http://eprints.lse.ac.uk

'Bourdieu goes to Baghdad; explaining hybrid political identities in Iraq',
Journal of Historical Sociology, in press, to be published March 2018.

Toby Dodge

Abstract:

This paper critiques the primordial and ethnosymbolic theories of identity that have come to dominate explanations of Iraq's descent into violent instability after the 2003 invasion. It argues that Iraq's contemporary politics can only be understood by examining its history over the longue durée not the past fifteen years. The paper critically interacts with modernist theories of nationalism and their relevance to explaining identities in the Middle East. It then deploys the work of Pierre Bourdieu, specifically his notion of field and capital, to explain the relationship between four 'principles of visions' that have competed to dominate Iraq's political field.

Bio:

Toby Dodge teaches in the International Relations Department at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is also Director of its Middle East Centre. He is the author of *Inventing Iraq: the failure of nation building and a history denied* (2003) and *Iraq; from war to a new authoritarianism* (2012). He has published previous papers in *The Review of International Studies*, *International Affairs*, *International Peacekeeping*, *Monde Arabe*, *Maghreb-Machrek*, *International Politics* and *Third World Quarterly.*

Contact:

Toby Dodge, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE.

B.t.Dodge@lse.ac.uk

'Bourdieu goes to Baghdad; explaining hybrid political identities in Iraq'.
Toby Dodge[1]

"What appears to us today as self-evident, as beneath consciousness and choice, has quite often been the stake of struggles and instituted only as the result of dogged confrontations between dominant and dominated groups. The major effect of historical evolution is to abolish history by relegating to the past, to the unconscious, the lateral possibilities that it eliminated" (Bourdieu 1994: 15).

Introduction.

Since the US-led invasion of March 2003, Iraq's political field has been increasingly dominated by overtly sectarian rhetoric. Initially, the country was swept up in an insurgency against foreign occupation justified by territorial nationalism. However, a militant form of Sunni Islamism quickly infused that conflict. The fight then degenerated into a civil war understood by participants and observers in terms of the violent assertion of ethnic and religious identity. Finally, in June 2014, Iraq's second largest city, Mosul, fell to the rejuvenated forces of the Islamic State or *Daesh* who claimed to be recreating a transnational Sunni caliphate, seeking to unite Muslims under their austere, violent and deeply sectarian interpretation of Islam.

Although there have been notable exceptions (Shadid 2005, Rosen 2010, Diamond 2005, Herring and Rangwala 2005, Bouillon, Malone and Rowswell 2007 and Dodge 2012), the dominant analytical framework adopted by those seeking to explain post-invasion Iraq tends to be shaped by either an ahistoric primordialism or a reworked and hence more intellectually sophisticated ethno-symbolic approach. Three indicative examples of this show the influence of this analytical framework at work in journalism, the work of participant observers and academics. From 2003 to 2007, Nicholas Pelham was one of the most astute foreign correspondents working in Iraq, bringing a fine-grained, almost anthropological, detail to his reporting. However, when his dispatches were collected together in a book, (2008), Pelham framed four years of detailed reporting by encapsulating his writing within a primordial approach that described not only Iraq's history but that of the wider Middle East in terms of trans-historical sectarian conflict (2008). This primordial approach was developed to an even greater extent by the best-selling work of Ali Allawi (2007), a former Minister of Trade and Defence under the American occupation of Iraq. Citing the 1950s Iraqi Sociologist, Ali al-Wardi, Allawi develops an argument that sees "the process of modernisation and urbanisation as skin deep in Iraq" (13), leaving a "a conflict-strewn society", where "mutual antagonism", both between Sunni and Shia and tribal and urban dominate (14). This analysis allows Allawi to trace the evolution of the post-2003 conflict

back to the split within Islam, the "great divide" between Sunni and Shia and, unproblematically, homogenise both groups as they entered into a conflict increasingly dominated by the violent assertion of different religious identities.

The most sophisticated academic advocate of the ethno-symbolic approach to understanding Iraq is Fanar Haddad, in one of the most important books published on Iraq since 2003 (2011). Following A.D. Smith's work, Haddad explains Iraq's history by placing causal weight on the conflict between "competing myth-symbol complexes", which provide "ontological security" for their adherents but also, at the same time, draw groups into assertive conflict with each other. For Haddad, Iraq's society, at different times, is divided into Sunni and Shia myth-symbol complexes with conflict between them reaching two separate peaks, first after the uprisings and state suppression of 1991 and then after the invasion of 2003. Although Haddadd is careful to stress the temporal fluidity of these complexes, his reading of Iraqi history leads to a "skepticism towards the possibility of a Sunni-Shi'a religious/theological rapprochement" and a sense that across Iraq, conflict between these two complexes seemed inevitable.

The analytical primordialisation of Iraq, Syria and then the wider Middle East accelerated after the fall of Mosul in 2014 and reached its peak with the hundred year anniversary of the Sykes-Picot agreement in May 2016. Under this narrative instability across the Middle East was caused by the 'false states' created by the Sykes-Picot agreement. This reading was then deployed by both academics and journalists to explain the violent crisis that engulfed the region after the 'Arab Spring' (Nasr 2014). The popular rendition of this approach gained its widest audience with a series of articles written by Robin Wright, who argued that the only way to bring peace and stability back to the region would to divide it up into fourteen new, more religiously and ethnically homogeneous states (Wright 2013, 2016).

Unlike the majority of recent work on Iraq and, increasingly, the wider Middle East, this paper deploys a Historical Sociological approach to argue that what appears to be self-evident today, the dominance of Iraq's political field by groups deploying sectarian rhetoric, is in fact an historical aberration. This point, the comparative novelty of sectarian politics, has been missed by media pundits, freshly minted think tank experts and some academics. Faced with the startling and fast moving events after 2003, the most readily available explanation involved the deployment of a form of populist primordialism, seeking to explain Iraq's contemporary descent into violence and radicalisation not in terms of a recklessly incompetent foreign intervention but instead by reference to supposedly trans-historical religious and ethnic identities, which allegedly pre-dated the creation of the Iraqi state in 1920 but have retained the capacity to dominate its politics.

There are at least two ways in which Historical Sociology can provide a particularly powerful antidote to primordial readings of Iraq. Firstly, at the core of Historical Sociological method is a powerful dialogue between "the nature and effects of large-scale structures and long-term processes of change" (Skocpol 1984b: 359). This makes the deployment of explanatory theory "more explicit, subjecting it to logical scrutiny, and challenging it substantively" (Calhoun 1998: 855-6). If successful, the result is an analysis that works on three levels, certainly describing immediate events but also "the subjective world of action" and, most importantly, structural causality (Abrams 1982: 64). This approach then allows for the ahistorical approach of primordialism to be challenged by a detailed and analytically nuanced study of Iraq over the longue durée, from its pre-state origins within the Ottoman Empire, through its creation as a state under British colonial occupation, to its independence and the series of bloody coups that destabilised the country up to 1968.

However, seeking to do justice to the complexities and nuances of Iraq's history through a flight into historically informed social science, specifically sociologically shaped theories of nationalism, brings with it its own set of problems. Theories of national identity have long been riven, if not stultified, by two competing schools of thought, a broadly modernist approach and its theoretical other, ethnosymbolism. Even a cursory examination of Iraq's whole political history, as opposed to the last fifteen years, shows both the applicability of modernist understandings of nationalism but also the damage that they can do to historical complexity, through an implicit teleology linked to the dominance of 'sociologism'.

This paper will certainly utilise some of the insights of the modernist approach to nationalism. However, it will combine these with the work of Pierre Bourdieu, especially his concepts of field, capital and symbolic power. The boundaries of Iraq's political field and who has the right to be a member of it have been the key point of contention since the creation of the state in 1920. The terrain over which this struggle has been fought is the competition for the symbolic power to define boundaries and membership.

Bourdieu was certainly a Sociologist who was comfortable working within a long-range historical context. His major work focused on how hierarchies of power were created, challenged and sustained. However, the powerful insights of Bourdieu's work, especially when applied to the longue durée of Iraqi history, come primarily from his relational approach, where competition for dominance within a field shapes both the nature of that field and the value of the capital being fought over. So, for Bourdieu, meaning becomes relational, with individuals, groups and states being interdependent units involved in competitive struggles that gives rise to the properties attached to them (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97, Swartz 2013: 22: Swartz 1998: 61, 63). It is the deployment of a Historical Sociological approach shaped by Bourdieu's analytical categories and his relational approach that provides the best way to

escape the ahistorical primordialisation of Iraq but also the intellectual stasis produced within the study of nationalism by the modernist-ethnosymbolic debate.

Theories of national identity.

As the modernist approach would assume, the Middle East, in the nineteenth century, was undoubtedly transformed by its integration into the world economy. This had far reaching ramifications for the political identities of what was to become the population of Iraq. As such the overtly modernist theories of nationalism capture, but only partially explain, the processes the region went through at the end of the Ottoman Empire and the period under European colonial rule (Gelvin 2009). For Gellner, the modernist transformation is exemplified by the move from an agrarian to an industrialised society, a move from face-to-face interaction to one of "… exo-socialisation, the production and reproduction of men outside the local intimate unit …". This exo-socialisation delivers the requirements of a mass society: "… a universal, standardised, context free …" communication. It also leads to a unificatory "high culture", homogenising the newly industrialised society thus creating the preconditions for the spread of nationalism (Gellner 1983: 14, Gellner 1996: 106, Gellner 1994: 26). In his expansion of the modernist account, Anderson's description of the move from the pre-modern to the modern includes the transformation of large cultural systems, Christianity, Islam and the Chinese Middle Kingdom from "… centripetal and hierarchical" to "boundary-oriented and horizontal". This occurs through the "… gradual demotion of the sacred language". This process is driven by the rise of a "clocked, calendrical time" and the spread of print capitalism and the resultant dominance of vernacular languages (Benedict Anderson 1999: 14, 18, 26, 45).

Both Gellner and Anderson and beyond them the whole intellectual edifice that is the modernist account of nationalism have come under sustained critique. First Gellner has been repeatedly accused of excessive structuralism, "single-minded economic functionalism" and immoderate materialism, because of his portrayal of the teleological and deterministic outcomes of industrialisation. Of equal importance for a sustainable explanation of contested political identities in Iraq, he has been accused of explaining away the ideological power and centrality of nationalism to identity by seeing them as a mechanical by-product of modernity (Perry Anderson 1992: 201, 207, 208). An even more relevant critique for Iraq are Chatterjee's inter-twined accusations of 'sociologism', Eurocentricsm and reductionism. Under this rubric the modernist school sees the rise of nationalism in the colonial and post-colonial world as an outcome of universal sociological processes that remove any agency from the recipients of a coercively delivered late modernity (Chatterjee 1996: 216, Chatterjee 1999: 21-22). Modernist accounts not only remove agency, the ability to shape identity through mobilisation and protest, but also complexity, the interaction between geo-temporally specific ideological structures and the transformatory

capacities of modernity. For Anderson and Gellner, nationalism in its global form is modular, whereas for Chatterjee in India, but also, for this paper, in Iraq, it is the outcome of contested, often violent, struggles between locally situated discourses and the transformation that modernity brings.

The major academic alternative to this modernist account is A.D. Smith's ethnosymbolism. Smith certainly recognises, if not reifies, the continuities across the modernist watershed. For Smith, these powerful historical continuities are situated within 'ethnies', "named and self-defined human communities" "whose members possess a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of common culture" and hence solidarity (Smith 2009: 26). For Smith the ubiquity of trans-historical ethnies makes them central to understanding the rise of nationalism. Given Gellner's economic functionalism and rationalism, Smith's approach certainly identifies the passions that political identity can engender, he also focuses on the symbols and mythologies involved in collective ideational mobilisation. However, the reification of ethnies opens Smith up to accusations of primordialism, giving them trans if not ahistorical causal powers, acting as the base for all successful nationalisms, with nationalism itself given sociological reality beyond the ideational force of Smith's 'myth-symbol' complex (Smith 1986: 14, Smith 2009: 13).

The modernist moment in the Middle East.

At first glance, the socio-economic transformation that the Ottoman Empire underwent in the eighteen hundreds, driven by both its integration into the world economy and its defensive modernisation, appears to mirror the working assumptions of the modernist school. There was clearly a transformation of societal units with a move from localised face-to-face interactions to the dominance of mass 'exo-socialisation'. With the decline of the Ottoman Empire we see the 'transformation of large cultural systems' along with the spread of print capitalism. However, in the Middle East, the causality modernists see as accompanying this, for Gellner, the birth of a homogenising 'high culture' and for Anderson, the rise of a unitary 'imagined community' did not happen. Instead, a number of ideologies came into competition, all the product of a modernist transformation, some with their roots in pre-transformation ideological formations with other being overtly modernist (Gelvin 2009 Gelvin 1991). Hanna Batatu sums up the outcome of this struggle in Iraq:

> " … the elements of the traditional social structures and the attendant values and categories of understanding did not disappear, but survived, if in diluted form, alongside the new mentalities and the new structural elements and principles. In fact, often the very same group bore the imprints of the two structures in combined form" (Batatu 1989: 11).

Those in Iraq pursing a modernist ideology of unitary nationalism can be divided by the boundaries of the political field they were fighting for and how they wanted to define membership of that field. Some fought for a territorial nationalism (*wataniyya*), seeking to unite Iraqis round a common set of unitary myths and cultural reference points. Others stressed a Pan-Arabism (*qawmiyya*), which sought the unity of all Arabs within one state, stressing linguistic commonality, religious heritage and an expansive Arab history. In addition, there were those seeking to mobilise a Kurdish national identity around a different set of linguistic, cultural and historical markers. All of these competing groups were the product of a modernist 'awakening', driven by the rise of print capitalism, a new class of professional intellectuals and the spread of mass politics along with a reaction to the centralising 'defensive modernisation' of the late Ottoman Empire (Bashkin 2011: 294, Davis 2005, Rhys Bajalan 2016: 140-157). Whilst urban areas transformed more readily, regions geographically and economically peripheral to the world market, experienced the effects in a more diffuse fashion. Also involved in the fight to categorise and hence dominate Iraq's new political field were those whose mobilisation was defensive, seeking to assert an identity they felt was threatened by a new secular form of mass politics (Gelvin 1999). This counter-reaction, also by its very nature modern, involved those asserting religiously based identities, both Sunni and Shia, but also those evoking a tribal identity (Jabar and Dawod 2003, and Jabar 2003).

Bourdieu's political field and symbolic power.

The analytical task of this paper is to explain the development of Iraq's relational political field over the longue durée not ahistorcially from 2003 onwards. This has to be done without reifying any of the competing identities that exist within it. Pierre Bourdieu's key analytical concepts of 'field' and different forms of 'capital' allow for this type of examination, stressing the political field's fluid and competitive nature. His relational sociology draws attention to the mutually defining competition between those attempting to impose different conceptions of Iraq's political identity. His focus on symbolic violence stresses the fact that this competition is ultimately about a struggle to impose one dominant vision of what Iraq is and who Iraqis are on the whole political field.

Bourdieu's development of 'field theory' is especially useful for understanding Iraqi politics (Zubaida 1989: 145-150, Zubaida 1991: 207). For Bourdieu, a society is comprised of "… relatively autonomous social microcosms … spaces of objective power relations…" or fields. These objective power relations are imposed on any person or group who enters the field. Fields then become determined by the relative power of the groups struggling within them for domination, either to conserve their existing position or transform the field to their advantage. The boundaries of the field are also determined by those struggling within it, with the determination of what the field encompasses a

central part of that struggle (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97, 101, 104, Bourdieu 2005: 30). The boundaries of Iraq's political field were a central point of contest from the 1920s to the 1970s: was Iraq simply a part of a wider Arab nation or a territorially delineated nation of its own, was the field dominated by a broadly secular nationalism or a community or *uma* defined by Islam?

For Bourdieu, the political field is not simply the state. The state is conceived of as an "ensemble of administrative or bureaucratic fields", multiple sites of contestation where the struggle is for "the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence, i.e., the power to constitute and to impose as universal and universally applicable within a given 'nation' …" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 111-112). This disaggregation of the state captures the reality of political struggle in Iraq. The coercive field was a constant site of competition between 1920 and 1968, with groups vying for dominance both within the official boundaries of the state and external to it.

Bourdieu understands the political field as having comparative autonomy, it is not simply the arena of overt class or economic interests. It is the site where political parties and professional politicians struggle for domination (Davis 2010: 206). Throughout Iraq's history the struggle to dominate the political field was not simply reducible to class or economic interests. The competition was to impose a vision of what the social world consists of "… a symbolic power to impose beliefs, recognised principles of vision…" The audience for this struggle is the wider public, with politicians competing for the power of " … surreptitious imposition of categories of perception endowed with authority and designed to become legitimate categories of perception". The aim is to mobilise the population behind the competing 'principles of visions' within the field (Bourdieu 2005: 36-39). In Iraq these principles of visions have been both nationalist but also, simultaneously, communalist.

Bourdieu also stresses that the power within a field is relational. Individuals and the groups they belonged to are enmeshed within broad networks that shape their consciousness and their actions. Understanding the struggle over Iraq's political field as relational allows analysis to move away from modernist teleologies but also a focus on primordial trans-historical continuities, each principle of vision, struggling to impose symbolic violence on the field, is locked in an interactive and hence transformative struggle with its competitors.

Bourdieu see power within any given field as determined by the different types of capital each player can deploy in their struggle for domination. The value of these different forms of capital change from field to field, depending on the nature of the struggle. Economic capital, the power to deploy financial resources is straightforward. Social capital comes from the extent of an actor's networks and associates "the size of the network of connections he can effectively mobilise" (Bourdieu 1986: 241-258). Cultural capital is central to Bourdieu's argument that culture has a stratifying power within society. The

third and most important type of capital is symbolic capital and symbolic power. It is the struggle for symbolic power within Iraq's political field that is the main explanatory focus of this paper. Symbolic capital has the ability to legitimise power relations. Those who wield symbolic capital, writers, teachers, and journalists for example, have the ability to shape and legitimise perceptions of the social order (Swartz 1998). Symbolic power comes from the ability to manipulate symbolic systems. Symbolic systems deliver individual cognition, communication and societal differentiation (Swartz 1998). Symbolic power is thus "… the power to constitute the given by stating it, to act upon the world by acting upon the representation of the world …" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 148).

Overall, Bourdieu's understanding of social struggle and the political identities that originate from it, stress the centrality of symbolic classifications. Cognitive conceptions are directly shaped by social structures and both are fought over by groups within the political sphere seeking ideational dominance.

Bourdieu goes to Baghdad; seeking to understand hybrid political identities in Iraq.

Competition within Iraq's political field has tended to oscillate around four 'principles of vision', with various groups struggling to obtain symbolic dominance by adopting one of these visions whilst also actively taking concepts, symbolism or rhetoric from the other competing visions. From the creation of the political field up until the 1970s, the main contest was between an Iraqist (*wataniyya*) conception of the field and an Arab nationalist (*qawmiyya*) one. However, by the late 1920s a third principle of vision, that of a Kurdish nationalism, had cohered in the process of developing an antagonistic relationship with both Arab and Iraqist nationalism. The entry into the political field of groups promoting a specifically Shia vision came in the late 1970s in the face of ferocious repression from the then Baathist government. This Shia majoritarian vision gained coherence through the 1990s, but only came to fruition in exile and was brought back into the Iraqi political field after regime change in 2003. Finally, a principle of vision that promoted a specifically Sunni identity was a late entrant into the political field, only solidifying into coherence after 2003.

As Brubaker and Cooper argue, none of these principle visions should be treated as sociological categories. The interactive relationship between the political groups utilising them indicates that they are at best a "category of practice" that at times indicate high levels of "relational connectedness" between those that acknowledge or accept the claims being made. However, at other times these visions represent little more than the political aspirations of the individuals and groups that deploy them (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 2,4,5).

Arab nationalism in Iraq's political field.

The first 'principle of vision', Arab nationalism, came to dominate Iraq's political field in the aftermath of the coup that followed the Young Turk revolution of 1908. This marked the start of a struggle to define the boundaries of a political field and attempts to deploy symbolic violence to define the identity of the people who lived within those boundaries. This struggle was triggered by and reacted to the assertion of an increasingly Turkified centralising Ottoman Empire. Arab secret societies, like *al-Ahd*, were formed to counter this with an alternative Arab nationalism. It was the Iraqi members of *al-Ahd*, former officers in the Ottoman army, who went on to form the core of Iraq's governing elite round the new king Faisal (Simon 1986: 27).

Once the Iraqi state had been established and its institutions built under the British held League of Nation's mandate, those promoting an Arab nationalist vision of the political field gained ascendency. The Arab nationalist cause had both Sunni and Shia Iraqis within its ranks, who saw Arab unity (and not political organisation based on sect) as the best way to unite the population against British domination.[i] However, Abdul-Salaam Yousif identifies the dominant sub-group of Arab nationalists during this period as *tabi'i* or dependent, official nationalists (Yousif 1991: 172). The myth of the Arab revolt, a British funded guerrilla campaign against the Ottoman Empire during World War I in the Hijaz, gave both the British installed king, Faisal bin Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi, and his allies cultural capital. It also gave them social capital as the network of former Ottoman army officers that Faisal brought back to Iraq dispersed through the institutions of the state and army into the economy (Batatu 1989: 115-117, 319-33). This gave rise to powerful contradictions; although Faisal and his allies were committed to expanding the boundaries of the political field to include all Arabs and to rid the area of colonial domination, they had been allied to the most powerful colonial state, Britain, since 1916 and were dependent upon the British for their survival in Iraq (Mufti 1996: 22).

The coup d'état of 1941 was a major watershed in the evolution of Arab nationalism in Iraq. It was an attempt to overcome the contradictions inherent in *tabi'i* Arab nationalism, but drove Britain to reinvade. Once British-led forces had secured control they set about purging the coercive and political fields of Arab nationalists. This marked the definitive break within Arab nationalism, empowering more radical currents, marking the rise of the Baath Party as an influential competitor within both fields.

The radicalisation of Arab nationalism fractured it as a political force after the 1958 coup that rid the country of the British installed monarchy and governing elite. Its social capital was divided between several serving and former senior military figures and the Baath Party. Those threatened by the new Iraqi President Abdul Karim Qasim's agenda of land reform and social

transformation and his alliance with the Communist Party, backed Arab nationalism as the more conservative alternative, empowering a military rival, Abdul Salam Arif.

In the struggle to dominate Iraq's political field Arif recognised the prestige that Egypt's president Nasser had accrued and allied with him, attempting to utilise Egypt's social, cultural and ultimately its symbolic capital. Arif seized power in two coup d'états in February 1963, one removed and murdered Qasim and brought Arif to power in alliance with the Baath Party. The second coup saw Arif purge the government of its Baathist members.

Arif's brand of Arab nationalism could not dominate a fractured and highly contests political field and his brother, who took over from him after he was killed in a helicopter crash, was removed in a third coup d'état in 1968 that brought the Baath Party to power and should have marked the high point of Arab nationalism. The Baathists set out to systematically dominate social capital by spreading political commissars through the army and civil service. This ruthless and well funded domination meant only under Baathist rule did the Iraqi state come to resemble Bourdieu's definition of the state as the "…culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital: capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or (better) informational capital, and symbolic capital" (Bourdieu 1994: 4).

In spite of becoming the most powerful competitor in the political field since Iraq's creation, the Baath's struggle to impose symbolic violence on Iraq's population was still relational, reacting to both groups within the field and externally (Rohde 2012). The construction of Baathist ideology by Michel Aflaq and Salah ud-Din al-Bitar, certainly placed Arab nationalism at its centre but was also a relational reaction to the Marxist debates that dominated the Sorbonne when they both studied there (Batatu 1989: 725). The resultant ideology was a fluid bricolage, attempting to fuse a commitment to Arab nationalism with a militant anti-Imperialism and a focus on state-led developmentalism. It produced an increasingly hybrid ideology that moved away from Arab nationalism towards an Iraqist vision of the political field as the party unsuccessfully attempted to impose its hegemony on the country.

The Iraqist principle vision.

The second main competitor within the political field were groups mobilising around the principle vision of a specifically Iraqi homeland. Primarily in competition with Arab nationalism, these groups tended to have a more pluralist conception of who could be a member of the political field, one that was not limited linguistically, religiously or racially.

The main forces representing this vision of the political field were social democratic Iraqist formations competing in the field from the 1930s onwards. These were personified by the *Ahali* (the People) Group. Formed in 1931 by young intellectuals, it set out to compete on the basis of a fusion of Leftism, Liberal Democracy and Iraqi nationalism. The group's agenda promoted *Sha'biyah* (populism) or the welfare of all, regardless of class or sect. It defined itself against Arab nationalist attempts to impose a political field based on exclusionary language and race, accusing them of being self-serving and conservative, promoting unity above social development. Instead, national cohesion would be delivered through political mobilisation to gain social transformation, democracy and equality (Bashkin 2009: 61-65, 132, Khaduri 1951: 71-74, 93, 113, Batatu 1989: 300-303).

The second major group fighting for an Iraqist definition of the political field were the Communist Party. Founded in the mid-1930s, the party's increasing popularity amongst Iraq's growing urban educated classes was repeatedly tempered by extensive persecution. Its social capital reached its peak under the leadership of Yusuf Salman Yusuf (Comrade Fahad), General Secretary from 1941 to 1947 (Franzen 2011: 40, 56 Batatu 1989: 530-531). From the first publication of its aims in August 1935, the Communist Party made its pluralist definition of Iraq's political field clear, arguing that all minorities had cultural rights and that the Kurdish nation, if they chose, had the right to self-determination (Batatu 1989*:* 436-437, Franzen 2011*:* 49-52 and Bashkin 2009: 100-101).

Under Abdul Karim Qasim's rule, 1958 to 1963, the Iraqist place within the political field solidified (Baskin 2011). However, Qasim's own position came to be defined by his lack of social capital. The strength of support for Arab nationalism across the officer corps of the army led to a constant challenge to Qasim. It was this vulnerability that drove him into a tense and constantly shifting alliance with the Communist Party, who delivered coercive capital backed by their militia balanced against Arab nationalists in the military.

Qasim's deployment of symbolic capital was relational, shaped by the power of both the Communist Party and Arab nationalism. Qasim set out to counter the power of Arab nationalism through the Ministry of Guidance, producing a cultural capital that imposed Iraqist definitions on the political field. State supervised television and radio broadcasts, book production and cultural festivals all sought to emphasise an ethnically and religiously plural Iraqist nationalism that was open to all (Bashkin 2011: 296-7, 302, Davis 2005: 111, 125, 133).

Between 1958 and 1963, the Iraqi Communist Party enjoyed the strongest social capital of any group in the political field. In 1958 it had 3,000 disciplined party members with another 3,000 supporters. Its newspaper, *Ittihad al-Sha'b*, had a circulation of 25,000 (Yousif 1991: 187, Mufti 1996:

112). It backed Qasim's leadership, attracting a constituency that had gained from land reform and government house building (Batatu 1989: 808, 851, Franzen 2011: 95). However, such an overt defence of Qasim brought it into direct conflict with Arab nationalists. The resultant bloodshed made Nasser attack both Qasim and the Communist Party, labelling the president "the divider of Iraq" and the communists "*shu'ubis*", damning them as partisan separatists (Franzen 2011: 97).

As soon as the Baath party seized power in 1968, its ideational fluidity allowed it to take the symbols of their competitors and simultaneously deploy coercive capital and symbolic violence against them. After 1968, the party set about tempering its commitment to Arab nationalism in recognition of Iraq's ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity. The party's ideological machinery focused on 'Mesopotamianism', "the identification of nationhood with the ancient territory between the Tigris and the Euphrates" giving it "equal status to and, occasionally, even priority over pan-Arabism" (Baram 1991: xxi). This, it was hoped, would create an ideational space in which the Kurdish population, along with Shia and Sunni Arabs, could be convinced to bond with the Baathist's conception of the nation.[ii]

The evolving shape and content of this ideational pluralism was heavily dependent upon the Baathists comparative power within the political field. When, in 1975, Iraq did a deal with Iran to end Iranian support for the Iraqi Kurdish insurgency, the Kurdish cultural content of Baathist ideology was reduced to reflect the reduction of the Kurdish nationalist threat (Baram 1991: 21). When, on the other hand, the Baathist government were faced with mass protests during the *Marad al-Ras*, Shia religious processions of 1977, the regime made a concerted effort to integrate Shia religious symbolism into its symbolic capital and increase the reach of its social capital by co-opting Shia religious figures and institutions (Jabar 2003: 213-214, Tripp 2000: 217, Mufti 1996: 224).

However, the Iranian revolution of 1979 posed the gravest threat to Baathist rule since it seized power. It sought to reduce this threat by invading Iran in 1980, hoping to impose a quick settlement on a weak regime. Instead, the war dragged on for eight years. In response to the revolution and then an extended war of attrition, the regime once again restructured its ideology, initiating 'The Project for the Rewriting of History'. This was a second attempt to develop a Baathist symbolic capital through 'Mesopotamianism', the inclusion of all the disparate elements of Iraqi society within a vision of the political field that hoped to exclude the revolutionary propaganda from Tehran (Davis 2005: 3, 6-9).

The growth of Shia centric visions of the political field.

The growth of a Shia centric principle position within Iraq's political field was driven by two separate groups with different types of social, cultural and symbolic capital, first the Shia ulama and secondly lay political activists. However, for the first fifty years of the Iraqi state, the majority of politically active Shia Iraqis mobilised round other principles of vision, primarily Iraqist nationalism but also Arab nationalism with both the Communist and the Baath Party having a majority Shia membership.

In the early days of the British mandate the Shia religious hierarchy were certainly active in the political field, but their deployment of cultural and symbolic capital was focused on driving the British out and promoting an Iraqist definition of the field and its membership (Sluglett 2007: 221-228). This resulted in British repression and the exclusion of a number of senior Shia ulama or *mujtahids* from Iraq. It was under the Qasim regime that the forces of Shia political Islam, in the form of the Dawa Party (*Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*), began to cohere and enter the political field. The Dawa Party was formed as a direct response to the growing power of the Iraqi Communist Party. For the first time since 1922, senior *mujtahid*'s abandoned their 'quietist' approach and began to openly criticise both Qasim's government but also the threat posed by Communism. This was partly driven by the steady reduction in the cultural and social capital of the *mujtahid*s, as the number of students training to join the Shia ulama declined (Batatu 1982 Mallat 1993: 9, 15).

As a member of the ulama, the Dawa Party's key ideologue, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, could capitalise on both religious, social and cultural capital. He wrote two of his major texts *Falsafatuna* (Our Philosophy) and *Iqtisaduna* (Our Economic System) in 1959 and 1961 at the height of Qasim's revolutionary zeal and the peak of the Communist Party's influence. They were intended as key interventions in the political field, deploying the cultural capital of the Shia ulama to combat what they saw as a threat to their very survival (Browers 2012 Batatu 1982b).

Although the return of senior Shia *mujtahid*s to Iraq's political field and the formation of the Dawa Party mark the start of the rise of Shia Islamism in Iraq, this was not an assertion of a specifically Shia identity juxtaposed against other communalist identities. Instead it was targeted at the dangers of atheism, problems with Qasim's policies and the growing threat of communism, deploying symbolic capital in Iraq's political field in the name of a universalising Islam.

It was Baathist attempts at dominating Iraq's political field that transformed Shia political identity, with the deployment of coercive capital and symbolic violence pushing activists towards a definition of the political field that gave priority to an exclusionary Shia identity. This process began in 1977 but was accelerated by the Iranian revolution. Predictably, the Baathist response was an extensive crackdown on protests and the arrest and subsequent execution of

Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr himself, his sister and hundreds of his followers and Dawa Party members (Jabar 2003: 225-234, Tripp 2005: 220, Mallat 1993b: 226, Cockburn 2008: 47-50). Although Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and the Dawa Party overestimated their power vis-a-via the Iraqi state, such an extensive deployment of coercive capital created an unbridgeable division within the political field between the Baath Party and the Shia population. As a senior *mujtahid*, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr had extensive cultural and symbolic capital. His murder, along with his sister, was certainly designed to intimidate but it also made it impossible for the Baath to deploy viable symbolic capital within the Shia section of the population.

If the events of 1979-80 marked a major breach in relations between the Baathist state and the Shia population, the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait made that breach public. An armed uprising across the south of Iraq erupted after the coalition offensive to drive Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The fact that the regime lost temporary control of Shia majority areas, the level of coercion and destruction deployed to regain control, the mobilisation of an opposition force against the regime and finally the involvement of the previously 'queitist' Grand Ayatollah al-Khoei, all combined to transform the political discourse used by those groups seeking to mobilise the opinion of Shia Iraqis. Fanar Haddad argues that 1991, more than any other moment in Iraqi history, created a "…clear delineation of Shi'i identity within Iraq, distinct from Iraq's other constituent parts and most certainly from the state" (Haddad 2010: 86, 97).

The final change in Shia identity under Baathist rule occurred in the 1990s. It was during this time that a comparatively young and charismatic *mujtahid*, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, built an activist, populist Shia religious movement that challenged the Baathist state and created a space within the political field for an overtly Shia political presence.

Sadr's main goal was to make the cultural capital of the Shia religious establishment more politically relevant to ordinary Shias. To achieve this he drew a powerful distinction between senior Shia Grand Ayatollahs and himself. The Grand Ayatollahs had become detached from society, unable or unwilling to become involved in the everyday suffering of their followers. Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, on the other hand, developed a populist religion whose economic capital, in the form of charitable networks, helped the poor and whose symbolic capital, in the form of a populist Islamic jurisprudence, was directly relevant to the everyday needs of Shias (Allawi 2007: 55-60, Cockburn 2008: 112-124, Jabar 2003: 183, 273).

Unsurprisingly, the Baathist state removed this potent challenge by assassinating Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr in February 1999. However, his lasting legacy was the transformation of cultural and symbolic capital that surrounded Shia Islam into a powerful and overtly political force, deploying it

within Iraq's political field not just to challenge Baathism but also to break the previous constraints placed upon politically active *mujtahid*s by the Shia clerical hierarchy. It produced a new exclusively Shia principle vision.

Kurdish nationalism and Iraq's political field.

Under the Ottoman Empire and in the early days of the Iraqi political field, the rise of a modernist Kurdish nationalism and with it attempts to define an exclusionary Kurdish identity were constrained by a variety of notables and religious organisations competing amongst each other and with the empire to impose local and religious identities on those who resided in what were to be classified as 'Kurdish' areas (van Bruinessen 1992: 267, 286, McDowall 2007: 1, 2, 51, 87, 88, 94-101). The tension between localist tribal and religious (primarily Sufi) cultural capital constrained those seeking to deploy symbolic capital in the name of an assertive Kurdish nationalism (Zubaida 1991: 200, van Bruinessen 1992: 7, 267, McDowall 2007: 122, 157-159).

The political field in Iraqi Kurdistan after 1958, saw a struggle for domination between those controlling the Iraqi state, first Qasim and then Arif, and three other groups, the Iraqi Communist Party, the leftist urban intellectuals of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and those conservative tribal and religious figures grouped around Mulla Mustafa Barzani. Mulla Mustafa, as a large landowner had economic capital that was augmented by his social capital as a tribal leader and his cultural capital as a religious figure. However, the integration of Kurdistan into the world economy and the area's integration into the Iraqi state had empowered a group of urban intellectuals, many the product of Iraqi colleges and universities. The formation of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party in 1946 was an unstable alliance between these two groups (Romano, 2006, 188). This conflict was brought to a head by the rising power of the Iraqi Communist Party after 1958 and Qasim's implementation of land reform in 1959. The leftists within the KDP allied with the Iraqi Communist Party and pushed ahead with land reform in the areas under their control. Conservative Kurdish landowners, on the other hand, threatened by this land reform and sensing Qasim's weakness, launched a rebellion against him, which Mulla Mustafa and, eventually, the KDP backed (McDowall 2007: 304, 311).

The resultant recriminations finally split the Kurdish national movement, with the young 'modernist' nationalists, Ibrahim Ahmad and Jalal Talabani, leaving the KDP to form a new party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Fighting between Kurdish forces and Baghdad continued sporadically until 1988, when the Baath launched the Anfal campaign, designed to depopulate Kurdish areas. The use of indiscriminate force and chemical weapons is conservatively estimated to have killed between 150,000-200,000. Its aim, however, was to demonstrate the unimaginable costs of sustained opposition to the Baath within Iraq's political field (McDowall, 2007: 359, Tripp 2000: 245). However, in a

comparable way to Shia political mobilisation, the genocidal aspirations of the Iraqi government created a specifically Iraqi Kurdish political field.

However, it was Baathist foreign policy adventurism that, in the aftermath of the defeat of Iraqi forces in Kuwait, finally led to the unambiguous solidification of an Iraqi Kurdish political field, created under international protection. However, the competing principle visions within that nascent field, led to the new Kurdistan Regional Government's division, with the KDP and PUK fighting each other and then refusing to pool social, coercive and economic capital, instead opting to create two separate administrations and two separate militia forces.

Overall, divisions amongst those fighting for a Kurdish principle vision constrained the evolution of a specifically Kurdish political field. Eventually it was a combination of the genocidal aspirations and foreign policy adventurism of the Baathist government that gave rise to the space and impetus needed for the creation of a specifically Kurdish political field.

Conclusions.

A great deal of analysis and commentary on Iraq since invasion and regime change in 2003 has stressed the dominance of its political field by those deploying exclusionary sectarian and ethnic principles of vision. The last thirteen years of Iraq's contemporary history was then read backwards to find the same principles of vision animating political competition since the creation of Iraq. The deployment of a Historical Sociological approach to the longue durée of Iraq's history, as opposed to the last thirteen years, clearly shows such sectarian caricatures do great damage to the pluralistic and decentred nature of that competition. As this paper has argued, those seeking to deploy symbolic violence on the political field to create exclusivist Shia or Kurdish definitions were clearly present at times in Iraq's pre-2003 history. However, they were rivalled and indeed marginalised by at least two other competing principles of vision with very different definitional aims for Iraq's political field.

Intriguingly, the two major external players in Iraq's political field, the British, from 1920 to 1958, and the Americans, from 2003 onwards, both used their coercive, financial, social and symbolic capital in an attempt to impose a definition of Iraq's political field that also stressed its religious, ethnic and tribal divisions (Longrigg: 1953, Dobbins, Jones, Runkle, Mohandas: 2009, Dodge: 2003, Dodge: 2012). During Britain's domination of Iraq, from 1920 onwards, the major indigenous competitors in the political field overtly rejected Britain's attempt to impose this definition. However, the United States' understanding of Iraq's political field, from 2003 onwards, dominated as it was by religious and ethnic divisions, was eagerly seized upon and promoted as a principle political vision by those Iraqis, many of whom who had been in exile until 2003, seeking to dominate the post-Baathist political field (Allawi 2007: 53, Dodge: 2012).

It is the deployment of Historical Sociology that can avoid ahistorical analysis and political primordialisation of Iraq. However, this paper has argued that within Historical Sociology, the modernist approach to understanding national identity, personified by the work of Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson, carried within it certain problems, excessive structuralism, 'sociologism', Eurocentricsm and reductionism, that make it partially problematic when deployed to explain the role of identity politics within Iraq. The paper has sought to overcome these shortcomings, by deploying the field theory of Pierre Bourdieu. This allows for an assessment of Iraq's political field, over the length of its existence, not just since 2003, that stresses the competitive and most importantly relational interaction between competing principles of vision within the country's political field. By deploying Bourdieu's work, the powerful insights of Historical Sociology and the modernist approach to nationalism can be utilised without the danger of the Eurocentric teleology it has powerfully been critiqued for. The result is an analysis that not only captures the plural competition within Iraq's political field but also defends the possibility of alternative futures for a country and a population that has suffered from so much violence and a number of incompetent international interventions.

References

Abrams, Philip. 1982. *Historical Sociology*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Allawi, Ali A. 2007. *The Occupation of Iraq. Winning the War, Losing the Peace*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Anderson, Benedict. 1999. *Imagined Communities; reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.

Anderson, Perry. 1992. "Science, politics and enchantment", *Transition to modernity; essays on power, wealth and belief*, edited by in John A. Hall and I.C. Jarvis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bajalan, Djene Rhys. 2016. "Princes, Pashas and Patriots: the Kurdish Intelligentsia, the Ottoman Empire and the National Question (1908–1914)". *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 43 (2), 140-157.

Baram, Amatzia. 1991. *Culture, History and Ideology in the formation of Ba'thist Iraq, 1968-89*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Bashkin, Orit. 2009. *The Other Iraq; Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bashkin, Orit. 2011. "Hybrid nationalisms: watani and qawmi visions of Iraq under Abd al-Karim Qasim, 1958-61". *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 43, 293–312.

Batatu, Hanna. 1989. *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq. A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Batatu, Hanna. 1982a. "Iraq's Underground Shi'i Movements". *Middle East Report* 102, (12), 3-9.

Batatu, Hanna. 1982b. "The Significance of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr". *Middle East Report* 102, (12).

Bouillon, Markus E., Malone, David M. and Rowswell, Ben. 2007. *Iraq; preventing a new generation of conflict*. Boulder, Col: Lynne Reinner Publishers.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1986. "The Forms of Capital", in J. Richardson (Ed.) *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, New York: Greenwood, 1986.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1994. "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field". *Sociological Theory*, 12, (1), 1-18.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 2005. 'The political field, the social science field and the journalistic field', *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field*, edited by Rodney Benson and Erik Neveu. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre and Loic Wacquant. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Browers, Michaelle. 2012. "Najaf and the (re)birth of Arab Shi'i political thought", in *Writing the Modern History of Iraq: Historiographical and Political Challenges*, edited by Jordi Tejel, Riccardo Bocco, Peter Sluglett, Hamit Bozarslan. New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing. Kindle edition.

Brubaker, Rogers and Frederick Cooper. 2000. "Beyond 'Identity' ". *Theory and Society*, 29, (1), 1-47.

van Bruinessen, Martin. 1992. *Agha, Shaikh and State: the Social and Political Structure of Kurdistan*, London: Zed Books.

Calhoun, Craig. 1998. "Explanation in Historical Sociology: Narrative, General Theory, and Historically Specific Theory ". *American Journal of Sociology*,

104, (3), 846-871.

Chatterjee, Partha. 1996. "Whose Imagined Community?", in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed), *Mapping the Nation*, London: Verso.

Chaterjee, Partha. 1999. *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, a derivative discourse*? In *The Partha Chatterjee Omnibus*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Cockburn, Patrick. 2008. *Muqtada al Sadr and the Fall of Iraq*, London: Faber and Faber.

Davis, Aeron. 2010. "Forms of capital and mobility in the political field: Applying Bourdieu's conceptual framework to UK party politics". *British Politics,* 5, 202–223.

Davis, Eric. 2005. *Memories of State; Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Diamond, Larry. 2005. *Squandered Victory. The American occupation and the bungled effort to bring democracy to Iraq*, New York: Times Books.

Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Benjamin Runkle, Siddharth Mohandas. 2009. *Occupying Iraq; A history of the coalition provisional authority*, Santa Monica: RAND.

Dodge, Toby. 2003. *Inventing Iraq: the failure of nation building and a history denied,* New York: Columbia University Press.

Dodge, Toby. 2012. *Iraq; from war to a new authoritarianism,* Abingdon: Routledge.

Franzen, Johan. 2011. *Red Star over Iraq; Iraqi Communism Before Saddam*, London: Hurst.

Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism,* Oxford: Blackwell.

Gellner, Ernest. 1996. "The coming of nationalism and its interpretation: the myths of nation and class", in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed), *Mapping the Nation*, London: Verso.

Gellner, Ernest. 1994. *Encounters with Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Gelvin, James. 1999. "Modernity and its discontents: on the durability of nationalism in the Arab Middle East", *Nations and Nationalism,* 5 (l), 71-89.

Gelvin, James L. 2009. " 'Arab Nationalism' Meets Social Theory", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 41, (1), 10-12.

Haddad, Fanar. 2010. *Sectarian Relations in Arab Iraq: Competing mythologies of history, people and state*, PhD in Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter.

Haddad, Fanar. 2011. *Sectarianism in Iraq; Antagonistic Visions of Unity*, London: Hurst & Co, kindle edition.

Herring, Eric and Glen Rangwala. 2006. *Iraq in Fragments. The Occupation and its Legacy*, London: Hurst & Co.

Jabar, Faleh A. 2003. *The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq*, London: Saqi.

Jabar, Faleh A. and Hosham Dawod (eds). 2003. *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*.

Khadduri, Majid. 1951. *Independent Iraq; a study of Iraqi politics since 1932*, London: Oxford University Press.

Longrigg, Stephen Hemsley. 1953. *'Iraq, 1900 to 1950. A Political, Social, and Economic History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press Oxford.

Mallat, Chibli. 1993a. *The Renewal of Islamic Law. Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf and the Shi'i International*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mallat, Chibli. 1993b. "Obstacles to Democratisation in Iraq. A Reading of Post revolutionary Iraqi History through the Gulf War", in Ellis Goldberg, Resat Kasaba and Joel Migdal, (eds) *Rules and Rights in the Middle East, Democracy, Law and Society*, Seattle: University of Washington Press.

McDowall, David. 2007. *A Modern History of the Kurds*, London: I.B. Tauris.

Mufti, Malik. 1996. *Sovereign Creations. Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Nasr, Vali R. 2014. "A Crisis a Century in the Making", *International New York Times*, 10 August.

Pelham, Nicolas. 2008. *A New Muslim Order; the Shia and the Middle East Sectarian Crisis*, London: I.B. Tauris.

Rohde, Achim. 2012. "Totalitarianism revisited: framing the history of Ba'thist Iraq", in Jordi Tejel, Riccardo Bocco, Peter Sluglett, Hamit Bozarslan

(eds), *Writing the Modern History of Iraq: Historiographical and Political Challenges*, New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing, kindle edition.

Romano, David. 2006. *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rosen, Nir. 2010. *Aftermath; following the bloodshed of America's wars in the Muslim world*, New York: Nation Books.

Shadid, Anthony. 2005. *Night draws near; Iraq's people in the shadow of America's war*, New York: Henry Holt.

Skocpol, Theda. 1984. "Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies in Historical Sociology", in Theda Skocpol (ed), *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sluglett, Peter. 2007. *Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country*, London: I.B. Tauris.

Smith, Anthony D. 1986. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Smith, Anthony D. 2009. *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism; a cultural approach*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Simon, Reeva Spector. 1986. *Iraq between the two world wars; the militarist origins of tyranny*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Swartz, David. 1998. *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, kindle version.

Tripp, Charles. 20000. *A History of Iraq*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Yousif, Abdul-Salaam. 1991. "The struggle for cultural hegemony during the Iraqi revolution", in Robert A. Fernea and Wm. Roger Louis, *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958. The Old Social Classes Revisited*, London: I.B. Tauris.

Wright, Robin. 2013. 'Imagining a Remapped Middle East', *International New York Times*, 28 September.

Wright, Robin, 2016. 'How the Curse of Sykes-Picot Still Haunts the Middle East', *The New Yorker*, 30 April.

Zubaida, Sami. 1989. *Islam, the people and the state; political ideas and movements in the Middle East*, London: I.B. Tauris.

Zubaida, Sami. 1991. "Community, class and minorities in Iraqi politics", in Robert A. Fernea and Wm. Roger Louis, *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958. The Old Social Classes Revisited*, London: I.B. Tauris.

---

[i] This would include national political figures like Fadil al-Jamali and Sadiq al-Bassim (Baram 1991: 5).

[ii] Baram quotes Saddam Hussein making this argument to textbook drafters in 1975, (Baram, 1991, 20).