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Article (Accepted version)
(Refereed)

Original citation:
DOI: 10.1111/anti.12412

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Available in LSE Research Online: June 2018

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A Political Ontology of Land: Rooting Syrian Identity in the Occupied Golan Heights

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Abstract

Questions of identity, belonging and place are heightened in societies under protracted military occupation. Bridging scholarship on territorial justice and settler colonialism, this paper examines the impacts of, and responses to, the misrecognition of Arab residents enacted by the Israeli state in the occupied Golan Heights. The injustice of misrecognition entails the imposition on the indigenous population of a Zionist ethnogeography consolidated through Jewish settlements, forced citizenship and discriminatory land and water policies. Focusing on the distinctive agricultural practices by which a Jawlani (Syrian Golani) identity is forged, we highlight the role of sumud (“steadfastness”) as a strategy of non-violent resistance. Sumud here rests on the mobilization of communal norms of land and water management, evident in the creation of counter-infrastructures and water collectives
supporting apple orchards. In the face of settler colonial misrecognition, Jawlani rootedness expresses a distinctive ontology on land with a conjoined right of resourcehood.

**Keywords:** Territorial justice, recognition, settler colonialism, Golan Heights, identity

**Introduction**

For the decades following the 1974 disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel, the occupied Golan Heights has been known as “the quiet front”. A drive from the southern end of the Golan Heights, starting at Lake Tiberias, takes you through a variegated landscape of rising elevation. The quiet front takes on a different meaning when driving on your own: the emptiness of the road, the fortified, Jewish settlements (or mere signs directing you to settlements) and numerous military outposts evoke the eerie sense of a militarized zone. Further north along the road, the settlements’ vineyards and apple orchards announce fertile agricultural land. People are not in sight; only cattle are spotted grazing nearby lands marked as dangerous on account of mines. Shattered military bunkers, tanks and other artefacts of war are reminders of a violent history. Reaching the northern part of the Golan Heights, there are the lively signs of Arab settlement, notably in Majdal Shams, the administrative centre of the formerly Syrian communities that survived Israeli occupation. Majdal Shams has a history of resistance to colonial rule, notably during the Great Revolt of 1925-1926: French forces destroyed most of the town as they crushed the insurrection (Neep 2012; Provence 2005). The small town has two important statues dedicated to this resistance: one of As’ad Kanj Abu Saleh, a renowned Syrian Druze leader at the time; and the second statue, Al Massira (The March), was erected in 1987 to represent the national leader Sultan Al Atrash, a military commander during the Great Revolt, and signalling anti-colonialist resistance. Majdal Shams is situated in a mosaic of apple orchards and, in this confined space at the foot
of Jabal El Sheikh (Mount Hermon), apple growing has become a symbol of the rootedness and permanence of the indigenous inhabitants. During the apple picking season, the Arab villages are transformed by collective participation in, and celebration of, the traditional harvest, as the residents declare their shared attachment to, and identification with, the land.

Questions of identity, belonging and place are heightened in societies exposed to protracted military occupation. Where territory is controlled by a foreign state without the consent of the population, the dislocative effects typically feature profound material and cultural changes. However, the obligations on the occupying power, under international humanitarian law (IHL), to protect the civilian population (which include prohibitions against extensive damage to, and material destruction of, civilian objects), do not directly address the systemic, often deliberate, erosion of collective identities and place-based attachments. This omission is highlighted by an ethnographic strand of post-colonial scholarship concerned with the everyday experience and geographies of occupation (Hanafi 2009; Makdisi 2008; Visweswaran 2013). From critical political theory more generally, recognition-oriented notions of justice (Fraser 1997; Honneth 1995; 2004) claim to capture the injustices caused by the deliberate weakening or erasure of individual and group identities. This paper examines the forging of a land-based political identity by a native population facing systemic misrecognition through settler colonial rule.

We identify below the impacts of, and responses to, the Israeli state not recognizing the Syrian nationality of the indigenous residents of the occupied Golan Heights. These Arab (predominantly Druze) residents have undergone decades of political disenfranchisement and economic de-development. Since 1967 the Israeli occupation, then de facto annexation, of the Golan Heights has disrupted the ethno-geographical markers by which they identify themselves, with the Israeli state offering material incentives for Arab residents to renounce
their Syrian nationality, whilst at the same time promoting Israeli settlements in the region. Most Arab inhabitants have resisted attempts at “Israelification” (Ram 2015; Wessels 2015), in part by collectively organizing agricultural and water infrastructure. Belonging to the land has (re)created and deepened a distinctive, hybrid identity as “Syrian Golani” (in Arabic Jawlani). While numerous studies have analysed the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights (Harris 1980; Davis 1983; Kipnis 2013; Newman 1999; Muslih 1999; Ram 2015), the land-based attachments of the Jawlani people are largely neglected in the literature on the region.

Empirically, the paper focuses on the distinctive practices by which farming acquires political subjectivity in the occupied Golan Heights, examining the role of sumud (“steadfastness” or “staying on the land”) as a form of collective non-violent resistance. If the political genealogy of sumud emerges from expressions of Palestinian nationalism and self-determination (Khalili 2007:99-103; Swedenburg 1990), its articulation by the Jawlani people attests to a shared experience of Israeli occupation that at the same time maintains a separate group identity. Consistent with its settler colonial policies in the Naqab/Negev, Galilee and occupied Palestinian territory, Israel’s geopolitical strategy in the Golan Heights converges on the territorial transfer and/or confinement of indigenous populations—an uprooting, moreover, that deploys material and symbolic violence against native communities (Braverman 2009; Falah 1996; McKee 2014; 2016; Reger 2017; Shehadeh 2008; Yiftachel 2008; Yiftachel et al 2016). The symbol of sumud and rootedness for the Jawlani people is the Golani apple. Apple cultivation in the occupied Golan Heights represents a political strategy for Arab communities (re)constructing their collective belonging in the face of a systemic withdrawal of recognition. This fosters a resistance identity insofar as it challenges a hegemonic logic of cultural devaluation and stigmatization (Castells 1997:6-12). The discussion draws on fieldwork carried out during fieldwork visits to Majdal Shams from winter 2013 to winter 2016, encompassing semi-structured interviews, ethnographic and historical analysis.
Interviews were conducted with farmers, civil society representatives, agronomists, academics and local residents of Majdal Shams. While most Jawlanis self-identify as farmers, stating during fieldwork that almost “everybody grows apples”, most of the interlocutors received their main income from non-farming sources (such as construction contractors and workers, lawyer and dentists). Here “farmer” is used to describe interlocutors who are actively involved in apple growing as a main source of income, and who belong to an older generation of apple growers: according to local sources, this is no more than 2% of the Arab population (around 400 farmers).²

In the next section, drawing on ideas of territorial justice and settler colonial theory, we outline a conceptual framing for settler colonialism as, at least in part, a project advancing the systemic misrecognition of indigenous ethnogeographic communities. Historically, the uprooting in the Golan Heights started with the forcible transfer of most of the Syrian Arab population and extensive land appropriation by the Israeli military for Jewish settlement building, erasing the Syrian legal framework governing land and natural resources. Only five Syrian Arab villages, clustered in the north, remain in the occupied Golan Heights, with access to 20,000 dunums (2000 ha) of cultivated land, compared to 80,000 dunums (8000 ha) of cultivated land farmed by Jewish-Israeli settlers (Al Marsad 2013). Since annexation in the early 1980s, misrecognition is manifest in Israeli efforts at forced citizenship and the discriminatory allocation of land and water resources. We argue that, in opposition to these settler colonial acts, collective agricultural practices have acquired political subjectivity for the Jawlani, expressing a distinctive ontology of land and right of resourcehood.

Settler Colonialism as Systemic Misrecognition
The claim that injustice can include misrecognition is now well-established in critical political philosophy and justice-oriented activism. In justice theory it is associated both with moves to broaden conceptions of justice thinking to encompass recognition relationships alongside forms of distribution and participation (eg Fraser 1997), as well as more far-reaching claims that posit recognition as foundational for social justice (eg Honneth 1995; 2004). However, only recently has work on the politics of misrecognition explored the symbolic devaluation of places and place-based identities. The conditions under which the erosion of collective identities constitute an injustice is a focus of various attachment theories applying a rights-based understanding to territorial communities (eg Kolers 2009; 2012; Moore 2012) and landscapes (Egoz et al 2011). Though detached from relevant geographical scholarship, Kolers presents arguably the most systematic integration of cultural and ecological elements within an attachment theory of territorial rights and justice. This account works up an idea of rootedness: what Kolers labels “ethnogeographic communities” share a common ontology of land manifest in culturally specific conceptions of use and a distinctive nexus of land use practices (2009:109-11). A necessary standard of justice–defined as non-dominination and fair distribution–for an ethnogeographic community with territorial rights is, he claims, a “right of resourcehood”, including a power to recognize what counts as a resource.

What Kolers terms “plenitude”–“the objective fullness of a place” (2009:114) in terms of diverse human flourishing and environmental sustainability–serves as a key normative criterion for justifying the territorial claims of ethnogeographic communities. Place attachment, as rootedness over time, supports just territorial claims insofar as settlement, resource use and human development achieve plenitude: “Ethnogeographic communities … can legitimate their assertions attachment in particular territories by demonstrating that the fullness of the territory has been formative in their own identity, and their projects have been
formative of the place itself” (Kolers 2009:137). In these terms, the injustice of misrecognition can feature a dominant group imposing on others a favored ontology of land, rendering vulnerable those “ontological minorities” (Kolers 2012:276) with a divergent ethnogeography. Misrecognition can be the engineered or unintended consequence of statal policies: state-led nationalism is a leading vehicle for the orchestrated misrecognition of indigenous groups and other minorities. As Aslan (2015) observes for nation-building in the Middle East and North Africa, more intrusive state-led nationalism—where projects of cultural homogenization penetrate everyday life—tends to devalue more deeply the ethnogeographic identities of minority groups (eg the Berbers in Algeria and the Kurds in Turkey) in contrast to less aggressive nation-building where minority group identities are accommodated rather than confronted (eg the Berbers in Morocco). At the same time, state non-recognition of minority land ontologies is instrumental in the emergence of indigeneity as a political category (Castree 2004; Trigger and Martin 2016; Yiftachel et al 2016).

Indigenous identities exist in a precarious tension with the place-making of settler colonial states, which is predicated on the imposition of a dominant ethnogeographic identity. Applying his theory to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Kolers thus acknowledges that the 1948 *Nakba*, then occupation by Israel from 1967 of remaining Palestinian territory, entailed the systemic erosion of an agrarian Palestinian ethnogeography by a Zionist one. While Israeli settlement and land use practices in the West Bank represent the most extensive material evidence of this erosion, as damaging, Kolers (2009) claims, is the erasure of land-based cultural heritage, most conspicuously the uprooting by settlers of Palestinian olive groves (see also Braverman 2009:143-154). He acknowledges that settler colonial acts are unlikely to be credited from the standpoint of plenitude (Kolers 2008:138), although he fails to examine the connections between his attachment theory and IHL—the global system of legal obligations applied to military occupations (Benvenisti 2012; Dinstein 2009; Ferraro
The notion of plenitude accords normative weight to the cultural recognition of ethnogeographic communities, whereas IHL prioritizes the protection of bodily integrity and human welfare. Systemic misrecognition in occupied territories is, at most, registered indirectly in IHL prohibitions against ethnic cleansing (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005, rule 129), harm to cultural heritage (e.g., Hague Convention 1954, Article 5.1), and damage to public and private property, including environmental resources (e.g., Fourth Geneva Convention 1949, Article 53; Hague Regulations 1907, Article 55). Similarly, there is no IHL protected category equivalent to ethnogeographic communities: “civilians” are the key protected (non-military) category, though other group categories, such as women, children and families, trigger specific IHL entitlements. At the same time, however, customary IHL recognizes that an occupied population retains permanent sovereignty over its natural resources (Okowa 2009:244-245)—a principle repeatedly reaffirmed by the UN General Assembly for the Arab population of the occupied Syrian Golan (United Nations 2017). This is a collective entitlement that prohibits resource dispossession of an indigenous community under occupation.

The Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan is of course one manifestation of a wider settler project featuring the dispossession and displacement of indigenous populations. Israel/Palestine represents the principal settler/indigene divide driving the territorial expansion of Zionist settler colonialism, which continues today in the Bantustanization of a Palestinian space fragmented by an intricate mesh of segregationist policies and practices (Makdisi 2008; Hanafi 2009; Weizman 2007). What McKee (2016) terms the binary enframing of Jewish/Arab identities is also operative in the Naqab/Negev, where Israel has, since its founding, maintained a segregationist policy of land expropriation and forced relocation in dealing with the Bedouin Arab population. Here the Israeli citizenship of the indigenous residents has allowed limited legal and political recourse for an Arab
ethnogeographic community claiming a distinctive ontology of land, but one that struggles for equality and recognition in the face of the state’s Judaization priorities for southern Israel (McKee 2014; Weizman and Sheikh 2015; Yiftachel et al 2016). For Israeli settler colonialism, as with settler colonialism elsewhere, is concerned above all with the control of land (Elkins and Pedersen 2005; Khalili 2014; Salamanca et al 2012; Wolfe 1999). Its Zionist self-justification, sanctioned with biblical authority, celebrates returning to the land of Israel (ha-shiva le-Eretz Yisrael) an exiled Jewish people, physically and symbolically overriding an indigenous Arab population seen as lacking an authentic national history (Piterberg 2008: 94-95: see also Hassan 2011; Leshem 2013). Zionist claims in the early twentieth century extended to the Golan Heights, reflecting both the geostrategic defensive value of a high volcanic plateau and also the area’s hydrological value in feeding three headwaters of the Jordan River.

The foundational displacement of settler colonialism is thus an ontological uprooting of an ethnogeographic community wrenched from land-based attachments and identities. In Le Déracinement [“The Uprooting”], a seminal account of territorial dispossession in 20\textsuperscript{th} century settler colonialism, Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad (1964) depict the forcible displacement and resettlement of Algerian peasants by the French military during the 1954-1962 war of decolonization. Their notion of uprooting captures, beyond the deracination of agricultural lands, the destruction of a moral economy and cultural identity associated with indigenous farming practices (see also Bourdieu and Sayad 2004; Bourdieu 2012). Bourdieu and Sayad also identify in settler colonial uprooting a “pathological acceleration” of cultural change through enforced assimilation and domestication (1964:35). The colonial displacement of traditional agriculture in French Algeria included the shock exposure of resettled communities to a capitalist market order and European cultural norms. In the Golan Heights, remaining Arabs have faced strong normalization pressures, intensified in December
1981 when Israel enacted the Golan Heights Law to apply Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to the territory (a de facto annexation not recognized by the international community). Efforts to impose Israeli citizenship on the indigenous population were met with riots and strikes in 1982: the Israeli state responded by issuing travel documents labeling Syrian Golani nationals as “undefined”, legally designating them as “non-citizen residents” of Israel (Hajjar 1996; Ó Cuinn 2011:93). As Ram (2015) argues, there is in the Golan Heights an inherent tension between the domestication of an occupational regime and the rearticulation of spatial practices necessary to maintain coercive control over recalcitrant individuals and groups. The misrecognition of the Jawlani community in the occupied Golan Heights expresses this tension, continually surfacing in the discriminatory spaces and socio-natures structuring the landscape.

**Jawlani Land Attachment**

In this paper, we focus empirically on the village of Majdal Shams, where the first irrigated apple growing activities begun in the mid-1940s in an area called Al Marj, lying between Majdal Shams and Mas’ada villages. The Golan Heights conglomeration of towns, villages and farms made the region distinct in terms of its economic activities and geographical importance, situated between Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. Agriculture was the economic backbone of the Golan during the French mandate and Syrian rule. Majdal Shams, and later other villages in the Golan, carried out land parcelization in the early 1930s, pursuing a fair distribution for each family (mostly Druze and Christian families) according to their needs and land productivity. These progressive steps secured land ownership for all families within the community and limited state encroachment on their lands. More importantly, the
parcelization of the land also fostered, according to the Jawlanis, a sense of belonging and attachment to the land:

The distribution of land had a very huge impact on how people viewed the land and means of production and it was done in a fair and equal manner. While in feudal systems peasants feel a sense of alienation from the produce and the source of labour (land), the small landholder who owns the land does not experience this feeling but a stronger feeling of attachment to his land.³

With this attachment to the land, Majdal Shams farmers were the first to adopt apple tree planting, largely replacing pulses and seasonal vegetable growing. Al Marj area was endowed with spring water from Ras El Nabi’ and therefore was the ideal location for these first orchards:

The apples have an interesting history in our area. One of the sheikhs from our region had relatives in Lebanon. On one of his visits, he was introduced to the apple tree and saw how productive it was. He came back and explained to people about the economic value of this crop. People didn't accept this at first... but he was a well-known and respected sheikh so a couple of farmers agreed to go into this venture. They travelled to Lebanon, and brought back a few saplings. That was in 1946, before the creation of the Israeli state. A couple of years later in 1950, the apple produce was ready. When people saw the production and the economic value of growing apples, there was a Hajmeh [Arabic for rush] on the land. They planted a large area of land in the Marj. Everybody began planting the apples. I remember clearly in 1953 another Hajmeh, and by then half of Al Marj was planted. In 1967, apple orchards covered 2500 dunums, and people began considering expanding to rain-fed land.⁴
For the Jawlanis, the 1967 war and its aftermath are considered an existential rupture in their collective experience. Similar to the Nakba experienced by Palestinians in 1948, the Jawlanis experienced an abrupt disintegration of everyday life: forced displacement of more than 130,000 people, destruction of cities, villages and farms and leaving behind a population of only 6,000 distributed in six villages: the five Druze villages of Majdal Shams, Buq’atha, Mas’ada, Ein Qinya and S’heeta, and the Alewite village of Al Ghajar (Mara’i and Halabi 1992). However, S’heeta Village was depopulated soon after by the Israeli army in 1970 and its population relocated to Mas’ada village: the village was demolished and turned into a military zone (Al Marsad 2005).

In control of two-thirds (1250 km²) of the Syrian Golan by July 1967, Israel quickly moved to appropriate land and prevent the return of any Syrians forcibly displaced by the conflict. Military Order No.20 treated as “abandoned property” all the private movable and immovable property of displaced Syrian nationals, while Military Order No.21 declared this and also Syrian government property to be the property of the Israeli government. A month later Military Order No.39 classified 101 Arab villages as closed military zones, prohibiting the return of their residents (Al Marsad 2014:8; Murphy 2012:143). Collectively, these orders shrunk the land base of the Arab agricultural economy, as Israel created extensive zones for Jewish settlement and rural investment—a state-led strategy of accumulation by dispossession replicating that in the West Bank. During the first years of the occupation, Jawlani farmers responded by expanding their agriculture to hilly and mountainous areas still under their control and actually profited from sales to the Israeli domestic market, but by the 1970s state subsidies and other support mechanisms for settlers established the growing economic dominance of these rival agricultural businesses.
Annexation, Land Reclamation and Jawlani Identity

With their decision in 1981 to annex the Golan Heights, including its Syrian Arab communities, Israeli policymakers envisioned citizenship as a tool to normalize the status of the territory and its inhabitants. As the indigenous population was predominantly Druze, Israel systematically pushed for the recognition of this ethnogeographic community as non-Arab, adopting the same policy of “Druzeness” employed for the Druze who lived in Palestine until 1948, who then became Israeli citizens (Hajjar 1996; Kaufman 2016; Ram 2015; Wessels 2015). From its declaration of independence, Israel promulgated a distinctive Druze identity as a non-Jewish minority separate from any pan-Arab imagining; for example, designing tailored educational curricula and enforcing army conscription for the Israeli Druze. These moves mirrored, albeit more successfully, the political efforts employed by the French in their Syrian mandate (1923-1943) to separate the Druze from the wider Arab population; though Druze historiography, even in Israel, has challenged the notion that the Druze are non-Arab (Provence 2005:15-17). Furthermore, the Druze citizens of Israel retain socio-ethnic ties with fellow Druze in Lebanon and Syria: all face citizenship duties and other domestic obligations which sometimes clash with their ethno-communal loyalties and practices, eg restrictions on cross-border travel and the customary usage of natural resources (Kaufman 2016; Mason and Khawlie 2016). Ongoing regional insecurity–notably a contested Israel-Lebanon border and the Syrian war–intensifies the political consequences of identity claims for Druze national minorities, none more so than the Druze in the occupied Golan Heights subject to pressures from the Israeli government to relinquish their Syrian identity.

The annexation of the Golan Heights featured a series of sanctions on the Druze population including income tax rises, house arrests, water supply cuts, restrictions on trade (of which apples were the main commodity) and on freedom of movement (Al Batheesh 1986; Davis
Easing or dropping of these sanctions was conditional on the Druze agreeing to adopt Israeli identity cards and citizenship: making the Jawlani Druze Israeli citizens would legitimize the democratic self-representation of a sovereign state performing an illiberal annexation. Israeli attempts to label Druze identity as non-Syrian and non-Arab provoked fierce opposition, but one neither representing a stable imagined community, nor simply reproducing the secular narrative of Syrian nationhood. The call collectively to resist Israeli citizenship was first issued in November 1980 from the Druze spiritual leadership, after a mass meeting in the Majdal Shams khalwe (house of worship): this declaration threatened religious ex-communication for any Druze taking Israeli citizenship, thereby explicitly redefining Druze identity as spiritually incompatible with Israeli citizenship (Kirrish 1992:130). The force of this sanction must be grasped in the context of what Kirrish (1992:127) labels the foremost, ontological criterion of Druze membership—the observance of endogamy. Following the mass meeting, a National Statement was issued in March 1981 signed by Abna’ Al Jawlan Al Muhtal [The sons/people of the occupied Golan]. It proclaimed that the Israeli occupation’s growing encroachment on the Druze “national characteristics and Syrian Arab nationality” would not be tolerated, citing an ethnogeographic heritage inseparable from their continuing dwelling on the land. It also asserted that Syrian Arab nationality does not vanish, being transmitted from generation to generation: “Those who replace their nationality with an Israeli one are offending our collective dignity (Karameh), national honour (Sharaf), nationalistic belonging (Intima’) and our traditions” (Abna’ Al Jawlan Al Muhtal 1981:1).

Confined spatially and deprived of formal self-identification as Syrian Arab, the Jawlanis increasingly identified as “Druze” (Firro 1988; Kirrish 1992:130). Their historical experience of resistance against French colonial rule and their non-violent opposition, including explicit embrace of the Palestinian idea of sumud, generated Jawlani loyalties in which attachment or
rootedness to land was the dominant marker within a hybrid identity featuring religious (Druze) and nationalist (Syrian/Arab) affiliations. The practical experience of farming favors land-based attachments, but the relative success of sumud as a strategy of political resistance, drawing on communal norms of land and water management in the occupied Golan Heights, shaped an ethnogeographic community constituted in large part as a defensive reaction to systemic misrecognition. As a resident and academic from Majdal Shams declared:

We are the small community that remained. The liberation of land in the national sense is not our responsibility. Our responsibility is to protect our land, our belonging and our existence and to remain steadfast. When the annexation took place, we had to reconsider what can be done to persevere and remain. We established the cooperatives, and started demanding water allocation within the legal framework of Israeli law. We did this to preserve and protect our existence and our livelihood.\(^5\)

Jawlani resistance to the annexation and the forced citizenship campaign in 1982 took the form of six months of strikes, direct clashes with Israeli security forces and demonstrations (Hajjar 1996:3). While Israeli annexation aimed to impose Israeli citizenship on the indigenous Arab residents, denying them the right to identify as Syrian, they identified land attachment as a long-term strategy for rejecting the “undefined” nationality imposed on them for refusing Israeli citizenship. As one farmer asserted during a 2013 focus group in Majdal Shams:

Our identity today is our steadfastness on the land. More so than our belonging to Syria, I feel this is what unifies us and brings us together. We, outside of our land and of the Golan, we have no identity. Even in our travel document, we are listed as undefined.\(^6\)
The campaign to refuse Israeli citizenship included another Hajmeh to carry out the agricultural development and reclamation of rain-fed and rocky land, fearing confiscation by the Israeli state of any undeveloped land. Since apples trees were the Jawlanis’ priority crop, the need for additional water sources also pushed Jawlani farmers to construct small-scale infrastructure, such as rainwater tanks and water piping, to irrigate their apple trees. Thus, the Jawlanis reconfigured and intensified their agricultural practices to articulate, and arguably, essentialize their indigeneity. Central to this distinct identity-formation was the material and symbolic creation of a worked agricultural landscape as inseparable from its inhabitants’ identification with the Golan Heights:

The 1980s, specifically the years of 1986 and 1987 were a very special time. We had bulldozers owned by Jawlani working in the construction business, we have good blacksmith and the materials were available to reclaim the land and build the tanks. The building of these tanks was very important... we had very economically sound agricultural activities... and we were willing to sacrifice. Our motivation was to protect and stay on our land, never to give up on it no matter what. If it required water, we will irrigate it. There was this determination that kept us going.7

Land-based identification as a means of belonging stabilizes what farmers labelled the chaos (Fawda) of being “the remainder of a society forcible displaced” under conditions of systemic misrecognition and is seen as effectively resisting the territorial uprooting of the Jawlani:

In general, our identity is protecting ourselves and our social fabric…you are talking about a small population, we are barely 20,000 people. Protecting ourselves, our land and our society is what constitutes identity and our legacy for the young generation.8
The National Statement, considered to be the official declaration of Jawlani nationalistic and political identification, condemned escalating water appropriation, notably what was referred to as the “rape of our groundwater” by the drilling of Israeli wells next to vital springs (Al Ya’fouri, Al Mushirfeh, and Ras Abu Sa’eed springs) and the “theft” of water from Birket (Lake) Ram, the principal freshwater reservoir in the north, to supply Jewish settlements in the Golan (Al Batheesh 1987:39). Before the occupation, the lake was used locally to irrigate crops and as drinking water for livestock: communities were also allowed by Syrian municipal authorities to use the lake for fishing. Military Order No.120 of 1968 gave the Israeli state full ownership of water resources in the Golan Heights (Al Marsad 2013) and, following the annexation, Israeli civil law was enacted in the Heights, allowing the state to enforce its national water law of 1959 and declare any new Arab water infrastructure as illegal. Access and use of Ram Lake was therefore prohibited by law, and fell under the control of Mekorot, the Israeli national water company, which built a new and highly centralized water system to support and develop settlement expansion in the region (Davis 1983; Al Marsad 2009). Since the 1970s, the discrimination with regards to water access, allocation and cost has grown between the “non-citizen” Jawlani and Jewish citizens in the occupied Golan Heights, fusing misrecognition and distributive injustice. Per capita water supply to Israeli-Jewish settlers is up to 17 times greater than for the Jawlani. Water pricing is also discriminatory, forcing the Jawlani growers to incur higher water costs, with access to none of the government subsidies made available to settlers and no meaningful say in the development of regional water infrastructure (Al Marsad 2013).

The National Statement treats the denial of indigenous water rights as a conjoined injustice of expropriation and misrecognition: by criminalizing community-managed water systems, the Israeli state is seen as undermining Jawlani self-determination. It cites the occupation as blocking the completion of collective irrigation plans for apple orchards in Majdal Shams and
Mas’ada, undermining the historical success of communal planning and funding of water resources. Ein El Tufaha project in 1945 was one such example, with water transferred from a natural spring (now inside the Syrian Golan) to connect 410 houses to running water in Majdal Shams. Similarly, the area of Al Marj, location for the earliest planting of apple trees in Majdal Shams in the 1940s and thereafter the main site for Druze agricultural activities during the following two decades, is culturally pivotal to the Jawlani ethnogeographic community. Al Marj lands are situated in the valley of the Ya’fouri: the apple orchards in Al Marj were irrigated by a basic network of cement channels constructed by the community in the 1940s, diverting waters from Sa’ar River. Jawlani farmers express pride in this tradition of communal action and utilization of natural resources, highlighting how their autonomy and distinctive agricultural practices consolidated their belonging to the land.

The deracination of the Jawlani ethnogeography has been a continuous military-bureaucratic process, punctuated by episodes of violent dispossession. In April 2016, convening an Israeli cabinet meeting in the Golan Heights, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that “the Golan will always remain in Israel’s hands” (Breaking Israel News 2016). Geostrategic interests, legitimated by biblical authority, have long justified Zionist plans for natural resource extraction and Jewish settlement in the Golan Heights, as articulated from 1967 in a series of regional development plans. Until the annexation, there was little acknowledgement of the remaining Syrian villages other than the recognition that the discriminatory effects of the development plans could create “open or veiled, active or passive hostility towards the Jewish settlement project” (World Zionist Organization 1975:20-21 cited in Davis 1983: 38).

Not surprisingly, the systemic misrecognition of Jawlani agricultural practices is central to the symbolic violence executed by the occupying power. A 1975 report by the Israeli
Ministry of Agriculture, *Druze Agriculture in the Golan Heights*, identifies Al Marj irrigation scheme as “primitive” and consuming excess water that could otherwise be used to supply Israeli settlements, recommending the prevention of any financial or technical support for Druze farmers, as well as the prohibiting the expansion of irrigation to new orchards. While the report concludes with proposals to “develop” the agricultural sector in the Druze villages by introducing new crops (such as cherry, grapes) and water saving techniques, the inclusion of Druze agriculture under the Israeli Fruit Council Law of 1973 enacts a legal-symbolic colonization: it establishes “administrative prohibition” and other state controls over the production of apples by Druze farmers, making space for World Zionist Organization plans to expand apple orchards, and other crops, in the newly established Jewish settlements of the Golan Heights (Ministry of Agriculture 1975).

More recently, the protracted conflict in Syria has encouraged Israel to boost settlement activity and economic development in what is termed “Northern Israel”, anticipating a future peace deal in which Syrian territorial integrity may be compromised. The five-year regional development plan for the Golan Heights, issued by the Israeli cabinet in January 2014, approved a proposal by the agricultural ministry to establish 750 new farming estates for settlers on 30,000 dunums of annexed land, including state investment in agricultural training, water infrastructure and mine clearance. According to Israeli Agriculture Minister Yair Shamir, the economic expansion is designed to “create anchors” to strengthen the (Israeli settler) communities (Jewish News Service 2014). A spike in land confiscation and property destruction in the late 1990s and early 2000s can be linked to a deepening of the settler colonial project in the face of collective agricultural organization and resistance expressed by the Jawlani farmers. Akin to the more well-known uprooting of olive trees in the West Bank, the physical uprooting of apple trees by Israeli state actors combines material and symbolic violence against Jawlani assertions of land rights. In Buq’ata village, several
residents have seen their apple orchards uprooted and bulldozed by security forces acting for the Israeli Land Administration Authority. Increased Israeli military activity, under the pretext of border security, has justified the razing of Jawlani agricultural land to create new military zones. This property destruction and land confiscation was reported by the farmers affected to have taken place without prior warning and in spite of legal titles to the property (Jawlan 2010a; 2010b).

**Jawlani Farming as Resistance Identity**

“Apples were and are and will be a symbol of the Golan Heights. We are attached to the apples and apples are also attached to us”.9

In response to a settler colonial strategy of accumulation by dispossession, the Jawlanis intensified communal agricultural activities after the annexation to resist expropriation of their land and water resources. As well as challenging material dispossession, this collective project generated a land-based resistance identity countering the symbolic violence of misrecognition. Realising the imminent threat to the hilly grazing lands used for herding, the Jawlanis moved substantial amounts of soil to these areas, producing a new agricultural terrain. With apples the dominant crop grown in the region, the farmers devised tactics to increase water availability and hence the irrigated area available to existing and planned apple orchards. The construction of cylindrical metal tanks to catch rainwater was employed by the Jawlanis as a low-cost, practical option to increase the availability of water for irrigation. Hundreds of such tanks, holding from 300 to 1000 cubic meters of water, were built mainly in the mid-1980s in defiance of Israeli water regulations (Figure 1). The veteran farmers belonging to this generation recall a “reservoir boom” and “agricultural revolution” and, by the summer of 1987, there were 450 collection tanks and open ditches to collect
rainwater, storing around 400-500,000 cubic meters (Abu Jabal 1993). The testimonies of farmers reveal that the construction of these structures was motivated above all by the conviction “that this land is ours, and we will not abandon it: if it needs water, we will provide it and quench its thirst”.10 The construction of the tanks was followed by threats of demolition, then the gauging of water use and the issuance of fines by Israeli authorities. While this counter-infrastructure failed in the long-term as a practically feasible mechanism to collect and distribute water, most reservoir tanks survive as visible markers on the landscape of a Jawlani ethnogeography.

INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE

Figure 1: The landscape of Majdal Shams village, with Druze apple orchards and a rusting metal water tank, August 2016 (authors’ photo)

From the late 1980s, Druze self-management of agricultural water was scaled-up through the establishment of water cooperatives to represent the farmers and facilitate collective water purchases from Lake Ram and other sources controlled by Mekerot, replacing the metal tanks as the primary source of irrigation water for growing apples. 18 water cooperatives were eventually established, representing farmers from all the Jawlani villages in the Golan Heights and resulting in the first direct arrangements between the farmers and Mekorot.
However, the relationship is contractual, remaining void of any acknowledgments of Jawlani rights to water in what one farmer described as “blackmail” and “sedated suffering”. Mekorot allows the purchase of strictly limited amounts of water from Lake Ram without providing or supporting the infrastructure needed to distribute supplies to Arab agricultural land. Since the early 1990s, the cooperatives have managed to increase the water purchase quantities from 70 cubic meters per dunum to 250 cubic meters per dunum in 2016. In contrast, Jewish settlements receive greater amounts of water (more than 700 cubic meters per dunum), as well as agricultural support from the government (Al Marsad 2013). In resisting this strongly asymmetric regime of resource control and access, the Jawlani have intensified their agricultural practices and claim-making over land and water resources.

At the heart of the transformation of Jawlani farming in the Golan Heights under occupation has been a six-fold increase in land devoted to apple trees from 2000 dunums (200 ha) in 1967. Community rituals of apple planting and picking have developed into collective acts of resistance by the Jawlani, slowing the advance of Israeli land appropriation. Both after the occupation and annexation, the planting of apple trees (Figure 2) has come to symbolize the persistence and rootedness of the native population, mirroring the sumud narrative of indigenous Arabs in the West Bank, Galilee and the Naqab/Negev (Braverman 2009; McKee 2014; 2016; Reger 2017; Yiftachel 2008). However, the Jawlani ethnogeographic community was born in a violent, traumatic act of separation from a host state that, despite its recent meltdown, continues to lay claim to the annexed Golan territory and invokes the Syrian nationality of its Arab residents. Unlike the Naqab/Negev Bedouin residents, most Jawlanis have rejected Israeli citizenship; yet unlike the Palestinians, they do not seek membership of a new state.
Figure 2: Newly planted apple orchard overlooking Lake Ram and the expansion of Arab agricultural land, July, 2013 (authors’ photo)

For the Jawlani, apple tree planting has become the material expression of a land-based political ontology, countering the systemic misrecognition meted out through displacement, dispossession, and strategies of forced citizenship. Compared to a subsistence-oriented focus on vegetables and pulses, the relative solidity and longevity of apples trees are seen as offering greater protection from state seizure of agricultural land:

I believe if we had remained vegetable growers, the occupation would have encroached on our lands much more intrusively. They still encroach on our land extensively but the apples as crops empowered farmers. The power was psychological and also material and gave them a sense of independence. There is a sense of dignity [karameh] and identity with the protection of such a crop under such conditions.12

Indeed, the affective bonds fostered by the collective attachment to apple trees invest sumud with cultural and political meaning for the whole ethnogeographic community. Surviving through decades as a minority indigenous community, amidst intense normalization pressures, is signaled by the physical rootedness of the apple orchards. As a water-intensive and seasonal crop in the face of high competition from subsidized settler farmers, the
commercial viability of apple growing is never secure. Jawlani farmers run large cooling facilities for the shared storage of apple crops to ensure year-round marketability, mirroring the cooperative management of agricultural water. The first such cooling facility, the Majdal Shams Cooler, was established in the 1977 as apple production was scaled up in the first decade of the occupation. Until the annexation, this and other apple coolers were supplied with electricity from diesel generators operated autonomously by the farmers. After annexation, these generators were confiscated by the state as Jawlani villages were connected to the Israeli national grid. The payment for Israeli electricity normalizes the presence of the communal coolers in the eyes of the Israeli civil administration. Today there are eight communal apple coolers that depend on a mixture of energy sources, including the grid, small-scale generators and solar panels.

The collective management and celebration of the Jawlani orchards deploys the “strategic essentialism” attributed by McKee (2016:65) to the Arabs in the Naqab/Negev, romanticizing traditional agricultural practices in response to Israeli evictions and land expropriation, which are themselves informed by Zionist idioms of land improvement. As in the Naqab/Negev, the naturalization of a way of life and landscape hardens ethnogeographic divisions between Jewish Israeli settlers and Arab communities, whilst at the same time advancing political claims for recognition (McKee 2014; Yiftachel et al 2016). Yet the trope of rootedness is fraught with ideological tensions and inconsistencies, revealing the semantic and material colonization of uprooting. In the occupied Golan Heights apple tree planting is, as noted above, historically recent and its expansion since the 1980s has banked on the active (re)production of suitable terrain, including the terra-forming of marginal grazing lands. The very selection and planting of Jawlani apple trees unavoidably bends to Israeli market preferences: the traditional varieties of Golden Delicious and Starking Delicious are giving way to varieties (eg Granny Smith, Gala, Pink Lady) favored by Israeli and global consumers
for their appearance and off-the-shelf taste. Similarly, Jawlani planters favor vegetative over seed propagation for apple trees, trading off commercial longevity (18 years for vegetative stock compared to 45 years for seed propagation) for short-term productivity in the face of the unequal marketing of subsidized settler apples: vegetative propagation (grafting) allows denser stocking and earlier harvesting, which is suited to the smaller plot sizes (1-5 dunums) characterizing Jawlani holdings. Within the very real physical and economic constraints of commercial apple-growing under occupation/annexation, the Jawlani ontology of land still rests on an essentialist casting of an ethnogeographic community—one central to a decades-long political struggle for recognition.

**Conclusion**

In the occupied Golan Heights, the self-representation of the native Arab community as Jawlani expresses a resistance identity forged in response to settler colonial uprooting. Jawlani identity-formation is dynamic, employing exclusive markers of religion (the Druze faith), nation (Syrian Arab) and place (Golan) to map out an indigenous ethnogeographic community. As argued above, it posits a political ontology of land manifest in the shared valuation and (re)making of dwelling and agricultural practices, resisting the deracination of occupation/annexation. For the Jawlanis, the injustice of misrecognition is distinct from, but inextricably fused to, the distributive injustices of resource dispossession and the civil-political injustices issuing from the denial of their self-determination. These overlapping injustices inscribe the people and terrain of the Golan Heights, producing a mosaic of misrecognized entities: bodies, apple trees, water flows, infrastructure and other artefacts. The injustice of misrecognition arises from the coercive imposition of a Zionist ethnogeography onto a Jawlani one, executed of course through Israeli sovereign power.
The adoption by the Jawlanis of sumud (steadfastness) as a strategy of non-violent resistance closely resembles its use by Palestinian and international activists in the West Bank, Galilee and Naqab/Negev, where the political significance of olive trees, as symbols of national rootedness, is heightened by the deliberate uprooting of olive groves by Jewish settlers and Israeli state actors. This reflects decades of grassroots mobilization and solidarity between Jawlani and Palestinian political prisoners, activists, and academics most evident in the political demonstrations during the 1976 Land Day in the Galilee, the six-month strike in 1982 in the Golan, and the first Palestinian Intifada in 1987. A common resistance identity emerges therefore from a shared Arab experience of subordination to a Zionist land ontology, which has produced parallel injustices of resource appropriation, misrecognition and civil-political disempowerment.

Under IHL an occupied population retains permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, as recognized for the occupied Syrian Golan by the UN General Assembly (United Nations 2017). IHL safeguards against the degradation of natural resources by an occupying power are captured in a range of prohibitions against damage to public and private property and environmental resource depletion, yet none of these are acknowledged by Israel as constraining its appropriation of land and water resources in the Golan Heights. Attachments to place and/or distinctive land practices that are formative of the ethno-cultural identities of people under occupation signal what Kolers (2009) labels a “right to resourcehood” for which political recognition is as necessary to territorial justice as fair distribution or self-determination. IHL protections against cultural violence are selective, indirectly covered by other prohibitions (eg against ethnic cleansing) or restricted to discrete forms of physical harm (eg destruction of cultural artefacts). The slow violence of settler colonial uprooting—a cumulative erosion of the material and symbolic conditions of an ethnogeographic community—is too diffuse to be registered as harmful by IHL. However, the structural
misrecognition constituted, amongst other practices, by coercive citizenship and ongoing discrimination against Jawlani land and water use in the occupied Golan Heights, is we argue a distinctive form of territorial injustice; that is, the *systemic misrecognition of an indigenous ethnogeographic community*.

At the same time, and given the length of the Israeli occupation/annexation, the Jawlani ethnogeographic community is largely defined against this systemic misrecognition, to which it must constantly adjust to, counter, and yet coexist with. The relative success of sumud, amidst settler colonial domination, is in layering across generations the co-production of Jawlani identity and place habitation. This constitutes a *political ontology* of land insofar as land-based attachments express, and anticipate, a realm of collective authority and civil-political freedom. Sumud motivates the mobilization of communal norms of land management, evident in the creation of agricultural counter-infrastructure and collectives for supplying agricultural land and water, supporting in turn the consolidation and expansion of apple orchards. Apple growing is the crowning symbol of Jawlani rootedness, cultivating a claim to resourcehood in the face of settler colonial misrecognition.

**Endnotes**

1 The Druze faith is a sect of Islamic origin, influenced by other belief systems including Gnosticism, Neoplatonism and Hinduism.

2 Interview with local researcher, Majdal Shams, 30 December 2016. From a random survey (37 residents) conducted by one of the authors in January and February 2013 in Majdal Shams, 84% of respondents stated that farming contributed to less than half of their income and none reported farming as their principal source of income: the
survey findings are available from the authors. Purposive sampling then identified local farmers for interviews and focus group discussion.

3 Interview with local civil society researcher, Majdal Shams, 30 December 2016.

4 Interview with political activist and farmer, Majdal Shams, 29 December 2016.

5 Interview with academic, Majdal Shams, 30 December 2016.

6 Farmer 1, focus group with a group of farmers, Majdal Shams, 24 August 2013.

7 Interview with political activist and farmer, Majdal Shams, 29 December 2016.

8 Farmer 8, focus group with a group of farmers, Majdal Shams, 24 August 2013.

9 Interview with farmer, Majdal Shams, 15 September 2016.

10 Interview with farmer, Majdal Shams, 15 September 2016.

11 Interview with political activist and farmer, Majdal Shams, 30 December 2016.

12 Interview with academic, Majdal Shams, 20 July 2016.

13 Interview with Majdal Shams farmer and agronomist, Skype, 31 December 2016.

**Acknowledgements**

The Majdal Shams fieldwork in 2013 was funded by the Emirates Foundation for Philanthropy through the Middle East Centre at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Award No. MEC-AC-2011-02: this award is gratefully acknowledged, as is the facilitation and support for the research provided by Golan for Development, Al Marsad and the Jawlanis. Many thanks finally to the three *Antipode* referees for their detailed, constructive criticism of an earlier draft of this paper: the usual disclaimers apply.
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