Could global democracy satisfy diverse policy values? An empirical analysis

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Abstract

An important strand in contemporary political theory argues that democratic methods of political decision-making should be extended to the global level. But are people's fundamental views on public policy issue too diverse across the world for democracy? We examine systematically the empirical basis of two related concerns: that global democratic decision-making would leave more people dissatisfied with the outcome of decisions than keeping democratic decision-making within national settings, and that it would increase the risk of persistent minorities, that is, groups who are systematically outvoted on most policy issues they care about. Using opinion polls covering 86 percent of the world population, we compare the distribution of policy values within countries to the distribution of policy values in the world as a whole. We find that the amount of dissatisfaction with policy and the risk of persistent minorities would not increase in a global democratic polity compared to individual states.

Keywords

Global democracy – Political values – Diversity – Persistent minorities – Policy satisfaction

Data and supplementary material

Data necessary to reproduce the results in the article are available in the *JOP* Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop).

Over the past decades, deepening global interdependence in economic, environmental, social and other affairs, along with concomitant reactions against various forms of international integration, has provided renewed impetus to age-old debates in political thought on the appropriate spatial scale of governance and democracy (Borowiak 2007). The effective provision of global collective goods and the protection of human rights and fundamental interests is often said to require deeper forms of cross-border political integration, stronger intergovernmental institutions, and perhaps even some kind of global government (Cabrera 2010, Zürn 2016). Scholars supporting the transfer of authority to global institutions generally also argue that such institutions ought to make decisions in accordance with democratic principles. Cosmopolitan democrats maintain that the best way to preserve democracy under conditions of globalization is to extend it beyond states, for instance by creating a global parliamentary assembly (Archibugi 2008, Falk and Strauss 2001, Held 1995). Some cosmopolitan theorists go as far as stating that "[e]ither democracy is global or it is not democracy" (Marchetti 2008, 1). While most scholarship on global democracy is concerned with normative arguments on its desirability, some studies empirically trace the emergence of nascent democratic dimensions in existing global governance institutions (Goodin 2010, Grigorescu 2015, Macdonald 2012, Payne and Samhat 2004, Tallberg et al. 2013, Zürn 2016).

As the number of scholars arguing in favour of one form or another of global democracy has grown, so has the number of their critics. Criticism has come from a variety of quarters, such as Realist IR scholars who maintain that state leaders will resist any real transfer of authority, theorists of democracy who regard it as possible only among populations that share intense and exclusionary bonds of identity, or analysts who consider global decision-making too distant from ordinary citizens to enable them to meaningfully participate or be represented (Dahl 1999, Miller 2009, Schweller 1999, for a systematic discussion see Valentini 2014). Even some defenders of international institutions' democratic legitimacy argue that such institutions

should be seen as roughly akin to central banks or judiciaries, effective and normatively desirable elements of democratic systems precisely because they are partially insulated from direct public input (Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2009).

In this article, we focus on a widespread and fundamental—but, we argue, insufficiently scrutinized—objection to global democracy: the view that in the world as a whole people's preferences over the content of public policies are simply too diverse for democracy.

Excessive diversity of what we term policy values—people's fundamental views on public policy questions—may lead to two dangers. First, unless everyone in a polity is in perfect agreement, any political regime will leave some citizens more dissatisfied with the content of policy decisions than others. To the extent democracies follow majority rule they can minimize this concern. More homogenous polities will be more likely to satisfy a larger portion of the population. Shifting the site of democratic decision-making from the state level to the transnational level risks subjecting populations to majority views distant from their own because policy values within states are thought to be relatively homogeneous, at least in comparison with the world as a whole. It follows that the emphasis should be on promoting and preserving national democracy rather than striving for some form of global democracy. A second and related fear is that a shift in the site of democratic decision-making to the transnational level would increase the risk of *persistent minorities*, that is, the existence of groups of people who are systematically outvoted not only on individual policies but on most policy issues they care about (Christiano 2008). Trying to keep the amount of citizens' dissatisfaction with public policies as low as possible is a worthwhile objective of institutional design. It underlies the principle of subsidiarity and much economic literature on federalism and decentralization. The problem of persistent minorities may be of even deeper normative significance, since for some theorists it potentially undermines the democratic credentials of a political system by not treating individuals equally.

While in this article we treat the potential increase of policy dissatisfaction and especially of the risk of persistent minorities as a *normative* problem, we also note that they have important pragmatic implications, e.g. undermining democratic stability. Even in situations where majority decisions might be legitimate for democratic *theory*, they may be rejected as illegitimate by the affected minorities themselves, with the resulting risk of alienation and rebellion.

If it were true that the extension of democracy to global decision-making would increase policy dissatisfaction and generate persistent minorities, this would constitute a significant challenge for its proponents. But is it true? Numerous scholars seem to assume, explicitly or implicitly, that it is. For instance, in criticising the proposal for a global parliamentary assembly, Joseph Nye remarked that "treating the world as one global constituency implies the existence of a political community in which citizens of around 200 states would be willing to be *continually* outvoted by more than a billion Chinese and a billion Indians" (Nye 2002, 17 emphasis added). The underlying assumption is that, if given the opportunity, people would vote along national lines and would do so consistently across the range of issues that may be the object of decision.

We must recognize that we have had little empirical basis to say whether such common assumptions are accurate. This article contributes to filling this gap. After introducing the terms of the debate, we assess how the extent of policy dissatisfaction and the risk of persistent minorities change under an imagined shift in the site of democratic decision-making from the national to the global level. We do so by systematically comparing—for the first time, to our knowledge—the distribution of policy values within numerous countries of the world to the distribution of policy values in the world as a whole. We perform this comparison by defining and calculating five measures: heterogeneity of policy values, polarization of policy values, crosscuttingness of policy values, overall policy dissatisfaction across issues, and inequality in

policy dissatisfaction across issues. Each measure contributes to our understanding of whether policy dissatisfaction and persistent minorities would increase under global democracy.

Our empirical analysis draws on two global surveys of political and social attitudes with around 50,000 respondents each, which together give us data for 72 unique countries that represent 86 percent of the global population. Since the surveys were not designed to answer the problem addressed in this article, below we discuss how the survey questions can be used for our purposes and, where appropriate, combined to obtain a better fit with our theoretical concerns. We find that, on average, the world as a whole is slightly more heterogeneous and polarized than individual countries. We also find that, on average, it is slightly more crosscutting. In terms of dissatisfaction, we find that a world democracy would have no more distance between citizens and the median policy value than the average country would. Furthermore, this dissatisfaction would be distributed more widely at the world scale than it would be within the average country. The key finding is thus that a world polity would have values of heterogeneity, polarization, crosscuttingness, dissatisfaction, and inequality of dissatisfaction that are comfortably *within* the range of those of existing states – in other words, the world polity would not be an outlier. The results, robust to a variety of alternative data, measurements, and aggregation rules, suggest that, on balance, the risks of dissatisfaction with policy and persistent minorities would not increase in a global democratic polity compared to individual states.

In conclusion, we find no significant support for rejecting global democracy *in general* on the ground of preference heterogeneity and persistent minorities. A global democratic polity would be like a fairly typical state in this regard. While our argument obviously addresses only one of the major debates regarding the democratic legitimacy of supranational institutions, our findings should be reassuring for those who believe that there should be more, and more democratic, governance at the global level.

Global democracy: what and why?

There is a variety of conceptions of what global democracy could and should be (Archibugi, Koenig-Archibugi, and Marchetti 2011, Zürn 2016). Some think of replicating at the global level the typical institutional features of constitutional democratic states (Cabrera 2004, Koenig-Archibugi 2011, Marchetti 2008). Others prefer to decouple democracy from statist assumptions and envisage novel forms of democratic control that can match the dispersion of power and governance in a pluralistic global system (Little and Macdonald 2013, Scholte 2014). Pluralistic conceptions of global democracy are often underpinned by theories of deliberative democracy (Dryzek, Bächtiger, and Milewicz 2011, Dryzek 2006, Macdonald 2008). While we cannot settle these differences here, we need to indicate how our approach and findings relate to them. We consider our approach and findings directly relevant for any conception of global democracy that envisages *some* role for the aggregation of global citizen preferences, even when the moment of aggregation is intended to come at the end of sustained and comprehensive deliberative processes (Fishkin 2011, 85-88). Aggregation is a feature not just of statist models, but also approaches such as the global stakeholder democracy advocated by Terry Macdonald, who emphasizes deliberative procedures but concedes that they have to be complemented by aggregative procedures when deliberative consensus cannot be reached (Macdonald 2008, 158-162). Moreover, finding that the world as a whole is not abnormally diverse even with regard to policy preferences *as they are* should be heartening also for deliberative democrats who hope that deliberative convergence can be fostered by creating appropriate transnational fora.

Generally speaking, supporters of global democracy advance two kinds of justification for it, which mirror the main justifications offered for democracy in general. Following the literature, we call them "intrinsic" and "instrumental" respectively (Cabrera 2014, Caney 2006, Christiano 2006). The intrinsic justification is based on the principle that individuals should be

entitled to participate, on equal terms, in important decisions that affect their lives (Gould 2004, Held 1995). Several authors note that global governance institutions create legal orders meant to address common problems and realizing shared values. While these authors regard the strengthening of global rule-making as an appropriate response to material and moral interdependence, they argue that individuals, being the ultimate subject to global rules, should have an equal opportunity to influence the content of those rules and hold accountable the power-wielders in charge of their application. The requirement is particularly strong when the power-wielders employ coercion (Abizadeh 2012, Erman 2016, Valentini 2014). For various reasons, the democratic principle that those subject to a law should also be its authors is not well served by the traditional doctrine of state consent and therefore, ideally, global democratic institutions and procedures are required to legitimize international law (Buchanan 2004, 314-27). Other authors support a more expansive interpretation of participatory entitlements in decision-making: such entitlements are owed not only to those who are subject to (coercively enforced) regulations, but to all those whose interests are significantly affected by the decisions (Goodin 2007). From this perspective, global democratic mechanisms are needed to control not only multilateral law-making but also unilateral policies of powerful states (Koenig-Archibugi 2012).

While such intrinsic arguments for global democracy stress "input legitimacy," instrumental justifications for it focus on the output of decision-making systems. From this perspective, global democratic procedures are seen as the most effective institutional framework for the realization of global justice and/or the protection of human rights, such as life, bodily integrity and basic economic opportunities (Cabrera 2014, Caney 2006). Also this strand of argument builds on a line of reasoning that is often heard in the context of national democracies: the protection of people's fundamental rights and interests is greatly enhanced if they have a voice in political decision-making, alongside other mechanisms such as fair access to impartial courts

that safeguard the rule of law (Mill 1861). Global democratic institutions are desirable, the argument goes, because they would provide people with means to advance their core interests that would be unavailable in a world of sovereign states.

Assessing the merits of the intrinsic and instrumental justifications of global democracy falls outside the scope of this article, but for our purposes it suffices that an increasing number of political theorists argues that circumscribing the scope of democratic politics to nation-states cannot be justified on normative grounds. The remainder of this article examines two important concerns raised by this argument.

The problems of diversity and persistent minorities

The idea of global democracy endorsed above entails not only the existence of mechanisms aimed at reducing political inequality among people around the world but also the expectation that, when extensive and inclusive deliberative processes are unable to generate consensus, policy decisions should reflect the preferences of the largest number. This expectation holds even though all known blueprints for global democracy contain devices for protecting the interests of minorities, notably the judicial review of legislative and executive decisions by a constitutional court, a federal distribution of authority across governance levels, and sometimes "consociational" arrangements. Here we do not examine how the inclusion of majoritarian elements has been justified by its supporters (see Marchetti 2008, 64-5). Instead, in this section we will show how those majoritarian elements have prompted some authors to question the normative desirability of global democracy.

We consider two reasons why introducing democratic-majoritarian procedures at the global level may be normatively undesirable: the first reason is that such a move would fail to respect and accommodate the legitimate diversity of policy values among the people of the world, which is better served by insulating national democracies from illegitimate outside interference; the second reason is that the global diversity of policy values is distributed in such

a way that democratic-majoritarian procedures at the global level would generate a serious problem of persistent minorities. To be sure, there are other reasons why global democracy may be seen as undesirable, such as the obstacles to deliberation in a linguistically and culturally fragmented world, low levels of trust, or absence of consistent collective preferences and sufficient levels of "meta-agreement" (as opposed to substantive agreement) among the world's population (Kymlicka 2001, List and Koenig-Archibugi 2010, Miller 2009, 2010, Song 2012, see the comprehensive discussion by Valentini 2014). But here we consider only the two lines of argument sketched above, which we now examine more closely.

At the root of much criticism of global democracy is the view that, as Andrew Hurrell (2007, 47) summarizes a central aspect of the pluralist interpretation of global politics, "diversity is a fundamental feature of humanity and that the clash of moral, national, and religious loyalties is not the result of ignorance of irrationality but rather reflects the plurality of values by which all political arrangements and notions of the good life are to be judged." Robert Jackson (2000, 178-9) distinguishes two ways in which the current world order is pluralist: it displays jurisdictional pluralism, i.e. the recognition of the equal sovereignty and territorial integrity of states; and it displays value pluralism, i.e. a strong diversity of values held by people in different states. "There is almost unlimited heterogeneity in the history, politics, ideology, religion, language, ethnicity, culture, customs, traditions, of the member states of global international society" (Jackson 2000, 403). In Jackson's account, the key function and achievement of jurisdictional pluralism is the protection of value pluralism. "People want to do their own thing in their own way in their own place" and thus "the most important thing is to have a local sovereign jurisdiction within which different groups of people can endeavour to build their own political life according to their own enlightenment and free of foreign interference" (Jackson 2000, 403-4). Pluralists conclude that, "[i]f diversity and value conflicts are such important features of international life, then we should seek to organize global politics

in such a way as to give groups scope for collective self-government and cultural autonomy in their own affairs and to reduce the degree to which they will clash over how the world should be ordered" (Hurrell 2007, 47).

Authors who stress the role of national sovereignty in protecting the pursuit of a diverse range of values do not necessarily have the same views on why such diversity deserves to be protected. Martha Nussbaum (2006, 314) notes that "[t]o protect national sovereignty in a world of pluralism is an important part of protecting human freedom." In David Miller's analysis of where the boundaries of demoi should be drawn, the importance attached to value diversity derives from an approach to democratic theory that he labels "radical democracy." From this perspective, "[d]emocracy is a system in which people come together to decide matters of common concern on the basis of equality, and the aim is to reach decisions that everyone can identify with, that is, can see as in some sense *their* decision" (Miller 2009, 205-6). Miller argues that a group must possess several qualities in order to be able to function as a demos in this way, notably sympathetic identification, interpersonal trust, stable relationships, and underlying agreement on ethical principles. In this article we focus on the latter quality. Miller maintains that agreement on ethical principles is weaker beyond nation-states than within them, and as a consequence "radical" democrats generally do not find it desirable to expand the demos transnationally, especially when there are alternative ways of dealing with the detrimental external effects of the decisions of national democracies (see also Miller 2010, 145-6). From a different perspective, Kukathas (2006, 20) objects to the establishments of global political institutions by, amongst other things, positing that "the likelihood of agreement on justice diminishes with the increasing size of the polity".

Significantly, these authors tend to assume a high correspondence between—and perhaps even tend to conflate—people's views on public policy, their broader cultural values and orientations, and their membership in societies delimited by state boundaries. Crucially for our

purposes, these arguments do not simply stress that the world population is diverse with regard to policy values and preferences, but they maintain that patterns of diversity and commonality track the division of the world into states. Simply put, they contrast relatively homogeneous state citizenries with a relatively heterogeneous world population.

As we noted above, there is a second line of argument that leads from the distribution of policy preferences in the world to a rejection of global democracy. This argument has been developed mainly by Thomas Christiano, who expects that global democracy would greatly exacerbate the problem of persistent minorities compared to national democracies. A persistent minority consists of members of a population who are systematically outvoted across all policy issues, rather than being sometimes on the winning side and sometimes on the losing side. Christiano distinguishes this problem from the problem of tyranny of the majority, which results from a majority knowingly exploiting and violating the basic rights of minorities. Christiano (2008) and other authors (Barry 1979, Cabrera 2014, Dworkin 1987, Guinier 1994, Saunders 2010) argue that the existence of persistent minorities weakens the legitimacy of democracy even if the majority decision does not violate basic rights. The existence of a group that almost never gets the policies that it wants is normatively problematic, Christiano argues, because it clashes with several important features of a just democratic process:

> "Clearly, if a group never or almost never has its way in the process of collective decision-making then it will not be able to provide a corrective to the cognitive bias of the majority in making the laws. They will not be able to make the larger world it lives in a home for themselves. And since other citizens will experience no need to listen to their ideas about justice and well-being, they will not learn much from the democratic process. Finally, since they can see that these interests are being neglected by the democratic process, they will have reason to think that they are not being treated as

equals by the society at large. So they will not have their equal status recognized and affirmed." (Christiano 2008, 296)

Christiano posits that the problem of persistent minorities would be more severe in a global democracy than in national democracies. "This is a significant problem in modern states as they are. But it would appear to be an even greater problem in global and transnational institutions if they were fully democratized. The larger the constituency, the larger the chances are that particular minorities would simply get lost in the democratic decision-making" (Christiano 2012, 76). Cabrera (2014, 231) agrees that the problem of persistent minorities "could again be magnified with a global extension of participatory institutions," but thinks that this problem is soluble with the appropriate approach to defining the boundaries of the demos. This discussion suggests that the desirability of global democracy may ultimately depend on a trade-off between desiderata.[1] As we saw in the previous section, global democracy may bring benefits of an intrinsic nature (it gives people an equal say over decisions that affect or coerce them even when they originate beyond state borders) and/or an instrumental nature (it helps protect basic rights). On the other hand, in this section we considered two potential costs of introducing global democracy: individuals might find their policy preferences overridden more often, and overridden across more issues. As Dahl (1994, 29) remarked, "judgments about trade-offs are no easy matter", and we make no attempt at providing a conclusive judgement here. But it is important to note that both the diversity and the persistent minority arguments make specific empirical assumptions. The former assumes that policy values are significantly more diverse at the global than at the national level, and the latter assumes that persistent

[1] Dahl (1994) described the development of supranational authority in terms of a trade-off between "system effectiveness" and "citizen participation". We endorse the idea of a trade-off, but conceptualize the terms differently.

minorities are more likely at the global than at the national level. How accurate are these empirical assumptions? The remainder of this article tackles this question.

Assessing the empirical assumptions: measures

Empirically assessing the view that policy value diversity and the likelihood of persistent minorities are significantly higher at the global level than within existing states presents considerable challenges. First, we need to know what the policy values of individuals around the world are. Second, we need to know which distributions of policy values across individuals are likely to leave more people dissatisfied with the outcome of collective decisions and to generate more inequality in how policy dissatisfaction is distributed. This and the next section outline our strategy for tackling these challenges. Since the second challenge sets some constraints on how we can approach the first one, we address it first. The question of the relevant data is then discussed in the next section.

Our task is to gauge the extent to which individuals will be left dissatisfied with the outcome of majoritarian decisions on policies, and the likelihood that persistent minorities will emerge. Note that we understand "persistent" to mean being outvoted across a spectrum of issues (e.g., economic, cultural, environmental) rather than across time - although presumably issues would alternate on the agenda and therefore the absence of persistent minorities is equivalent in practice to taking turns in winning and losing over time.

To pursue this task, we adopt or introduce five different measures that apply to a population and that, by themselves or in combination, provide useful information for these purposes. These are: (1) heterogeneity, which refers to the extent to which the members of the population are evenly divided between all possible views on a policy value (e.g. between strong support, moderate support, moderate opposition and strong opposition to the "free market"); (2) polarization, which captures the extent to which views on a policy value cluster at opposite ends of a given dimension (e.g. strong support for and strong opposition to traditionalist family

policies); (3) crosscuttingness, which captures the extent to which views on one policy value (e.g. free market) are correlated with views on a different policy value (e.g. traditional morality) in a population; (4) overall policy dissatisfaction in a population, which aggregates the distance of each individual from a polity's central (i.e. median) value across policy issues; and finally (5) inequality of policy dissatisfaction across all issues among the members of a polity, which captures the extent to which dissatisfaction is concentrated in certain parts of the population.

Our measures of heterogeneity and polarization are adopted from the literature. Cross-cuttingness has also been used by other scholars to assess the distribution of religious or ethnic cleavages in societies, but we take the additional step of applying it to policy values, as we have in earlier work on the European Union (Hale and Koenig-Archibugi 2016). To our knowledge, this is the first article to measure overall policy dissatisfaction and inequality of policy satisfaction both within countries and globally.

Each measure can in principle be operationalized in various ways. In Web-Appendix 1 we discuss how the measures capture the theoretical concepts of interest and note the various formulas that we use in this article and, when relevant, compare them with alternative formulas. What is relevant here is that each of these measures can help us capture the underlying phenomena of interest, i.e. a) how dissatisfied with majority decisions should individuals expect to be in different polities, and b) how unequal that dissatisfaction is likely to be. Our measures of *heterogeneity*, *polarization*, and, most directly, *dissatisfaction* each provide information on the first concept, the extent to which a majority decision will satisfy all members of the polity. Regarding the second, *inequality of policy dissatisfaction* is a way to directly estimate the severity of the persistent minority problem.

Combining *crosscuttingness* with *heterogeneity* or *polarization* provides a different route to that goal. When policy preferences on individual issues are not polarized, democratic satisfaction is likely to be widespread even at low levels of crosscuttingness. The more

preferences on individual issues are polarized, the more high crosscuttingness is necessary to ensure that democratic satisfaction is widespread. The problem of highly unequal democratic satisfaction and persistent minorities is severe when polarization is high and crosscuttingness is low.

The implications of transferring powers to supranational levels of governance hence raises the following question: *How do the five measures compare between the national and the global levels?*

Assessing the empirical assumptions: data

The problems of preference dissatisfaction and persistent minorities are here understood in relation to the content of public policies, as opposed to other forms of minority exclusion such as lack of demographic representativeness of elected politicians. We are therefore interested in the "policy values" of individuals. These are distinct from personal values in that policy values refer to the content of collectively binding decisions rather than norms of personal conduct. Policy values are also distinct from preferences for specific public policies in that they refer to the outcomes of political decision-making rather than the means to achieve them.

Some studies use socio-demographic indicators such as religious affiliation, language, ethnicity and income as proxies for the distribution of preferences across a population (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999, Gubler and Selway 2012). While such socio-demographic characteristics no doubt influence the formation and distribution of policy values, the correlation between the two is far from perfect – we simply cannot assume high homogeneity amongst all members of a certain religious, linguistic, socio-economic, or other group (Dion and Birchfield 2010, Guillaud 2013, Kriesi 1998). Hence, our empirical strategy aims at capturing those values directly through the analysis of opinion polls.

A key decision concerns the dimensions that structure policy values around the world. Recent research on Western countries seems to have reached the conclusion that public opinion

(as opposed to political parties) is divided along at least two distinct dimensions (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi et al. 2008, Lefkofridi, Wagner, and Willmann 2014, Rovny and Marks n.d.). First, there is an economic left-right dimension, which concerns issues such as the relationship between governments and markets and the redistribution of income and other resources across economic strata. Second, there is a cultural dimension that pits libertarian-alternative against traditionalist-authoritarian value orientations. While these dimensions are compelling and are included in the study, we accept the argument of Rovny and Marks (n.d.) for identifying the main dimensions deductively rather than inductively (e.g. via factor analysis). Therefore we add a third dimension – the importance of protecting the environment even at the expenses of economic growth – because theoretically it seems sufficiently independent from the other two dimensions and because of its substantive importance for national and global politics.

Our goals set significant constraints on the surveys that we can use. First, the surveys need to have sufficient coverage, i.e. they need to encompass all countries in the world or, more realistically, a substantial number of countries from each region of the world. Second, to measure crosscuttingness we need to know how the *same* individuals responded to questions on *at least two*, and ideally more, distinct policy dimensions. Third, we need questions that ensure comparability across diverse national contexts. While some degree of context anchoring is inherent in all survey data, questions that explicitly or implicitly lead respondents to use the national status quo as baseline (e.g. Do you prefer *more* or *less* redistribution?) are less useful than questions that do not do so (e.g. Should the government take care of the poor?).

With these considerations in mind, we rely primarily on the Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2007, which polled around 1000 individuals in each of 47 countries representing 60 percent of

the world's population.[2] The relevant questions covering traditionalism, economic values, and environment are shown in Table 1. The questions on environmental protection and traditionalism are well suited to capture disagreements that may divide people not only within their own countries but also across different regions of a hypothetical global polity. The environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis expects respondents from richer and poorer regions to provide different answers in relation to the trade-off between environmental protection and economic growth (Bravo and Marelli 2007). Similarly, disagreements on whether religion should be kept separate from government policy or not have both domestic and global relevance, as they can affect a range of transnational issues from human rights to security (Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011). Regarding economic values, the advantage of the Pew survey is that the relevant questions are phrased in absolute terms rather than relative to an (implicit) baseline. However, an extrapolation from the national to the global level is less straightforward for views on the appropriate policy response to poverty and inequality, and therefore we address this issue at length in a later section of this article.

In addition to the Pew survey, we also use the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), which was conducted between 2005 and 2007 and polled nationally representative samples of the adult population in each of 90 countries. Because not every question was asked in every country in the fifth wave of the WVS, in practice we include only 52 countries from that survey, which cover about 70 percent of the world population. Twenty-seven countries were included both in the Pew survey and the WVS. The drawback of the WVS is that the three

[2] The survey respondents are a representative sample of the adult population of the 47 countries, except those in seven countries (Bolivia, Brazil, China, India, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, and Venezuela) where the urban population is slightly to moderately overrepresented and one country (South Africa) where the respondents are exclusively urban. See Pew Research Center (2007) for full details.

questions on the economy, and one of the questions on the environment, are phrased in more relativist terms than the Pew questions, and hence responses are likely less comparable across countries than those in the Pew survey (see Table 1). Since the questions asked in the Pew survey are better suited than the WVS to capture transnational differences, we should have a higher confidence in the accuracy of the world's rank based on the former. However, including the WVS results is useful because they provide additional reassurance that the broader finding – the world is not an outlier with regard to policy values diversity – is not overly sensitive to the wording of survey questions and the exact set of countries surveyed.

Estimates for what in the following we call the "world" refer either to all the approximately 47,000 participants in the Pew study or to the 50,000 individuals surveyed for the questions we have selected in the WVS fifth wave. Together they cover around 100,000 individuals in 72 unique countries representing 86 percent of the world population. In the results reported in the following section, the responses are weighted proportionally by the population of the respondents' countries, to simulate a simple "one person, one vote" scenario. In a subsequent section, we report results based on alternative aggregation methods.

We do not aggregate questions across the surveys to avoid potential measurement errors. Within each survey, we followed Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder (2008) and averaged individuals' responses across questions in the same dimension to reduce the potential bias any individual question may introduce (with appropriate adjustments to make sure high and low responses were in the same direction across countries, and, in the case of the traditionalism measure in the WVS data, to compress two questions with 10 responses categories to five). Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder (2008) found averaging across questions to be little different empirically from more complex (and less transparent) approaches to combining data to capture an underlying dimension (e.g. factor analysis).

Findings

Table 2 provides an overview of our findings, showing how a world polity would compare to existing countries in relation to the various measures presented above. In relation to each measure and policy dimension, the table indicates the place of the world in a ranking where the first-ranked country displays the highest level of heterogeneity, polarization, cross-cuttingness, overall dissatisfaction, or inequality of dissatisfaction. Recall that higher scores can be expected to exacerbate the problems of diversity and persistent minorities, with the exception of crosscuttingness, for which higher scores are more beneficial. Web-Appendix 2 provides full results on each measure: the exact scores for each country, the average of countries, and the scores for the world as a whole. In the following, we provide an overview of the main findings.

Heterogeneity. According to the Pew data, for all three dimensions the level of heterogeneity of the world is near the average level of heterogeneity of all countries. According to the WVS data, the world is more heterogeneous than the average country in all dimensions, but, strikingly, not much more. In no case is it more heterogeneous than the most heterogeneous countries. To take just one salient comparison, according to the WVS, a hypothetical world polity would have less disagreement on the traditionalism dimension than the United States.

Polarization. Our measurement of polarization paints a similar picture. The Pew data show the world to be *less* polarized than the average country in the economy and traditionalism dimensions, falling comfortably low in the rankings. It is as polarized as the average country in the environment dimension. The WVS data, by contrast, show the world to be more polarized than the average country, although several countries – including the United States in the traditionalism dimension – are more polarized than the world.

Crosscuttingness. The measure provides information on how policy values crosscut or reinforce each other in the surveyed countries and across all the citizens in our sample as a

whole. Our three dimensions can combine in three different ways: traditionalism-economy, economy-environment, and traditionalism-environment. As with our other measures, a hypothetical global democratic polity would fall comfortably within the range of individual countries in terms of crosscuttingness. In the Pew data, the world as a whole is more crosscut than the average country in the economy-environment and traditionalism-environment dimensions, and less than the average country in the economy-traditionalism dimensions. In the WVS data, policy values are more crosscutting in the world as a whole than within the average country for all dimensions. In particular, the world is more crosscut than the United States in all dimensions in both surveys, except with regard to economy-environment using the WVS data.

Figure 1 summarizes the preceding findings graphically. Each subgraph plots the values of each country and of the world (World-PR) in relation to the polarization in one dimension (horizontal axis) and the crosscuttingness between two dimensions (vertical axis). Recall the point made above: the risk of persistent minorities is highest when high polarization is combined with low crosscuttingness, a situation that corresponds to the bottom-right area of the graphs. The graph shows that the world as a whole is further away from the "danger zone" than a significant portion of countries.

Overall dissatisfaction and inequality of dissatisfaction. Finally, the findings regarding dissatisfaction reveal a very similar story. According the Pew data, the world as a whole has almost exactly as much dissatisfaction as the average country, falling squarely in the middle of the distribution. The WVS data, in turn, show the world as a whole as having slightly less total dissatisfaction than the average country. In both datasets, however, the world's dissatisfaction is spread more broadly than in the average country, with the world ranking 16th out of 47 in the Pew data and 11th out of 45 in the WVS data. (Full results in Web-Appendix 2).

Probing assumptions about transnational solidarity

The empirical strategy employed in this article rests on the assumption that the policy values expressed by citizens would not change if the context of democratic decision-making shifted from the national level to the global level. This assumption makes sense in the context of our thought-experiment—there is no a priori reason to treat a larger polity differently from a smaller one—but how closely does it match current reality? As noted above, the assumption seems highly plausible for some of the policy values we consider and the survey questions we use to capture them – for instance, a supporter of the legalization of homosexuality in her own country is unlikely to support a ban across the world, and this is likely to apply to other issues pitting personal freedoms vs traditional morality. The validity of the assumption is perhaps less straightforward in relation to other issues, and specifically views on poverty and inequality. Most importantly, a respondent completely agreeing that "It is the responsibility of the state to take care of very poor people who can't take care of themselves" (one of the Pew survey questions we use) may have only her poor co-nationals in mind when answering the question, and possibly object to the use of public funds to help poor people abroad. Of course, under the global polity we posit, everyone in the world would be co-nationals, but we may worry that higher levels of cultural diversity, economic disparity, and other factors may systematically reduce such sentiments as the size of the polity expands. Taking the analysis one step further, we assess this possibility via a further question included in the Pew survey: "Do you think the wealthier nations of the world are doing enough or not doing enough to help the poorer nations of the world with problems such as economic development, reducing poverty, and improving health?" Two response categories are relevant: "doing enough" and "not doing enough". This survey question complements the economy questions considered above by capturing transnational economic solidarity values more directly.

We find that support for global redistribution is both higher and more widely distributed than may be commonly thought. First, the respondents answering that the wealthier nations are *not* doing enough outnumber respondents answering that enough is being done in all 47 countries except Indonesia. Globally, about three in four respondents support the idea that rich countries should do more. Second, contrary to what some perhaps might expect, we find that the view that wealthier nations are *not* doing enough for poorer nations is more widespread in wealthier countries than in poorer countries. There is a strong positive correlation ($r = 0.59$, $p < 0.01$) between the GDP per capita of a country and support for the view that richer countries should do more to promote economic development, reducing poverty, and improving health in poorer countries.[3]

For our purposes, however, the overall level of solidarity is less important than how it may affect the distribution of policy values at different levels of aggregation. Given what we know about levels of international solidarity, would the distribution of opinions on helping the *global* poor be fundamentally different than the distribution of opinions on government help for the poor in national contexts? We can test this question by weighting individuals' views over economic redistribution by whether or not they express transnational solidarity. Specifically, we re-calculate our economic dimension at the global level by recoding all respondents who a) completely/mostly agree that the government should take care of the poor (question Q24b on the Pew survey) *and* b) replied that rich countries were already "doing enough" as respondents

[3] The correlation reported is between (a) the difference between the percentage responding "not doing enough" and the percentage responding "doing enough" and (b) expenditure-side real GDP in 2007 at current PPPs divided by population and logged (from Penn World Tables 9.0). The correlation is slightly weaker if GDP per capita is not logged ($r = 0.32$, $p < 0.05$).

who mostly/completely *disagree* that the government should take care of the poor.[4] In other words, those who support public help for the poor but not transnational solidarity are now assumed to only support help for the poor at the national level, and are therefore coded in opposite way for our calculations of a global polity. Under this very restrictive assumption, does the global polity lead to a highly increased risk of dissatisfaction or permanent minorities?

Table 3 compares a world polity in which opinions on redistribution are weighted by transnational solidarity to one in which they are not. As we would expect, assuming that all respondents who do not express support for transnational solidarity would turn against redistributive policies at the global scale increases the world polity's heterogeneity and polarization. Significantly, however, the effect is modest, shifting the world from the middle of the distribution to the top quartile, still comfortably within the range of countries. The effect on crosscuttingness and overall dissatisfaction is instead largely neutral or even slightly positive. In sum, even if respondents were to sharply change their policy views on helping the poor with a shift to a global polity, the overall distribution of policy values would not be unduly prone to the problem of persistent minorities.

While these results should be considered suggestive rather than conclusive, what we can say is that the most relevant available evidence on public opinion does not support the expectation that citizens in rich countries would be constantly outvoted by citizens of poor countries over

[4] Specifically, 4004 respondents who "strongly agree" with government responsibility for the poor but not with more help from rich to poor countries were re-coded as "mostly disagree" with government responsibility for the poor, and 2557 respondents who "mostly agree" with government responsibility for the poor but not with more help from rich to poor countries were recoded "strongly disagree" with government responsibility for the poor. In total 14.5 percent of the observations were changed for the new measure.

issues of transnational redistribution under a regime of global democracy. As with the policy dimensions considered earlier, transnational solidarity is a contentious issue, but not more so *across* countries than *within* them.

Alternative assumptions on global institutions

The measures for the "world" reported above are based on the assumption that public policies will reflect median policy values and that each individual counts the same, irrespective of the size of her country of residence or other factors. However, in principle there are various ways in which individual responses can be combined into a global measure, reflecting alternative assumptions on how citizen preferences may be represented and aggregated in a global decision-making process. This point is important because scholars and activists have proposed a variety of institutional designs for global democracy. While some are sympathetic towards global majoritarianism, other proponents of global democracy would prefer a combination of majoritarian elements with "federal" institutional devices that acknowledge the role played by nation-states in structuring people's interests and identities (see, for instance, Held 1995; Archibugi 2008). One such combination is familiar from the U.S. constitution: a bicameral system in which one chamber aims for equal representation of individual citizens and the other chamber gives equal weight to constituent states in the allocation of representatives to citizens. Moreover, some supporters of an elected global assembly advocate an institutional design that balances individual and state equality within the same chamber, by implementing degressive proportionality in the distribution of assembly seats to constituencies. Specifically, leaders of the International Network of a Second UN Assembly and of the Committee for a Democratic U.N. have endorsed the square root formula proposed by Lionel Penrose in 1946 (Bummel 2010, Segall 1990). According to this proposal, "the voting power of each nation in a world assembly should be proportional to the square root of the number of people in millions on each nation's voting list" (Penrose 1946, 56). Another proposal for allocating votes is based on a

formula that gives equal weight to population sizes, the sovereign equality principle, and states' financial contributions to common activities (Schwartzberg 2012). More complex designs are conceivable (Colomer 2014).

This is not the place to assess the merits and drawbacks of different aggregation methods. But we are interested in determining how our results change if we make different assumptions about how individual views are aggregated at the global level. To do this, we compare measures based on four different aggregation principles: (1) the "one person, one vote" world assumed in the previous section, where individual survey responses are weighted in direct proportion to the population of the respondents' countries; (2) a "Penrose" world, where they are weighted by the square root of the country's population; (3) a "censitary" world, where they are weighed by the GDP of their country, understood as proxy for financial contributions to providing global public goods; and (4) a "sovereign equality" world, where individual survey responses are not weighted by population or other factors. We do not compute formulas mixing the four principles for reasons of manageability.

Figure 2 shows graphically the outcomes of this analysis (the exact scores are provided in Web-Appendix 3). We find that the worlds reflecting Penrose, censitary and sovereign-equality aggregation principles differ only marginally from the one person, one vote world described in the previous sections. Most importantly, the global polities based on each of the four aggregation principles would all have values of heterogeneity, polarization, crosscuttingness, overall dissatisfaction and dissatisfaction inequality *within* the range of values displayed by existing states. In this context, it is interesting to note that we found no statistically significant correlation between any of the five measures considered here and country population size.

Conclusion

In this article we have probed the empirical assumptions of two important objections to the thesis that democracy should be extended to the global level: the fear that global democracy

would fail to respect and accommodate the legitimate diversity of policy values among the people of the world, and the fear that it would undermine its own democratic credentials by locking a substantial proportion of its citizens into a status of persistent minority.

The empirical analysis has revealed that the distribution of policy values across countries is not significantly different from the distribution of policy values within countries. In terms of heterogeneity and polarization, the world is about as diverse as the average country in most respects, and in any case it cannot be described as an outlier. At the same time, policy values across countries tend to crosscut one another slightly more than policy values within countries. Overall dissatisfaction with the median position is similar in the world as a whole and in the average country, and this dissatisfaction is spread somewhat more equally among individuals. The most striking finding is how "normal" a hypothetical global polity would be in terms of citizen policy values. This is all the more remarkable considering that individual countries possess a state apparatus able to promote convergence of policy values through the education system or other socialization mechanisms, whereas the world as a whole does not. While data limitations prevented us from conducting longitudinal analyses, researchers interested in the topic should be on the look-out for, and ideally generate, new global data that could help identify trends over time.

We noted above that assessing the desirability of global democracy may involve trade-offs. Even those of us who are persuaded that strengthening and democratizing global governance would help realize important democratic values may be reluctant to endorse the necessary reforms if they resulted in citizens having their policy preferences overridden much more often, and overridden across more issues. Our findings indicate that this risk is low, and thus offer empirical reassurance regarding two important objections to extending democracy to a larger scale.

This article addressed the problems of diversity and persistent minorities as potentially limiting the desirability of global (aggregative) democracy from the perspective of normative democratic theory. Can our approach tell us something also on whether global democratic institutions would enjoy widespread public support, i.e. social legitimacy in an empirical sense? Social legitimacy is not simply a matter of policy satisfaction. Global democracy may be undermined by factors such as lack of deliberation in a common public sphere due to high linguistic diversity and a deficit of trust resulting from the absence of a shared national identity (Archibugi 2008, Zürn 2000). We could conjecture that, if global democratic institutions were created, their day-to-day operation might help make people more aware of something that emerges from our analysis, i.e. that disagreements over policies often cut across borders rather than routinely pitting nationally delimited publics against each other. In turn, this awareness may dilute the impact of national identities in driving perceptions of the legitimacy of global institutions, and perhaps increase trust beyond national borders. But we have to acknowledge that these conjectures remain, for the time being, in the realm of speculation.

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Table 1: Survey questions used to measure policy values

Dimension	Question	Response categories	Source and question code
Traditionalism	Religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government policy.	1 completely agree 2 mostly agree 3 mostly disagree 4 completely disagree	Pew2007 Q24c
	Our way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence	1 completely agree 2 mostly agree 3 mostly disagree 4 completely disagree	Pew2007 Q24d
	How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statement: Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office.	1 Agree strongly 2 Agree 3 Neither agree or disagree 4 Disagree 5 Strongly disagree	WVS 2005-7 F102
	How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statement: Religious leaders should not influence government.	1 Agree strongly 2 Agree 3 Neither agree or disagree 4 Disagree 5 Strongly disagree	WVS 2005-7 F105
	Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: *Homosexuality*	1 Never justifiable ↑ ↓ 10 Always justifiable	WVS 2005-7 F118
	Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: *Divorce*.	1 Never justifiable ↑ ↓ 10 Always justifiable	WVS 2005-7 F121
Economy	Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor	1 completely agree 2 mostly agree 3 mostly disagree 4 completely disagree	Pew2007 Q19a
	It is the responsibility of the *(state or government)* to take care of very poor people who can't take care of themselves.	1 completely agree 2 mostly agree 3 mostly disagree 4 completely disagree	Pew2007 Q24b
	On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?	1 Incomes should be made more equal ↑ ↓ 10 We need larger income differences as incentives	WVS 2005-7 E035
	On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?	1 Private ownership of business should be increased ↑ ↓ 10 Government ownership of business should be increased	WVS 2005-7 E036
	On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?	1 People should take more responsibility ↑ ↓ 10 The government should take more responsibility	WVS 2005-7 E037
Envir	Protecting the environment should be	1 completely agree	Pew2007

	given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs	2 mostly agree 3 mostly disagree 4 completely disagree	Q19c
	I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental pollution	1 Strongly agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly disagree	WVS 2005-7 B002
	The Government should reduce environmental pollution, but it should not cost me any money	1 Strongly agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly disagree	WVS 2005-7 B003
Transnational solidarity	Do you think the wealthier nations of the world are doing enough or not doing enough to help the poorer nations of the world with problems such as economic development, reducing poverty, and improving health?	1 Doing enough 2 Not doing enough	Pew2007 Q100

Table 2. Rank of the world in relation to heterogeneity, polarization, crosscuttingness, overall dissatisfaction and inequality of dissatisfaction

Measure	**Dimension(s)**	**Pew Survey**			**WVS**		
		Average of countries	World	Rank of World	Average of countries	World	Rank of World
Heterogeneity	Economy	0.59	0.59	28th of 48	0.82	0.84	9th of 53
	Traditionalism	0.58	0.59	19th of 48	0.63	0.68	14th of 46
	Environment	0.65	0.67	18th of 48	0.59	0.62	16th of 53
Polarization	Economy	0.68	0.65	37th of 48	1.68	1.90	11th of 53
	Traditionalism	0.66	0.63	33rd of 48	0.78	0.91	5th of 46
	Environment	0.85	0.85	25th of 48	0.69	0.73	17th of 53
Crosscuttingness	Economy-Traditionalism	0.73	0.69	31st of 48	0.91	0.96	13th of 46
	Economy-Environment	0.88	0.96	12th of 48	0.90	0.93	28th of 52
	Environment-Traditionalism	0.92	0.99	4th of 48	0.90	0.96	9th of 46
Overall dissatisfaction	All dimensions	0.94	0.93	30th of 48	0.88	0.88	19th of 46
Inequality of dissatisfaction	All dimensions	0.19	0.21	16th of 48	0.26	0.30	37th of 46

Note: In the WVS data the number of countries for each measure varies slightly because not all questions were asked in all countries.

Table 3. Comparison of a world polity in which policy values over economy are weighted by transnational solidarity and one in which they are not. Pew data; responses proportional to population.

	Unweighted		Weighted for transnational solidarity	
	Value of World	Rank of World	Value of World	Rank of World
Heterogeneity economy	0.587	28th	0.624	9th
Polarization economy	0.65	37th	0.74	6th
Crosscuttingness economy-environment	0.964	12th	0.955	13th
Crosscuttingness economy-traditionalism	0.690	31st	0.727	27th
Overall dissatisfaction	0.931	30th	0.914	24th
Inequality of dissatisfaction (SD)	0.211	16th	0.233	13th

Figure 1 (a, b, c): Polarization and crosscuttingness of economy, traditionalism and environment for countries and World (World-PR), Pew survey.

a

b



c

Figure 2 (a, b, c): Polarization and crosscuttingness of economy, traditionalism and environment for World under different aggregation rules, Pew survey.

a



b



c



Note: World-PR denotes the “one person one vote” World; World-SQ denotes the “Penrose” degressive proportionality World; World-GDP denotes the censitary World; World-IG denotes the “sovereign equality” World; dots represent existing countries (country codes not shown).

Could global democracy satisfy diverse policy values? An empirical analysis

Supplementary Web-Appendices

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1. Construction of the measures used in the paper

Heterogeneity

Heterogeneity refers to the extent to which the members of the population are evenly divided between all possible views on a policy value (e.g. between strong support, moderate support, moderate opposition and strong opposition to the "free market"). To measure the heterogeneity of views on individual policy issues, we use the Herfindahl index. Page (2010, 70) notes that it is the most common measure of diversity, and is often used to measure the extent of ethnic and linguistic fractionalisation, e.g. by Fearon (2003, 208). The Herfindahl index ranges between 1/n and 1, where *n* is the number of observations. To ensure that higher numbers reflect higher degrees of heterogeneity, we subtract it from unity. Our measure of heterogeneity for each individual question is therefore:

$$H = 1 - \sum_{k=1}^{p} Y_k^2$$

where Y_k is the proportion of the population giving a certain response to the question, and p is the number of responses for the question.

Because we focus on three general dimensions (traditionalism, economy, and environment), for our principal measure of heterogeneity, we aggregate across different questions, and so employ a slightly different measure. We employ Lieberson's A_w, often used for public opinion data, which subtracts the Herfindahl measure from unity and allows for the possibility of combining various dimensions. The formula is:

$$A_w = 1 - \left(\sum_{k=1}^{p} \frac{Y_k^2}{V} \right)$$

Where A_w is the heterogeneity in population w, Y_k is the proportion of the population falling in a given category within each of the questions, V is the number of questions, and p represents the total number of categories k possible for all the questions (Lieberson 1969, Sullivan 1973). Larger values indicate more heterogeneity.

Polarization

Polarization must capture not only how policy values are spread across a population, but the extent to which policy values cluster at opposite ends of a given dimension. As Bartels (2013) notes, the term can be confusing because authors apply it to at least four distinct concepts: the level of 'social dissensus' in a country, an increase in social dissensus, the degree to which public preferences correlate with support for certain parties, or an increase in the degree to which public preferences correlate with support for certain parties. In our article polarization refers to the first of these alternatives. Lindqvist and Östling (2010, 563) provide a helpful discussion of alternative ways of measuring polarization, understood in this way. They compare the standard deviation, the measure developed by Esteban and Ray (1994), and a simple measure of bipolarization, the minimum of the proportion of respondents that select the highest and lowest values, finding significant correlation across these dimensions. The dimensions we consider tend to follow relatively normal distributions (see below), with most citizens clustered toward the center. Like Lindqvist and Östling, we chiefly employ the standard deviation as it is transparent and easily interpreted.

Figure A1 provides a visual illustration of the meaning of heterogeneity and polarization and their difference, by comparing the distribution of policy values on the economic left-right dimension in four countries (using the Pew data). Thailand has relatively low heterogeneity and low polarization, as most respondents express moderate views. By contrast, both heterogeneity and polarization are above average in Romania, since respondents express a

wider range of views, including extreme views. Respondents' view are widely spread in Italy as well, but extreme views are less common there than in Romania, which produces a level of polarization that is lower than the sample average, despite heterogeneity being above average. Jordan illustrates the opposite situation: some views are expressed much more commonly than others, which reduces heterogeneity, but they display a bimodal distribution, which contributes to raising the level of polarization above the mean of all countries in the sample.

Figure A1. Heterogeneity and Polarization of four countries on the economic left-right dimensions (Pew data).



Crosscuttingness

While long discussed in the pluralist literature, the concept's empirical meaning was first developed by Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor (Rae and Taylor 1970). They explain the idea as follows:

> If…all those who held a particular religion were also in the same class (and vice-versa) so that the two sets of groups…were considered identical, then the two cleavages are said to reinforce each other. If, however, some of those who were of a particular religion were divided among several social classes, then we say that the two cleavages cross-cut each other. Cross-cutting, then, is the extent to which individuals who are in the same group on one cleavage are in different groups on the other cleavage (Rae and Taylor 1970, 82).

There are two approaches to measuring crosscuttingness. The first approach is to connect crosscuttingness between categories to heterogeneity within categories, so that crosscuttingness is necessarily lower at higher levels of heterogeneity. This is the approach chosen by Rae and Taylor, who render the concept of crosscuttingness mathematically as:

$$XC = \sum_{i} p_i^2 + \sum_{j} p_j^2 - 2\sum_{i,j} p_{ij}^2$$

where $\sum_i p_i^2$ is the sum of the proportion of individuals in each category of a dimension with i categories, $\sum_j p_j^2$ is the sum of the proportion of individuals in each category of a second dimension with categories j, and $\sum_{i,j} p_{ij}^2$ is the sum of the proportion of individuals at all possible combinations of the two dimensions, $i \times j$. The concept can be rendered as a contingency table that assigns observations to dimension one in i columns and dimension two in j rows. Crosscuttingness is then just the sum of the proportion in each row plus the sum of the proportion in each column, minus twice the sum of the proportion in each cell.

The alternative approach is to capture crosscuttingness through measures of statistical association, which indicate the extent to which membership in a category on one dimension can be predicted from membership in a category on another dimension, irrespective of how heterogeneous the dimensions are. This is the approach chosen by Joel Selway (2011), who has recently reintroduced the concept of crosscuttingess in the comparative politics literature in order to understand the effects of linguistic and ethnic cleavages on civil war. Selway employs the standard chi-square test that measures the independence of two variables. To ensure comparability across dimensions that may have different numbers of categories, Selway uses Kramer's V, which normalizes the χ^2 statistic by the product of the categories of the two dimensions under consideration.

Since we find it useful to keep a clear conceptual distinction between heterogeneity and crosscuttingess, we adopt an approach similar to Selway's. But because we are concerned with the crosscuttingness of policy values as ordinal variables, not discrete linguistic or ethnic groups, Kramer's V is not appropriate (Selway 2011, 52). Instead we rely on Goodman and Kruskal's gamma, an ordinal measure of association:

$$\gamma = \frac{P_s - P_d}{P_s + P_d}$$

where P_s is the probability that a randomly selected pair of observations will place in the same order and P_d is the probability that a random pair will have a different order (Goodman and Kruskal 1954). Gamma varies from [-1, 1], with -1 indicating perfect divergence, 1 indicating perfect convergence, and 0 indicating no association. Because we are not concerned with the *direction* of association, just whether the dimensions are crosscutting or reinforcing, we obtain our measure of crosscuttingness by subtracting the absolute value of gamma from unity:

$$XC = 1 - |\gamma|$$

Note that gamma is sensitive to the number of categories within each dimension, meaning that our measure of crosscuttingness will not be directly comparable across dimensions that have different numbers of categories (Rae and Taylor 1970, 84). Happily, working with public opinion data allows us to elide this limitation, because we can select questions that have the same number of possible responses, allowing crosscuttingness to be compared directly.

Overall dissatisfaction

We introduce "dissatisfaction" as a measure of the diversity of policy values in a society. It measures the distance of all individuals' policy values from the average individual in each policy dimension, averaged across policy dimensions. Because our research question is concerned with democracy, we measure each individual's distance from the median value,[5] which in a perfect voting environment can be expected to be the policy adopted.

Conceptually, one could imagine dissatisfaction as the total area under a density plot of the number of people holding certain policy values on a given dimension. Because in this article we employ a simple ordinal scale to measure policy values, mathematically we represent this idea as:

$$D = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{P}\left(\sum_{n=1}^{N} \hat{x}_k - x_{i,k}\right)}{NP}$$

[5] As an alternative, we also calculated the same measure using the mean, and found little difference in practice (in almost all the polities in our sample the mean and the median are quite close).

Where $x_{i,k}$ is individual *i's* policy value on dimension *k*, $\hat{x}_k$ is the median policy value on dimension *k*, N is the total number of individuals in the society, and P is the total number of policy dimensions.

Inequality of dissatisfaction

We are also interested in how widely dissatisfaction is distributed across a polity. When dissatisfaction is highly concentrated, the threat of persistent minorities grows. Many measures of dispersion are possible. Here we simply use the standard deviation of our dissatisfaction measure for a given polity.

2. Complete scores on all measures for all countries and World

Table A1: Heterogeneity across the globe compared to heterogeneity in individual states. Pew data.

Country	Economy	Traditionalism	Environment
Palestinian Territories	0.61	0.64	0.73
Argentina	0.64	0.60	0.63
Bangladesh	0.56	0.56	0.46
Bolivia	0.62	0.54	0.66
Brazil	0.57	0.57	0.65
Bulgaria	0.60	0.55	0.62
Canada	0.58	0.59	0.66
Chile	0.60	0.58	0.65
China	0.52	0.54	0.62
Czech Republic	0.58	0.57	0.66
Ethiopia	0.59	0.55	0.65
France	0.64	0.60	0.73
Germany	0.58	0.60	0.65
Ghana	0.62	0.56	0.68
India	0.60	0.55	0.60
Indonesia	0.55	0.57	0.70
Israel	0.57	0.65	0.69
Italy	0.55	0.54	0.59
Ivory Coast	0.59	0.59	0.68
Japan	0.58	0.57	0.64
Jordan	0.64	0.64	0.68
Kenya	0.60	0.54	0.64
South Korea	0.51	0.52	0.59
Kuwait	0.64	0.67	0.61
Lebanon	0.59	0.54	0.73
Malaysia	0.52	0.60	0.66
Mali	0.62	0.60	0.72
Mexico	0.55	0.55	0.66
Morocco	0.57	0.54	0.58
Nigeria	0.58	0.58	0.75
Pakistan	0.63	0.58	0.72
Peru	0.60	0.56	0.70
Poland	0.55	0.51	0.65
Senegal	0.58	0.60	0.73
Slovakia	0.60	0.55	0.65
South Africa	0.59	0.60	0.71
Spain	0.50	0.57	0.62
Sweden	0.60	0.57	0.54

Turkey	0.59	0.54	0.61
Uganda	0.61	0.63	0.52
Ukraine	0.58	0.55	0.67
Russia	0.61	0.61	0.66
Egypt	0.68	0.63	0.69
Great Britain	0.56	0.59	0.65
Tanzania	0.63	0.60	0.51
United States	0.63	0.64	0.70
Venezuela	0.61	0.55	0.65
Country average	**0.59**	**0.58**	**0.65**
World	**0.59**	**0.59**	**0.67**
World's rank	**28/48**	**19/48**	**18/48**

Table A2: Heterogeneity across the globe compared to heterogeneity in individual states. WVS data.

Country	Economy	Traditionalism	Environment
Andorra	0.808	0.559	0.626
Argentina	0.856	0.717	0.598
Australia	0.831	0.691	0.654
Brazil	0.827	0.653	0.596
Bulgaria	0.854	0.674	0.639
Burkina Faso	0.810	0.602	0.572
Canada	0.818	0.699	0.620
Chile	0.837	0.685	0.610
China	0.840		0.567
Colombia	0.848		
Cyprus	0.839	0.687	0.622
Egypt	0.797		0.558
Ethiopia	0.805	0.536	0.654
Finland	0.804	0.689	0.647
Georgia	0.806	0.487	0.645
Germany	0.833	0.688	0.619
Ghana	0.846	0.560	0.647
Guatemala	0.849	0.639	0.610
Hong Kong	0.711		0.498
India	0.844	0.623	0.594
Indonesia	0.795	0.431	0.497
Iran	0.837	0.528	0.427
Italy	0.823	0.669	0.548
Japan	0.774	0.650	0.652
Jordan	0.786	0.488	0.582

Malaysia	0.741	0.600	0.540
Mali	0.794	0.654	0.556
Mexico	0.842	0.694	0.554
Moldova	0.817	0.612	0.642
Morocco	0.813		0.548
New Zealand	0.823	0.686	0.599
Norway	0.807	0.594	0.717
Peru	0.816		0.528
Poland	0.839	0.668	0.636
Romania	0.863	0.632	0.599
Rwanda	0.791	0.553	0.580
Serbia	0.826	0.636	0.466
Slovenia	0.836	0.701	0.651
South Africa	0.847	0.648	0.625
South Korea	0.793	0.608	0.593
Spain	0.804	0.690	0.523
Sweden	0.836	0.578	0.569
Switzerland	0.813		0.668
Taiwan	0.809	0.620	0.598
Thailand	0.739	0.546	0.485
Trinidad and Tobago	0.831	0.604	0.584
Turkey	0.832	0.594	0.558
Ukraine	0.831	0.608	0.558
United States	0.823	0.729	0.618
Uruguay	0.807	0.693	0.568
Vietnam	0.847	0.555	0.581
Zambia	0.830	0.653	0.648
Average country	**0.818**	**0.625**	**0.590**
World	**0.844**	**0.682**	**0.623**
World's rank	**9/53**	**14/46**	**16/53**

Table A3: Polarization across the globe compared to polarization in individual states. Pew data.

	Economy	Traditionalism	Environment
Palestinian Territories	0.73	0.77	1.01
Argentina	0.76	0.69	0.81
Bangladesh	0.61	0.63	0.58
Bolivia	0.71	0.60	0.83
Brazil	0.65	0.66	0.88
Bulgaria	0.67	0.60	0.76
Canada	0.67	0.68	0.88
Chile	0.69	0.65	0.83
China	0.59	0.59	0.74
Czech Republic	0.69	0.67	0.83
Ethiopia	0.69	0.62	0.80
France	0.76	0.71	1.04
Germany	0.67	0.68	0.83
Ghana	0.73	0.64	0.93
India	0.69	0.60	0.88
Indonesia	0.63	0.64	0.90
Israel	0.65	0.78	0.88
Italy	0.61	0.62	0.70
Ivory Coast	0.68	0.68	0.92
Japan	0.65	0.66	0.77
Jordan	0.75	0.75	0.85
Kenya	0.70	0.60	0.89
South Korea	0.55	0.54	0.69
Kuwait	0.75	0.85	0.96
Lebanon	0.67	0.62	0.99
Malaysia	0.60	0.69	0.85
Mali	0.73	0.72	1.04
Mexico	0.62	0.60	0.83
Morocco	0.63	0.58	0.68
Nigeria	0.68	0.67	1.07
Pakistan	0.73	0.65	1.01
Peru	0.70	0.63	0.94
Poland	0.64	0.59	0.79
Senegal	0.68	0.71	0.98
Slovakia	0.69	0.67	0.83
South Africa	0.69	0.69	1.02
Spain	0.58	0.65	0.75
Sweden	0.70	0.73	0.75
Turkey	0.67	0.58	0.73
Uganda	0.71	0.76	0.74

Ukraine	0.70	0.62	0.89
Russia	0.73	0.70	0.82
Egypt	0.83	0.75	0.89
Great Britain	0.65	0.66	0.81
Tanzania	0.74	0.69	0.79
United States	0.74	0.76	0.92
Venezuela	0.70	0.61	0.85
Country average	**0.68**	**0.66**	**0.85**
World	**0.65**	**0.63**	**0.85**
World's rank	**37/48**	**33/48**	**25/48**

Table A4: Polarization across the globe compared to polarization in individual states. WVS data.

Country	Economy	Traditionalism	Environment
Andorra	1.50	0.72	0.72
Argentina	2.07	0.96	0.69
Australia	1.73	0.89	0.78
Brazil	1.72	0.81	0.68
Bulgaria	1.98	0.84	0.76
Burkina Faso	1.59	0.72	0.68
Canada	1.58	0.92	0.72
Chile	1.82	0.88	0.70
China	1.83		0.64
Colombia	2.07		
Cyprus	1.87	0.88	0.73
Egypt	1.50		0.67
Ethiopia	1.66	0.69	0.79
Finland	1.52	0.89	0.77
Georgia	1.46	0.59	0.76
Germany	1.70	0.88	0.77
Ghana	1.96	0.68	0.78
Guatemala	1.98	0.77	0.70
Hong Kong	1.11		0.55
India	2.11	0.78	0.70
Indonesia	1.53	0.56	0.57
Iran	1.79	0.65	0.53
Italy	1.68	0.85	0.61
Japan	1.36	0.79	0.78
Jordan	1.71	0.56	0.70
Malaysia	1.19	0.71	0.61

Mali	1.59	0.81	0.65
Mexico	2.04	0.89	0.63
Moldova	1.56	0.72	0.74
Morocco	1.54		0.61
New Zealand	1.62	0.89	0.70
Norway	1.51	0.78	0.95
Peru	1.69		0.60
Poland	1.80	0.84	0.75
Romania	2.10	0.77	0.71
Rwanda	1.43	0.62	0.68
Serbia	1.74	0.78	0.57
Slovenia	1.80	0.90	0.78
South Africa	1.91	0.78	0.73
South Korea	1.41	0.72	0.67
Spain	1.59	0.92	0.57
Sweden	1.72	0.74	0.67
Switzerland	1.56		0.82
Taiwan	1.52	0.74	0.69
Thailand	1.20	0.59	0.55
Trinidad and Tobago	1.90	0.72	0.66
Turkey	1.75	0.72	0.69
Ukraine	1.68	0.72	0.61
United States	1.58	1.02	0.72
Uruguay	1.57	0.88	0.64
Vietnam	1.91	0.61	0.65
Zambia	1.78	0.81	0.77
Average country	**1.68**	**0.78**	**0.69**
World	**1.90**	**0.91**	**0.73**
World's rank	**11/53**	**5/46**	**17/53**

Table A5: Crosscuttingness across the globe and in individual states, Pew data

	Traditionalism-economy	Economy-environment	Traditionalism-environment
Palestinian Territories	0.790	0.878	0.936
Argentina	0.770	0.776	0.949
Bangladesh	0.637	0.998	0.979
Bolivia	0.666	0.969	0.812
Brazil	0.740	0.905	0.948
Bulgaria	0.778	0.967	0.978
Canada	0.732	0.847	0.873
Chile	0.574	0.890	0.965
China	0.598	0.907	0.964
Czech Republic	0.864	0.894	0.993
Ethiopia	0.745	0.751	0.947
France	0.882	0.965	0.903
Germany	0.826	0.970	0.877
Ghana	0.633	0.828	0.897
India	0.712	0.888	0.986
Indonesia	0.880	0.809	0.969
Israel	0.771	0.941	0.881
Italy	0.609	0.883	0.898
Ivory Coast	0.792	0.984	0.927
Japan	0.652	0.919	0.931
Jordan	0.930	0.956	0.867
Kenya	0.795	0.594	0.982
South Korea	0.428	0.902	0.975
Kuwait	0.894	0.997	0.996
Lebanon	0.671	0.765	0.813
Malaysia	0.755	0.992	0.765
Mali	0.748	0.875	0.858
Mexico	0.642	0.905	0.801
Morocco	0.773	0.697	0.979
Nigeria	0.630	0.662	0.915
Pakistan	0.804	0.834	0.970
Peru	0.838	0.940	0.964
Poland	0.593	0.948	0.970
Senegal	0.827	0.946	0.951
Slovakia	0.846	0.872	0.911
South Africa	0.722	0.884	0.984
Spain	0.590	0.996	0.958
Sweden	0.751	0.722	0.736
Turkey	0.691	0.767	0.984
Uganda	0.686	0.873	0.864
Ukraine	0.533	0.985	0.981
Russia	0.716	0.943	0.933

Egypt	0.897	0.803	0.924
Great Britain	0.731	0.904	0.838
Tanzania	0.839	0.991	0.973
United States	0.658	0.758	0.709
Venezuela	0.632	0.930	0.910
Country average	**0.729**	**0.881**	**0.917**
World	**0.690**	**0.964**	**0.985**
World's rank	**31/48**	**12/48**	**4/48**

Table A6: Crosscuttingness across the globe and in individual states, WVS data

Country	Traditionalism-economy	Economy-environment	Traditionalism-environment
Andorra	0.918	0.933	0.918
Argentina	0.941	0.942	0.980
Australia	0.938	1.000	0.781
Brazil	0.941	0.928	0.960
Bulgaria	0.785	0.719	0.879
Burkina Faso	0.852	0.932	0.914
Canada	0.950	0.976	0.810
Chile	0.999	0.914	0.915
China	1.000	0.888	1.000
Cyprus	0.798	0.969	0.895
Egypt		0.946	
Ethiopia	0.834	0.990	0.639
Finland	0.998	0.975	0.848
Georgia	0.955	0.953	0.895
Germany	0.986	0.803	0.905
Ghana	0.983	0.895	0.891
Guatemala	0.929	0.994	0.915
Hong Kong		0.993	
India	0.906	0.961	0.858
Indonesia	0.888	0.853	0.960
Iran	0.866	0.853	0.935
Italy	0.965	0.917	0.945
Japan	0.931	0.808	0.928
Jordan	0.990	0.957	0.829
Malaysia	0.971	0.946	0.828
Mali	0.943	0.948	0.940
Mexico	0.886	0.989	0.938
Moldova	0.890	0.909	0.978
Morocco		0.851	
New Zealand	0.965	0.870	0.820

Norway	0.877	0.956	0.915
Peru		0.814	
Poland	0.804	0.755	0.934
Romania	0.753	0.662	0.891
Rwanda	0.930	0.904	0.897
Serbia	0.877	0.934	0.976
Slovenia	0.827	0.808	0.757
South Africa	0.903	0.892	0.939
South Korea	0.950	0.876	0.973
Spain	0.883	0.960	0.960
Sweden	0.942	0.730	0.829
Switzerland	1.000	0.949	1.000
Taiwan	0.826	0.773	0.731
Thailand	0.870	0.973	0.920
Trinidad and Tobago	0.972	0.947	0.929
Turkey	0.965	0.988	0.975
Ukraine	0.880	0.926	0.997
United States	0.853	1.000	0.948
Uruguay	0.928	0.929	0.925
Viet Nam	0.858	0.887	0.779
Zambia	0.881	0.818	0.909
Average country	**0.910**	**0.904**	**0.900**
World	**0.963**	**0.926**	**0.961**
World's rank	**13/46**	**28/52**	**9/46**

Table A7: Dissatisfaction across the globe and in individual states, Pew data

Country	Overall dissatisfaction	Inequality of dissatisfaction
Palestinian Territories	0.971	0.251
Argentina	0.907	0.169
Bangladesh	0.956	0.197
Bolivia	0.911	0.162
Brazil	0.902	0.156
Bulgaria	0.888	0.127
Canada	0.911	0.187
Chile	0.894	0.157
China	0.900	0.146
Czech Republic	0.902	0.160
Ethiopia	0.888	0.131
France	0.964	0.230
Germany	0.901	0.152
Ghana	0.966	0.243
India	1.007	0.280
Indonesia	0.934	0.193
Israel	0.933	0.204
Italy	0.890	0.123
Ivory Coast	0.907	0.180
Japan	0.931	0.185
Jordan	0.959	0.220
Kenya	0.907	0.184
South Korea	0.892	0.112
Kuwait	1.082	0.354
Lebanon	0.942	0.225
Malaysia	0.921	0.170
Mali	0.961	0.234
Mexico	0.912	0.161
Morocco	0.881	0.130
Nigeria	0.969	0.236
Pakistan	0.934	0.200
Peru	0.915	0.190
Poland	0.896	0.139
Senegal	0.932	0.202
Slovakia	0.913	0.177
South Africa	0.976	0.240
Spain	0.887	0.114
Sweden	1.058	0.320
Turkey	0.893	0.135
Uganda	1.009	0.278
Ukraine	0.895	0.161
Russia	0.912	0.183

Egypt	0.980	0.241
Great Britain	0.899	0.146
Tanzania	1.003	0.271
United States	0.945	0.233
Venezuela	0.904	0.175
Country average	0.933	0.193
World	0.931	0.211
World rank	30/48	16/48

Table A8: Dissatisfaction across the globe and in individual states, WVS data

Country	Overall dissatisfaction	Inequality of dissatisfaction
Andorra	0.90	0.27
Argentina	0.94	0.30
Australia	0.90	0.29
Brazil	0.85	0.25
Bulgaria	0.93	0.31
Burkina Faso	0.84	0.23
Canada	0.90	0.28
Chile	0.93	0.30
Cyprus	0.91	0.29
Ethiopia	0.93	0.31
Finland	0.89	0.26
Georgia	0.84	0.19
Germany	0.86	0.25
Ghana	0.92	0.28
Guatemala	0.89	0.27
India	0.93	0.32
Indonesia	0.85	0.21
Iran	0.90	0.23
Iraq	0.89	0.26
Japan	0.70	0.29
Jordan	0.84	0.23
Malaysia	0.86	0.22
Mali	0.84	0.23
Mexico	0.91	0.31
Moldova	0.83	0.20
Netherlands	0.89	0.26
Norway	1.02	0.38
Poland	0.89	0.27
Romania	0.92	0.29
Rwanda	0.85	0.21
Serbia	0.89	0.27
Slovenia	0.89	0.29
South Africa	0.89	0.27
South Korea	0.83	0.19
Spain	0.87	0.25
Sweden	0.94	0.31
Taiwan	0.86	0.22
Thailand	0.83	0.18
Trinidad and Tobago	0.88	0.26
Turkey	0.91	0.30
Ukraine	0.83	0.20
United States	0.92	0.28

Uruguay	0.86	0.25
Viet Nam	0.88	0.25
Zambia	0.87	0.26
Country average	0.88	0.26
World	0.88	0.30
World's rank	19/46	37/46

3. The World under four aggregation rules

Table A10. Scores of World for four aggregation rules compared to average country. Pew survey.

Measure		Proportional representation (one person one vote)	Sovereign equality	Penrose (degressive proportionality)	Censitary (votes weighted by GDP)	Average country
Heterogeneity	Economy	0.587	0.599	0.596	0.588	0.590
	Traditionalism	0.589	0.604	0.603	0.596	0.578
	Environment	0.666	0.681	0.676	0.678	0.650
Polarization	Economy	0.65	0.69	0.67	0.67	0.68
	Traditionalism	0.63	0.70	0.67	0.68	0.66
	Environment	0.85	0.90	0.88	0.89	0.85
Crosscuttingness	Traditionalism-environment	0.985	0.967	0.998	0.794	0.917
	Economy-environment	0.964	0.928	0.941	0.881	0.881
	Traditionalism-economy	0.690	0.750	0.721	0.895	0.729
Overall dissatisfaction		0.931	0.931	0.923	0.913	0.933
Inequality of dissatisfaction (SD)		0.211	0.211	0.200	0.189	0.193

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