.”

To these girls, their choices are highly individual, however outsiders might interpret them. Building on her choices, Abby imagines how her interest in music could lead her first to an elite music school and then to a musical career, though when we talked again a few months later, she had already given up on that idea. Dilruba, who lived in a low-income, mixed-ethnicity family of four girls and a single-parent mother, dreamed of a career in fashion, which she expressed partly through being an early adopter of Twitter—as a way of “keeping up-to-date. Just, like, looking, like, seeing celebrity lives.”

At that time, Twitter permitted entry to an adult world, allowing first steps in following, contributing, and trying things out, even if little noticed by others. Abby, too, had also worked out that Twitter could bring her closer to the music world that she hoped to join as a career. And so had Dominic, from a far wealthier home: as a footballer and football fan, he would join in Twitter conversations among professional footballers and commentators, enjoying the chance to be part of something that he cared about but which was beyond his normal reach as a young teenager.

By contrast, the whole class used Facebook. Whilst once exciting as a space of identity work (Livingstone 2008), this was used by the young people in a remarkably parallel manner to the school’s civil space, as an online domain in which banal but significant phatic and identity tasks could be played out. Almost everyone was “friends” on Facebook with everyone else, rendering this meaningless for the construction of strong ties or for more intimate explorations of selfhood but meaningful in terms of weak ties (Granovetter 1983; Hampton and Wellman 2003) and the generalized construction of a common social belonging.

In short, consumption of media represents a key site for young people’s identity work, (Buckingham 2008), both providing a visible way of marking the acceptance or rejection of taste cultures (Thornton 1995), but also because, in ways young people may relish more than adults, media consumption affords easy and active experimentation with possible identities. Insofar as “taste classifies and it classifies the classifier” (Bourdieu 1984), our fieldwork revealed young people’s lives lived between the social conservativism of family and school life and the mediated imaginaries made possible through media connections. These mediated imaginaries served to reinforce a kind of conservative progressiveness—an enlightenment notion of civility—whilst also offering the flexibility for individualized escape routes.
Educational aspirations and the digital home

At home, we saw a similar oscillation being played out between the shared experiences of family life—often with the family on the sofa around the television set for at least some part of each day, usually at the instigation of a determined parent, irrespective of social class—and the desire of family members to pursue individual pursuits in their own time and spaces (for children, usually in their bedrooms and/or online). But in one crucial respect digital media were co-opted into a highly classed practice, namely, that of supporting school learning and, thereby, children’s imagined futures. In this regard, perhaps unsurprisingly given a context of considerable anxieties over precarious futures, we saw parents (as well as school) tending to see children less in terms of who they are or what they do than in terms of who they could become (Qvortrup et al. 1994; Corsaro 2011). Crucially, digital media are being co-opted into the future-oriented effort to ensure children “keep up” or “get ahead” (Blum-Ross and Livingstone 2016), with an emphasis on the provision of curricular knowledge in ways that promise competitive academic achievement and, perhaps, social mobility.

Yet the evidence shows that social mobility—the chance for young people to improve on the material conditions of their parents—has ground to a halt in recent decades, to the point where developed countries can no longer promise future generations increased prosperity or quality of life (Brown et al. 2011; Cribb et al. 2013; Putnam 2015). Rather, as Basil Bernstein (1990) argued, education “re-contextualizes” knowledge so as to ensure success for young people from middle-class homes compared with those who are less privileged. In effect, education is a key instrument for the social reproduction of inequality, notwithstanding that it professes “fairness.” This intensifies the felt burden on parents as they struggle to ensure that their child can be included among school’s beneficiaries.

Social reproduction occurs as much, if not even more, at home than at school as families with already-greater economic and cultural capital work competitively to sustain their social advantages (Bourdieu 1984). These processes, too, appear intensified in late modernity. In the UK, Valerie Hey (2000) wrote of the “offensive” sociality (or “pushy individualism”) of the new middle class by contrast with the “defensive” sociality of the disadvantaged (with their reliance of the traditions of hierarchy). In the US, Annette Lareau (2011) contrasted the rigorous schedule of adult-organized out-of-school enrichment activities (“concerted cultivation”) practiced by middle-class families with working-class families’ assumption of “natural growth,” arguing that the former breeds a cumulative sense of entitlement in children which helps them get ahead in institutionalized settings such as the school. Meanwhile, in working-class families, “the cultural logic of child rearing at home is out of sync with the standards of institutions” (2011, 3), and thus “social class dynamics are woven into the texture and rhythm of children and parents’ daily lives” (2011, 236) to the disadvantage of the already disadvantaged.

In our study we focused on the relationship—imagined and practiced—between learning at school and at home. In a host of different ways, digital media promised to undergird this relationship in progressive ways, improving mutual understanding, overcoming dysfunctional
boundaries, building on spontaneous interests, and supporting personalized pathways. Yet the realities more often supported processes of social reproduction. In our book, we traced this in two main ways. One was how families acquired and deployed home computing technology so as to support their children’s homework, arranging a corner of the home and devoting time in the daily routine to ensuring its “proper” use. A second was the way in which some of the families supported their children’s music learning, variously providing instruments, lessons, and social and other forms of support. We have only space here to illustrate the first of these, with two vignettes.

Yusuf’s parents, Muslim immigrants from East Africa, took the idea of supporting learning in the home a step further. They had invested in an expensive but unaccredited set of CDs containing a curriculum in math and English for their four children to improve their educational outcomes working individually in an especially kitted-out bedroom at home. The father, originally a trained nurse but now working as a railway ticket inspector, acted as the head teacher (school principal), charting the children’s progress on a series of complex wall charts. Yusuf’s teachers were unaware of this domestic investment in technology and effort, and it was unclear whether it brought educational benefits—especially as Yusuf was withdrawn for language support at school. Indeed, we saw a rather reserved boy with little time to relax or identify and pursue his own interests.

By contrast, Giselle’s educated and artistic parents supported a host of creative learning practices in their daughter, including a mother who took sketchbooks, paints, and an easel on holiday to teach her children art, and child-led rather than grade-led music lessons with an “alternative” teacher. A similar structure of support framed Giselle’s technological pursuits. For example, her father told us unprompted of how her Minecraft play developed technological fluency and social skills to participate in a virtual social world. Giselle had learned to conceive of her game-play as part of her interest-driven artistic practice, contrasting with the school’s hard distinction between art lessons, ICT lessons, and, excluded from school entirely, playing computer games.

Unlike Yusuf’s home, which mimicked school routines, testing, and outcomes, for Giselle it was home that was seen as superior in providing creative and flexible opportunities to learn, and school that failed to match up. As Giselle’s father said:

“I don’t know what happens in the school really… when it comes to music I think it always sounded like music is a bit chaotic generally at school, and isn’t really the place to really… the music classes aren’t really the place to do much at all….”

Our book offers more such examples, further complicating any simple conclusions about digital media use in relation to social class. But we do want to stress that it wasn’t the working-class families just leaving their children to grow up as they might, while middle-class families push theirs ahead. Rather, we saw most if not all parents strive for some degree of “concerted cultivation,” to borrow Lareau’s terminology, or for some “curricularization” of leisure time (Buckingham and Sefton-Green 2004), but their differential starting points in terms of cultural capital made for differential outcomes. Supporting and going beyond the
accounts of Hey, Lareau, and others, we observed, first, that some middle-class parents deliberately eschewed competitive pressures by seeking alternative approaches which, since they were often built around artistic endeavors, we decided to call “bohemian.” Second, since many of our poorer families belonged to minority ethnic cultures, the pedagogic support they provided at home tended either to misrecognize the values of the majority culture (and, thereby, the school’s values) or to result in outcomes that could not be converted into those valued or even recognized by the school.

**Mediated disconnections**

While parents often used digital media as part of their efforts to build a bridge between home and school, albeit sometimes unsuccessfully, a further theme emerging from our study of media use was the desire for positive disconnections. As we saw in a host of apparently disparate but thematically linked ways, children, parents, and teachers all had good reasons to try to keep the spaces of their lives distinct. And, in a highly mediated age, this often meant subtly undermining the extraordinary capacity for digital networks to connect previously unconnected people, activities, or experiences in an effort to preserve privacy and autonomy.

In one such episode, we saw how digital connections could work against the interests of those with something to lose, even as they might, in other circumstances, aid those with something to gain from the greater visibility of their private lives. Aiden, an Afro-Caribbean boy in the class, had been expelled from a previous school for violent behavior, and his family was, we were told, “known to social services,” meaning that the family was in receipt of a range of state interventions. At school we observed him to be generally polite but reserved, seemingly anxious to avoid trouble, and to make a success of this new opportunity. However, he brought a somewhat dangerous air of what he termed “the street” into the social world of the class, and on several occasions we witnessed his good behavior disintegrate as he became drawn into disruptive exchanges.

One day we arrived at school to learn that it was no longer prepared to try to integrate Aiden into mainstream education; he had, in effect, been expelled again. The trigger was an incident on Facebook, but as so often, behind the amplification of conflict on Facebook lay a “real-life” (offline) incident, which he described to us in these terms:

“Basically some girl Facebooked me and said, ‘How did you get out at lunchtime?’ And I said, ‘I’m allowed to go.’ And then she said, ‘Oh, I’m going to come with you.’ And I’m like, ‘Okay, cool, but if you get caught, don’t bring my name into it.’ And then she came with me, and we were in… some chicken and chip shop. And then we were playing about: she was grabbing me as a little play thing, and I punched her in her leg. And then she told her friend. And then her friend started hyping [acting ‘over the top’] to me on Facebook, and I replied back. And then I don’t know how the school found out or what it had to do with them… She told her friend, who was a boy, and then he started hyping to me. And then I retaliated, and I don’t know how the school got involved.”

8
Reflecting on this incident, both Aiden and his mother acknowledged that he was at fault, but Aiden was adamant that this incident was not a matter for school. In his view, such peer interactions—on Facebook, on the street—were played out according to social codes that adults did not understand, nor were they meant to. He put a lot of effort into managing life at school so as to keep it quite separate from life with his tight group of friends “on the street,” and so he felt the school’s decision was unjust.

When we visited Aiden’s Facebook profile, we found that the seemingly reserved boy we had met at school had more “friends” than anyone else in the class (over 1,000) and low privacy settings, and he chatted daily with much vigor and interest. These communications revealed a curious mix—for the most part, he presented himself as a tough guy, strutting, flirting, threatening, and swearing. Yet there were also some photos of a “good boy,” along with happy birthday messages, suggesting (to us) a curious switching between seemingly incompatible identity performances.

Most interesting was the way in which Aiden sought to manage the boundary between personal and public through his use of language. Quietly well-spoken at school to adults, online he relished the linguistic repertoire of black London English along with contemporary forms of hip-hop culture (in this case, variants of British “Grime,” London-centric rap). On Facebook, nearly all expressions were in this argot, often involving highly sexist and sexual observations about women, violence, and anger, as well as solidarity with other oppressed black youth. The very frequency and intensity of these interactions revealed Aiden’s investment in asserting particular identity practices, in contrast with the largely banal yet civil online interactions of most of the class. For Aiden, unlike others in the class, Facebook offered a closed and peer-directed space for important personal expression and subcultural solidarity.

Had such interactions remained “on the street,” it is possible that Aiden could have maintained the boundaries between different parts of his life. Interestingly, his teachers tended to share Aiden’s view that in-school and out-of-school spaces should be separate. But as they explained to us, once Facebook had made the out-of-school visible within school, they could not fail to take action. Indeed, several teachers had complained to us that social networking incidents increasingly opened up an unwelcome and troublesome window onto the mess and muddle (as they saw it) of some of the students’ lives out of school, forcing them to deal with problems that they regarded as outside their remit. As one teacher said, “I honestly think that some students become something quite different when they are online.” Then, compounding the problem, “unfortunately often that home matter spills into school, and that’s where… that’s where that tension and that difficulty lies, because we then have to call home and say, ‘There’s been this incident. Part of the investigation has shown that it stemmed from…’ And then you’re into home territory.”

Over and again, teachers told us of incidents in which events in one location had spilled over and continued online and then all through the day, to the point that they felt they had to intervene in life out of school in order to protect school standards. One problem was the way in which Facebook interactions leave “hard traces,” making them difficult to ignore: as one
teacher commented in the middle of a longer story of student conflict—“then one of the parents showed me the evidence, the rock-solid, watertight evidence, of the Facebook exchange which definitely proved [what had been claimed].” Yet these teachers knew that they could be presented with edited highlights, so that dis-entangling what had really happened in an out-of-school exchange might prove both technically challenging and highly time-consuming. In short, although Aiden’s story is a sadly familiar one of social disadvantage reproducing itself across generations, the digital media have complicated matters—on the one hand, creating a new space for at times rapid-fire transgressive peer interaction, while on the other, undermining long-established boundaries of authority dividing home and school in ways that can become troubling for all concerned.

Conclusions

Our analysis of the relation between media and social class in the lives of a class of 13- to 14-year-olds began by questioning the continued relevance of the contrast between middle- and working-class families, given that the class included educated families with little money, minority ethnic families with strong subcultures but lacking majority-cultural capital, female-headed households difficult to classify in traditional class terms, and few, if any, traditional working-class households at all. Our ethnography went on to show how social class could not predict family responses to the demands of late modernity. For instance, some of the middle-class families were content to endorse the authority of the school whilst others sought more “bohemian” alternatives, and some of the migrant families prioritized values and practices characteristic of their home cultures (and local subcultures) rather than those endorsed by the school or wider society. These alternative or subcultural pathways were rather quietly trod, with rich subcultural knowledge gained outside the school sometimes making little impact on or even being recognized by the bounded life of the school.

In contrast to earlier studies of school life (see Willis 1978; Giroux 1983), we weren’t struck by either “hidden curricula” or the processes of “learning to labour” that implicitly validate middle-class children while working-class children are allocated to the factory floor or seek tactics of resistance. This is not because the school was as fair as it claimed but rather, because the discourse of individual competition and success was made explicit rather than tacit. Differences in opportunity or achievement were not seen as either controversial or unfair—quite the contrary. Thus, it seems that a sense of collective classed identity is giving way to an uncertain and ambivalent recognition of status differentials, understood as a matter of individual talent or luck, good or bad. The long-term outcome—that social advantage and disadvantage persist, with little social mobility evident—is little changed from 20 years ago, but the means by which it comes about and the implications for identity and social relations are being reconfigured.

What can schools or families do about the determining influences of social class? How could different conceptions of learning alter such seemingly over-determining social structures? These questions have haunted almost every study of childhood and youth and, with varying degrees of explicitness, they underpin most countries’ education and family policies, as well as those for digital inclusion and educational technology. While investigating young people’s
lives in the round might seem only to deepen our knowledge of these challenges, we also believe that it reveals some chinks in the processes of social reproduction, at least for some young people in some circumstances. As we argue in more depth in our book, paying attention to the ways that young people develop and enact their identities within particularly enabling or constraining contexts, often mediated, enabled us to reveal not so much cruel fate as society’s lack of imagination and resources for creating alternatives. By imagining and investing in alternatives that can expand young people’s vision of future opportunities, by establishing new pathways by which such opportunities might be reached, perhaps their prospects could be altered. But our year with the class has also taught us that such a project can only work if it engages with people’s identity commitments to how things have been until now, and with their often-justified fears about a risky or threatening future.

Notes

1 This chapter draws on research supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation under Prime Award no. 10-97572-000-USP and the Regents of the University of California. It draws on material published in Sonia Livingstone and Julian Sefton-Green, The Class: Living and Learning in the Digital Age (New York: New York University Press, 2016).

References


