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Cultivating Power:
Gardens in the Global Politics of Diplomacy, War and Peace

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Abstract
Although gardens are typically appreciated as peaceful spaces of apolitical serenity, this article highlights how gardens can provide new sites and sensibilities that complicate our understanding of diplomacy, war and peace. While gardens are a popular location for diplomatic performances—for example, the Treaty of Versailles—the global politics of gardens remains under-researched in International Relations (IR). To address this gap, the article follows the “aesthetic turn” in IR to examine gardens as contingent social constructions of social-ordering and world-ordering which both shape and participate in global politics. In particular, it develops a framework to examine how peace-war becomes intelligible in gardens through contingent conceptual dynamics such as “civility/martiality.” It then employs the framework to explore how two key national memorial sites—the Nanjing Massacre Memorial in China and the Yasukuni Shrine in Japan—work as gardens to creatively perform civility and martiality in unexpected ways. Such an oblique intervention underlines how war memorials, gardens and other odd IR sites are not stable containers of meaning, but need to be actively (re)interpreted as performances of cultural governance and resistance. Garden-building here is theory-building: by producing new sites and sensibilities of global politics, it creatively shapes our understanding of IR.
On December 26, 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo to commemorate his country’s war dead. A few days later Liu Xiaoming (2014), China’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, denounced Abe’s visit in London’s Daily Telegraph:

In the Harry Potter story, the dark wizard Voldemort dies hard because the seven horcruxes, which contain parts of his soul, have been destroyed. If militarism is like the haunting Voldemort of Japan, the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo is a kind of horcrux, representing the darkest parts of that nation’s soul. Last week, in flagrant disregard of the feelings of his Asian neighbors, Shinzo Abe, the Japanese prime minister, paid homage at the Yasukuni Shrine …

Liu here is voicing a reasonable concern that Abe is remilitarizing Japan; indeed, the Yasukuni Shrine is a controversial site because it enshrines the souls of thousands of war criminals. China and South Korea are particularly critical when Japan’s leaders visit the Shrine because they are still mourning the atrocities committed by imperial Japan.

Discussions of the Yasukuni Shrine thus characteristically frame it as an issue of “Japanese nationalism,” “East Asian International Relations (IR),” and/or the problems of “history and memory” (see Kingston 2007; Takenaka 2015). Ambassador Liu’s intervention is interesting because it points in new directions. Certainly, his invocation of Harry Potter follows the trend in IR that values popular culture as an innovative approach to global politics (see Neumann and Nexon 2006). Importantly for this article, Liu’s criticism of Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine also highlights gardens as sites of global politics: the Shrine is not simply a memorial, it is also a garden park (see Mashima 2008). While “peace gardens” as a site for relaxation are now common in everyday urban life (see McClimens, Doel, Ibbotson, Partridge, Muscroft and Lockwood 2012), how can we understand the global politics of gardens which actively celebrate war? This article thus follows the Chinese ambassador’s lead to explore how gardens
can be “unexpected places” for the global politics of diplomacy, peace and war in a general sense (see Sylvester 2008; Lisle 2016; Guillaume et al. 2015), and how the Yasukuni Shrine in particular demands to be interpreted as a peace/war garden.

Although gardens are a popular location for diplomatic performances—the Treaty of Versailles, for example—analysis of the global politics of gardens itself is under-researched in IR. Serious analysis is generally located in the humanities and professional schools: art history, social history and landscape architecture (see Barmé 1996, 2008; Clunas 1996; Jay 2011; Kuitert 2012, 2017; Henderson 2013; Wang 2014). Among social scientists, geographers and sociologists have devoted the most attention to the topic, using gardens to interrogate relations of space, nature, culture and power (see Bauman 1987, 1989; Yoon 1994; Mukerji 1997, 2012; Luke 2000; Burrell and Dale 2002; McClimens et al. 2012). This article builds on these interdisciplinary trends, especially as they combine in international social history/international historical sociology (see Go and Lawson 2017). The aim is to examine how gardens—like battlefields (see Guillaume et al. 2015, 2)—are contingent social constructions which shape and participate in global politics. Gardens here are a site, an institution, an enactment, and an encounter. In addition to analyzing gardens as sites of symbolic power, the article also appreciates them as a material modality where diplomacy, war and peace are represented, performed, and experienced through more embodied, affective and everyday encounters (Butler 1990; Enloe 2011; Lisle 2016, 22). The aim of the article, then, is to highlight how peace/war becomes intelligible, and thus is enacted or appropriated, in part through garden performances.

To develop a framework for exploring the global politics of gardens, the article first locates its analysis in four interrelated theoretical contexts: Rancière’s “distribution of the sensible,” Foucault’s “heterotopia,” and the hybrid concept “civility/martiality,” in order to understand gardens as a dynamic performance of cultural governance and resistance. The following two sections use examples from Japan, China and France to further develop this analytical framework, which is then applied to explore how two key national memorial spaces—the
Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo and the Nanjing Massacre Memorial in China—act as gardens which embody different experiences of cultural governance and resistance. The conclusion argues that we can use this analytical framework to raise questions about other key national memorial spaces, such as the National September 11 Museum and Memorial in New York. The analysis thus advances critical IR in two ways: it uses gardens to explore how global politics emerge through complex performances of social-ordering and world-ordering, and it employs non-Western (here East Asian) concepts and examples to explore global politics both beyond and within Euro-America.

**Aesthetic Global Politics**

The discussion of the global politics of gardens is located in the “aesthetic turn” of international studies (see Bleiker 2009; Shapiro 2013). It argues that the issues of diplomacy, war and peace can be profitably explored through an assemblage of conceptual dynamics: utopia/dystopia/heterotopia, (re)distribution of the sensible, cultural governance/resistance and civil/military.

It is common to see gardens as a utopian space: a peaceful place, a blissful island of apolitical serenity, where people engage in contemplation, play, and sensuous enjoyment. In both Persian and Greek, “Paradise” comes from the word for a walled garden (Burrell and Dale 2002; Mcclimens et al. 2012,124-125, Henderson 2013, xi, 6). Interestingly, in his discussion of utopia and heterotopia, Foucault points directly to gardens. Utopian spaces, according to Foucault (1986, 24), are “fundamentally unreal spaces … sites with no real place.” Heterotopia, however, can be radical because it is “capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible” (Foucault 1986, 25). Heterotopia is a hybrid place where multiple spaces are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. Foucault’s examples of heterotopia are colonies, brothels, prisons, cemeteries, ships—and gardens. Here, heterotopia is involved in projects of social-ordering and world-ordering. Indeed, Foucault (1986, 26) is particularly fascinated by the garden as heterotopia because it “is the smallest parcel of the world and then it
is the totality of the world. … [it is] a sort of happy, universalizing heterotopia.” Botanical gardens, for example, are a heterotopic mix of incompatible plants which juxtapose incommensurable ecosystems: alpine plants in lowland London, and desert plants in rain-forest Singapore (see Luke 2000). Heterotopia, then, is an interesting concept because it liberates us from the search for singular meaning, and encourages us to understand space aesthetically in terms of multiple, overlapping and contingent dynamics, such as utopia/dystopia/heterotopia (see Rancière 2004, 40-41).

When we speak of “aesthetics” in global politics, we are not discussing a theory of beauty, but are more concerned with styles of ordering that raise ethical questions (Hall and Ames 1998; Rancière 2004, 2009; Bleiker 2009; Shapiro 2013). Rancière (2004,10) argues that we need to understand aesthetics as a “specific regime for identifying and reflecting on the arts: a mode of articulation between ways of doing and making, their corresponding forms of visibility, and possible ways of thinking about their relationships.” Aesthetics is thus a specific “distribution of the sensible”: “the delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the invisible, of speech and noise, that simultaneously determines the place and the stakes of politics as a form of experience” (Rancière 2004, 13). Politics, then, is not found in the struggle for power, but in the configuration of space that frames social-ordering and world-ordering. Politics thus takes shape either in “policing” the hegemonic distribution of the sensible, or challenging it through dissensus, a redistribution of the sensible that “disrupt[s] the relationship between the visible, the sayable, and the thinkable” (Rancière 2004, 63). Politico-aesthetics here is very active, a heterotopic performance that takes in all senses of material experience (Butler 1990; Rancière 2004, 40-41; Lisle 2016, 21).

As heavily-designed spaces that forge particular relations between the visible, hearable, smellable, and feelable (Kuitert 2002), gardens are exemplary distributions of the sensible. Still, the politics of such material modalities is often overlooked, even in critical IR, because of their indirect impact on global politics; this article, however, argues that gardens can shape global politics in a broader way as sites of political performances that set the parameters for what can (and
cannot) be seen, said, thought and done (Rancière 2004).

To chart out the ethical workings of such aesthetic global politics, the dynamic of cultural governance and resistance is useful (Shapiro 2004). For example, rather than taking the “nation” for granted as an actor in a rational calculus, Shapiro sees the nation as a set of unstable social relations that take on coherence through cultural governance. This cultural governance looks to Foucault’s (1991) understanding of power as a productive force that is generated by contingent social relationships, rather than as a set of juridical practices that restrict action. Shapiro (2004, 34) argues that while for the early-modern state, sovereignty relied on “military and fiscal initiatives,” by the nineteenth century these “coercive and economic aspects of control have been supplemented by a progressively intense cultural governance … aimed at making territorial and national/cultural boundaries coextensive.” But Shapiro (2004, 49) does not simply chart out the productive power of state-led cultural governance; his critical approach also shows how resistance can emerge through other modalities of expression—films, journals, diaries, novels, and counter-historical narratives—that “challenge the state’s coherence-producing writing performances.” Cultural governance here is analogous to Rancière’s policing of the distribution of the sensible, and resistance emerges through dissensus, a redistribution of the sensible (see Shapiro 2013, xv, 30-31).

Lastly, this section considers how the peace/war distinction is informed by the civil/military dynamic. As Ambassador Liu’s article shows, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) regularly presents itself as a “peaceful civilization”—especially in relation to what it sees as the “remilitarization” of Japan. Tokyo likewise proudly points to postwar Japan’s “Peace Constitution,” and worries about China’s growing military capability. But “militarism” refers to more than the accumulation of military hardware; as Shaw (2013, 20) explains, it is better understood as “the penetration of social relations in general by military relations.” Indeed, while the common liberal narrative of social progress sees society civilizing the military, often the interaction results in the militarization of society (Huntington 1957, 466; Virilio 1986, 62).

I would like to expand this consideration of civil/military relations to see
how civil and military can work together aesthetically in the distribution of the sensible in war/peace gardens. IR theory’s standard view of “civil” and “military” figures them as separate and distinct camps “pitched in opposition to each other” in a struggle for power (Huntington 1957, 80-86; Feaver 2011, 90). To see how civil and military work aesthetically in war/peace gardens it is helpful to examine how the civil/military distinction takes shape in another political space: imperial China’s wen/wu dynamic. Wen generally means “literary,” “civilian” and “civilization,” while wu generally means “physical,” “military” and “martial” (Louie 2002, 10). The two concepts certainly can be understood as opposites; but not necessarily in the sense of the mutually exclusive binary opposition of “either civil or military.” Wen/wu does not necessarily contrast the roles of different autonomous actors, such as the soldier and the civilian (Huntington 1957; Feaver 2011). Likewise, wen/wu does not map easily onto gendered distinctions: that is, feminine-civil and masculine-martial (Louie 2002, 9-11). Rather, the ideal person in pre-modern China, Japan and Korea harmonized a dynamic balance of civility and martiality, as both a poet and a warrior. World-ordering, national governance, family relations, and personal self-cultivation, all were guided by this quest to harmonize the complementary opposites of literary and martial performances (Louie 2002, 11, 15-17; Benesch 2011, 133-137).

The main point here is not the (neo)Orientalist one that East Asia provides an “exotic” alternative, fundamentally different from “Western civilization.” Following current trends in comparative political theory (see Jenco 2015), this article resists the geopolitical container-style organization of knowledge-production where the choice is between the “modern West” and “traditional China.” Rather than replacing “Eurocentric” concepts and experiences with “Sino-centric” ones, the article explores how discussions of civil/military relations in different social and historical spaces can generate theoretical consensus and dissensus.

Here, the argument is that civil/military is much more than a categorical distinction or a struggle between the autonomous camps of civilians and soldiers. It builds on critical IR’s critique of the binary oppositions that characterize Enlightenment thought and disciplinary IR (see Walker 1993;
Shapiro 2013), to see civility/martiality as a contingent conceptual dynamic. This dynamic governs the performances of social-ordering and world-ordering in ways that can provide a more nuanced understanding of questions of diplomacy, war and peace. The point is not simply to sort national identities as “peaceful” or “militarist,” but to see how each new event (national day parade, treaty signing, military battle—and garden experience) needs to be evaluated in terms of how it performs the civility/martiality dynamic. Indeed, what is most interesting about this dynamic is its lack of a stable canonic definition: there is no orthodoxy, and its contingent flexibility demands that we make sense of civil/military relations through continual interpretive practice (see Louie 2002; Benesch 2011, 165).

As this section has argued, these four conceptual dynamics share a common aesthetic approach that helps us to highlight how global politics takes shape through social relations, sensibility, experience and performativity. These contingent dynamics resonate with each other in complex ways as an assemblage that offers no stable account of causality. For the sake of this article’s analysis of the global politics of gardens, they constitute a framework for examining how gardens can act as exemplary sites where the civility/martiality dynamic takes shape as a heterotopic experience of particular (re)distributions of the sensible. Such (re)distributions of the sensible, in turn, generate cultural governance and resistance.

Gardens as Political and Diplomatic Spaces

The Yasukuni Shrine and the Nanjing Massacre Memorial are not isolated examples of gardens as sites of global politics. Since the turn of the twentieth century, gardens have been an important part of public diplomacy for both China and Japan. Their goal was to use gardens as a mode of cultural governance to present their countries to the West as “civilized” and “peaceful” nations worthy of international respect—and thus not targets of military intervention. One of the first Japanese gardens built abroad was commissioned by Tokyo as Japan’s official national pavilion at the Chicago World’s Fair in 1893. This Japanese stroll garden was very popular: it worked to present Japan as an exotic, civilized
country that was not a threat. In 1910, the British and Japanese governments organized the Japan-British Exhibition in London to celebrate the two countries’ new military alliance; it also was designed to convince the British public that Japan was not a backward country. In addition to showing Japan’s modern manufactures, the exhibit displayed a traditional Japanese garden, “The Garden of Peace” (Mochizuki 1910).

After World War II, one of the ways that the US and Japan pursued reconciliation was through gardens. The Japanese embassy in Washington DC includes the Ippakutei tea house garden, which is open to the public each Spring. Ippakutei, which means “Century Tea House,” was built in 1960 to commemorate a century of US-Japan relations. Many cities in the US have a Japanese garden park, often accomplished though sister-city diplomacy (Hamilton 1996, 89-90). Indeed, the Japanese pavilion in Chicago was rebuilt in the 1960s with donations from the Japanese city of Osaka, and is now called the Osaka Garden. Likewise, the Portland Japanese Garden in Oregon (dedicated in 1963, opened in 1967) was part of a prominent move toward reconciliation and cultural exchange at the local level (Hamilton 1996, 1, 89-93). As Portland’s mayor explained in 1962: “This Garden will provide the citizens of Portland with an area of great beauty and serenity and at the same time represent a warm, understandable link to Japan” (cited in Hamilton 1996, 91).

Chinese gardens are also popular around the world, and are likewise part of diplomatic reconciliation (see McDowall 2016). After the US and China normalized diplomatic relations in 1979, the first cultural exchange project was to build a Chinese garden for the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York (Murck and Fong 1980-81, 61). This garden-building was part of Beijing’s general re-engagement with the world that started in 1978 with Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening policy. Indeed, by 1998 over thirty-five Chinese gardens had been built in fourteen countries (Wang 1998, 61; McDowall 2016). As its plan to build a $100 million Chinese garden in Washington’s US National Arboretum shows, Beijing continues to see gardens as a suitable investment for influence abroad (Higgins 2017). Japan and China have thus recruited gardens into their public diplomacy strategies as examples of state-led cultural governance. As in
many hegemonic distributions of the sensible, gardens employ seemingly apolitical activities for very political aims. The success of this strategy can be seen at the UNESCO world headquarters in Paris where global humanity’s “Garden of Peace” is a Japanese garden (UNESCO n.d.).

Strangely, both China’s and Japan’s public diplomacy strategies involve an odd recycling of Orientalist discourse that is now deployed by Asian states, rather than by the Euro-American metropole (see Clunas 1996; McDowall 2016). But such diplomatic gardens are not merely directed at foreign audiences; as we will see in the next section, state-sponsored gardens are a site of cultural governance (and resistance) for both domestic and foreign policy performances.

Gardens as Sites of Social-Ordering and World-Ordering

Louis XIV (r. 1643-1715) was known to have an overwhelming passion for two things: building and war. The result of both passions is the world’s most famous imperial garden at the Palace of Versailles. With its geometrical design, Versailles is the best example of French formal gardens embodying the Enlightenment values of order, rationality and logic. As Mukerji (1997, 2012) explains, Versailles was not simply a pleasure garden, but rather a site of cultural governance. French formal gardens functioned as “social laboratories,” where economic power was translated into political power (Mukerji 1997, 32). The garden at Versailles was thus France-writ-small, a virtual world where the French monarch’s control over the garden embodied the French state’s control over nature—and its control over society (Mukerji 1997, 2012; Hall and Ames 1998, 181; Thomas 2009, 119). The geometric patterns at Versailles were not simply aesthetically pleasing, but served to integrate diverse elements—in the garden and in French society—to reflect the hierarchies of the new centralized state (Yoon 1994; Mukerji 1997, 9; Thomas 2009). As such, it is an example of Rancière’s politico-aesthetics: Versailles’s new relation of the visible, the sayable, and the thinkable, asserted a redistribution of the sensible suitable for imperial France.
Here, Louis XIV was engaging in what Bauman calls the “gardening impulse,” which is not just about gardens, but entails broader notions of governance. While in pre-modern Europe the ruling class functioned as “game-keepers” to keep peasants off their estates, by the early modern period the ruling class worked as “gardeners” to regulate the environment and society (Bauman 1987, 52). Bauman (1989, 70) thus argues that the gardening impulse works to violently set “apart useful elements destined to live and thrive, from harmful and morbid ones, which ought to be exterminated” (emphasis in original). This scientific view of social ordering informs the modern administrative state, which Bauman (1989, 13) calls the “gardening state,” to apply the violent logic of the gardening impulse to sort humanity into useful elements to be nurtured, and harmful ones to be exterminated (also see Luke 2000; Barmé 2008; Jay 2011).

The violence was not merely metaphorical. Versailles’ baroque landscape was constructed by military engineers to reflect the Sun King’s martial values: the garden’s battlement-style walls supported the king’s hierarchal view of society (Mukerji 1997, 15, 39ff; Jay 2011, 50). Louis XIV thus integrated civility and martiality in a redistribution of the sensible that built France as a modern administrative “gardening state.”

Versailles’s cultural governance also worked through garden itineraries written by Louis XIV himself: nobles, the bourgeoisie, and even peasants were invited to perform the garden by walking it in particular ways. These promenades were heavily organized, instructing people to look at a series of views designed to surprise and delight (de Certeau 1984, 91-110; Mukerji 2012). Such garden performances were also a diplomatic activity: the state organized tours to impress distinguished foreigners. The goal was to display the French state’s cultural and technical power, as well as its geographical and civilizational reach. Indeed, many modernizing monarchs in Europe emulated Louis XIV’s model of cultural governance by building their own Versailles-like gardens: Peter the Great’s Peterhof Palace in St. Petersburg, for example. As a project of the gardening state’s social-ordering and world-ordering, Versailles actively worked to produce “France” for natives and foreigners alike (Mukerji 1997, 37).
Like Louis XIV, China’s Qianlong Emperor (r. 1735-96) had a passion for battles and gardens (Keswick 2003, 92; Thomas 2009, 118). He is well-known for doubling the territorial expanse of the empire, and for expanding the size of the Summer Palace in Beijing, the Garden of Perfect Brilliance (Yuanming yuan)—and these two activities are related (Barmé 1996; Broudhehoux 2004, 46-47). The Qianlong Emperor certainly enjoyed the Garden of Perfect Brilliance as a pleasure garden, a place to rest and recuperate after his long military campaigns and elaborate imperial tours (Thomas 2009). While it is common to see gardens as a refuge from the demands of political life (see McClimens et al. 2012), the Garden of Perfect Brilliance was an imperial site that, like Versailles, was a diplomatic space. While Louis XIV engaged in Westphalian interstate diplomacy at Versailles, the Garden of Perfect Brilliance embodied the hierarchical diplomacy of tributary relations in the Chinese world order: vassal states came to the garden to present tribute to the Son of Heaven. Indeed, this tribute from China’s Asian neighbors often included garden-building materials such as exotic plants, ornamental stones, and strange beasts (Keswick 2003, 45, 169; Thomas 2009, 116). European diplomats also met the emperor in the garden: when British envoy Lord Macartney went to China in 1793, he first visited the Throne Room of the Garden of Perfect Brilliance to offer gifts to the court (see Thomas 2009).

The Garden of Perfect Brilliance was not simply one coherent utopian garden; rather, it is better understood as a heterotopic redistribution of the sensible that integrated a “massive complex of gardens, villas, government buildings, landscapes and vistas, [that] drew on many elements of fantasy, of garden and scenic design, of cultural myth and imaginative practice” (Barmé 1996, 113). This heterotopic garden combined civility and martiality in interesting ways: the Qianlong Emperor brought back gardening ideas from both his military campaigns and his imperial tours (Broudhehoux 2004, 49-50).

The Garden of Perfect Brilliance thus functions both as a condensed version of the best gardens of the empire, and as the Sinocentric world order’s particular distribution of the sensible. The Qianlong Emperor’s main imperial residence in the Garden of Perfect Brilliance was the “Garden of the Nine
Realms, Clear and Calm” (Thomas 2009, 126), which, according to garden historian Wang Yi (2014, 158), was the exemplary imperial garden. In this “peace garden” (i.e. “Clear and Calm”), the Emperor could survey the world in microcosm, with the mythological integration of the “nine realms” alluding to the legendary unification of China—and of the world (Barmé 1996, 117; Broudehoux 2004, 53; Wang 2014, 158-162). As with Foucault’s (1986, 26) garden heterotopia, the Garden of the Nine Realms “is the smallest parcel of the world and then it is the totality of the world. … [it is] a sort of happy, universalizing heterotopia.” And as at Versailles, military engineers constructed the imperial garden as a redistribution of the sensible that reproduced the expanding territoriality of the Qing dynasty, as well as the enduring hierarchy of the Sinocentric world order.

The Qianlong Emperor’s gardening practice was much like that in Bauman’s (1989, 13) gardening state, which views “the society it rules as an object of designing, cultivating and weed-poisoning.” As the Qianlong Emperor put it: “When I find pleasure in orchids, I love righteousness; when I see pines and bamboo, I think of virtue; when I stand beside limpid brooks, I value honesty; when I see weeds, I despise dishonesty” (quoted in Keswick 2003, 191). The Qianlong Emperor thus showed his control over nature and society through garden-building, much as Louis XIV did at Versailles (Thomas 2009).

At about the same time that grand imperial gardens were being built in China and France, expansive stroll gardens emerged in Japan. After unifying war-torn Japan at the beginning of the Edo period (1603-1868), one of the ways that the Shogun military leader safeguarded the new order was to require nobles to maintain two residences: one in their home province, and another in the imperial capital (where their families were held “hostage”). Yet the shogunate did more than use centralized military control to create social order. It employed cultural governance as the “sponsor of the imperial imagination” (Kuitert 2002, 165): elite competition for status and privilege worked largely through nonviolent means, including the construction by nobles of elaborate gardens both in the provinces and in the capital. By the early nineteenth century, there were more than one thousand stroll gardens in the capital alone (Kuitert 2017, 7).
Edo stroll gardens worked much like the Garden of Perfect Brilliance: they were built to embody ideal social worlds, but in a heterotopic way that typically mixed Chinese and Japanese classical references and views. Like in the Qianlong Emperor’s heterotopic garden, they functioned as a “theme park” that offered a sequence of fantastic scenes, rather than a singular master narrative (Keane 1996, xi, 39). Edo stroll gardens thus combined previous Japanese garden styles on their expansive landscaped grounds, including tea house gardens and temple gardens. The development of Japanese garden styles over the past 1,500 years is quite complex (see Keane 1996; Kuitert 2002, 2017); at the risk of over-generalization, one can say that temple and tea house gardens were developed during periods of military rule for leaders who sought to cultivate a civility/martiality dynamic as a means of cultural governance (see Kuitert 2002, 151-157).

Because Japan had little international contact in the Edo period, the focus of cultural governance in the garden was less on diplomacy, and more on constructing and maintaining social order, on the one hand, and fantastic world orders, on the other. The large gardens were vibrant social sites for entertaining the Shogun, the Emperor, and other elites (Kuitert 2017, 7): much like in France and China, people performed the gardens by walking around a central pond on a path that revealed (and concealed) a series of carefully cultivated views. Many of these Edo stroll gardens did not survive into Japan’s modern period (1868-present); those that did were often transformed into public parks, such as Korakuen in Okayama prefecture—an interesting example because it balances the civility of a stroll garden with the martiality of a castle, which rises above the garden as a borrowed view.

Back in China, in addition to working as sites of entertainment and diplomacy, gardens were also the site of war. Indeed, the Garden of Perfect Brilliance was itself a battlefield during the Second Opium War (1856-1860): British and French troops looted the palace of its treasures, and then burnt it down. The Second Opium War is important because it still plays a central role in China’s national identity as a brutal clash of civilizations; or, more to the point,
as a prime example of how Chinese civilization—the imperial garden—was destroyed by European “barbarians” (see Lee 2009).

But as Barmé (1996) explains, it is more complicated than that. The war had been raging on and off since 1856. In 1860, the British and French sent an official delegation to Beijing hoping to negotiate permanent diplomatic recognition from China. “After numerous prevarications, bluffs and acts of deception” by the Qing court, it imprisoned the thirty-nine members of the delegation in the Garden of Perfect Brilliance. They were held hostage, and “subsequently tortured. Of their number eighteen died and, when their bodies were eventually returned to the Allied forces in October 1860, even the liberal use of lime in their coffins could not conceal the fact that they had suffered horribly before expiring” (Barmé 1996, 131).

British and French forces discussed various ways to respond to this outrage. One option was to burn the capital city, as new dynasties typically did in China (see Ryckmans 2008). Another was to attack the imperial garden rather than the city: the looting and torching of the Garden of Perfect Brilliance was designed to inflict pain on the court and the Manchu dynasty, rather than on the general Chinese public. It was seen not as an act of vengeance, but as an act of “justice” that would punish what the Europeans saw as China’s corrupt and barbaric regime (Barmé 1996, 132-133; Keswick 2003, 57; Thomas 2009, 27).

Rather than simply frame it as a military action, we thus can see the attack on the garden as a redistribution of the sensible that resisted China’s cultural governance. Instead of pure martial barbarism, it is a curious combination of civility and martiality. On the one hand, the garden was built to embody the Sinocentric hierarchy’s particular distribution of the sensible. Much like the cultural governance of promenades at Versailles, diplomats in Beijing were obliged to recognize China’s hierarchical worldview as they performed the imperial garden on official visits. On the other hand, the looting and burning of the garden was a political performance, a violent redistribution of the sensible that was figured as an act of resistance to the Sinocentric world order. It was a key event in the redistribution of the sensible that asserted an alternative
“standard of civilization”: the Westphalian system of the liberal world order (see Gong 1984; Ringmar 2013).

Indeed, the Garden of Perfect Brilliance continues to function as a powerful site of cultural governance: this major educational tourist destination works to exemplify both China’s sophisticated civilization and the barbarism of Western imperialism (see Lee 2009). But that does not exhaust its impact either in terms of meaning or affect: in the twenty-first century, Beijing’s Old Summer Palace has been rebuilt as an historical theme-park where people create their own meanings through the active interpretive practice of walking the grounds in unpredictable ways (Barmé 1996; Lee 2009; Rancière 2009; Callahan 2010). The Garden of Perfect Brilliance is thus a heterotopic distribution of the sensible that continues to combine civility and martiality in complex ways: it is both a palace and prison, a site of diplomacy and torture, peace and war, civilization and barbarism, cultural governance—and resistance.

France and China have recruited gardens into public diplomacy as an expression of cultural governance for the performance of both domestic and foreign policy. Likewise, dissensus in gardens is neither new nor rare. During China’s Yuan and Ming dynasties (1271-1644 CE), for example, gardens actually flourished as a mode of resistance. Scholar-officials turned to garden-building after they resigned in protest at what they saw as “immoral government”—or when they were fired. While imperial gardens such as the Garden of Perfect Brilliance engage in cultural governance, private literati gardens offer a redistribution of the sensible as sites of alternative orders, places where marginalized scholar-officials could control things in their own utopia (Murck and Fong 1980-1981, 1-9; Clunas 1996, 51-52; Keswick 2003, 121, 117, 123; Henderson 2013, 12-13; Wang 2014). This was not simply a private protest against official oppression: China’s literati gardens characteristically were open to visits from elites on tour, and from peasants during festivals. The best example is the aptly-named Artless Administrator’s Garden, which is the largest and one of the most popular in Suzhou, the garden capital of China (Clunas 1996, 22-59; Keswick 2003; Henderson 2013, 33-42).
Gardens of Peace, War and Civility/Martiality

The previous section’s discussion of examples from France, China and Japan demonstrated how gardens are part of a long and complex international history of social-ordering and world-ordering (see Go and Lawson 2017). Its focus on the historicity and sociality of gardens as sites of diplomacy, war and peace can help us to analyze the aesthetic politics of our two controversial examples—the Yasukuni Shrine and the Nanjing Massacre Memorial. While they are typically understood as modern memorial sites, this section will show how the Nanjing Massacre Memorial and the Yasukuni Shrine were actually designed as gardens, and are often experienced as gardens (see Qi 1999; Mashima 2008; Precinct Map n.d.). While earlier sections used historical analysis to develop the analytical framework, this section will explore the aesthetics of garden-building itself as a set of practices that can provoke cultural governance and resistance. The aim is to see how the memorials not only convey facts and figures, but also to show how they use garden-building conventions to produce political meaning and political affect—and not necessarily the meanings and feelings that we’ve come to expect.

Therefore, to understand these memorials as distributions of the sensible that creatively combine civility and martiality in political ways, it is helpful to survey the aesthetic regime, that is, the conventions, of Chinese and Japanese garden-building (see Yoon 1994; Sakuteiki 2001; Ji 2004; Kuitert 2012, 2017; Henderson 2013). As the Chinese gardening manual Yuan Ye (1631 CE) tells us, “[t]here are no fixed rules in garden creation; it all depends on what the landscape lends” (Kuitert 2015, 35; Ji 2004, 257;). Hence a garden is judged by how it combines five elements—rocks, water, architecture, plants and poetry—according to the aesthetic conventions of irregularity, asymmetry, variety, and rusticity (Yoon 1994; Hall and Ames 1998; Keswick 2003; Ji 2004). Unlike French formal gardens that remake the environment, Chinese garden designers often defer to the site to take advantage of the environment’s natural contours and borrowed views. Certainly, they still shape the site: according to Yuan Ye,
gardening is the process of “digging ponds and piling rocks for mountains” (Ji 2004, 56). This underlines the need to construct an aesthetic balance between rocks and water, which is seen as a symbolic balance between magical mountains and sacred lakes. This aesthetic balance is not simply of natural elements, but also integrates aspects of high culture: Chinese gardens characteristically contain poetic inscriptions and architectural follies (Ji 2004, 76-103; Henderson 2013, 21-29).

Rather than the precise geometry of French formal gardens, Chinese and Japanese gardens thrive on the aesthetic experience of irregularity: a common feature is the zig-zag bridge that questions the rational desire to go from here to there (see Yoon 1994). Walls are another important feature; but rather than perform as absolute barriers, they work to both conceal and reveal (Hall and Ames 1998, 175-178; Keswick 2003, 138, 146-148; Ji 2004, 179-193). As master gardener Shen Fu (1763-1808 CE) explains, Chinese garden-building employs the heterotopic art of deception: “showing the large in the small and the small in the large, providing for the real in the unreal world and for the unreal in the real” (cited in Wang 1998, 34). Like the civility/martiality dynamic, garden-building is a contingent social construction, a heavily-designed distribution of the visible, hearable, smellable, and feelable, and thus of the sayable, the thinkable and the doable.

Japanese gardens grew out of Chinese gardens, which were introduced from Korea in the sixth century CE (Yoon 1994, 447; Keane 1996, 10). While Chinese gardens employ five elements, Japanese gardens generally look to three elements: water, stones, and plants (Yoon 1994; Keane 1996, 38). But, once again, the dynamic of the garden lies in the way it is designed, rather than in its design elements. Japan’s medieval gardening classic, the *Sakuteiki* (2001,151), opens with the declaration that gardening is “the art of setting stones.” It values the harmonic interplay between two-dimensional planes (ponds, raked sand, walls, and fences) and three-dimensional volumes (especially rocks and clipped plants) (Keane 1996, 16-18, 137; Hall and Ames 1998, 180-181). There is always a tension between awe at nature’s wildness, and the need for human control (see Luke 2000; *Sakuteiki* 2001, 151, 191-192;
Burrell and Dale 2002), which is very similar to the civility-martiality dynamic. Gardens in both China and Japan thus don’t focus on flowers; they are more conceptual, as an interplay of style and content which conveys feelings in a (re)distribution of the sensible. Again: the best question is not “what is the garden,” but rather “how does the garden work” as an aesthetic experience and mode of cultural governance?

Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall

The Nanjing Massacre Memorial is the most popular museum in China. It commemorates the victims of atrocities committed by the imperial Japanese army when it invaded the Chinese capital in 1937 (The Memorial Hall n.d.; Denton 2014, 133-152). The Massacre Memorial is thus the closest thing China has to an official war memorial: indeed, in 2014 Chinese President Xi Jinping went there to declare China’s first “National Memorial Day” (Xinhua 2014). It sees over five million visitors per year, primarily students on school trips but also an increasing number of domestic tourists. Over the May Day holiday in 2011, for example, it was packed with families, as well as a few young dating couples.

The Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall is an award-winning series of structures. The Memorial Hall’s main exhibit is in a “tomb-like” underground history museum that commemorates the victims of wartime atrocities by graphically telling the horrific story of rape, murder, looting, and destruction. While the museum works to nail down the meaning of the memorial as singular and dystopic—militarist Japan attacking civilized China—the overall style of the memorial space is more of a heterotopic distribution of the sensible. It was designed by top architect Qi Kang (1999, 12), who felt his mission was to express the “social and national feelings” of the Nanjing massacre by “embodying the historical disaster in the entire design of the environment.” To do this, Qi (1999, 16, 124-125) mixed the design styles of socialist realism, classical Chinese gardens, and Japanese public architecture. His task was to generate an atmosphere using landscape gardening techniques “to give visitors a true representation of what happened in history. In a word, buildings,
grounds, walls, trees, slopes and sculptures were essential elements not to be neglected” (Qi 1999, 13). The Memorial has been built in four phases to commemorate the fortieth and seventieth anniversaries of the end of World War II, and the sixtieth and seventieth anniversaries of the Nanjing Massacre. It thus is a heterotopic site that contains many different gardens, and this article will focus on two of them.

![Image of Nanjing Massacre Memorial]

**Fig. 1: Disaster in Jinling, Nanjing Massacre Memorial**

The “Disaster in Jinling [Nanjing]” public sculpture opened in 1997 as part of phase two (see Figure 1); since its organizing themes are “pain” and “hatred,” it focuses sharply on what is seen as China’s unfinished historical business with Japan (Qi 1999, 16). This monumental sculpture shows a scene of violence and tragedy, where Chinese people suffered during Japan’s invasion of Nanjing, which resulted in a huge death toll and the destruction of one third of the city’s buildings. The site includes a massive decapitated man’s screaming head, the frantically outstretched arm of a buried-alive victim, and a city wall that has been mutilated by artillery fire. Qi’s (1999, 17) aim here is for the memorial sculpture to be “resonant with the wails and shrieks of the dead.”
But on second glance, the Disaster in Jinling also employs many classical Chinese garden-building conventions (see Figure 2). As Qi (1999, 16) explains, “[i]n design, Chinese gardens came to mind, which is a sort of concentration of nature, with mountains and pavilions put in a limited ensemble.” When viewed from this oblique angle, different meanings emerge (see Rancière 2009, 111ff; Whitehall and Ishiwata 2012). The memorial has the familiar mix of water, rocks, and architecture, and there is a harmonic dynamic between the water-like gravel in the front, and the mountain-like wall in the rear. The sculptures of a dismembered head and a clawing arm resemble a Chinese garden’s ornamental stones. The bullet-ridden city wall, inscribed with the official number of victims—300,000 dead—is much like a garden’s symbolic mountain range inscribed with poetry. Lastly, the curved bridge (another garden convention) takes visitors over a river of gravel to a different place, which has vibrant pine trees that symbolize virtue and eternal life (see Keswick 2003, 191; Henderson 2013). Hence, “Disaster in Jinling” is not simply a memorial, it is a Chinese garden.
The second example is “Peace Square,” which opened in 2007 to mark the seventieth anniversary of the Nanjing massacre. It has a long reflecting pool at the center on an East-West axis, a landscaped garden to the South, and a bas-relief wall to the North. The focus of Peace Square is on “Peace Tower” at the West end of the reflecting pool; the tower integrates three “peace symbols” into one sculpture: a woman who both carries a child and releases a dove (see Figure 3). Rather than a Chinese garden, Peace Square is a more generic, modern garden-park. Still, it uses some Chinese aesthetic conventions to conceal and reveal the view (Keswick 2003, 28, 37): to enter the garden, you have to first pass through a very dark commemoration hall before coming out into the bright light that reveals the beautiful scene of the reflecting pool with the Peace Tower at the end.

But what kind of “peace” is presented in this garden? China’s military victory over Japan is displayed by the bugling soldier, whose boot stands on a Japanese helmet and sword (see Figure 4). As the sculpture shows, this garden embodies a particular civility/martiality dynamic: peace through strength. Behind the bugler is a large bas-relief “Wall of Victory” that records how the communist party heroically led the Chinese people to employ military force to triumph over Japan. Peace here is seen as the result not of mutual understanding, but of military strength.
While Qi Kang’s goal is to foster peace and promote reconciliation through garden-style landscape architecture, the memorial’s particular distribution of the sensible works to produce feelings of fear, outrage, and hate. Peace here is not tied to nonviolence or reconciliation, but to overwhelming military force and vengeance. This peace/war dynamic was underlined in 2002 when a plan to rename the massacre memorial as the “Nanjing International Peace Center” generated outrage among the Chinese public. After 80% of Nanjing residents opposed the plan, it was dropped (Huang 2002). In 2015, the Memorial opened an annex dedicated to a new exhibit “Three Victories: The Victory of the Anti-Fascist War in the China Theater and Judging the Historical Truth of Japan’s War Crimes” (The Memorial Hall n.d.). Hence, in China, the cultural governance of anti-Japanese historiography and militarized peace is hegemonic, allowing only limited space for resistance (see Callahan 2015).

Even so, there are opportunities for people to performatively experience the garden in ways that resist state-led cultural governance. Teenagers on a date are likely to be engaging in their own redistribution of the sensible. Back at Peace Square, resistance emerges through an unintentional use of a Chinese garden-building convention. Behind the Peace Tower is an impious “borrowed view” (see Kuitert 2015): the sacred patriotism of the site is violated by the (capitalist) profanity of the billboard for Jinsheng International Property (see Figure 3).
Yasukuni Shrine

Like most national war memorials, the Yasukuni Shrine in central Tokyo commemorates the sacrifice of people who died for their country (see Edkins 2003, 57-110). All fallen soldiers’ souls are enshrined at this Shinto temple that is sponsored by the Japanese emperor (see Figure 5). It is also a controversial place because in 1978 the souls of fourteen “Class A” war criminals and 5,700 “Class B and C” war criminals were secretly enshrined (Kingston 2007; Takenaka 2015). Hence, as the Chinese ambassador’s intervention described above shows, there was outrage when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine in 2013.

FIG. 5: Yasukuni Shrine, Tokyo

To many in East Asia, the Yasukuni Shrine is not a utopian site for national heroes, but a dystopian site that celebrates wartime atrocities. Abe’s visit thus provoked a general concern about the return of Japanese militarism, and was seen as part of his reinterpretation of Japan’s Peace Constitution to expand the role of the military (Thorsten 2016). The Yusukan Museum, which is on the grounds of the Shrine and guides mainstream understandings of this memorial, shows that there is cause for concern. The museum’s tour of Japanese history, with its scenes of war, death, and martial commemoration,
glorifies Japan as both a heroic warrior nation and as an unrepentant victim (see Record in Pictures 2009). The Yusukan Museum thus embodies a distribution of the sensible that serves to police the meaning of the Yasukuni Shrine and of the Japanese nation according to a stable linear narrative of patriotic coherence and unity (see Edkins 2003; Whitehall and Ishiwata 2012).

But there is more to the Yasukuni Shrine than the Yusukan Museum; in many ways, the Shrine is an Edo stroll garden that juxtaposes different elements and styles (see Mashima 2008). To enter, you can pass through Japan’s largest shrine gate, and promenade up the central path through landscaped gardens complete with statuary, stone lanterns, religious out-buildings, and market stalls. After passing through another gate, you enter into the “Inner Garden,” a temple garden that is dominated by Yasukuni’s Main Shrine, and also contains other temple and tea house gardens: behind the Shrine is the Sacred Pond Garden that includes three tea house gardens (see Precinct Map n.d.).

Hence, when recognized as a heterotopic garden park that combines civility and martiality, the Yasukuni Shrine complex can accommodate meanings and feelings that resist the militarism of the Yushukan Museum. To put it another way, there is more than one way to experience the Shrine. Most people outside Tokyo only see the Shrine when it is a site of key national events, especially the militarist and pacifist demonstrations sparked by the visits of leading politicians. But for people who live and work in the neighborhood, the Shrine has different meanings that are not exhausted by the war-peace binary opposition. While it is a sacred imperial shrine, it is also a space of everyday life. People crisscross it as part of their everyday activities, creating different meanings as they walk (see de Certeau 1984, 91-110; Enloe 2011). Much like Louis XIV’s Versailles, the Shrine is a space of performative cultural governance. But unlike Versailles, it is also a site of resistance to both militarism and its opposite, pacifism. It is a sacred space and a hypernationalist site; but it is also a short cut, a place for a smoke, or to eat your lunch on a sunny day (see Whitehall and Ishiwata 2012; Figure 6). Unlike the Nanjing Massacre Memorial, which is mostly contained behind high walls, the Yasukuni Shrine, like many urban peace gardens, is a crossroads for pedestrian traffic at the heart of the city (see McClimens et al. 2012, 122).
“Walking in Tokyo, Yasukuni Shrine” is a fascinating Youtube video that records the experience of simply walking through the Shrine, and thus performing this Japanese stroll garden via an impious itinerary (Egawauemon 2008). The video was a response to a film made of the hypernationalist crowds that gathered in 2006 to cheer on Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, the day that Japan marks the end of World War II. It aims to show how the Yasukuni Shrine has meanings beyond hypernationalism and militarism. The video starts off outside the Shrine grounds in the midst of a political demonstration complete with banners, activists with loudspeakers, and helicopters circulating overhead. It offers the perspective of an ordinary visitor, walking in the front gate and up the main pedestrianized avenue of the Yasukuni Shrine, performing it as an Edo stroll garden. It is fascinating to see—and hear—the experience evolve from partisan politics to the politics of everyday life. The people walking the site shift from activists outside the gate to a human assemblage on the Shrine grounds: salarymen, students, families, tourists, and shoppers all out for a stroll. The sound of the loudspeakers and helicopters is gradually overwhelmed by the screech of crickets, the murmur of private conversation, and music from the temple. Surely, some people are going to the Yusukan Museum, but that is not the focus of this film. Others pause to experience the sacred space, while yet another set of people traverse the site as a crossroads between here and there. In this way, meaning is actively constructed in perambulative performances worthy of de Certeau’s (1984, 91-114) practice of everyday life and Rancière’s (2009) emancipated spectator (also see Enloe 2011).
Fig. 6: Yasukuni Stroll Garden

This film thus encourages us to change the question from “what is the meaning of the Yasukuni Shrine,” to “when” and “where” is the meaning of the Shrine? If we find the film’s perambulative performance meaningful, then we can appreciate the Yasukuni Shrine as an Edo stroll garden which performatively resists the state-led cultural governance that frames politics in terms of war vs. peace. Rather than allow the Yusukan Museum to determine the meaning of the experience, we can look to the Sacred Pond Garden at the back of the Shrine to reframe our understanding of it as a site of life, reflection, and other possibilities (see Figure 6). Hence to redistribute the sensible and thereby resist cultural governance, it is not necessary to burn down China’s imperial garden as the Anglo-French forces did in 1860. People can resist state-led cultural governance simply by experiencing the garden as a heterotopia that redistributes the sensible dynamic of civility and martiality in performances that not only counter militarism, but also resist the war-peace framing of global politics.
Conclusion

This article has explored the contingent social workings of key gardens to make two main arguments: first, gardens are “unexpected spaces” for the global politics of social-ordering and world-ordering which, in turn, impact issues of diplomacy, war and peace; and second, to understand the global politics of gardens, it is necessary to take an aesthetic approach to IR that appreciates gardens as heterotopic (re)distributions of the sensible that can embody new performances of cultural governance and resistance. Specifically, it questioned how we categorize the Nanjing Massacre Memorial and the Yasukuni Shrine as “peace gardens” or “war gardens” to explore how they function as distributions of the sensible that embody particular civility/martiality dynamics. As we saw, such (re)distributions of the sensible, in turn, can generate cultural governance and resistance.

Rather than performing a simple reversal to see the Nanjing Massacre Memorial as a war garden and the Yasukuni Shrine as a peace garden, this analysis aimed to loosen up such binary distinctions to better appreciate the creative play in the civility/martiality dynamic (see Rancière 2004, 48-49). Such oblique interventions underline how war memorials, gardens and other unexpected spaces of IR are not stable containers of meaning, but need to be actively (re)interpreted as performances of cultural governance and resistance. As noted above, what is most interesting about the civility/martiality dynamic is its lack of a stable canonic definition: there is no orthodoxy, and its contingent flexibility demands that we make sense of global politics through continual interpretive practice.

This article addresses East Asian international politics because that is the author’s particular area of expertise. But as the example of Versailles shows, this research deploys unexpected juxtapositions to call into question any Orientalist regionalization of international studies. Indeed, the hope is that this article will generate further studies of the global politics of gardens that explore examples from other times and places. For example, what can we make of the
National September 11 Museum and Memorial in New York, which embodies a particular civility/martiality dynamic in its heterotopic distribution of the sensible? On the one hand, its official museum seems to follow the distribution of the sensible seen at the Nanjing Massacre Memorial. Both provoke raw emotions through their intimate connection to death: the Massacre Memorial is built on the site of a mass grave, and thousands of people died a violent death at Ground Zero. Both underground museums seek to stabilize the meaning of the tragedy (and the identity of the nation) by assigning the roles of villains and victims in a tragically heroic narrative (see Blais and Rasic 2015).

On the other hand, rather than be walled-off like the Nanjing Massacre Memorial, the above-ground 9/11 Memorial is open like the Yasukuni Shrine. As a hub in New York’s transportation system, it is even more of a crossroads that people traverse going from here to there in everyday life, as well as on particular pilgrimages. Michael Arad’s “Reflecting Absence” memorial is also radically open: twin voids that controversially reproduce the gaping wound in the cityscape as a pair of black holes. As in the Japanese stroll garden, this water garden is open to multiple interpretations as a site of life, death, and rebirth (see Denson 2011; Blais and Rasic 2015; Sturken 2016).

As this exploratory discussion suggests, the 9/11 Memorial is ripe for further analysis; it can be profitably analyzed as a garden heterotopia that redistributes the sensible dynamic of civility and martiality in performances of cultural governance and resistance. Garden-building here is theory-building: by producing new sites and sensibilities of global politics, it creatively shapes our understanding of IR.

References

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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ew9AllEWehM.


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