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Discussion: the futures of global history

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‘If you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are citizen of nowhere’, declared Theresa May in autumn 2016 to the Tory party conference, questioning the patriotism of those who still dared to question Brexit. Within a month, ‘Make America Great Again’ triumphed in the polls in the United States. From Erdogan’s Turkey, to Putin’s Russia, to Modi’s India, a current of anti-globalization nationalisms is in full flow.

The storm clouds are indeed dark. They seem even to cast their shadows on the world of historical scholarship, provoking the Princeton Latin American historian Jeremy Adelman to offer a lament about the academic field of global history.¹ For Adelman, it seems, the relevance of the field derived from ‘globalization’ and its recent Whiggish boosters, ergo: ‘In our fevered present of Nation-X First, of resurgent ethno-nationalism, what’s the point of recovering global pasts?’. Contained in his rebuke of global history, and of its rootless cosmopolitan practitioners, is the idea that it sought to ‘eclipse’ national frames of enquiry. It was not the first time that such a jeremiad about global history had issued from the sages of Princeton’s Dickinson Hall. In late 2013, David Bell, the distinguished historian of France, had shrugged in a notorious New Republic book review, that ‘perhaps the “global turn,” for all of its insights and instruction, has hit a point of diminishing returns’.² ‘Perhaps it is time’, Bell mused, ‘to turn back’ to the ‘small spaces’.

Adelman and Bell do put their fingers on many serious problems, and their swashbuckling essays provide a helpful basis for a reflection on the state of global history. But the claim that ‘resurgent ethno-nationalism’ in some way challenges the premises of global history is odd. For, as we shall examine in more detail later, global historians have long noted that forms of ethno-national resistance to globalization were themselves responses to new kinds of global connections. All the fundamentalist upheavals and jihads of the last hundred years to give one obvious example, arose in response to increasing connection.³ Modern nationalisms, across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, both inside and outside of Europe, in any event, were incubated within transnational and transimperial connections.⁴ It

² David Bell, ‘This is what happens when historians overuse the idea of the network’, The New Republic, 26 October 2013.
⁴ Rebecca Karl, Staging the world: Chinese nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002; James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The settler revolution and the rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939, Oxford: Oxford University
is not even a new story. The mercantilisms of early modern European states, and the subsequent fabrications of Louis XIV and Whig England, for example, responded to the new acceleration of European and global trade propelled by the silver of Potosí and the gold of the Caribbean and Africa. Anti-globalization is itself a phenomenon of globalization, and usually seeks to reconstitute the nation’s place in the world rather than to retreat into a disconnected autarky. Trump’s ‘America first’ and its international analogues are only the most recent incarnations of this reactionary dialectics.

Even stranger is the idea, not confined to Adelman and Bell, that global history implies a rejection of the smaller scales of historical experience, in particular the nation. It is not merely that global historians are often keenly anchored in national history, or that much innovative recent work has operated at the level of micro-history, following the experience of the global in particular small places or through clusters of individuals. More crucially, national history from its origins has been in dialogue with however people have understood the cosmopolitan. We might usefully rediscover how history at the scales of the local, ‘national’, regional, and global has been entangled from the very origins of human study of the past. Such an enquiry might help us to better understand, beyond the vanities of polemic, where we are now and what might be the futures of global history.

The Passes of Global (and National) History

Global history is an approach to the past which has two key modes. On the one hand, the comparative approach seeks to understand events in one place through examining their similarities with and differences how things happened somewhere else. This is opposed to, or combined with, the connective approach, which elucidates how history is made through

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the interactions of geographically (or temporally) separate historical communities. Both of these are very old, although the connected and egalitarian terms on which the world’s histories met by the late Twentieth century gave them radically new meanings.

Sima Qian, born in the second century BCE, is considered the first and greatest of the classical Chinese historians. The 130 chapters of his *Grand Scribe’s Records* combine lapidary Tacitean studies of personalities – not just rulers or generals, as was conventional, but artisans, assassins, artists, even among them women – with studies of war, economy, society. While China was his focus, Sima set his history into the context of the non-Chinese world, drawing on ethnographic observations made by travellers and officials at all of the Han Dynasty’s frontiers. Sima distinguished the Chinese through a discipline of comparison with foreigners who, he insisted, were as human and full of potential as his own people.

Global history, at its foundations, is not a new genre. Universal history, by which we mean a history that seeks to tell a history of all of mankind, its origins, and perhaps its destiny, is in fact one of the most ancient kinds of history, always in connection with how each culture understood its peculiar history. The historians of ancient Greece, from Herodotus onwards, framed their accounts of Attic prowess relative to universal history. The ethno-national community was understood relative to the *xenoi*, the stranger friends at one’s immediate frontiers, and the *barbaroi*, those understood as radically different. In the hands of Polybius and Eusebius, a tradition of juxtaposing the inner history of Romans and Christians to those who lay beyond set the frame for what became the discipline of history a millennium later in modern Europe. But it was not confined to that western peninsula of Asia, to the east, in the medieval Arab world al-Mas’udi, al-Tabari, and Ibn Khaldun wrote histories of the world, and in fourteenth-century Persia, Rashid al-Din brought together learned men from across Eurasia, including those born in China and Europe, to write a world history from the perspective of the Mongols.

National history, in its nineteenth century European incarnations, was similarly intertwined


with a kind of global history. If Ranke is the symbol of nation-centred history, it must always be remembered that he and his disciples around Europe, such as Acton in England and Monod in France, understood the careful study of the archival trace at the level of the nation to be only a preliminary to some future enterprise of universal history. This was the high play Ranke indulged in his essay on ‘Die großen Mächte’.\(^\text{10}\) His *Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker* sought to examine the historical event both in its local particularity (that ‘eigentlich’, which is generally mistranslated as ‘actually’), and its general universal character.\(^\text{11}\) Its first chapter explained that at the core of the common history of Europe were three ‘external enterprises’: great migrations, the Crusades, and the colonization of foreign countries.

The Rankeans’ view of universal history had the shared history of Christendom at its heart, from which modern world civilization was assumed to diffuse. Such a perspective was in quiet collusion with a post-1815 world order for which Europe appeared to be the military, technical and economic vanguard. Its impact, which endured into the late twentieth century, was to constitute extra-European history as either the imperial history of European nations, or as exotic theatres of marginal relevance to the main forces and events in universal history. Challenges to diffusionist universal history, such as Eric Williams’s *Capitalism and Slavery* (1944), were greeted with hostility or studiously ignored.\(^\text{12}\) Hugh Trevor-Roper’s infamous description of African history in 1965 as ‘the meaningless gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe’ was perhaps the swan song of that way of seeing which subordinated universal history to the Whiggish self-constructions of each European nation and a collective eurocentrism.\(^\text{13}\)

Global history, as we know it, came out of two post-1950 revolutionary changes. The first, obvious, and often invoked, was the collapse of the European empires and the demand from and for post-colonial nations for their ‘own’ histories and for a share in the story of the cosmopolitan. Decolonization challenged the white supremacist assumptions which had quietly ordered two centuries of the human sciences in the West. Euro-American universities responded to this after c. 1960 by sprouting ‘area studies’ enclaves, although new strength in Asia, Africa and the Middle East was often at the margins of history departments in which national and European history remained dominant. As the West’s universities gradually opened themselves to people of colour and scholars from the non-West, however, these


\(^\text{11}\) Ranke’s ‘eigentlich’ is not merely a positivistic claim, it is an Aristotelian assertion of how that which was actual was the concrete expression of the universal or general, see Leopold Ranke, *Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 1535*, Leipzig and Berlin: Reimer, 1824. The essays in Wolfgang J. Mommsen, ed., *Leopold von Ranke und die moderne Geschichtswissenschaft*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988, provide some further insights.


margins grew in their strength and centrality.

The second intertwined revolution, rarely recognised, was the impact of ‘history from below’. Historical practice after 1960 no longer found its inevitable centre in understanding the voices of those privileged white men preserved in the West’s state archives. Once we began to pay attention to historical agents below the level of the state, we looked outwards: E.P. Thompson’s classic 1967 essay on time and work-discipline in Britain, for example, repeatedly reaches towards transnational comparison.\(^\text{14}\) People now sought to understand historical processes from the view of, and through the agency of subordinate groups. There is a direct epistemological connection between the inclusion of women, the poor and non-whites as historical agents, and a new late twentieth-century attention to historical agents in and from the ‘Global South’. New attention went towards understanding ‘Western’ science and philosophy as shaped by imperial expansion and extra-European agency.\(^\text{15}\) To this extent, there is no way back out of the ‘global turn’ in our century, any more than we could go back to a history which paid no attention to women or the poor.

The World History Association emerged in the United States in 1982. It reflected how in schools and universities in that country, uninterrogated ‘Western Civilization’ courses were giving way to new attention to extra-European history and international interactions. Underpinning the initiative was a new body of bold transnational histories which rethought universal history under the impress of ‘area studies’ history, in particular the work of William McNeill, Marshall Hodgson, Philip Curtin and Sidney Mintz.\(^\text{16}\) In 1990, the World History Association founded the Journal of World History, now in its 28th volume, which Jerry Bentley, its founding editor, declared would foster ‘historical analysis undertaken not from the viewpoint of national states, but rather from that of the global community’.\(^\text{17}\) Patrick O’Brien, then Director of the Institute of Historical Research in London, began in 1996 to organise a seminar series on ‘Global history over the very long term’, which was quickly partnered by a ‘World History Seminar’ organised by John Darwin, Peter Carey and one of the authors of this article, Richard Drayton, in Oxford. Yet it is fair to say that the vast majority of historians paid very little attention to these initiatives, in particular in Britain.

‘Global history’ acquired a new momentum, visibility and sense of collective purpose, however, with the cresting of both the realities and idea of ‘globalization’ around 2000. A Cambridge workshop on the History of Globalization in summer 2000, which resulted in A.

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G. Hopkins’s edited volume *Globalization in World History*, was both a symbol of, and stimulus to this new tide. Two books in particular marked the new moment: Kenneth Pomeranz’s *The Great Divergence* (2000), perhaps the most influential single twenty-first century work of history, and Christopher Bayly’s *The Birth of the Modern World* – the latter appearing in 2004, the bicentenary of the Haitian Revolution, with the startling image of the Black Jacobin Citoyen Belley on its cover. Excited by the rise of Asia in the 1990s, global economic historians began a vast project to assess why in the mid-eighteenth century it was Europe, and not China or India, that took the leap to industrialization and ‘modernity’. Pulled by historians of slavery, American historians became increasingly receptive to the project of Atlantic History. Indian ocean history and other ‘thalassologies’ emerged quickly in the wake of the Atlanticists. Migration and diasporas became central objects of research in relation to these oceanic histories.

Out of its momentum came also the *Journal of Global History*, which located itself explicitly in the terrain of the history of globalization, asserting through this a ‘subtle difference between the closely related endeavours of global and world history’. No consensus emerged, then or since, however, about the utility of this distinction between ‘world’ and ‘global’ history, and in practice these flags sheltered very similar initiatives. A decolonised British imperial history chose to go global under the flag of ‘world history’, perhaps because it better represented the federal nature of its alliance with ‘area studies’ history. In 2006 in Cambridge, for example,

the ‘Extra-European History Group’ of the Faculty of History became the ‘World History Group’, with its seminar rechristened from the Commonwealth and Overseas History Seminar to the World History Seminar.\textsuperscript{26} From 2009, in London, similarly, the then eighty-year old Imperial History seminar, became the ‘Imperial and World History seminar’.

Elsewhere, at least for the post-1750 period, the banner of ‘transnational history’ has effectively taken some or all of the terrain of global history. The appointment of historians from post-colonial countries, in particular India, to prestigious departments in the West, brought the views from the periphery into the centre. ‘Area studies’ historians began to write, or more accurately to be read, as global historians. European historians began (slowly) to take down the firewall between national and colonial history. British historians in the United States led here, in a cunning tactic to justify saving posts in their field. French historians soon followed, rediscovering C. L. R. James’s long ignored arguments about the interdependence of the French and Haitian revolutions.\textsuperscript{27} At the same time, dramatic falls in travel costs made it possible for students to undertake international multi-archival doctoral research projects. Both the theory and practice of global history became newly attractive.\textsuperscript{28}

### The Challenges of Global History

The wave of global history has, however, met with some resistance. Adelman and Bell in a way speak for many – and some of their criticisms are wholly fair. There is, for example, clearly an inflationary use of words like global, transnational, and intercultural. These are now brands under which, as Matt Connelly noted, historians often retail ‘very conventional kinds of scholarship’.\textsuperscript{29} The field remains driven covertly by Western priorities, with the ‘divergence debate’ and the global history of the French Revolution, to take two prominent examples, returning us often by non-western routes to the idols of the old ‘Rise of the West’ historiography. It was within temporal boundary markers derived from European history that such masters of the genre as Bayly and Osterhammel ordered their global panoramas (although the latter chose to have no cut-off dates in the title of his book). Global history, in general, is dominated by anglophone historians who seem unable or indisposed to read history written in other languages.\textsuperscript{30}

26 Richard Drayton in 2003 had already changed the faculty web page to describe ‘Extra-European History’ as ‘a Cambridge name for two things: the histories of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Pacific, on the one hand, and comparative approaches to world history, which often intrude into the histories of Europe and the United States, on the other’.


30 It is particularly striking how \textit{Comparativ: Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Geschichtsforschung}, founded in 1990, making it almost as old as the \textit{Journal of World History}, and which over 28 volumes has engaged with all the international developments in global history, is very rarely cited by anglophone historians. Only two chapters of James Belich, John Darwin, and Margret Frenz, eds., \textit{The Prospect of Global History} Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, appear to engage seriously with historical work not in English.
countries have access to the books, or can travel easily to foreign archives and conferences they would need to play the game of ‘global history’? As Boubacar Barry, the doyen of history in Senegal, asked the opening plenary of the European Network in Universal and Global History Conference in Paris in 2014, what exactly did ‘global history’ mean when Africans like himself found it almost impossible to obtain a Schengen visa? As Adelman bemoans, ‘the high hopes for cosmopolitan narratives about ‘encounters’ between Westerners and Resterners led to some pretty one-way exchanges about the shape of the global’. There are risks, inherent to global approaches, that while similarities and convergences are identified, or sometimes forced, differences and interruptions are ignored.31

But many of Bell and Adelman’s criticisms of this young field seem exaggerated and eccentric. It is true that there has been a dramatic number of new appointments in non-Western and global history, in particular in American and British universities, over the last decade. But Bell and Adelman’s implication that the global has become hegemonic, displacing other fields, is rather off the mark. ‘For many years now, it has been the rage among historians to uncover past global connections’, David Bell writes. Hardly. Few historians commit themselves to the comparative and connective approaches, the signature methods of global history as a genre. In our seminar rooms and conference halls, national history is and remains the dominant form of historical inquiry. Across the world, the vast majority of university professorships and academic journals remain dedicated to national history. National histories – such as The English and their History (2015), the little island story of Brexit drummer Robert Tombs – are at the top of our bestseller lists.32 Pierre Nora’s vituperative denunciation of the Histoire mondiale de la France (2017) was emblematic of a wider rejection by key French intellectuals of its attempt to understand French history as a dimension of global processes.33 Those appointed as South Asian, Chinese and Middle Eastern historians usually work as faithfully within the national paradigm as almost all French historians, while not all ‘area studies’ historians welcome the transgressions of global history. National history remains the mode through which most contributions to ‘world history’ or ‘international history’ happen. It is rather premature of Bell to worry about ‘diminishing returns’.

While global history is a charismatic field, it is small and weak. It will take more than two or three generations to overcome the profound eurocentricity of our discipline. We should not exaggerate how representative our history departments have become. Token Africanists and Middle Easternists are asked to represent the histories of entire regions over millennia. In


Britain, as Adelman admits, Latin American history has fewer posts than around 1980. Huge areas of the human past remain in darkness. To take one startling case, there are about a dozen specialist historians of Indonesia, which has a population equivalent to Europe’s, outside the Netherlands and Australia.

It is true that connection remains prized by global historians. But is Adelman right that they are only concerned about, ‘integration and concord, rather than disintegration and discord’? On the contrary, considerable attention has gone to things which do not flow, and to resistances to the global which emerge within globalizations. Serge Gruzinski in *La pensée métisse* (1999) and *Les quatres parties du monde* (2004) has described how what he calls ‘European standardisation’, a kind of cultural resistance to the impact of the exotic, accompanied Habsburg expansion into the early modern world.34 Margot Finn has similarly written about ‘frictions’ as a dimension of the imperial experience, of resistance and opposition to flows and exchanges.35 Commodity historians have written about the ‘anti-commodity’ as a phenomenon which arises in the midst of global exchange.36 Interruptions, reversals, and processes of de-globalization have long been of interest to global historians. Historians have demonstrated again and again that periods of global integration could end. Such major works as Bayly’s *Birth of the Modern World*, Jürgen Osterhammel’s *Verwandlung der Welt* (2009; published in English as *Transformation of the World*, in 2014) – and indeed such precursors as Marshall Hodgson and Michael Mann – examined the fragility of global connections and the dynamics of disruption.37 There is a voluminous body of work on the breakdown of connections in the early modern Islamic imperial world. The ‘divergence debate’, from Pomeranz to Prasannan Parthasarathi’s *Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not* (2011), has been about breakdowns of trade links, as much as connections.38 Harold James’s perceptive *Creation and Destruction of Value* (2009) has shown that breakdowns of globalization have as much been part of the world’s economic activity as integration.39 Vanessa Ogle’s *Global Transformation of Time* (2015) is as much about the local and national fractures of globalization as about any seamless and coherent convergence.40 Pierre Singaravélou’s luminous *Tianjin Cosmopolis* (2017) reveals the overlap of globalization and its crisis in a single

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38 Parthasarathi, *Why Europe grew rich and Asia did not*.
Nor is it fair to condemn global history as focused on elite actors. Global history made visible the outsiders – slaves, the colonised and other actors at the margins long ignored by the discipline in the West. James’s *Black Jacobins* (1938), ignored by the generation of French historians who trained Bell, is only an early example. In his pioneering work of global labour history, *Workers of the World*, Marcel van der Linden’s has looked at ordinary workers, farmers and sharecroppers – not the winners of globalization. Others, like L.L. Robson, Roger Ekrich, and Clare Anderson, have traced the transportation of convicts to penal colonies. The wretched of Van Diemen’s Land or Devil’s Island were hardly a cosmopolitan elite. Historians like Myron Echenberg, Timothy Parsons, Gregory Mann, David Killingray, and Tarak Barkawi have brought back the experiences of hundreds of thousands of colonial subalterns in the world wars. New transimperial and transnational histories have illuminated the global life of religion in the flows of ordinary believers – missionaries, pious slaves, and hajj pilgrims. Global historians have always shown an interest in the losers of global integration, and in those who travelled in steerage rather than on the promenade deck.

Moreover, global history has never just focused on globetrotters. Adelman’s binary of ‘globalists’ versus ‘the ones who cannot move’ does not stand. Historians have repeatedly illuminated how global integration engaged people who otherwise appear isolated from the global. Take the movement of commodities – sugar, silver, diamonds, tea, porcelain, opium, and so on – which changed the lives of people no matter how mobile they were. As

47 What we might call the Warwick school of global economic history has explored in particular how luxury goods opened and thickened Eurasian connections with consequences which reached deep into the commercial hinterlands, see Maxine
Fernand Braudel reminded us in the very first number of *Annales*, the impact of Caribbean gold crossing to Spain, for example, affected the trans-Saharan caravan trade in the interior of Africa. Later, simultaneous with the rise of the trading cities of Western Europe and the slave plantations of the Atlantic came the Second Serfdom: east of a line which stretched from Hamburg to Venice, peasants were re-subordinated to a fierce discipline which ensured that wheat flowed to Danzig, Riga, Stettin, and Wismar, and the products of the East and West Indies, flowed to their masters. Tracing the flows of tobacco and chocolate in the Atlantic World, Marcy Norton’s *Sacred Gifts, Profane Pleasures* (2008) has vividly demonstrated how seamen and colonists from the Americas brought these products to Europe, from where they spread to the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. As tobacco and chocolate became more available, consumers in the remotest corners of the globe developed a taste for them. They might not have gone into the world, but the world came to them. Similarly, scholars of France have shown that global trade affected economy and society even of apparently ‘isolated’ places in eighteenth-century France’s interior. Even the most rooted actors could have a cup of coffee, smoke a cigar, or sell cotton shirts in the local shop. Even the most isolated hermit couldn’t (and can’t) escape global influences. Much as David Armitage has argued for a ‘Cis-Atlantic history’, that is to say a history of regions which were shaped by the distant effects of Atlantic interactions, so we must insist on a cis-global history, lived in territories far from the apparent hot spots of trans-global processes or circulation.

Even less is global history guilty of Bell’s charge of neglecting individuals. Indeed, there is now a growing field of global micro history – centred on the individual and family – which has shed light on major historical phenomena and should not be easily dismissed. Natalie Zemon-Davis (among others) has looked at the odyssey of Berber geographer Leo

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Africanus.\textsuperscript{54} John-Paul Ghobrial has traced the seventeenth-century global adventures of the Ottoman priest Ilias of Babylon, from Europe to South America.\textsuperscript{55} While Linda Colley, as Bell notes, has pursued the global trajectory of Elizabeth Marsh, Emma Rothschild has used the global lives of the Scottish Johnstone family as a lens through which to see the inner life of Britain’s global empire.\textsuperscript{56} Gagan Sood has used a single cache of documents to illuminate how family, religion, and kinship ties ordered the economic and cultural life of Islamicate west Asia in the middle of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{57} Jean Hébrard and Rebecca Scott have followed the trajectory of Rosalie, a slave from Senegambia in the Age of Revolution.\textsuperscript{58} And one of the authors of this article, David Motadel, is tracing the story of two globetrotting Persian shahs, who roamed the aristocratic world of the fin de siècle, from the Ottoman borderlands to the shores of Scotland, to offer a reinterpretation of the relationships between the world’s sovereigns in an age of European domination.\textsuperscript{59} It is true that many global historians – particularly those of the great syntheses – prioritise structures over individuals, but this bias is surely as characteristic of national history. Where they do – as in Robert Allen and Sven Beckert’s very different attempts to explain the early modern global context for nineteenth-century industrial production – they surely answer Bell’s opposite assertion that global history neglects making broader arguments and overarching narratives.\textsuperscript{60} While some global historians are tempted by David Christian’s ‘Big History’, the vast majority prefer not to surrender their methods to the uncertain guesses of the natural sciences, and continue to work on sources and problems which address much smaller spaces, recent times, and human agency and experience.\textsuperscript{61}

To be resisted equally is the idea that global history is, or needs to be, the luxury trade of an elite minority. There is certainly a kind of global history practiced, as Adelman charged, by the ‘upper echelons of a higher education committed to an idyll of global citizenship’. But the historical profession in general is dominated by the offspring of the Euro-American white upper middle class, and one is more likely to find exceptions to this in global history than in many other fields.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{54} Natalie Zemon-Davis, \textit{Trickster travels: A sixteenth-century Muslim between worlds}, London: Faber and Faber, 2006.
  \item \textsuperscript{58} Rebecca Scott and Jean M. Hébrard, \textit{Freedom papers: An Atlantic odyssey in the age of emancipation}, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.
  \item \textsuperscript{59} David Motadel, ‘Qajar shahs in Imperial Germany’, \textit{Past and Present}, 213, 1, 2010, pp. 191-235, provides some first insights.
\end{itemize}
Less controversial, however, should be Adelman’s warning that, ‘It is hard not to conclude that global history is another Anglospheric invention to integrate the Other into a cosmopolitan narrative on our terms, in our tongues.’ There are indeed real inequalities, as we noted earlier, in the global trade in historical ideas: few are those who read in other European languages, let alone write in them, while rarer still are any capacities to read sources in Arabic, Chinese or Hindi. One might insist, though, this is not a problem peculiar to global history. United States historians of France are increasingly notorious for citing very little historiography not published in English. Global history, as in the hands of Dipesh Chakrabarty among others, quite to the contrary has provided a vehicle through which historical perspectives shaped by Asian, African and Caribbean intellectual and language environments, have quietly penetrated the Western mainstream.62

Towards a new global (and national) history

Global history has never been a demand that historians only pay attention to ‘big’ transnational phenomena. Its more important meaning is a change in the explanans of history: a new sensitivity to the historical agents, forces and factors at scales above and below that of the nation or region. As Christophe Charle concluded, in a brilliant essay of 2013:

The global and the national approaches are neither radically incompatible universes, nor Russian dolls which nest simply and harmoniously one within the other, because each contributes to destabilise the other by obliging it to reconsider the implicit presuppositions on which it rests, and thus [together they] relaunch perpetually the question of the articulation of the scales of historical experience and of the diversity of themes which need to be taken into consideration, from the most particular to the most general.63

For Ranke and his heirs, an uninterrogated global was central to making national history. So too, in our moment, from quite the other direction, a self-conscious global history neither neglects ‘the small spaces’ nor evades the specificity and strangeness of disconnected historical experience. It is instead an invitation to the historian to be self-conscious of the jeux d’échelles, of the interdependence of the scales of space – village, province, nation, region and world – and time – days, decades, centuries – through which we explore and explain the past. A whole new genre of national histories is emerging with deliberately and self-consciously engage with the global.64 No longer can we find the motor for the industrial revolution in the history of Lancashire, nor the causes for the French Revolution in the

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politics of Paris versus Versailles. The impact of global history is already visible in the transnational historical practice of those who do not think of themselves as global historians – one thinks of the European history of Richard J. Evans and Christopher Clark, or of Adam Tooze’s experiment with an entangled European and United States history. Pace David Bell, there is no way home to even a French national history which finds its first or final causes purely within the hexagon. This is not to say that the global frame of reference is always the most relevant one, events at smaller scales of experience often unfold, and must be understood through, their own local logic. To be a global historian is often to study very specific places, institutions, and people and not to pretend to any general or generalizable claim.

The old universal historians – Chinese, Arab, or European – sought to tell the story of other human communities as the frame for the history of their own tribe. What distinguishes the enterprise of global historians in the twenty-first century is our attempt to map the human past from and for the view of humanity as a whole. This project is young and fragile. The critics of global history are not wholly wrong to imply that it is always at risk of become a new mask for imperial history, as hijacked by global elites it constructs new panoramas of centre and peripheries. There are good reasons, for example, why many African historians retain a measure of hostility to Atlantic history, seeing it as paying attention more to those Africans most entangled in offshore European and American history. More generally, Euro-American history, particularly its anglophone variants, exerts a palpable drag on all attempts at extra-European history, both in its national, comparative and connective dimensions.

There are good reasons for this. To an overwhelming extent, the weights and measures which we bring to Asian, African, and Latin American history find their standards in north west European history. Our attempts at reciprocal comparison are distorted by how much more the practitioners of global history know about the West. The legacy of the ways in which the world was integrated after c. 1600, by and in response to European imperial and cultural power, is a cognitive eurocentrism embedded in our methods. To give two

examples, consider how Marshall Hodgson’s proposition of a Song dynasty ‘industrial revolution’, or Indian historiography’s constitution of a ‘medieval period’ depend on an imported set of referents which inherently corrupt the enterprise of measurement, ultimately cashing all phenomena into European standards. Ideas of ‘revolution’, ideas of ‘class’, ideas of ‘progress’, even ideas of ‘empire’ are lenses which distort at the same time as they allow us to see. The challenge for twenty-first century global historians is to find new kinds of standards, in the physical sciences sense of the word – that is to say methods, value judgments, and, most importantly, concepts – in the historical experience and historical self-consciousness of the tricontinent. We may even find our way to ways of telling stories about the past which do not assume that history is being made from or for a given geographical or conceptual centre.

Global history has many futures. It needs to (continue to) break out of the twentieth-century mode of collecting national histories, which has sometimes turned global history into an equivalent of the children’s card game, ‘Snap’! Global history is not a federation of national and area studies history, as important and sovereign as these levels of analysis are. It is the product of engagements with the problem of the global based on inspired comparative and connective thinking and not just the accumulation of examples from different regions. Yet there are not only intellectual but also practical considerations which will help the field to develop further. What seems clear is that the enterprise of global will depend on collaboration. The edited volume and the work of translation are the natural media of global history. But these volumes, like many conferences, will be dialogues of the deaf if we do not work actively against the idea that the business of history can or should be done in English, or that only that which is translated or translatable deserves our attention. If we are serious about global history, more training in languages, particularly non-western ones, is an obvious priority. This must be matched by an acceleration of the digitization of sources. We should prioritize this means of repatriation, via internet, of the archives of Latin American, African, and Asian history held by former colonial powers, to be complemented by the digitalization of archives outside of Europe and Northern America.

Global history is more important than ever before. Academically, it remains one of the most dynamic and exciting fields of historical studies. Politically, it is of pressing importance as well. Retreating from global history would seem to be the least obvious response to the resurgence of populist nationalism. One of the reasons for the rise of nationalist populism is the dominance of national narratives in the popular historical imagination. As they connect


present resentment to false memories of lost national grandeur, these narratives are already
unselfconscious arguments about global history. New kinds of entangled national and global
history, particularly as they speak to the public, have important kinds of work to do. They
may even provide us with a sense of a shared global humanity. Lynn Hunt’s vision that a
‘more globally oriented history’ would ‘encourage a sense of international citizenship, of
belonging to the world and not just to one’s own nationality’ and ultimately ‘produce
tolerant and cosmopolitan global citizens’ couldn’t be more timely.\(^73\) What is clear is that our
students and fellow citizens are profoundly conscious of the global character of many of our
contemporary challenges – global warming, refugee crises, pandemics, war and terror,
unemployment and the deterritorialisation of capital. Our most pressing problems today go
beyond the nation state (even resurgent chauvinism nationalism and anti-globalism
themselves). The spectre of global history will continue to haunt the corridors of the world’s
ivory towers, inspiring some perhaps, to see new worlds of past and future.